This is a statement of belief, not a plan. It’s the very Domino Theory that SimonX brought up in the OP. For it to be a plan, the must be some mechanism by which the desired result can be achieved. In all the meanderings of this thread, no such mechanism has been presented. Any reasonable observer of the tumult in Iraq would come to the conclusion that the administration’s entire plan for achieving their goal goes by the name of “winging it.” Given this near absence of a plan on the part of the white house, it’s safe to say that almost anyone without ideological blinders could do a better job of moving things along towards that bright neocon vision of democracy spreading throughout the mideast.
Even if a democratic Iraqi becomes prosperous it will be probably be with the US propping them up… like Cuba was by the URSS… a halfway development for propaganda purposes. Other Arabs will see it not as an example… but as US client state. The US can’t finance all of them into prosperity.
What exactly do you guys mean by a mechanism? Are you not to be satisfied without the names of the individuals who will "export democracy? The exact dates on which other countries will become democratic?
Obviously, the scenario furt laid out is not the only possible outcome. Many things, as has been pointed out by others, could go wrong. But this complaint of a lack of mechanism is begining to ring hollow. Maybe I am misunderstanding the way you are using the term. Can you give me a good definition of the word the way you are using it?
Well, this is certainly good news. You will not have any problem, then, providing a better plan that the one furt laid out.
When did we all forget the power of the principles of a Constitutional Republican form of government? It seems to me that all of the complaints and worries center around the problem with getting various factions to share power. But doesn’t this require assumptions of the form of government which are not yet in evidence? Specifically, if the Iraqi’s are able to set up a central government in which all of the factions are allowed a place, and if this central government is supported by the US, won’t the factions have to participate in said central government? At least for a time? If during that time, they are able to share power in a peaceful way, they would have a powerful, functioning, and even democratic government.
Certainly they might fight each other with guns to gain more power. But they also might fight each other with politics to achieve their goals.
This sounds like a mechanism to me:
Interestingly enough, according to the Arab Human Development Report from 2003.pdf (p19), the view that democracy is the best form of government and a dislike for autocracies are more widely held in the Arab countries than in the US/Can/Aus/NZ.
(Yes, I know that Iran is not an Arab country. But in the category of, “Democracy is the best form of government,” the group called “Other Islamic” countries also ranked higher than the US/Can/Aus/NZ)
This may be so; however, for the case under discussion it depends on the idea that a democratically reformed Iraq is guaranteed to be peaceful, (esp re Iran), and that the permanent presence of US troops in Iraq will not be seen as a threat to Iran.
There’s no inherent guarantee that democratically reformed countries are more peacable than those which are not.
Additionally, last I checked, Iran has grave concerns about the US’s aggressive intentions. If this is still true, it is very unlikely that having permanent US military bases implanted in a neighboring country will be seen as “non-threatening.”
As noted above, Arabs and other Middle East residents arguably already, want a “piece of the action” re democratic government. So this is not a change. Since it’s not a change, it cannot be the result of democractic reform in Iraq.
This also requires Arabs and other Middle East residents to believe that economic well being is either synonymous with or otherwise dependent on democratic reforms. I’m not sure that this is the case, (especially since the source of economic wealth you listed was oil revenues). It may well be that to many Arabs and other Middle East residents economic well being is not seen as dependent upon democratic reforms.
Is there any ready evidence of such a connection in the minds of a critical or even a signifigant number Arabs and other Middle East residents?
While one could infer this, though it’s not a necessary implication. IIRC, there’re instances of countries that’re democratically reformed having civil wars. It was not a necessary indication that these civil wars were the result of an inherent inability to “run a democracy.”
This is a part of Bush’s plan that you have made up. No one AFAIK believes that the plan relies on a guarantee of peace from anyone. Such a guarantee is not possible. The closest anyone comes to suggesting such a guarantee is when Bush or others suggest that a democratic Iraq will be more peaceful than Saddam was.
But this is true whether we are in Iraq or Kuwait. The fact that America can project massive amounts of destructive power accross the world is a fact. Most countries are aware of it. Many countries are quite nervous. Whether that nervousness is deserved or not is something only time will tell. The processes we are talking about require decades to play out.
While this may be arguably true, it’s also arguably true that the reasons for this being the case, despite an Arab affinity for democratic government ( Arab Human Development Report from 2003.pdf (p19)), are open to debate as well. Apparently, there’re some within the Arab world who hold that this dearth of “working model[s] of pluralistic democracy” us the result of outside interference, specificlly Western Powers. Regardless of whether this belief is rightly or wrongly held, it has effects on the residents perceptions of current and future interventions in the area. These perceptions have real results in the physical world via the actions of these residents.
It’s not necessary to agree with the “premise that it’s grievances with the US that drive militant Islam,” to realize that the main grievances that predispose Arabs toward anti-US violence are not, (and would not be), grievances with their own, (or even newly reformed), governments, but instead with the US. Militant Islam could conceiveably exist w/o any serious and concerted efforts to commit acts of violence against the US.
Unless, of course, you’re presenting the case that Arabs have no grievances with the US outside of “autocratic governments shrugging problems of their own creation off on evil America and Israel.” Are you saying that the US is blameless in alll instances? If it were then it would certainly be sufficient to democraticall redress the issues w/ Arab regimes. If not, redressing issues w/ Arab regimes will not have an effect on grievances w/ the US, and the question still stands, "What democratic means would residents of newly reformed ME countries use to redress their grievances with the US? "
The use of it as a “rallying pioint” by politicians doesn’t render it null though. Rather the effectiveness of it as a “rallying point” underlines its inherent importance in the Arab world. If it weren’t important, it wouldn’t make for much of a “rallying point.”
I assume that you have a very good reason for not reading what I wrote in the context of what Jojo posted.
originally posted by KidCharlemagne
Let’s take a closer look at furt’s outline you’ve provided below to see whether it can safely be considered a mechanism or not:
originally posted by furt
First point - while the above may be true, its equally possible that replacing the Iraqi regime may deveolve into internal chaos. We’ve accomplished the first part (gotten rid of Saddam and his regime) - what do we do now to ensure that we help create the possibility for a successful, liberal, democratic Arab state? By what means and methods?
Second point - how do they (the Iraqi’s) do this (with US help)? What are the methods/means of acheiving this so-called social/political/economic situation that would make it superior to that in other Arab nations? Even if the Iraqis were to somehow achieve this superior social/political/economic situation (whatever that may be), how would this translate into other Arab nations wanting to follow suit?
Third point - how is this to be acomplished? See my above comments. This stance assumes that by vitue of its existence (a socially/politically/economically reformed Iraq), that this will somehow “act as a dramatic spur to reformists sentiments in those nations”. While this may be true, it’s also quite possible that the opposite could occur. What’s left out is the means/methods to ensure that a socially/politically/economically reformed Iraq DOES act as a catylyst for change in the region.
This is a non-sequiter. The Arabs are quite capable of governing themselves. The issue is the FORM of governance. And if the issue is a form of governance that WE (the US) can live with, what means/mechanisms do we implement in order for this outcome to take place? Or more importantly, by what means/methods do we implement change in order for a form of governance to come about that is acceptable to BOTH the US and those in the region? What the US wants and what the Arabs want might be two different things.
Another non-sequiter. Islam and democracy can be quite compatible. The question is, though, would it be a form of democracy that the US can live with? And what are the methods/means to ensure that it is a form of democracy that the US can live with? And what do we do if it isn’t?
By what means/methods do we (the US) help change this perception? Why is certainly true that many of the problems in the region are internal, there’s certainly a perception by large segments of those countries populations that their problems are of an external nature.
How? What do you mean by “internal pressure?” Is this the result of increased economic propserity, or a demand for more political freedoms? What? You haven’t identified the mechanism that will create this internal pressure.
Does this also include Iraq as well?
Another assumption can that can’t be justified - again, what are the mechanisms that bring this about?
Or not. By what means/methods do we implement to ensure this takes place?
What are the mechnisms that allow those nations to modernize?
How is this to be accomplished?
I’m not trying to nitpick either you or furt’s observations. What I personally would like to see are the details. Wolfowitz’s, et al plan assumes way too much. If some of the assumptions are wrong, then the whole plan crashes and burns. From what I understand (and admittedly I could be wrong), by establishing a socially/economically/politically reformed Iraq this will somehow act as a catalyst for change in the region.
But an assumption isn’t a mechanism.
Yes. I read what you wrote and that you were talking in reference to what Jojo wrote. Namely that a guarantee of some sort that a democratic Iraq would not be hostile to Iran is necessary to reduce Iranian militarism. I think you mentioned further that Iran might be nervous about American troops stationed in Iraq. I was trying to point out that guarantees have never been offered. Nor are they necessary for the plan we are discussing to succeed.
You and eponymous among others seem to be fixated on the lack of mechanism for democracy to flower in the middle east (excuse the language). At first glance, this seemed like a valid complaint. I had not seen much detail on the idea either. But you guys don’t seem to want to pony up with a definition for mechanism which is reasonable in this context. We are talking about possible changes in many cultures over the next several decades. Specifically how America might want to influence these changes. Mechanisms for such long range changes over such broad sociological areas will necissarily be vague. Given that the doctrine Bush is trying to articulate is somewhat new they will be even more so. You will not get an answer which includes specific dates, names of activists, or anything like a Gantt chart of the sequence of events which result in democracy flowering in the Middle east (again, forgive the language).
You have been offered several wordings of the mechanism and have simply waved them away because:
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They are not “mechanisms” or at least not specific enough.
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They do not contain guarantees, or even strong assurances, of peace.
These criticisms are valid. But they do not amount to wholesale refutation of the idea that a Democratic Iraq might influence its neighbors in a manner similar to the way West Germany influenced some Eastern European countries during the cold war. I realize this is not a mechanism. Perhaps it is more of a principle. Maybe historical example is more accurate. I’m not sure. Again, I don’t know how you mean mechanism in this context anymore.
By what mechanism have you decided the it is equally possible?
Again, I don’t understand the cognative dissonance required to forget what a constitutional republic is. America does not have to provide assurances that Iraq will not attack Iran, Syria, or anyone else. America does not have to provide any assurances that Iraq will succeed economically. We certainly should not enforce any such implied assurances. The whole idea is to let the Iraqi people form a government which is of their own choosing. Ensuring that such a government does this or that is not the point at all. Perhaps you think of this freedom as a lack of mechanisms for democratizing other MENA countries. Maybe it is.
I’m not sure, anymore. Perhaps it is simply an article of Conservative/Libertarian faith that free people are more reasonable to deal with.
D’ya think maybe that’s why I titled it “the Neo-Cons’ plan?” and said Paul Wolfowitz would like it? Are you just skimming?
OK, you’re on; see you in the other thread; unless you have ideological blinders or something.
Rashak Mani: A distinct possibility.
hehe... the way americans are bitching about France one might think you're not right. I agree that free people are more reasonable... but reasonable doesn't include submission necessarily. There lies the problem... does the US want a free Iraq or an Iraq that won't bother them ?
huh ?What we want is both. But we are willing to settle for helping them become free for now. If they decide to make war on us after that, we’ll deal with it then. The last thing any thinking American wants is some sort of Veto power over the Iraqi people’s right to determine their own government.
RM: I was responding to #62
Eponymous, I’m really not sure what you’re looking for. By what “mechanism” do ideas spread? A million different ways.
–A Yemeni teenager is surfing the Arabic chat rooms and starts talking to an Iraqi, who tells him that he goes to a mixed high school where the girls don’t wear burqas. (You can see their wrists and everything!)
–A Syrian businessman looks with envy at the lack of government interference that gives his Iraqi competitors an advantage.
–Professional women start moving to Iraq from all over the Arab world because they can find employment and freedom there.
–A Saudi who comes to the US for college is embarassed to find that Iraqi classmates are so far ahead of him in science.
and so on and so on. And all of these people are much more likely to say “yes” when the reformist parties come looking for volunteers.
We work it out as we go along. Same as Germany, Japan, Afghanistan as well as all the other countries that have moved to democracy, with or without US help.
Waddya want, guarantees? There aren’t any. This isn’t a video game where there is a “right answer” and you have to find it. You minimize the risks, pick the route with the best chance of success and you take your chances. This is why Presidents pray a lot.
I agree, but not all Arabs do.
We can’t change their beliefs. And FWIW, some of it IS our fault. But the only thing to do now is move forward and try to improve things as they are.
Opposition parties. Protests. Unrest. Strikes. Increasingly-outspoken press.
No guarantees. I hope not.
Free market. Education. Crazy shit like that.
If I put a hyperactive child and puppy in a china shop, it’s a safe bet they’ll make a mess. I don’t know if the kid will accidentally stuff over chasing the puppy, if they’ll want to play fetch, if the kid will start knocking over stuff intentionally or what. I don’t know the mechanism. But knowing the nature of children and the nature of china shops tells me it’s a safe assumption that stuff’s gonna get broke.
I am not so sure of the good intentions of the neo-cons about freedom and such... and the idea of using Iraq as a staging ground for further "help" to the neighboring countries.
Well lets pretend that they want to help and “thinking americans” don’t want veto power. Al Qaeda and several Arab regimes (US allies many) will make sure Iraq fails. It’s far easier to destroy than to build (or rebuild as the americans no doubt are learning). Could it be due to fear of a “domino” effect ? Possibly… more like its a very easy and quick way to humiliate US efforts. Even if the US persists any real definite results are always medium to long term… while bombs exploding make for quick chaos. Finally even if something stable comes out of all this the effort to prop up Iraq makes it unlikely further attempts will happen, at least not invading and occupying Bush style. nor financial largesse to help Arabic economies.
Both, but if we have to choose, we want the latter. The fomer is the means to the latter. The move to self-government will be gradual, but some limits will stay for awhile.
Independant Executive or a Parliamentarian system? We don’t care.
You wanna freeze out the Kurds? No.
Death penalty? Abortion? Appeals system? Ya’ll figure it out.
Islam as official religion? Sure.
Full Sharia law? Uh-uh.
Hopefully they’ll be smart/afraid enough not to push the limits.
I was thinking about something and I guess this thread is appropiate enough…
While Bush is talking about establishing Democracies in Arab countries that aren’t asking for or aren’t ready for it… Latin American Democracies are going through some tough economic times that might be undermining their political stability. Bush has been so focused on terrorism that Latin America sure feels forgotten. Do only rogue nations deserve attention ?
Venezuela with Chavez isn’t about to become a new Cuba… but populism is rampant and democratic values left aside. Peru’s president has 10% approval only and the country is on the brink. Equador is in bad shape too… I don’t think its dire or disastrous… but if their economies and those of most Latin Americans don’t improve this decade we could see some new military coups (without American support this time around) using populist stances. Perhaps civil disorder or the coming back of terrorist groups.
Some asian countries might be going through something similar... and they have radical islamists to make things worse.Well, I don’t think I am being entirely fixated on the lack of mechanisms (well, maybe a little bit) - just that I can’t quite grasp the details of how democracy is to flower in the region. It’s quite appropriate to establish a policy that sees the democratization of the region as an admirable and desirable goal. But it’s another to state that, once the US gets rid of the regime in Iraq (i.e. Saddam) and helps the Iraqi people establish a democratic government that this will somehow “trigger” other countries to want to establish democracies as well.
Generally, yes; however, with such an ambitious plan I think it would be mindful to at least take into account the social/cultural/political/economic complexity of the region. Broad strategic plans don’t necessarily have to have a lot of detail, but I would think, at the very least, that the tactical plans would be specific enough to fit within the broader strategic framework in order to achieve the desired goal. And it will be the tactical plans that would serve as the mechanisms to achieve the end result (at least to me it would).
No one (at least me) is saying one would need every little detail in the strategy. But one would think that there would be corresponding tactical plans that would be “out there” (somewhere) that would mesh nicely with the overall strategic plan/goals. And if there are no tactical plans are “out there”, then at the very least rely on the advice and wisdom of those that can help one achieve the broad strategic goal.
There WAS plenty of “tactical information” and guidance out there, so to speak. But so far, the current administration has chosen to ignore or disregard much of it (if you disagree, I would suggest that you peruse the article by James Fallows in the latest issue of Atlantic Monthly for a similar perspective). If you’ve got a great plan, but aren’t willing to undertake the necessary steps to achieve the desired result, then that plan will fail.
To the first, my major concern/complaint is primarily with the mechanism not being specific enough. And I don’t mean that one needs to outline every specific detail in order for me to be satisfied. But it should contain enough information that I get a sense that, if the “tactics” associated with the plan (the mechanisms) are implemented successfully, then the broad strategic goal will eventually be achieved.
To the second, why implement a policy if you can’t even give a strong assurance of peace? I agree there are no guarantees, but I for one would like some assurance that the policy being pursued is a sound one (at the very least, in theory). I certainly don’t get a sense of a soundness from the Mid-East democratization domino theory.
No, you are right that it doesn’t amount to a wholesale refutation. But why put forth and implement a policy that might work? If not done right, it can easily backfire. What I want is something that, if done right, will achieve the desired results.
Second, I think you’re example using Western Germany and Eastern Europe is flawed. I don’t think it was necessarily the fact that Western Germany was democratic and Eastern Europe was not (hence the reason that Eastern Europe eventually became democratic after the collapse of Communism). I think economic considerations for your example are just as important (if not more so) than political ones.
I think the democratization of the Middle East is an admirable goal. I could also agree that the United States should somehow be involved in the process. I additionally see the above being a sound policy. But what would convince me of the soundness of the goal is the necessary steps required in order to achieve it. That is, how do we do it? What do we do in order for the desired results to occur? What broad tactical options should we pursue that will allow us to achieve our goal?