Keep in mind the flexibility inherent in the accepted use of the term “intelligence”. Intelligence can be anything, verified or no. Rumor is “intelligence”, and blueprints for a factory to produce nuclear anthrax unicorns is “intelligence”. Those who are tasked with processing such things are forced to regard just about anything as possible intelligence, up to and inlcuding the bald face llies of “Curveball”.
The phrase means next to nothing in terms of fact.
Well, as you said, John, there is no point in debating the war all over again - in terms of changing each other’s mind, that is. However, given the OP, it’s somewhat unavoidable.
But let me just say this and then I’ll be out the rest of the day:
Containment doesn’t equal impotence. Just because we had Iraq contained, it didn’t mean Hussein couldn’t develop WMD, and it didn’t mean he couldn’t have either given, sold or allowed them into the hands of a variety of terrorist groups. And this was especially a concern during the run-up to the war, as terrorist groups all around the world had become energized and highly motivated by 9/11.
Pakistan, et. al have had nowhere near Hussein’s history (in modern times, that is) of aggression against their neighbors, the use of WMD, and an apparent willingness to try to become the 500 lb. gorilla of the region.
Then there is the matter of what would happen when the country fell into the hands of his utterly reprehensible sons, and given Hussein’s age the likelihood of this happening in the next decade or so was considerable.
I’m sure that from Bush’s point of view, there were many, many factors that played into the decision to oust Hussein. The lack of WMD has become the focus of his detractors simply because it’s the easiest to hang their hats on and claim he lied about.
Reread my other post to which you responded. Jut because some may see “great uncertainty” as opposed to "uncertainty’ does not detract from what I wrote.
What I am saying does not hinge on whether there is “uncertainty” or “great uncertainty”. You are completely missing the point.
I’ll recap. Your post beats up a strawman. You are purporting to lecture us about how wrong we are to criticise Bushco for making a decision in the face of uncertainty. No one is arguing that there is anything wrong with doing that, per se. Heck, making good decisions in the face of insufficient facts is the essence of good leadership.
What people are actually saying however is that Bushco misled the public as to whether there was or was not such uncertainty. Consequently your post is an irrelevant non sequitur.
Again, I invite you to reread the initial post I made to you. You’re missing something. My point was, is, that there is rarely certainty in military decisions. But once an administration decides on military decision, that they need to put as positive a face on it as possible. They therefore need to, and should, create an air of certainty about such decisions. They need to put as good a face on their decision as possible. I explained why in my post.
Well, when do you figure that decision was made? Because, you will recall, GW was swearing up, down, and sideways that he had made no such decision, that he was actively and determinedly seeking a peaceful solution.
Now, me, being a dirty fucking hippy, didn’t believe a word he said, I was pretty much convinced he was going to war no matter what. But that’s just me. When did you catch on? Or have you yet?
I mean, if you tell us that he was supporting a war decision with confidence-boosting lies…no, propaganda…no, you’ll have to supply the euphemism, I’ve clean run out…well, if he was doing that while at the same time telling us he hadn’t decided on war? Then he was lying to us, no?
Even dirty fucking hippies have to realize that wars call for preparation, even if simultaneous public efforts are underway to find a peaceful solution.
The pressure on Saddam that let the UN inspectors in was a good thing. But the absence of evidence after that is more than a bit of intelligence - it was a significant datum that shouldn’t have inspired someone with his mind made up that the threat was imminent. What you are saying is perilously close to Groucho saying that Freedonia had to go to war because he paid a month’s rent on the battlefield. The money it cost to keep the troops nearby pales in comparison to what it has cost to screw up Iraq.
Here I agree with you. Bushco made the military decision long before the war, and putting a good face on it involved trying to come up with some justification. Remember the guy who said you don’t market things in August? Polls at the time said that the American public would support the war with UN backing, so they tried - and failed miserably - to get Security Council support. So they ignored the UN inspectors, ranted about the need for fast action, and attacked, confident that the American public, out of a sense of patriotism, would support them.
For the war it was decision first, justification later.
If you think Bush was seriously looking for a peaceful solution, I’ve got a bridge to sell to you.
A war requires preparation, but preparation doesn’t require a war.
No, what I am saying is if one is in in the position of having to decide whether or not to go to war, to continually delay taking action pending verification of every bit of the thousands of pieces of intelligence coming in would result in such a log jam that the final decision could never be made.
As I said upthread, there were many, many considerations to take into account in deciding whether or not to oust Hussein. In a sense, the decision to go to war is like a rendering a courtroom verdict; if the overwhelming evidence suggests guilt, it overrides this or that odd piece of evidence to the contrary that may or may not prove valid. In the case of Hussein’s Iraq, the overwhelming evidence dictated that military action was necessary.
Neither Bush nor any other president, when faced with the decision of whether or not to go to war, is going to sit in the Oval Office frantically sifting through the thousands of pieces of intelligence pouring in daily and continually holding off giving the order until each and every one is verified.
I’m sure what it all boiled down to in Bush’s eyes is what I said upthread: Hussein simply presented too much of a threat (a threat, ironically, that Hussein himself worked to perpetuate) and he had to go.
Let’s get something out of the way first, before we move on. You accept, going by the above, that Bushco misled about the basis for war? Put yourself on record on this issue so I know you’re not going to weasel on it later, then we’ll move on.
Yeah, “overwhelming evidence”. Reckon that’s a term with a lot of variation in its meaning.
You mean like the evidence Colin Powell presented to the UN? That would probably be his best case, don’t you think, since he was out there trying to secure allies, and stuff. Most likely put his best stuff forward, don’t you think?
I may have some memory issues, you can help me out with this. That stuff Powell presented, making his best factual case…what percentage of that turned out to be true? Wasn’t a hundred percent, pretty sure about that. No, I don’t even think it was seventy-five percent.
Actually, unless my brains have totally turned to cheese, I seem to recall it was pretty close to, approximately, well, round it off to zero. Zip. Zilch. *Nada *damn thing. But that’s just me, you probably have the facts right at your fingertips, show me how off base I am there.
He doesn’t know that Bush ‘misled’ anymore than you know he ‘lied’. The fact of the matter is that none of us here know what Bush’s thoughts were.
What magellan01 said is very true. Every president puts a strong and decisive spin on whatever military action he takes. That’s called leadership, and it doesn’t mean that every last “t” is crossed or every last “i” is dotted. It means that an overwhelming case has been made that military action is necessary, and the ‘certainty’ that admistration feels is based on that overwhelming evidence.
Presidents don’t have the luxury of the type of hairsplitting that goes on here.
Not that I’m all that interested in moving on, but NO. There are pros and cons to any military action. Once it is decided that it’s going to happen, they focus on the pros. I frankly don’t know why this concept is so hard to grasp.
This is so incredibly weak, so hair-splitting, so specious an argument as to defy belief in your sincerity. No one ever knows what anyone else is thinking: this is a revelation?
But when Presidents make the case that they know more than we do about national security issues, we cut them the necessary slack to do what they say is so, knowing that when the facts can be revealed to the public, the facts will (mostly) support the decisions we accepted wihtout full knowledge of the details at the time.
Of course, Presidents know this, and know that we know it. That was one of the reasons, the biggest one, in fact, that I personally supported Bush in his march to war in 2002 and 2003: he couldn’t possibly be lying about this because future events will clearly demonstrate the existence of WMDs, of nuclear capability, etc., and even Bush would never say these monstrous things if they weren’t even a little bit true.
Well, they weren’t. He can’t decide to go to war on the belief that maybe, just possibly, there just might be a valid rationale going to war. He’s got to be certain that ,when the facts come out, there will be overwhelming support for his decision; Even if the war itself goes badly, we must (and I mean most of us, not all of us, of course) concede, “Okay, but he did have pretty good reasons at the time for making that decision.”
Otherwise, he will get lambasted and derided and reviled by every right-thinking, patriotic, intelligent citizen of his country, even those of his own party. Sorry you’ve decided not to identify as one of those.
magellan01, above you gave us a lecture on how it is appropriate for a government to “put the most attractive face” on the situation. You also lectured us on how there was always uncertainty and how we should grow up and accept this.
I was assuming (perhaps inappropriately) that your comments had some relevance to the discussion at hand. Consequently, I was assuming that you were accepting that there was uncertainty about the Iraq situation, but that Bushco gave the impression that there was no uncertainty as part of “putting the most attractive face” on the situation.
If this isn’t what you were saying, what the hell was the relevance of your lecture? Was it just something you decided to type out for the sake of it?