I think the point he was trying to make wasn’t that you shouldn’t respond given the questions, but that you shouldn’t in the first place create the impression that you are using a logical basis to assert your beliefs. Namely, that your only argument should be “My experience has led me to believe…” and “In my view” not “my experience creates a logical system that proves God exists” and then defend it by using definitional attacks every time somebody questions that assertion that your experience is somehow tied to any logical system. Using logic to assert a universal God from your personal experiences is, in fact, an attack on everybody else. By saying that God is necessary, unless you add in a clause like “I think God is necessary” or “God is necessary, to me (or in my view)” you’re not asserting a personal belief anymore, you’re asserting a belief that by it’s very nature we MUST follow. I realize, of course that many (all) religions do indeed try to do just this, but in a thread soliciting outside definitions, to continuously defend your position as a logical necessity within a certain parameter of definitions seems like you’re brushing off every other possible definition in favor of creating environment where the only thing that CAN be debated is your position (which is indeed what’s happening)
First of all, I consider Lib to be no more confrontational than a grad school bull session. I understand that this is not to everyone’s tastes, but I find it a good way of arriving at the truth, or at least an understanding of differences. Everyone who works for Intel must take a class on how to use confrontation at meetings to advance a project.
I’m also not suprised at someone not having read all the backstory getting confused. Lib defines God as the necessary entity. Let me try to summarize the argument, not saying I believe it. If you grant that God as a necessary entity is possible, then he must exist in all worlds, being necessary. I don’t quite remember this argument, but I think it is valid. The way to refute it is to show that it is impossible for there to be a necessary entity, which is what I’m doing when I construct a world where no such entity exists.
Now, a necessary entity has no other properties, necessarily, besides existence and necessity. In this thread Lib is trying to show some other properties, such as supremacy. In the last go round I noted that the necessary entity might be some sort of slime mold - a God by Lib’s definition, but not one that is very exciting.
This part in no way stems from experience. The goodness part might, since it seems to be motivated by Jesus, and I think someone only believes in Jesus through experience, direct or indirect. I don’t understand the goodness argument well enough yet to summarize it.
(BTW, my comment on existence and the supernatural was based on my perception that the supernatural was being defined by the negation of the natural. It seems that it only includes negation of some of the natural - how that set is determined I don’t understand yet.)
That the God here does not match the God we’re familiar with is in no way Lib’s problem. I’ve never noticed him recommending attendance at any particular church based on this.
And while I’m at it, I do have big problems with analogical reasoning. It’s been used throughout history, and has usually turned out badly.
It certainly isn’t an atheist’s problem since god isn’t necessary or existent (only possible) to us. I can see other theists having a hard time with it, though.
If I’ve given the impression that I find Liberal confrontational or that I’m trying to refute the logic stemming from his premises, then I have failed in the very task I was trying to convey. My apologies to you both.
Doesn’t this sort of play around with the layman and technical defintions of the word ‘possible’? I mean, I can say it’s possible that there’s something that exists in all possible worlds, and not mean that that object actually exists in some of those worlds. It’s the distinction between usage and metausage of the term.
Oh, and in the argument (1) it is possible that God exists, and (2) it is necessary that if God exists in actuality, then He exists necessarily, I reject the first premise. There is no evidence that there is anything that is necessary in all possible worlds.
(all assuming that I understand what we’re talking about here…)
It’s also always struck me as a category error. It’s assigning a characteristic to something IN a possible world that is actually a meta-characteristic of all possible worlds. If I have an infinite collection of boxes, it makes no sense to claim that there must necessarily be X in every box just because it’s possible that one of the boxes box contains an X with the “characteristic” that it exists in all boxes. That’s not a characteristic of something you can find in a box, so you can’t “discover” it from looking in just one box (i.e. just from considering possibility).
Necessary existence is also not the uncontroversial application of modal logic that Liberal implies that it is to people just learning about it (oh, modal logic is totally common in computer science, you’re so silly to question it!)
I have no problem with the purpose of the thread. I provided my own definition, I think soliciting definitions is fine, and don’t agree with the “scoffers”. I didn’t chastize them because I don’t like to stick in my two cents where others can do it just as well and I was sure you were up to the task.
I approve of you defining things (it is helpful for clarifying your views) but when you’re talking about things like good and morality and love you are talking about thinks that are not well understood by anybody on the planet much less universally agreed on to a mathematical degree of precision. Unless you redefine these things in ways that are totally independent of their traditionally understood meanings (like “that which is necessary”) you will fail to have a mathematically precise term.
Though some terms must be undefined to prevent infinite regress, there is virtually total agreement among mathematicians about how they work. This is far from the case with philosophical terms. Except for extremely complex cases, mathematicians rarely disagree on whether some proof is valid. Philosophers almost never agree on the validity of philosophical proofs. As a result, I completely distrust any conclusion that is arrived at by obscure logical manipulations of philosophical concepts. I suspect that much of the error comes from subtly shifting definitions, but it may also come from faulty application of deductive rules and hidden assumptions.
Since a “statement” is a sequence of symbols, I am not wrong. But I do agree that it is a grammatically correct sequence. Since I assume you are not claiming the English word “supernatural” somehow “obtains”, I cannot understand how the hypothetical supernatural realm fits your definition. All I see is an unsupported claim that the supernatural exists, and I happen to disagree.
If you admit that a necessary object exists in one world, then it must exist in all, by the very definition of necessary. There may be plenty of things that exist in some, but they’re not necessary.
Forget about evidence. We see only one world, and there is no way to know if something in our world, even a hairy thunderer, is necessary. There might well be an entity that talks, acts and smells like a God, but is not by his definition.
And I agree with your point 1). if we define God as a necessary entity, then God is impossible since a necessary entity is impossible.
The gimmick here, if I may indulge in some meta-analysis, is that if Lib can convince someone to say God is possible (being ecumenical and all) then he’s got that person, and can force them into admitting that God is necessary. It’s a very excellent rhetorical tactic.
Good, you can argue with him about that one. I’m happy enough to feel that necessity is in itself impossible. I’ve found that it’s far more profitable to argue the premises - things soon break down into if you assume God, you get God.
Be careful. The specific God as Lib defines him is not even possible. Some other gods might be, but not that one.
I don’t see how “possible” and “necessary” go hand-in-hand. Can you elaborate on that?
Whoa, wait. I never said that a necessary entity is impossible. I rejected the premise that it is possible. As you noted, we simply don’t know.
The gimmick is that ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ don’t mean the same thing when talking about possible worlds as they do when you’re talking in english. This does not necessarily mean he’s being sneaky or deliberately out to trick us; everyone may be misunderstanding him. I would say it’s possible (common usage) that there’s a necessary thing in the multiverse. Heck, I might be ‘necessary’ (in all possible worlds); I just am not aware of being so. But I certainly don’t know that there’s a necessary thing in the universe, and if there is I certainly have no way of tying other attributes to it.
(This is not to say that Liberal doesn’t have such methods; I admit not having read all his dissertations. However I cannot even concieve of a way to arrive at these conclusions. So either he’s pretty sharp, or he’s wrong somewhere.)
Remember. we’re talking Lib’s definition of God here. When you said that you reject the premise that it is possible that God exists, then you assert that it is impossible for God to exist. (Saying you don’t know is different from rejecting the premise.) If you say that it is not possible that God exists, then you are also saying that it is not possible that a necessary entity, identical to God, exists.
The proof rests on the definition of possible world. I’d define it as all possible combinations of logically possible things. A world with a square circle is not possible, for instance. I’m stating the the subtraction of a “necessary” entity from a possible world still yields a possible world, so the supposedly necessary entity isn’t. The only problem arises if you explicity assume that no world without the entity is possible, which I’d like to see justified by Lib. Basically we’re taking the premise, constructing a set of possible worlds with the entity, then constructing one without it to refute the premise.
So you did say a necessary entity is impossible, and I agree.
Like I said, that’s the part where I forgot the argument. I’ll need to search for it when I have the chance. I think I bought it last time, or I might just have given up.
I think necessary things are possible, but possible things aren’t necessary. Otherwise, we’d all be necessary and obviously, that’s not true. It is also not true that god is necessary, or we’d all have one.
Not all possible things, certainly, but possible necessary things. And some people do think we all have one.
The argument is coming back to me. If a necessary entity is possible, it must exist in at least one possible world, otherwise not all possible worlds exist (and I grant you I don’t buy that they must) or the entity is not truly possible. Now if a necessary entity exists in one world, it must, by definition of necessity, exist in all worlds.
Now, as for existence - if existence is a property, then for all possible worlds we must have two identical ones, one of which is existent and one which is not. So all possible worlds, minus the existence property, must exist.
This is where philosophy falls short, in my opinion. This assumes that all worlds logically possible must exist. However, it may be true that not all logically possible worlds are physically possible. Even in our universe, it may be logically possible to go faster than c, but it is probably not physically possible.
If this is confusing, it is because I’m defending and attacking Lib’s position at the same time, which is, like Groucho said, very efficient.
Your explanation was infinitely clearer than **Lib’**s but no more convincing (and I’m sure you know that 
). He is making god necessary without proving that it exists outside his mind. Again, that’s fine, but it has no effect on my or anyone else’s world. Until he clears up that problem, the entire exercise is pointless. In effect, he’s saying we all live in our own reality; a concept that I believe to be true to a large extent. But in the physical world, part of our realities overlap, but the god presence can never exist outside a believer’s mind.
Um no. Rejecting a premise is explicitly not the same as assuming the opposite. If it were, there would be no way to say, “We don’t know that.” There are only three ways to be: asserting A, asserting Not A, or not asserting either. (You can’t assert both, not reasonably anyway.)
It’s my understanding that the definition of ‘possible’ means ‘exists in at least one possible world’. The definition of ‘necessary’ is ‘it exists in ALL possible worlds’. Therefore, all necessary items are possible, if any possible worlds exist. By defintion. Also, at least one possible world exists as far as reality is concerned, 'cause we’re in it. (No impossible worlds exist.)
Given that that is true this all seems like an excersize in assuming the conclusion.
Ah. You said that you rejected the statement that God is possible. That’s different from rejecting the statement that you believe God is possible (which just says you lack belief in the possibility of God) or that you know God is possible (which would be you don’t know if God is possible.) I suspect you meant one of those things, instead of the statement of fact (God is possible) which you did write.
A possible thing might not be existent. It would exist in one possible world, true, but the existence of that possible world as an actuality is the question at hand. I didn’t assume that all possible worlds exist, in fact I stated that half of them do not, but for every one that does not exist, there is an almost identical one that does.
I am assuming that all possible worlds have the potential to exist, and, as I said, I don’t think that is actually correct.
As I understand it, it all hinges on the premise that the existence of God is possible.
Unfortunately, deciding if God is possible depends on the proposed definition of God. And… we’re back to square one. Looking for an inherent logical contradiction in the properties of God. With Autolycus’ definition, it was trivial, because there was inherent circularity right up front. There are inherent contradictions in any omnimax God, of course, as has been shown. It’s when you have extremely fuzzy concepts like “Aesthetic” that things get tricky - they aren’t usually used in circular definitions like “Love” and “Truth” are. Still, without a coherent definition of God, you can’t use modal logic to prove anything, because the premise “It is possible God exists” kind of hinges on it.