# Determinism **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 11, 2011, 8:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558 "2011-05-11T20:07:55Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 7
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2011, 9:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/121 "2011-05-20T09:21:04Z")
> [@Ramanujan](#): > > the ball’s flight is a sequence of positions where each follows non-causally from the previous one. > > with each reply, it seems more and more like you are searching for the causal mechanism in a non-causal universe. No. I’m asking what ‘follows non-causally’ means. > [@MrDibble](#): > > A doesn’t “get chosen”. A is “what happened”. There’s a vast semantic difference between those two statements. But is there a factual one? If both A and B are possible at some point, and only A happens, then there must have been some choice – I don’t mean in an active agent sense, but merely in the sense that a ball running down a hill chooses whether to roll to the left or to the right, at some point. Otherwise, it ought to be the case that still A and B are possible! You tell yourself that things can ‘just happen’. To me, that makes as much sense as an underdetermined equation just having one specific solution. If A and B are possible, and A happens, a choice must have been made somewhere – a ball rolled down the left path rather than the right one, anything like that. In a deterministic universe, such choices are trivial – they’re enforced by causality. But in an indeterministic one, there does not seem to be a way for them to be made at all; and asserting ‘it just happens’ is at best (if it is logically coherent at all, which I don’t think it is) intellectual surrender of the ‘god did it’ type – if one were to accept this, then debating about the fundamentals of the universe is useless, anyhow. > [@](#): > > The Universe doesn’t care about “selecting a single path”, in a non-causal Universe that is a broken metaphor. How? There are multiple possible paths, right? And in the end, only one gets actualized, right? So how doesn’t that mean that a single path was selected? > [@](#): > > So you’re moving the randomness out of the initial momentum choice and putting it into the boundary conditions. No, I’m _re_moving the randomness. In any case, this part of the discussion has probably run its course. There’s just no inherent stochasticity in physical modelling; all the stochastic effects emerge from models with perfectly deterministic microdynamics, and all randomness is just accounting for our ignorance of the precise microstate. Of course, one can arbitrarily introduce stochasiticity, just as well as one can introduce faeries, but then that’s not scientific modelling anymore. > [@](#): > > And that’s your calculable classic mechanics, is it? “Now with Built-In Uncertainty!” It’s just accounting for the fact that ultimately, classical physics fails. Nothing very shocking, really. > [@](#): > > Only if you assume there exists a causal chain between position now and future position, like I said already. If you _don’t_ accept that causal chain, you can’t even construct such a hyperplane. Instead you get a complex ramifying hypersurface. No. The hyperplane of simultaneity is well defined for any inertial observer in any single instant; it doesn’t depend on causality in any way. > [@](#): > > But not relativity, because you’re in the “spooky action at a distance” zone and we all know what Einstein thought of _that_. Einstein wasn’t a fan of it, but relativity only forbids information transfer \>c, which entanglement doesn’t provide; entanglement is perfectly coherent with special relativity (which is a good thing, otherwise quantum field theory would be impossible). > [@](#): > > Basically, you’re arguing for superdeterminism. Which really means arguing for Local Hidden Variables, because that’s the only way to have superdeterminism post-Bell experiments. Superdeterminism is usually regarded as a loophole that opens up the possibility to have local realistic theories despite Bell inequality violation (basically, the argument is that the experimenters had to set their measurement devices according to some predetermined scheme – it means ‘an exaggerated form of determinism’ in the sense that there must be a predefined plan according to which the actions of the experimenters have to occur, which is certainly not what I’m arguing for), but other than that, it doesn’t have anything to do with local realism. > [@PBear42](#): > > The problem with this objection is that it applies with equal force to all the proposed theories (libertarian free will, strict determinism, traditional compatibilism and my own little theory of soft or psychological compatibilism). The simple truth is that we don’t know how the mind works, yet still have to make judgments about people and their behavior. One has to pick an answer with the mechanism unknown. I explain why I reject determinism in the links above. You’re picking it (not stated whether of the strict or traditional compatibilist stripe) on grounds of parsimony. Okay, then. What say you about the issue of responsibility? Which, after all, is the question raised by the OP. Uh, I’m not sure I want to go into all this as well. Basically, I follow Dan Dennett’s thinking – he defines a concept of ‘evitability’, which quantifies how well an agent can escape certain consequences in a variety of similar situations. The analogy is that of a pro golf player, who will make a given putt in more cases than an amateur will – his evitability, i.e. the capacity of evading the bad consequences of missing, is higher than that of the amateur; even though in any given situation, whether or not the putt is successful is determined completely by the situation, i.e. there is no ‘could have done otherwise’ in the same situation. But in a given set of similar situation – putts in different weather conditions, on different days, on different courses, from different distances --, the pro will outperform the amateur. The same concept of evitability can be applied to moral judgements. ‘Committing a crime’ describes a set of similar situations, particularly when you consider one specific crime, in which a ‘moral’ agent will commit a crime less often than an ‘immoral’ one – the moral agent’s evitability is higher. Now, the evitability of any agent is probably not a fixed quantity – and that’s where punitive or other corrective measures come into play. Like the amateur can practice to improve his putting, the immoral agent can ‘practice’ to enhance his ability to not commit a crime in a given situation – or if he will not practice on his own, he can be trained. That’s it in a nutshell, I think. Overall, I’m not sure it’s of any use – or even possible – to try to codify morality into a rigid set of rules. In the end, moral judgements are a bit like grammatical ones – you judge a set of words to be grammatical similarly to how you judge a set of actions to be moral. The rules for this are essentially heuristic, to a certain extent malleable, sometimes inconsistent, they contain certain exceptions etc., which is only natural if you consider their origin – by and large, they have evolved alongside human society, the selection acting on them being the survival of the society itself, similarly to how grammatical rules have evolved, with those being selected that allow for efficient communication within certain limits. So trying to find a single guiding principle for moral judgements is a bit like trying to find a single – descriptivist – principle according to which grammar works. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2011, 9:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/122 "2011-05-20T09:58:25Z")
**MrDibble** , in an entirely deterministic universe, do you think that there would not be something like Brownian motion? More broadly, what are the observable differences between a deterministic and an indeterministic universe/the observations that suggest that this is an indeterministic universe? ---
**Author:** ![Ramanujan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/51bf81/32.png) [@Ramanujan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ramanujan)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2011, 1:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/124 "2011-05-20T13:36:42Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > No. I’m asking what ‘follows non-causally’ means. one thing happens, and then another thing happens. things follow each other non-causally (at least apparently) all the time. maybe i’m missing something, because i can’t understand how this is a difficult concept. ---
**Author:** ![Ramanujan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/51bf81/32.png) [@Ramanujan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ramanujan)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2011, 1:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/125 "2011-05-20T13:50:00Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > if one were to accept this, then debating about the fundamentals of the universe is useless, anyhow. well, of course debating about the fundamentals of the universe is useless, if they’re hidden. we only care about the universe insofar as it can be known. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2011, 2:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/126 "2011-05-20T14:17:23Z")
> [@Ramanujan](#): > > one thing happens, and then another thing happens. things follow each other non-causally (at least apparently) all the time. maybe i’m missing something, because i can’t understand how this is a difficult concept. How is it that one thing happens, rather than another, which would have equal reason to do so? Yes, I know, it ‘just does’, but to me, that’s the same as saying x = 3, y = 2 ‘just is’ the solution to x + y = 5 (I think that’s actually a fairly close analogy, as any mathematical modelling of indeterministic chains of events would include just such underdeterminations). It’s certainly a possible solution, but how can it be ‘the’ solution? It just is – I don’t know what to make of that. ---
**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\ **Post date:** [May 21, 2011, 5:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/127 "2011-05-21T05:30:44Z")
**Half Man Half Wit** , thanks for a thoughtful response. For the benefit of any lurkers, I will mention that [Dennett](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Dennett) is a traditional compatabilist, and a very highly regarded one at that. Although, of course, not everyone in professional philosophy circles agrees with him. His is but one of several compatibilist models. FWIW, my problem with Dennett’s model is two-fold. First, I don’t think determinism is true, although it’s patently obvious there are influences on behavior. Volition-subject-to-influences seems to me a better fit with the evidence. And a better fit with how most people (except professional philosophers) look at the problem. Second, if evitability is to serve the function of supplying a basis for assigning responsibility, it seems to me to be volition in sheep’s clothing. After all, the whole point of choosing the label was to distinguish his model from inevitability. When push comes to shove, I don’t think traditional compatibalism goes through. What persuaded me of this was a careful reading (and rereading) of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on [Compatibilism](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/). Many models have been proposed, of which as I said Dennett’s is only one. Yet, it appears, none will work if one takes determinism seriously. The solution, I think, is to let that go. The mind isn’t like an ideal gas or a ball rolling down a hill. It’s a different kind of thing. Swallow that pill and volition-subject-to-influences follows rather easily. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 21, 2011, 7:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/128 "2011-05-21T19:15:19Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > **MrDibble** , in an entirely deterministic universe, do you think that there would not be something like Brownian motion? No, I don’t. Superficially similar, sure, but “like” it, no. > [@](#): > > More broadly, what are the observable differences between a deterministic and an indeterministic universe/the observations that suggest that this is an indeterministic universe? The unpredictability of nuclear decay, Heisenberg and the non-uniform nature of the broader Universe. If the Universe were entirely deterministic (no randomness whatsoever) then it wouldn’t look as it does. ---
**Author:** ![RadicalPi](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/radicalpi/32/9806_2.png) [@RadicalPi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RadicalPi)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 3:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/129 "2011-05-22T03:48:24Z")
I am generally loathe to get involved in Great Debates, but because a number of people have been so very helpful in answering my own questions, I feel obliged to respond since I have a studied determinism for quite some time. My responses will generally be in a GQ sort of perspective. That said . . . > [@Left\_Hand\_of\_Dorkness](#): > > Actually, the best argument against being a determinist that I’ve ever heard is that it leads to worse results. I think free choice is an illusion, but believing in that illusion tends to get people to live their lives in better, more productive, less harmful ways. This is a doctrine known as illusionism. Its primary relevance is in assigning moral responsibility for various human actions, in particular crimes. This perspective eliminates the argument that one was not unable to not do what one had done because of the laws of cause and effect. This is generally tricky to justify, since it’s the falsity of the assertion of free will is in the name, but it is also generally acknowledged that this kind of thing isn’t exactly rare. > [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > The real problem is the assertion of some “free will” that is neither deterministic nor random. Which would make it…what? This is at the heart of the free will debate. Generally speaking, on one side you have people saying that the actions of the will essentially are random, in that they have no cause. That is, the will determines itself. On the other hand, you have those who say that finding a motivation for most human action is not difficult, and if you understand one’s thinking process, that is avoid projection, everything pretty much makes sense as following cause and effect. So, this leads to the conundrum that if the will is not acting randomly, but is following a predictable course, then how can it not be that the will isn’t being determined by the motivations at the moment? That there are so few truly crazy people with utterly inexplicable behavior is generally considered among the strongest evidence for determinism, and explaining this in a free will context is the chief problem of adherents of free will. > [@Kimmy\_Gibbler](#): > > The first is the notion that proceeds from materialism: because all matter follows physical laws and because the mind/consciousness is merely the product or chemical or electrical changes in the material brain (and if you don’t believe this, you have to explain how the non-physical, incorporeal mind affects as well as is affected by the physical world), all mental states and activities—feelings, beliefs, judgments, and intentions—are inevitably caused by prior states of the physical universe, all the way back to the beginning of time and space. It gets a bit trickier than this, though, which is why materialism today is more commonly called physicalism. Mostly because there is more than matter in the universe today, which makes it harder to say just what counts as physical. If there is some distinct substance that affects thought, then whatever the hell it is, it would be physical under most conceptions of the doctrine of physicalism even though the entire point of the doctrine is that this doesn’t and can’t happen. I suspect you know this already though, but I thought I’d point it out. > [@colonial](#): > > I abhor determinism because it renders invalid human autonomy, human initiative, > and human responsibility. > > We are all puppets of some Science or God? I can think of no fate more demeaning > and unholy. This does not necessarily have to be true. Even if humans are completely determined by the chemical and electrical and so on structure of their bodies and outside influences, people are widely acknowledged to be able to do things that no other extant collection of matter can do. It does not necessarily follow that human value does not exist because of determinism. Although, you do bring up a side concern of the free will debate, which is theodicy, or why God allows evil to exist. This question is not so important today, but it caused huge disputes in the past. Free will is one of the more common answers to the question of theodicy, since by placing moral responsibility into human hands, it absolves God of all wrongdoing, that is of moral responsibility for his actions. > [@MyFootsZZZ](#): > > Can’t both notions come into play when one makes a decision? Working together… all a part of what leads to who we are? > > Or am I missing the point? This is one of the most common ways to avoid the random/determined thing Der Trihs was talking about. The idea, especially common in the seventeenth century, was that our motives influence our actions without determining them. So, for example if you’re hungry, you want food, and this leads the will to lean toward the direction of looking for food without making that happen. And this idea has some credence. We don’t always eat when we’re hungry because of many, many reasons. But what happens (and I am condensing a lot here) is that this argument is very slippery because if motives can influence the will to some significant degree, it becomes difficult to see how exactly the will is distinct form other physical processes, which on the whole, are considered to be deterministic. That is, if the will is beholden to the physical universe to any significant degree, how can it be made of different stuff. > [@Hambil](#): > > Er, we are still talking about determinism, right? Because you have me confused. Your actions are either pre-determined or they aren’t. Stimulus has nothing to do with it, other than being just another thing that is pre-determined. This is a general shorthand. It is generally considered that the universe is determined or at the least mostly so. The question is how the mind fits into it. So, the stimulus, whatever it is, is usually considered to be determined, and the question is how does this affect someone’s mind, where the determinism issue isn’t quite so clear. > [@WordMan](#): > > I think this is the crux of it - whenever I come across conceptual Philsophic questions, I pause and consider “is answering THAT question helpful?” The problem is that it’s not always clear whether knowing the answer to a question is going to be helpful or not. Often times applications of ideas and whatnot are not apparent for quite some time. > [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > I hear that sort of argument a lot as a reason why we shouldn’t believe in determinism\*. I take the opposite view; if the accused man’s “exact state of being” didn’t lead him to rape, then we shouldn’t punish him at all. Why bother, since it wouldn’t make any difference? Crime and punishment is based on a deterministic view of human nature and the world, that a particular stimulus and a particular action will have a predictable outcome. If his past self doesn’t determine the actions of his future self, then nothing we do in the past will modify his future behavior. This is another common way to adhere moral responsibility to an individual’s actions. When an action (or less often an omission), however it comes to pass (or doesn’t), can be reasonably attributed to an individual, then you can adhere moral responsibility to it. And this is how a lot of things work. For example, duress: Person A is doing something under threat of Person B, and clearly we attribute the fault to Person B since that is the “origin” of the action. Why determinism makes that tricky is that this sort of thing relies on an idea of agency, an idea which tends to disappear under determinism. And if there is no agent, there is no moral responsibility. So, here, to resolve the dilemma, it is necessary to explain agency and why exactly people can act in given ways, or the argument presupposes its conclusion. > [@mlees](#): > > The crime & punishment system assumes that by making an activity less attractive by attaching (steeply) negative consequences to it means that potential law breakers decide it’s not worth risking. How is that not fully in the Free Will domain? Largely, because if outside actions have such an effect, then the will is not acting of its own accord, which, according to a free will doctrine it must. That negative reinforcement is effective implies that the will is at the least not completely free. Okay, those are my comments on the first page. Now it is time for me to eat dinner. If these comments prove helpful, I will do the other pages when I can. Let me also say that I am not a physicist, and most of my knowledge of physics comes form this very message board, so I can’t say for sure whether determinism is true or not. ETA: Please ignore all grammatical errors. I see a whole bunch, and five minutes will not be enough to fix them. I’m sorry about that. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 10:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/130 "2011-05-22T10:35:04Z")
> [@RadicalPi](#): > > there are so few truly crazy people with utterly inexplicable behavior Are there, though? ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 11:49am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/131 "2011-05-22T11:49:28Z")
> [@PBear42](#): > > **Half Man Half Wit** , thanks for a thoughtful response. For the benefit of any lurkers, I will mention that [Dennett](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Dennett) is a traditional compatabilist, Well, then I should mention that I don’t regard myself as a compatibilist – I don’t think what Dennett calls ‘free will’ has enough in common with the everyday notion of the term to be called such. > [@](#): > > Second, if evitability is to serve the function of supplying a basis for assigning responsibility, it seems to me to be volition in sheep’s clothing. After all, the whole point of choosing the label was to distinguish his model from inevitability. I think the important distinction is that his model doesn’t apply to singular situations, but rather to classes of broadly similar ones – in any given situation, what happens is indeed inevitable. > [@](#): > > The mind isn’t like an ideal gas or a ball rolling down a hill. It’s a different kind of thing. Swallow that pill and volition-subject-to-influences follows rather easily. I, on the other hand, don’t think that any ‘different kind of thing’ (dualist) model can work – the problem of how two fundamentally different kinds of thing should interface appears insurmountable. This was already realized by Descartes, who postulated a special sort of ‘gateway’ to be located within the pineal gland, without ever expounding on how that gateway supposedly worked; other people (I forgot who) came up later with the metaphor of synchronized clocks, where the only interaction between the two substances is apparent. In truth, both substances just share a common evolution, like a clock on your desk and a clock in the hall – that you hear the chimes of the clock in the hall whenever your desk clock shows the full hour then isn’t evidence of an interaction between the two, but merely brought on by the synchronization. Of course, the problem here (apart from the question of how the two substances could possibly become synchronized) is that since whatever we see, feel, or experience is ultimately mental, we could completely leave out the physical, without any noticeable difference. > [@MrDibble](#): > > No, I don’t. Superficially similar, sure, but “like” it, no. But what exactly would be the difference? If I am handed a system exhibiting Brownian motion, how can I tell whether it is deterministic or indeterministic at bottom? It seems to me both would lead to indistinguishable behaviour on the accessible level – a grain of pollen (say), whose motion is best modelled by a random walk. > [@](#): > > The unpredictability of nuclear decay, is only indeterministic if one interprets quantum mechanics in such a way. > [@](#): > > Heisenberg only puts limits on how exact certain observations can be made. > [@](#): > > and the non-uniform nature of the broader Universe. can easily come about through purely deterministic means – take a simple structure, such as the [Rule 30 cellular automaton](http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=rule+30): starting from very definite, very special (i.e. non-random) initial conditions, it develops to a very non-uniform, random (in the sense that it passes all tests of randomness) state by means of the application of a simple, deterministic rule. > [@](#): > > If the Universe were entirely deterministic (no randomness whatsoever) then it wouldn’t look as it does. What, concretely, would look different? How does one distinguish true from apparent randomness? If I were to initialise the momentum vectors of particles producing a Brownian process using the middle column of Rule 30 as initial data, how would you tell it’s not a ‘true’ Brownian process, but only ‘superficially like’ one? ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 3:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/132 "2011-05-22T15:50:01Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > can easily come about through purely deterministic means – take a simple structure, such as the [Rule 30 cellular automaton](http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=rule+30): starting from very definite, very special (i.e. non-random) initial conditions, Do you read your own links: “Rule 30 is a class 3 rule\*\* from random initial conditions\*\*” - run rule 30 with an initial 0 rather than a 1 in the initial cell (simple coin flip) and tell me how chaotic it runs. Or run it with a more complex starting condition… > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > it develops to a very non-uniform, random (in the sense that it passes all tests of randomness) state by means of the application of a simple, deterministic rule. There are an infinite number of initial conditions for Rule 30 that yield repeating results. And [apparently](http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=D006693EC371B29AD38A5B3B85E2C775?doi=10.1.1.21.870&rep=rep1&type=pdf)it doesn’t do so well on chi-squared testing, compared to some other GAs. It remains pseudorandom, anyway, because knowing the rule and the initial conditions, you can run it again and get the same result. Definitely chaotic, yes, but that’s not what we’re talking about here, as you know. And I can’t help but start to think that you are confusing the appearance of randomness with the fact of it. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 3:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/133 "2011-05-22T15:59:46Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > What, concretely, would look different? How does one distinguish true from apparent randomness? If I were to initialise the momentum vectors of particles producing a Brownian process using the middle column of Rule 30 as initial data, how would you tell it’s not a ‘true’ Brownian process, but only ‘superficially like’ one? Because it would be the same every time you run it. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 4:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/134 "2011-05-22T16:28:04Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > Do you read your own links: “Rule 30 is a class 3 rule\*\* from random initial conditions\*\*” - run rule 30 with an initial 0 rather than a 1 in the initial cell (simple coin flip) and tell me how chaotic it runs. The point was that from a decidedly non-random initial condition – one single cell set – using a deterministic rule, a pattern with an apparent complexity emerges that rivals, in the long run, any complexity you find in the universe, so that this complexity is no indication of fundamental randomness. Really, you’re shifting the goalposts here a little. At first, you argued that the apparent stochasticity of Brownian motion (or similar effects) came from the stochasticity of the microdynamical interactions; when I showed that even with deterministic interactions, Brownian motion emerges, you claimed that the stochasticity resides in the random initial conditions; now I show you a system where highly (apparently) random behaviour derives deterministically from non-random initial conditions, and still you quibble. The point is, any complexity, any apparent randomness of the universe can be reproduced deterministically. > [@](#): > > There are an infinite number of initial conditions for Rule 30 that yield repeating results. Only finitely many of which, of course, one would recognise as being repetitive, as the rest are far too complex in themselves to be surveyed as a whole. But that’s a minor point. > [@](#): > > It remains pseudorandom, anyway, because knowing the rule and the initial conditions, you can run it again and get the same result. You can do the same with reality, at least classically. > [@](#): > > Definitely chaotic, yes, but that’s not what we’re talking about here, as you know. And I can’t help but start to think that you are confusing the appearance of randomness with the fact of it. That’s why I’ve asked a couple of times how to tell ‘the appearance of randomness from the fact of it’. You seem to believe that there is some ‘fundamental layer’ of reality, in which is held the matter of fact of how things really are, as opposed to how they appear; hence, you concede that there may be deterministic models of Brownian motion that _seem like_ real Brownian motion, but _aren’t really_. And while that may be so, appearances are all we have access to – and to all appearances, deterministic models work at least as well as indeterministic ones, and in most cases, much better, as determinism seems to be at least an approximate property of our everyday experience, and strategies built under the assumption that effect follows cause have typically a larger chance of success. There is only the necessity of a fundamental indeterministic layer if you assume that there must be; without that assumption, there are deterministic models in perfect accord with observable reality, and that’s it. Determinism is embodied in the general predictability of large numbers of natural phenomena; nothing points to indeterminism in such a way, that can’t be equally well described deterministically. > [@MrDibble](#): > > Because it would be the same every time you run it. So would the universe. Go ahead, try it! ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 4:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/135 "2011-05-22T16:49:59Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > The point was that from a decidedly non-random initial condition – one single cell set That’s not non-random. You have you choice of 2 initial settings (for the Universe, remember). You choose black. Why? Why not white? > [@](#): > > So would the universe. Go ahead, try it! Funny man. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 4:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/136 "2011-05-22T16:58:22Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > That’s not non-random. How is ‘making a definite choice for the initial condition’ random? Of course, that choice is arbitrary, but why not? And choosing all white would be like choosing all momenta = 0 in a Brownian motion example. Sure, you don’t get Brownian motion then, nor evolution in rule 30, but so what? The point is that choices of initial conditions and rules exist such that observed complexities are reproduced, deterministically. > [@](#): > > Funny man. The thing is, if you have a physical system, you simply generally can’t re-set it with the necessary precision and watch it evolve again. In principle, if you could set up the system – say, a box of gas particles with some larger object in it – exactly as it was in the beginning of its evolution, then yes, we would get the same motion again. Problem is, you can’t; so you effectively only get to observe each system once. So if I showed you a video of the ‘natural’ system’s evolution, and a video of the rule 30-seeded one, could you tell the difference? ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2011, 9:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/137 "2011-05-22T21:21:24Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > How is ‘making a definite choice for the initial condition’ random? Are you claiming the \*Universe \*made a definite choice? ---
**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2011, 4:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/138 "2011-05-23T04:34:51Z")
**Half Man Half Wit** , if you’re not a compatibilist, you’re not really following Dennett. And you’re not furnishing a basis for assigning responsiblity. See the Stanford article. Mind, this isn’t why I think determinism isn’t true. The reasons for that are explained in the links supplied in Post #107. But, if determinism is true, I think we have to change how we do things and how we think about responsibility. Indeed, because I think determinism is partly true, in the sense that some people have impaired volition, I think we should be taking a different view in those cases. In real life, that’s the side of this debate I generally find myself having to argue, since most folks operate under LFW assumptions. BTW, I’m not sure where you got the idea that I’m arguing for a dualist position, but I’m not. No ghost in the machine for me. When I say the mind is a different kind of thing, I mean it’s not like an ideal gas or a ball rolling down a hill, i.e., not something which is necessarily deterministic. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2011, 7:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/139 "2011-05-23T07:29:09Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > Are you claiming the \*Universe \*made a definite choice? No, there presumably was only one possibility – that’s how determinism usually shakes out. Are you claiming it rolled dice? > [@PBear42](#): > > **Half Man Half Wit** , if you’re not a compatibilist, you’re not really following Dennett. I disagree with Dennett about his being a compatibilist, too. 😉 (Well, it’s actually more that I’m not sure that I think compatibilism is really a coherent stance; to me, the question of whether or not there is determinism is a bit of a red herring concerning the question of whether or not there is free will. Even in an indeterministic universe, I still see the (usual) concept of free will as logically problematic. Dennett sees these problems to, and resolves them through coming up with a new concept of free will; I disagree that this concept really exemplifies what is usually meant by the term.) But his evitability concept doesn’t mind what one calls oneself. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2011, 11:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/140 "2011-05-23T11:15:38Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > No, there presumably was only one possibility But there are two possibilities for Rule 30 (at its simplest case, that is) > [@](#): > > – that’s how determinism usually shakes out. Are you claiming it rolled dice? Yes, effectively (not that I think there’s only one starting parameter for the actual Universe). That we are living in the Universe that resulted, doesn’t mean we \*necessarily must \* assume this is the only possible one. Think of it as a parallel to the Strong Anthropic Principle. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2011, 11:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558/141 "2011-05-23T11:24:05Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > But there are two possibilities for Rule 30 (at its simplest case, that is) Well, one might imagine a multiverse, one universe corresponding to every possible set of initial conditions. Or anything else; as I said before, I don’t think the ‘how did it all come about’ question is terribly important here. > [@](#): > > Yes, effectively (not that I think there’s only one starting parameter for the actual Universe). That we are living in the Universe that resulted, doesn’t mean we \*necessarily must \* assume this is the only possible one. It’s the conservative assumption to make, though. And I still can’t see how this dice rolling is supposed to work, but it seems I’ll have to live with that. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558.md?page=6) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/determinism/581558.md?page=8)