Because it’s not undefined. It is the thought processes we are aware of. We aren’t sure how it works or what purpose it has but we can define it easily enough.
Because consciousness is a sensation; we might be wrong about what it is, but it is most certainly there. “Free will” is a concept that no one seems able to define meaningfully. They just harp on what it isn’t; it supposedly isn’t deterministic and it isn’t random, but what else is there?
Of course, that doesn’t seem to hold for most people who make a living thinking about these kinds of things – among philosophers, regarding the question of free will, compatibilism is the favoured option, which of course implies a belief in determinism. Libertarianism and no free will at all are about equally well represented.
I think this is a crucial point, that can yet be somewhat strengthened – in a system sufficiently complex to allow universal computation, it is in principle impossible to predict its future behaviour in any other way than through explicit simulation; attempt anything else, and you’d have to solve the halting problem first. This means that, for any decision-making system, you’d have to have, in general, a copy of exactly the same decision-making system making the same decision; in a way, its decision is predicated on nothing but its making this decision. This is, I believe, as free as it gets; it is, however, far from the traditional concept of free will as a ‘could have done otherwise’: in the same situation, it could not have done otherwise, and in fact, it makes no sense to assert it could’ve.
Daniel Dennett builds an account of moral responsibility around what he terms a compatibilist free will; there’s a great video of a talk given by him about the concept, but I’m too lazy to search for it now. Basically, an agent’s moral responsibility derives from his evitability – his potential to have done otherwise across a range of similar scenarios (he agrees that ‘being able to do otherwise in the same situation’ is nonsensical, which is why I have some issues with him calling his concept ‘free will’). Basically, somebody who would have done the ‘right’ think across a broader range of possible variations on some scenario is morally ‘better’ than somebody who would more often do the ‘wrong’ thing. This is one way to justify concepts of moral responsibility in a completely deterministic world, and I think it’s quite clever.
Well, no. In general, one could monitor your action potentials, and know whether or not you are gonna slap somebody before you yourself do. There’s compelling evidence for the correlation of neural states to cognitive states; and none that I know of to the contrary.
You have said it yourself. There is deterministic phenomena. There might be random phenomena. And then there are willed phenomena.
I can take a stab at a definition for you. Free will = motivated behavior of a being. Some choice is implied.
Does it still involve deterministic behavior? Yes of course, but the difference is in the motive. Again, in a perfectly deterministic universe every single thing (except I suppose random events) traces back to the Prime Mover, be it willed or not. So, that leaf that just fell off the tree? It has been set to do so since the beginning. However, maybe you notice the leaf falling and take an interest in it, and catch it before it hits the ground and put it in your pocket. You have interfered with the determinism of the universe by butting in, imposing your will, and taking action. Yes yes, all of your actions accord with the laws of physics and so on. You have constraints- only so much is within your power to choose to do. But you could choose to do this, you could choose to do that, or nothing at all.
I could go on, but I need to go.
In a perfectly deterministic universe, you were just as set to catch it and put it into your pocket as the leaf was to fall down.
No one said anything about a perfectly deterministic universe. Some things are random, i.e. neither deterministic or “willed”. Your definition of will is still deterministic though.
Yeah, the universe isn’t perfectly deterministic, some things do occur at random that could effect our choices. Consider using a random number generator (a truly random one, using quantum methods). I could use that generator to determine whether I eat pancakes or waffles for breakfast. It’s not a result that has been set in stone since the big bang, but rather one that is set only as soon as the number is generated.
Look at gas laws. They are deterministic in a sense, but they are at heart statistical, and thus based on a certain amount of randomness. Randomness through chaos, not through fundamental uncertainty.
Why is choice inconsistent with determinism? You have a choice to catch the leaf or not. But there was a reason you chose to catch the leaf, right? Are you trying to say there wasn’t?
And if you rewound the tape and played it back, that reason would still be there, so you would still catch the leaf. Sure, you chose to catch it, but that choice was just as determined by physics as the leaf falling was. It’s just that you are aware of the decision-making process which in part determined what your choice would be, unlike the falling of the leaf which seems to fall “automatically”. I’m with those who believe choice necessitates determinism. Otherwise it would be a random event, and not a choice at all.
Supposing the edge case: There is exactly, for whatever reason you care to define, a 50% probability you’ll catch the leaf and a 50% probability you will not. Supposing you could rewind time and revisit that moment over and over again–would you always catch it every time, regardless? Or does the fact your decision is on the knife edge of “maybe” mean you could do something different each time? What does that mean for “free will” and “determinism”?
Even if it is on the knife edge, something caused it to go one way or the other the first time, so why wouldn’t that something still be there when you played back the tape? Are you saying the wind would blow differently or the dice in my head would roll a different way the second time? And what would cause that to happen?
I just think time already happened. You can’t play it back and expect different results, because that’s not how the world works. If you replay it with no changes, nothing changes. I just don’t know what would cause things to play out differently than they already did.
And even granting it did play out differently, that would be a random event, and not free will.
How do you distinguish the two cases?
I can’t see how it is a choice in a deterministic universe. Ok, I have changed my position a little bit in this thread so I apologize if people can’t tell where I am coming from. I take a ‘perfectly deterministic universe’ as a theoretical case, since that is key to the thread topic. I admit that there are random events, so therefore the universe cannot actually be perfectly deterministic. But how big a deal are random events? After ~14 billion years, do we get a ‘butterfly effect’ such that the original deterministic blueprint of the universe is completely obliterated? Or are some things up for grabs, but other things immune from degradation due to random phenomena? How can we even answer this question?
Ok, to your question. I tried to pick an example in which the willed action is pretty much a whim. I suppose there is still a reason for catching the leaf, but considering how small a thing this action is, and considering the question of just how deterministic the universe really is, couldn’t one’s attention in this moment have just as easily been diverted to, I dunno, a wasp, or the hot jogger across the way, or one’s internal musings on the implications of this thread instead?
How is choice inconsistent with determinism? I guess it partly depends on how ‘strong’ your determinism is. If we are utter observers of our own and everyone else’s and everything else’s robot actions, I just don’t see how there is any free will whatsoever, because what choice whatsoever do you have in that universe? What ‘role’ do ‘you’ even play in that case? I guess we need to define the distinction between ‘free will’ and ‘choice’.
It is funny. Today I was thinking about Der Trihs’s objections that I have no evidence for free will, and wound up thinking about rewinding the universe too. I couldn’t think of how else we could demonstrate that any of our choices whatsoever are truly free unless we could go back in time and say, 'See? Instead of catching the leaf I checked out the hot jogger the second time. Satisfied?!?" But we can’t do that, so how do we prove it? Hmpf. It sure seems like willed actions, constrained as they are, originate in the mind, and that this capacity is some kind of emergent property of matter which allows for willed action contrary to the determined and/or random flow of physical events. Is it raining out? Why, we can get off our asses and build some kind of shelter to stay dry. We just. don’t. seem. like automatons, we seem to have the capacity to author our own causes for effects in the world, without waiting for the Prime Mover/First Uncaused Cause to provide those effects for us. This category of actions seems neither random nor determined, but willed, though I admit the problem of ‘is this ‘seeming’ just an illusion?’ is still there.
Searle defines it as, “The thing that happens in your mind between the time you wake up and the time you go to sleep.” I suspect that he didn’t take your approach because he wanted to define his dog as conscious (he wasn’t sure about spiders). At any rate, your definition isn’t bad, though I’ll observe it encompasses more sophisticated neurology than Searle’s.
Admittedly, I’m losing the thread at this point. I’d justify punishment and responsibility along behavioral lines. I’d also claim that a process of human choice or human decision making exists, and that such choices are manipulable by social sanction. In other words, I typically side step the metaphysics of free will, but endeavor to keep the human responsibility aspect. It gets a bit meta, but so do certain defenses of utilitarianism, as do other parts of philosophy.
If I wanted to be difficult, I might turn around and question the underpinnings of determinism. Deterministic frameworks assume that everything has a cause, but causality itself is fraught with philosophical difficulties. I’m not claiming that they are intractable: I am claiming that my casual research on the topic many years back left me perplexed. Introductory treatments typically discuss necessary and sufficient conditions, but that seems to cover only smallish part of the subject. Scientists discuss proximate and remote causes, but I haven’t seen a solid philosophic treatment of that (which means nothing - my knowledge of philosophy is rudimentary). I fooled around with a modified truth table for a while – it seems to me that much of what we call causality blends into combinatorics – and can therefore can get very elaborate very quickly. So saying that everything is either deterministic or random is itself fraught with difficulties. What’s the alternative? There are lots of them, but they pragmatic (ie legal or related to the social sciences) rather than ontological.
Ok, I recognize that Der is arguing against Fundi free will, but I strongly suspect that meaningful definitions of free will exist. (As I understand it, in philosophy the main standard of quality isn’t correctness or truth-value, it’s whether a proposed concept is nonsense or not. Constructing coherent concepts that survive scrutiny can actually be pretty tough.) Let’s go to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
I believe that rational agents have the capacity to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Whether that choice was inevitable or stochastic is besides the point (or rather it is besides some points, but is admittedly central to many others.) All that said:
I find this stuff fascinating, up to the point where the philosophical technicalities overwhelm me. Which is sooner than I would like.
My computer bluescreens every time I run certain games. In each of those games, I can avoid the bluescreen simply by using a command line option to turn all calls to the sound card off.
On this basis, I credit the bluescreens to the sound card (or at least, the soundcard-cpu system together with its interface).
Completely deterministic system, about which it makes perfect sense to credit certain actions to certain parts.
Many forms of psychedelic experiences, trances, and altered states of consciousness can result in a temporary ego death, where the illusion of the self is pulled back. There are also unlucky people who suffer from disassociative disorders where you don’t feel in control of your actions and experience the world as an outside observer. See depersonalization disorder for an extreme case.