Define God

i don’t think anyone’s looking for an ontological statement about attributes.

where i think the problem lies is the conflating of the god you can prove with the god whose attributes you know. you can’t prove the latter, nor do you claim you can, but it is the latter with which we are here concerned.

Note that a black hole singularity and the universe singularity are hardly identical entities. As I understand it, entropy can change in the black hole only from the perspective of a reference frame within the event horizon: it still looks timeless to one outside it. The t=0 singularity has no outside.

The t=0 singularity shows an increase in entropy compared to…what? A different configuration of the universe? Which one, given that the only other configurations possible would appear to be at t>0?

Liberal: Do you find the proof you posted satisfying?

My gut told me there were problems (which may have just been my own desire to poke holes in it, or maybe I was really detecting problems), not with the logic, but more with definitions. I read Sentients link and since then I have investigated and read some of the criticisms of the ontological argument.

It seems pretty clear you enjoy logic and philosophy and so I’m curious whether you feel the criticisms are valid, or whether that proof is satisfying as it stands.

What the…?

I commented on it before. It is an excellent commentary, in my opinion. I have no substantial arguments with it.

Sorry for misunderstanding you. Please note that the MOP is not proof of necessary existence. That is a separate proof, and is even simpler:

Definitions:

A = for every
E = there exists

Prove:

AxEy(y=x)

Argument:

  1. x=x (Identity Axiom)

  2. Ay(y≠x) -> x≠x (Quantifier Axiom)

  3. x=x -> ~Ay(y≠x) (Contrapositive of 2)

  4. x=x -> Ey(y=x) (Definition of E)

  5. Ey(y=x) (Modus Ponens 1 and 4)

  6. Ey(y=x) (Rule of Necessitation)

Conclusion:

AxEy(y=x) (General Modal Axiom)

That isn’t what the MOP proves. The MOP proves that Necessary Existence exists in actuality.

I honestly do understand your point. However, it isn’t like I haven’t gone out of my way to explain myself forty ways from Sunday. I have made clear what I am talking about and in what context.

Understood. No problem.

That may indeed be your concern. However, as I’ve said already, I complied with a request from someone else that I supply proof of the ontological statement. Perhaps it can be the case that a thread need not be so narrow as to exclude all related topics. The thread’s title, after all, is “Define God”. I offered my definition, and have responded to all requests for clarification. If you do not wish to engage me in a discussion about it, then don’t.

But that makes my point, doesn’t it? Events are occuring inside.

I’m not sure I understand the question. It seems to me that there must be information inside the singularity; otherwise, there is no mechanism by which it could expand. Very small singularities typically are not very stable. I don’t know whether you’re conjecturing that the singularity had all the mass of the universe, but if so, I don’t see how that can be the case since mass is equal to energy.

indeed. and i was quite satisfied with your separation of the two different (provable and knowable) sets of attributes of god.

i just meant to point out that the confusion, and perhaps where Left Hand of Dorkness thinks he finds dishonesty, is in calling them both god. one god you can prove exists, and one god you know exists. when we see “i can prove god exists”, we’re usually looking for proof of the latter.

Liberal: I am curious about your views of the proof you linked to earlier.

I’m not sure if you missed my previous question or if you do not want to respond. Either way I will ask this 2nd time.

The only interesting criticism against it, in my opinion, is rejection of the premise ~~G in favor of the premise ~G. If indeed the former is replaced by the latter, then the opposite conclusion is reached, namely ~G. However, the assertion ~G is untenable, in my opinion, chiefly for two reasons: (1) it is a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition, i.e., negation of the modality itself implies a modal state — whatever is not necessary is still possible, and possibility (<>) is the same as the negation of a modal negative (~~), which supports the original premise, and (2) it is a contradiction to say that that which exists necessarily possibly does not exist.

Please be patient. The board is excruciatingly slow, I am one against many, and these matters are quite technical, requiring thoughtfulness and precision. My response to you is, as of this writing, just above this post.

Were there not a long history of this discussion, I would agree with you. For example, in the case of II Gyan II, I am covering the most elementary aspects of the MOP. But Daniel has participated in these discussion for, well, years now. I cannot take seriously any pretense from him at the sort of misunderstanding you describe.

Thanks.

I’m only familiar with propositional and predicate logic, but I’m going check out this modal logic in more detail.

I do not believe I am misunderstanding you. But if you consider this worthy of further discussion, it’ll need to be in a new thread; this is a two-step hijack of this one, I believe, which is not supposed to be about the merits of the ontological proof or about whether I believe you debate said proof honestly.

Daniel

Here is an excellent introduction:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

Liberal, I’m going to post your proof here and try to clarify some things…

Liberal’s MOPOG, few things added

Well, here’s my problem, if I’m reading this correctly. You define God as necessary existence. Then shouldn’t (4) by itself be proof?

(1) is a statement borne out of our uncertainty, isn’t it? IOW, we can’t claim that Reality can accomodate God, but that we can’t see a reason why not.

Isn’t (2) a tautology since they reference the same underlying entity? If not, how is it justified?

No problems with (3), (4) or (5), per se.

(6) seems to be saying the same as (3).

(7) sounds sticky. Why must God necessarily not exist if not necessary?

Just to make sure I’m following along correctly…in what context are we using the word “necessarily” in reference to God’s existence?

In case anyone has no idea what I’m talking about, here is a brief description.

As it relates to the discussion, I’ve been told that some phenomenologists posit that nothing exists, which I personally think is a rather asinine conclusion.

Very astute of you, Polycarp. Consider also Shakespeare (whom some people have alleged was also a fabrication of one or more people). ;j

Lib, I think our discussion of singularities and entropy is best had elsewhere since you’re currently in the midst of quite a crowd, but if you’re opinion is that the January 2005 universe is the singularity (and hence “events are occuring inside it”) then we largely agree.

No, because you can’t just define things into existence. Otherwise, I could prove that pigs fly by defining fly to mean “wallow in mud”. There is a difference between a definition and a proposition (or assertion) — the latter is a truth bearer (having a truth value), and the former is not. Before G -> G can mean that God exists, it must be the case that G is true as a proposition (not a definition). And that doesn’t happen until step 9.

More or less. All induction is born of uncertainty. Take Peano’s Fifth Axiom, for instance. There really is no way to know (or prove) whether any given n will have a successor, but it “rings true” intuitively.

I don’t understand the question. To what does “they” refer?

Just for the record, Becker’s Postulate is not entirely without controversy. A logician named Pete Suber, in particular, is a bit critical of its use here. But the MOP can be formulated without Beckers Postulate.

Not at all. First of all, number 3 is an implication, meaning that if the first term is true, then the second term must be true. Implications may be read as, “If A, then B,” or “A implies B”, or “B follows from A”. Number 6 is a conjunctive phrase. Either A is true, or B is true, or both are true, but both cannot be false. And one does not necessarily follow from the other. But second, the first term in 3 is negated, and is not negated in number 6.

Because it is a logical modus tollens. Two of the most popular and influencial rules of logic are the modus ponens and the modus tollens. A modus ponens is of the form A -> B; A; Therefore B. A modus tollens is of the form A -> B; Not B; Therefore, Not A.

For example…

Modus Ponens:

Bob wears a red shirt only on Sundays. Bob is wearing a red shirt. Therefore, today is Sunday.

Modus Tollens:

Bob wears a red shirt only on Sundays. Today is not Sunday. Therefore, Bob is not wearing a red shirt.

As a matter of interest, the MP and the MT have accompanying logical fallacies: Affirmation of the Consequent, and Denial of the Antecedant. An AC fallacy is of the form A -> B; B; Therefore, A. A DA fallacy is of the form A -> B; Not A; Therefore, Not B.

For example…

Affirmation of the Consequent fallacy:

Bob wears a red shirt only on Sundays. Today is Sunday. Therefore Bob is wearing a red shirt.

Denial of the Antecedant fallacy:

Bob wears a red shirt only on Sundays. Bob is not wearing a red shirt. Therefore, today is not Sunday.

(Maybe Bob is wearing a blue shirt this Sunday.)