Define God

But in this form, you are. It is, as I said, bivalent.

Premises aren’t about knowing. They are not epistemic claims. They are empirical claims — inductions synthesized from experience. They are merely accepted as true or rejected as false based upon what one has observed. It is utterly ridiculous to attempt to introduce truth-value ambiguity into a Kripke system.

I proved I’m right. Now it’s your turn.

The “translation” you gave was a mistranslation. You called it (rightly) a conditional implication, and then said (wrongly) that it was a definition.

God is defined as G. If you want a full tableau, search for it. I’ve posted it many times. Kalhoun asked for a plain English treatment, and I gave it to him.

Wait a minute. Why is it that here you understand how God is defined, but in the paragraph before it do not? Of course God exists in some possible world. Only contradictions do not exist in any world. What about “necessary existence” in se do you find to be a contradiction?

“Wow, you’re on the defensive, aren’t you?” — Begbert2

Same same for me. It was clear, not just from posts for the past five years, but from this very thread that God was defined as necessary existence for the MOP. Maybe you just skipped ahead.

Not for this proof. See, people are asking me all kinds of things from a dozen different points of view and directions. One person wants to talk about ontology. Another wants to talk about morality. One wants it simple. One wants it technical. Yet another wants to snipe and bitch. If you can’t keep them straight, then you could at least sympathize with me. I’m doing my best to answer all the many questions that I can get to.

I’ve already posted a link to Tisthammer’s refutation of that complaint. Why don’t you read it?

:smiley: Well, Jesus, man. Do you honestly mean to say that you’re making all this uproar over what you consider to be nothing of significance?

Sir or madam, I’m sorry, but you have yet to say much that is even remotely correct about logic or its mechanics or rules. I realize you might take that personally, but it was your choice to come in with all these guns ablazing, rather than simply asking for clarifactions or points of order. It is astounding how misinformed you are. “God is necessary existence” is a definition, and is represent by the symbology “G”. But “God exists necessarily” is an inference, and is represented by the same symbology. It is the inference, not the definition, that is in the body of the proof.

Wow. You’re all over the place. I don’t even know what you think any more.

I’m afraid the person you’d like to beat upon is dead. His name was Kurt Gödel.

Finally, a hint about what it is you don’t understand. If you’ll stop right here and not wiggle some other way, we can say that you’ve confused epistemic modality with metaphysical modality. Suppose someone were to say, “It is possible that it is raining outside.” As an epistemic modality, he would be saying, “For all I know, it is raining outside, but I haven’t really looked.” But as a metaphysical modality, he would be saying, “There is nothing logically that can preclude rain from falling outside.” It isn’t about what he knows or doesn’t know. There is a doxastic modal logic that is useful (to a limited degree) in examining epistemic issues, but the system we’re using is not designed for that.

I don’t even know what to defend. I thought you claimed that that wasn’t a premise at all, but was a definition. I also thought you said it was neither true nor false.

Well, this is new. Which ones were wrong? Which ones have escaped the attention of logicians for the past 60 years?

That’s just nonsense. It’s like you’re playing a game of Maypole or something.

A definition cannot be a premise. It has no truth value.

Your “that that” is syntactically vague. But no, we aren’t done because possibility does not inhere into necessity; it’s the other way around. It is one thing to say that something possible is necessary; but you’re wanting to say that something necessary is possibly not actual. You’re conflating the modal and the term the modal modifies. I guess. Who can say.

For the sake of anyone interested, let me give a famous example of a premise that is not epistemic but empirical. Peano’s Induction Axiom, which basically states that every natural number has a successor, is almost universally accepted as true. No one really “knows” whether it is true or not, but our experience simply gives us sufficient assurance of its truth that we are willing to stipulate that it is indeed true. That stipulation allows us to prove that 1+1 does indeed equal 2.

Okay, you just made me do some research. As you said years ago:

If you are still adopting that position, it still suffers from the criticism of it that I offered four years ago. If you no longer adopt that position, then I think you’ve made a wise choice.

Daniel

Welcome to the club. Has it ever occured to you that I’m in the same boat? Have you counted the number to whom I’m responding? Do you think you could manage it better than I? Not to toot my horn, but I think I’m doing a pretty good job of it. :slight_smile:

With respect, I think you’re a bit lazy about all that. The fact that the spirit is real and the flesh illusory should answer all your questions about the Trail of Tears. I’m no smarter than you are, but I can draw the necessary conclusions. And strange as it may sound, there is great value in that horrible episode. It is a bellwether for people who blindly trust governments to be benevolent. As for the people themselves who bloomed into their eternal existence, it was of great value as well. They are hallowed saints (to speak metaphorically) who have all that they treasure. And even in this temporal world, they are martyrs and heroes who are an inspiriation to whole nations. But none of that removes the Indian Hater’s culpability. Just because he was incapable of destroying the Indian spirit does not mean he didn’t make the attempt. He is still a despicable monster.

Listen. Let me ask you something straight up. Is it at all within the realm of your abilities to craft a post to me that contains none of that kind of sniping? Has there ever been such a post? There’s something about you that keeps telling me that you’re sincere, and yet you have the bedside manner of Dr House on steroids in the Pit. It is a struggle to trust you. If you honestly want to do something about that, it is within your power.

Of course we treasure the Trail of Tears. That’s why we treat it as sacred, and why we’re so pissed off about it.

Maybe its my “abstruseness”.

Good thing you have feelings and I don’t, huh. Oh, wait…

Let’s see whether your posts from here on out match your claims about good intentions and all that.

Note to Left Hand of Dorkness on preview: Thanks for waiting as requested. :rolleyes:

Good question. Yes, God freely chooses to value goodness because my premises move it from an ethical question to an aesthetical one. Think of it as a person who likes a particular painting in a museum. He is not compelled to like it; he simply does. That’s what aesthetics means, really. It’s the study of what we find to be beautiful, valuable, significant, etc. Very few philosophers (with notable exceptions like Schopenhauer) have tread very deeply or originally into the waters of aesthetics. What caught my attention about it was in studying Jesus, and how He just seemed to be drawn to goodness as though it were something beautiful to Him. At some point, it all clicked. And thus emerged the premise that morality is matter of aesthetics.

Back atcha, Sparky. Consider that as much as you get frustrated with what you perceive as tag-teaming, the flip side of that is that you write massive posts full of snark toward a bunch of people at once; I tend to read the ones addressed to me and skim the rest. I’m no tag-teamer, so that quote obviously didn’t address me.

You’ve nicely defined me into taking a stab at you, but that’s no more valid a proposition than the definition of God that I reposted above.

Daniel

Then you should have listened earlier when I spelled out exactly that. Once we move away from the MOP, we can begin to study other attributes of God. Among all the philosophers I have studied, one stands head and shoulders above the others as ringing true for me, and affirming my observations. Among the likes of Aristotle and Fa-tsang and Ockham and Augustine and Kant and Nietzsche and Sartre and Godel and Plantinga, Jesus stands out as singularly coherent on the matter of morality. There may be people who have studied nothing else and have swallowed Biblical principles like Kool Aide, but I’m not one of them.

But why? Why would you not want what you want? No one is precluding you either way. If you don’t like your bed, make another. If you’ve made the bed you like, what’s the problem? Are you of the mindset that it’s not enough that you suceed; other men must fail? Why can’t you be happy holding what you treasure while allowing another man to hold to something different that he treasures?

Of course there are. That’s because the universe is amoral (meaning not that it’s immoral, but that it is unconcerned with morality). But people who value the universe value entropy and death. That’s why Jesus teaches, “Do not store up treasure on the earth where men can pillage and destroy. Instead, store up treasure in heaven where men cannot pillage and men cannot destroy.” I go through the same bullshit you do with respect to an uncaring universe. So did Jesus. So do we all. Fortunately, however, this undefined biological “life” is not life in the real sense. It is just slow death. (Slower for some than for others.)

At the very least, you could be fair. How can I take the time to “prove” anything about anything while still trying to address all my respondents by going over issues from four years ago? I’m doing the best I can.

That’s not quite accurate. The human aspect is not trivial; it’s just the physical aspect that is trivial. Even materialists understand this. They are saying all the time what an insignificant speck man is in the universe, and what a teensy blip he is on the geologic timescale. Why does it bother you in this context, but not that one?

Not an afterlife. An eternal life.

See this post for a semi-formal proof that edification is necessary.

But that mixes up separate things. It’s just saying that we should treat other attributes when we examine them similar to the way we treat His existence, not that His existence implies that he has the other attributes. If we are to examine His knowledge, then we should examine the bounds of His knowledge, just as we examine the bounds of His existence with the MOP. That does not mean that the MOP says anything about his knowledge.

By the way, I’m glad you dug that up because there is corroboration for a claim I made recently in SentientMeat’s post a few posts above the one you cited. He wrote: “Lib’s links provide almost all of the objections contained within this entire thread. Reading them can’t hurt us materialists.” I’ve never shied away from supplying the objections.

Consider that I have (as of this writing) more than 25% of the posts in this thread — a remarkable statistic given that its purpose was to solicit other people’s definitions — despite all the consolidation I have done. If you want to toss that off as making no difference just because your only interest is yourself, that’s up to you. But maybe if you’d read more, you wouldn’t have misunderstood so much. SentientMeat is proof that a person can and will give these matters a thorough read and not confuse one point with another. Your bias is amazing. My snark? You see no other snark in here? Or it isn’t worth mentioning? I expect that, if all goes as usual, this is the time when you declare that you can get no further with this and you will abandon the attempt. Am I right?

Correction to post #341:

I wrote: “It is one thing to say that something possible is necessary; but you’re wanting to say that something necessary is possibly not actual.”

I should have written: “It is one thing to say that something possible is possibly necessary; but you’re wanting to say that something necessary is possibly not actual.”

I am fascinated that we come to this same conclusion from very different starting points. To me, that museum patron is compelled to like that painting - compelled by his aesthetic. Do you disagree with me that aesthetics are acquired and changeable? Could it be that God has not and will not always value goodness? Or is an aesthetic wholly a product of the will? (Or perhaps partially but that seems problematic.)

Given that you’ve reached the point where you’re making it personal and resorting to accusations of ignorance, that would be the appropriate step for me to take. Consider it taken, and Charlie Brown kicks himself for trusting Lucy with the ball.

Daniel

My bolding. I will repeat what I said just before the quoted post, with additions:

I put it to you that “supreme being” is one of those nebulous concepts I was objecting to. “Supreme” at what? At existence? Then I’d say anything that exists is as good as anything else that exists - “existence” does not lend itself to superlatives, it is binary. A thing either exists or not, there is no ranking of degrees of existence. [edit:How can anything have "supremacy of existence]

If you say “the supremacy is the necessary existence in all possible worlds” then I’d say that you’ve included your conclusion in your first premise (A Supreme being i.e. necessary existence in all possible worlds is possible), and the argument collapses on itself.

That doesn’t mean god told him anything. You’re confusing men with supernatural beings. None of what you’ve laid out here proves that a supernatural world exists. You start out with that premise with no facts to back it up. Not only that, but you act as if this is common knowledge and I’m some sort of moron who missed the newsflash. Your theory is based in christianity coupled with your personal desire for it to be true. That does not make it so. All the logic may make it possible, but that also doesn’t make it true. It’s wishful thinking.

It’s not always possible to make another bed. If you know differently, please share.

I agree that life is a slow death, but I do not agree that it’s not real. It is not only real…it’s all we’ve got.

Have at it. We’re waiting. But somehow, I think you’ve only proved it to yourself, if the rest of your theory is any indicator.

It bothers me in this context because you take it a step further with no facts to back it up. The effect we have on others is indeed an important one. But eventually, that ends too. We are an insignificant blip. Period.

Hoookay. And this is based on what facts, again?

(Warning to all: this is going to be a heckuva long post, covering a lot of basic logic and the perhaps non-obvious implications thereof. If you are not too Liberal about things, you should feel no guilt in scrolling (and scrolling, and scrolling) right past it.)

Okay, I have returned, and I would like to note a few things.

  1. I am a male. (It doesn’t really matter to my arguments but I thought I’d clear that up anyway.)

  2. I fully appreciate that you are playing catch with a half-dozen people at once, from all different directions. I sympathise with the fact that you are feeling outnumbered (since you are) and that the feeling of being outnumbered by opposition can incite feelings that there is a conspiracy of enemies against you. However, being outnumbered does not make you correct, nor does it make your position immune to attack. If you do not feel like responding to these attacks, due either to the indefensibility of your position or fear that we all are out to get you, then you always have the option of departing the field. I would prefer you remain and use this as an opportunity to ferret out any errors in your position, but if you don’t want to, that’s okay. (I will of course reserve the right to interpret your departure as a concession to the correctness of my position. Wouldn’t you?)

  3. I am arguing only against the logical proof(s?) you present for God’s existence. Whether or not you believe Jesus came to you and told you what was moral is your business. However, you present obscure and cryptic logic as supposed proof that your positions are correct. To my eyes your logic is not as solid as you claim. If you believe it is solid, then it is my opinion that you have misled yourself and would probably benefit from having your ignorance fought. (Why else post here?) If you know your logic is false, then you must be trying to bamboozle people for some unfathomable reason. I really don’t think that’s what’s going on, but if it were it then publicly refuting you for the benefit others would be an equally, er, edifying activity to merely assisting you in correcting your misconceptions.

Of course, I could myself be wrong. Perhaps your arguments are all rock solid, and I am merely a poor fool who got As in those logic-related college courses due to the infinite pity my teachers took upon me. Or maybe I’m lying about those very classes (one must ph34r the aurgument from authority). Heck, maybe I’m actually a pedestrian hick who can barely string two words together!

Of course in that case it should be a trivial matter to prove me wrong. You wouldn’t even have to resort to debate ‘techniques’ like Ad Hominem; you could just disprove me flat. Oh, and speaking of which…

  1. What’s with all the ad hominems? Your last post to me was almost nothing but. Whether that sort of thing improves your position in the eyes of others I cannot say, but you can be entirely confident that calling my knowledge of basic logic into question does nothing to bolster your debating position in my eyes.

In fact, I’ve got to the point that I’m not entirely confident you even understand how logical arguments are employed. In an effort not to simply escalate the exchanges of ad hominems further, I will instead ask you to confirm whether or not you feel each of these factual points about logic is true. (I’ll start with an easy one.) Once that’s out of the way, we can maybe talk specifically about your premises and argument.

(Warning: as noted above, this is going to be a very long post, so take your time in replying. Deal with everyone else first if you like. Take all weekend if necessary. I’m in no hurry.)

(Note about symbology: In any logical arguments, premises will be numbered P1, P2, P3… Inferences that are not the conclusion will be numbered I1, I2, I3… The concludion will be marked C. The the rule of inference used to inder each non-premise will be noted at the end of the line in parentheses. Oh, and I’m going to informally use == to mean statement equivalence, since I haven’t anything better.)

So.

Point 1) Attacking the premises: A logical argument must be both valid and sound to allow you to validly reach any new conclusions from it. To be valid an argument must have no internal inconsistencies, according to the rules of that form of logic. To be sound, the argument must be valid, and also the premises must all be True (presuming a bivalent logic system).

So, do you, or do you not, agree with the above? If you don’t, we’re done. You wouldn’t be talking about logic. In fact it’s worse: all logic would be useless. I could make the following valid logical argument:

P1: If helicopters hunt down and eat children on a daily basis, then God doesn’t exist.
P2: Helicopters hunt down and eat children on a daily basis.
C: God doesn’t exist. (Modus ponens, on P1 and P2).

…and you could not dispute it, since it is valid. You don’t want that, of course.

However, if you do accept my point 1, then you must admit that your premises need to be True for your argument to be sound. It is, therefore, fair game for me to question the truth of your premises, and if you fail to demonstrate that they are true, then your argument is unsound and your conclusion, unproven.

Okay. You should be at this point vehemently denying you ever said or implied otherwise. That’s fine; this was an easy one. Moving on…
Point 2) Truth values: In a bivalent logic system, the only value that a statement in the argument can have is the value True. There are no False statements in the argument; any statement that is written down is considered True within the frame of the argument. If any written down statement in your argument can be demonstrated not to be True (for example, if you can arrive at the statement A & ~A via valid application of the logical rules) then your argument is demonstrably unsound, indicating either a logic error or that one of the premises was False. (This is done deliberately in proofs by contradiction.)

The fact that all written statements are presumed True does not, however, mean that all unwritten statements are False. If that were the case, then it would be impossible to extrapolate any further statements or conclusions, since those would already have been shown to be False by the sheer fact that they had not been stated or deduced yet. Every logic system requires it to be possible for there to be statements of unknown truth value. (So does Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, incidentally. And where’s my whifflebat? I don’t mind beating a dead thing, equestrian or otherwise.)

Therefore, all bivalent logic systems have three values: True, False, and Not Known. (The third truth value, ‘False’, can be assumed to be the case for any unwritten statement that is the negation of a written statement.)

Because all written truth values are being asserted by the arguer as true, any statement who’s truth value is not certain to be true, either by the proof of it’s negation or by the casting of reasonable doubt upon it* must be stricken from the list of premises along with all conclusions drawn from it (lest it be misrepresented as a known true value when its truth value is in fact Not Known).

  • Note that internal statements and conclusions of a sound argument are made immune from such criticism by the power of logic. All hail the power of logic!

What then, it might occur to you to ask, do you do if you find that your opponent rejects all of your premises flat, regardless of merit? Suppose that someone denies that Socrates was a man. Is it then impossible to prove to that person that he was mortal? Answer: Yes. You cannot prove anything to anyone who refuses to accept your premises despite all evidence. Common ground is indeed required for any (logical) discussion. (Alternatively you could try torture. It’s been known to work.)

So, do you, or do you not, agree with the above? If you don’t, we’re done. You wouldn’t be talking about logic. Even worse, I could create the following argument:

P1: At some unspecified time in the future, the Invisible Pink Unicorn will appear and declare that God does not exist.
P2: The Invisible Pink Unicorn is someone who never lies.
P3: If at some unspecified time in the future, someone who never lies appears and declares that God does not exist, then God does not exist.
I1: At some unspecified time in the future, someone who never lies will appear and declare that God does not exist. (Substitution into P1, from P2)
C: God does not exist. (Modus ponens, I1 and P2)

The structure of this argument is valid. But is it sound? Two of the premises are absolutely unprovable, either as True or False. I have here asserted that they are True, just as you have done with the premises to your proof. If you had to prove their negation to dispute them, then you would be unable to do so, and by default my argument would be both valid and sound, proving God’s nonexistence. You don’t want that, of course.

However if you do accept Point 2, then you must also accept that those disputing the proof of your premises (that would be me) are not required to prove their negation to dispute them. They need only successfully dispute that your proof that they are True is correct. Because, if the premise is not True, then it is not allowed to be written into the argument, because to have a non-true premise would make the argument unsound.
Point 3) The Meaning Of Things: All logical symbols have a specific, unchanging meaning, and all user-defined variables have a specific unchanging meaning for the duration of the argument. Also, there are strict suntactic rules for the use of all symbols and variables, defined by the logic system. And, based on these, in any given statement these symbols can be directly translated into english statements that convey the same meaning that the symbolic statement did.

Examples of symbols and their english translations: (in these examples, A and B are statements that are either true or false. C and D, on the other hand, are objects.)

“A & B” becomes “A and B”
“~A” becomes “not A”
“A -> B” becomes “A implies B” or “If A, then B”.
A” becomes “it is necessary that A”
“<>A” becomes “it is possible that A”
“C = D” becomes “A equals B” or “A is B”.
(I got the <> symbol, and my newfound understanding of Modal logic, from a disreputable source.)

When expanding a logical statement out into english, parentheses may be used to avoid ambiguous statements, and minimal rephrasing can sometimes help things be easier to read. In all cases, of course, you must be very careful not to change the meaning of the sentence. (Of course.) Note that a reverse process can be used to turn english statements into logical statements, and in fact that’s how premises are generally made.

I assume you’re in agreement with me so far.

now, about those statements that are either true or false, those A’s and B’s. Assuming we’re not doing our proofs with the aim of making additional rules of inference, then all of these will be replaced by a specific statement which is constant throughout the argument. If this statement is used anywhere that one of those As or Bs is in the definitions above, it also must be the sort of statement that has a true or false value.

In the equals sign, the C and D must be objects. They cannot be statements with true or false values. (The entire statement “C = D”, however, can be used wherever a true/false statement is required.)

Thus we introduce the notion that not all symbols and variables can be used everywhere, and that some syntactical arrangements are invalid.

So, for a (cough) random exaple, let us translate the statements “G -> G” and “~~G” into english. By symbolic replacement we get:

“If G, then it is necessary that G.”
“not it is necessary that not G.” (Or, “It is not necessary that not G.”)

Okay then, what’s G? by its placement in the logical formulas, we know that it must be a statment with a true or false value. That would rule out G referring to some object, such as “God”. I mean, then you’d get sentences like “If God, then it is necessary that God” and “it is not necessary that not God.” That doesn’t make any sense. Fortunately, you’ve stated previously what “G” means in the context of your premises: “God exists”. That’s fine. So the randomly selected (cough) statements translate to.

“If God exists, then it is necessary that God exists.”
“not it is necessary that not God exists.” (Or, “it is not necessary that God doesn’t exist.”)

Similar to G, any variable that is defined at any* point in the proof retains the same value throught the proof and the discussions thereof.

  • This is of course excepting variables defined with a limited scope like x in ‘Ax.(P(x))’, but then you already knew that.

So, do you, or do you not, agree with the above point? If you don’t, we’re done. You wouldn’t be talking about logic. (Heck, there would be no reason to believe that your premises or conclusion meant anything even close to what you claim they do.) Even worse, I could create the following argument:

P1: S (meaning, “Socrates was a man”)
P2: S -> M (meaning, “If Socrates was a man, then Socrates was mortal”)
C: M (Modus ponens on P2 and P1. Oh, and it means “God doesn’t exist”.)

Two true premises, and a valid argument: the conclusion’s meaning must be true, therefore proving that God doesn’t exist. You don’t want that, of course.

However if you do accept Point 3, then you must also accept the following several things:

G”, which you have called the ‘definition’ of God, translates into “it is necessary that God exists.” On the upside, this does have a truth value, so it can be used in the proof as a premise, as we are wont to do with definitions. (Premises are the only possible way to introduce definitions formally into the argument, after al.l)

Of course you didn’t acutally use G in the proof as a premise, probably because if you did then I or most anybody else would reject it out of hand (that is, we’d refrain from asserting it to be True; Point 2). After all I don’t actually believe that god is necessary, to the point of asserting it to be True. I never even met the guy; how would I know about his necessaritude? There is no epistemic or empirical reason I should accept this statement, this ‘definition’ as being True.

If we did accept that this ‘definition’ wasn’t false, then your job would be easy:
P1: G
I1: G->G (substitution into A->A, a modal logic rule from my cite, with G for A.)
C: G (Modus Ponens and the axiom (M), from my cite.)
…No other premeses are even needed; we can prove God exists without this premise alone! This ‘definition’ as good as assumes the conclusion. Of course, since there’s no evidence for this conclusion, rejectomundo.

I will repeat: every time this ‘definition’ is used, the user of it is assuming the conclusion. It is certainly pointless to replace it into other things to get us to beleive that premises are true since it is not assumed to be true, and therefore it’s non-true value makes all arguments using it unsound, and the hoped-for conclusion rejected.

Okay, so we know that “G” translates into “it is necessary that God exists”, or perhaps “God necessarily exists” or even “God exists necessarily”. Is this synonymous with “God is necessary existence”?

Of course not. And, as one would expect, a statement with a differing meaning cannot possibly translate into the same string, unless you make a mistake in your conversion. Let us examine what the statement does mean, and how that differing meaning actually would translate into symbolic logic.

In english, “God is necessary existence” is interesting in that “necessary existence” is a nouned verb; it is nonsensical to talk about existence (necessary or not) without a referent or set of referents, stated or implied. So, this statement defines the term ‘God’ as being a nouned verb; it is therefore proper usage (by definition) to say “That helicopter Gods.” That would of course mean “That helicopter necessarily exists.” This “God” would be defined as “God(x) == E(x)” for some x, assuming that we define ‘E(x)’ to mean ‘x exists’. (No such definition has been made to date, but why not? We’re tripping the light fantastic anyway.)

Suffice to say, this ‘God’ cannot equal the God in your argument; it also (therefore) can’t equal the God in your other ‘definition’. This makes sense, since we knew the english definitions were not synonymous. Amusingly, your other definition could be written “God Gods”, or formally “God(g)”, assuming we define ‘g’ to be the object God, defined such that “G == E(g)” is true. But doing so would be quite silly, don’t you think? Almost as silly as defining God as a nouned verb in the first place.

I have gotten the impression that you found my tendency in that one post of mine to refer to your Premise 2 as “the definition of God” to be confusing, in spite of my having explained that tendency in the subsequent post. Fair enough, I will not refer to your Premise 2 as a definition again. However, as I have pointed out, and you must accept if you accept my logic Point 3, neither of the ‘definitions’ of God as G or God(x) are acceptable as non-false definitions, since the first cannot reasonably be accepted as being true and the second is basically a nonsensical mess caused by misuse of the language. (Unless you really do want to define God as a nouned verb, which cannot itself exist independently…)

So do yourself a favor and do not use either “God is necessary existence” or “God exists necessarily” as definitions when discussing your argument with me. Doing so will only make whatever point you are trying to make with them unsound, and automatically dismissed. (You probably shouldn’t use them in discussions with anyone else either, but that’s not within my power to require.)

(It may seem harsh of me to dismiss your definitions of God in a (rather hijacked) thread officially about definitions of god, but there is one key difference: you have been trying to use yours as justification for premises in a logical argument. The OP merely asks for definitions, without requiring them to be True. If I had to hold the definitions to the standard of truth that a premise requires I’d reject all the definitions of “god” that imply its existence…even the one I gave myself!)
Anyway, to get back to the point: do you accept all three Points about logic, and all that they imply? If so, then I can continue discussing your argument with you from a logical framework. If not, then you’re not doing logic at all, and I need not bother; if you are not doing logic then your streams of symbols have no persuasive power as to the conclusion. Regardless of how confusing they are.

Essentialism versus existentialism. No, really — bear with me. For a reasonable simplification, these two opposing worldviews may be summed up in this way: essentialism posits that essence precedes existence; existentialism posits that existence precedes essence. In other words, if you believe that something must have an identity before it can exist, then you’re an essentialist. If you you believe that something must exist before it can be identified, you’re an existentialist.

As I see it, your aesthetic is that which identifies your essence. It was in place even before you existed. So in that sense, it is safe to say that you cannot help what you are drawn to because if you were not drawn to it, you would not be you. God is drawn to goodness because of Who He is. But not everyone values what he is drawn to. In fact, many people hold themselves in very low esteem precisely because of what they are drawn to.

And that’s where the matter of choice comes in. It is a moral choice. Sometimes, when people argue about free will, they are arguing about brain choices. Motor choices, like “Will I turn left or right?”. But free will with respect to God, of course, is about moral choices.

Suppose you see a little old lady standing on a street corner. In materialistic terms, she is a blob of electromagnetism suspended in a field of gravity. Nothing more than that. But spiritually, she is an object around which you may make a moral decision. Will you harm her? Mug her? Rape her? Will you help her? Extend an arm to steady her as she crosses the street? Give her an encouraging smile? Say a kind word? Or will you just ignore her? At their foundation, these are the decisions made by the spirit and they are the exercize of your free will. The brain simply decides how to carry out physically — smile, greet; assist; trip, mug, rape; look away, walk on, flee — what the spirit has decided supernaturally — help, harm, ignore.

And so it doesn’t really matter whether God created the universe or not; it serves His purpose all the same. It is the perfect amoral context in which a free agent may express his morality. It is important that it is amoral so that there is no built in bias of any kind. It is the moral agent who attaches significance to the amoral blobs.

Thus God’s choice in the matter is whether to deny Himself. Will He value that to which He is drawn? Or will He despise it? Or will He avoid it? How will He choose to deal with His attraction to goodness? His choice is to share it with others, to use it to edify them. And it’s a great choice to make because love multiplies love. Any two happy people with a child know this. Their love for one another is not diminished by their new love for the child. If anything, it is greatly enhanced.

It bears repeating, apparently, that premises are, by definition, offered without proof.

Out of curiosity, have you demanded that Einstein’s premises in Special Relativity be proved? He used two: (1) the speed of light is constant in a vacuum, and (2) physical law is everywhere the same. He did not (and could not) prove these were true, but his whole argument rests on them. Have you demanded that Peano’s Induction axiom be proved? How do you know for a certainty that every natural number has a successor?

It seems to me that you often apply this type of double standard, accepting materialist arguments without demanding proof of axioms while rejecting metaphysical arguments because their axioms have not been proved.

Try to understand that proving premises is problematic. If they had to be proved, then the premises used to prove them would have to be proved. And the premises used to prove those would have to be proved. There would be an infinite recursion of proof.

And so that’s why I said at the outset that I take it as axiomatic that the supernatural exists based on my experiences. You may reject that premise if you wish, but to complain that it hasn’t been proved is, forgive me, simply ignorant.

Pardon me for butting in Kalhoun, but I didn’t think you’d mind. Liberal, see Point 2 regarding premises and proof… but more to the point: if you know that your personal experience is convincing only to yourself, why are you using it as a premise in an argument presented to others? If you know in advance that they have no reason to accept your premise, then you also know that you cannot persuade them (by legitimate argument) to accept conclusions based on the premise.

It is entirely possible to have an argument that is only sound to yourself, if based on a premise of personal experience. There’s nothing wrong with that. You can witness about your personal experiences in an attempt to persuade others of their objective truth, but if that fails then continuing to cite personal experiece as a premise can avail you naught.

(And isn’t every natural number defined as having a successor?)

False dichotomy. Those are not my only dues.

Certainly not. That would be idiotic. Whether you are here or there or nowhere has no bearing on the truth of any argument.

It is neither obscure nor cryptic. It is prodigiously published and simple.

You are not your knowledge. I’m sure you’re a perfectly nice guy. And bright. Smarter than I, in all likelihood. But your knowledge of logic is weak and pedestrian.

Ad hominem? Cura te ipsum.

A sound argument is automatically valid; otherwise, it wouldn’t be sound. And the conclusion of a sound argument is a sound conclusion, not just valid.

In post #282, I wrote, “To be valid, a proof need only follow the rules of its system. But to be sound, a proof must be valid and it’s premises must be true.”

That’s false.

How is that even possible in your mind if you hold that “the only value that a statement in the argument can have is the value True”?

That’s just gibberish.

Oy. You’ve mutilated Godel. The paper you reference speaks only to Peano systems of arithmetic, not to every system of logic. And the truth of the statements is not unknown; it is undecidable. That is not a trivial difference. It’s like division by zero being undefined. It doesn’t mean we just cannot compute the expression; it means that the expression is nonsense.

Gah. :smiley: :smiley: :smiley: That’s just beyond ridiculous. Bivalent, trivalent — all the same, eh?

Let’s just do this. You take my decision at this point to crumple up your magnum opus and toss it in the trash as a victory well earned. Go celibrate with your friends. Tell tales of a mighty conquest. Just be careful that you don’t send them here. They may be literate. :wink: