The islands are now making a mint out of selling fishing licences, and exploitable oil and gas deposits have been found within its territorial waters
I promise you, there is no such thing as a bloody fish license.
Nitpick:
The General Belgrano was the ex-U.S. light cruiser Phoenix.
Cite
[sub][sub][sub][sub]I’ve always wanted to “cite” something [/sub][/sub][/sub][/sub]
Your casualty numbers are way higher than those generally reported. This site gives 255 deaths on the UK side, which seems to be a generally-accepted number. The Argentinian death estimates from various sources vary between 500 and 1000 (the Wikipedia article claims 655).
The Wikipedia article also says that:
One could claim that the postwar suicide numbers should be added to the war deaths, but that would still leave numbers way below the ones you suggest, ralph124c.
I think you also have to factor in that each side regarded the other as a bunch of posturing blowhards without the balls or the budget for a fight, and that the usual ineptitude led to various key warning signs and responses being mishandled on both sides.
It is interesting to notice that Las Islas Malvinas still sems to surface as an international issue whenever the Argentine government is having its feet held to the fire on some domestic issue - I guess it’s their equivalent of the War on Terror. “Look, over there! Britons violating our national sovereignty!”
Slaphead
You are being far too charitable.
The signs on the British side were ‘misread’ in an extremely convenient manner, and those who should have been informed, surprisingly, seemed not to recieve the information they should have, despite being renowned for being very ‘hands on’ in terms of national interest.
I once spent a week sailing aboard an Argentine navy destroyer. It was the only ship I’ve ever been aboard where all crew members wore life vests at every waking hour while underway, all because of the sinking of the General Belgrano.
The XO and the senior enlisted man aboard (the equivalent of an American command master chief) were both Belgrano survivors. They were in the water for nearly two days, in high seas, before being rescued.
While I think the Argentine government was dead wrong in that war, you can’t help but respect men who did their duty in such trying circumstances.
Interesting. Do you have a few links I could read up on?
Slaphead
Since it is definately well in the public domain, then yes I can.
Here’s one.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4597581.stm
…and another
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4597581.stm
Here is what happened, those links do not tell all the story.
Back in 1977, around Christmas, HMS Phoebe, my ship, and IIRC HMS Alacrity, along with nuke powered hunter killer HMS Dreadnought were sent down to the Falklands.
We were accompanied with a couple of Royal Fleet Auxiliaries(R.F.A s) whose names I cannot recall, however although one was a stores supply vessel and the other was an oiler, they were also carrying a wartime complement of helicopters too, helicopters at sea are a major weapons platform, thus they also had very great strategic value.
The reason we were sent, was that intelligence had been recieved that indicated that Argentina was making military preparations, including a large maritime contingent, and although there had been territorial disputes with Chile about areas near Cape Horn, the force being assembled was not of a nature to be involved in this area.
The reason we had intelligence assets in Argentina is that the UK has trained very many of their pilots and Navy officers, we sold them lots of equipment and there is a very strong social link between the elites fo both countries, after all, even our Royals are very fond of Polo, as are the Argentine elites.
As a result we were sent down there over Christmas 1977 through the first couple of weeks of 1978.
You will note that for some reason, Argentine forces did not make any landing on the Falklands, perhaps they somehow became aware of a British maritime presence, HMS Dreadnought all on its own would have been plenty deterrnet on her own, but a more visible threat (even if less powerful) in the form of a couple of surface warships was the main advertisment for our presence, you simply do not advertise the fact you have subs around, so they don’t make for good deterrant effect, unless you hint in a roundabout sort of way.
Now we all know about the Falklands war itself, but, it seems rather strange to me that somehow none of our intelligence assets reported the build up of men and material for a Falklands operation, unbelievable is a better word.
You can’t simply gather enough material in one place to support around 30k troops, (you need far more than you will use initially due to troop rotation and reserve purposes), along with the urgent purchase of necessary spares to support you aircraft, and naval units. It would be very highly likely that Argentinas main adversary Chile would know, and frankly, with the watch that the US keeps upon all things South American, its reasonably certain that the US knew too.
So, we all knew about the build up, its fairly safe to accept that.
Its also safe to assume that such things would be reported back in the UK from its own and these other sources, so it seems unusual to say the least, that Ms Thatcher, a hands on Prime Minister if there ever was one would have been extremely concerned and would have taken some action, unless someone somewhere took a deliberate policy of not informing her whilst knowing what the likely outcome would be.
I also find it strange that Ms Thatcher didn’t recieve some hints, given the landings on South Georgia it surprises me that she never looked or enquired deeper into Argentine goings on.
It appears to me there was a policy of ’ Don’t tell me yet, and I won’t look too hard’
You probably know already that farily shortly after the Falklands war finished, there was a general election and Ms Thatchers government was returned to power, and you may well remember all the massive publicity given in the media about the ‘Falklands factor’ which was nothing more than militaristic jingoism.
What many do not remember too well, was that actually, just before the Falklands war, Ms Thatchers administration was so unpopular that there was genuine speculation about wether her party would be completely eliminated from parliament completely at the next election.
Quite simply, had the Falklands war not happened, the Conservative government of Ms Thatcher would have lost the election, and they had very little to lose if the lost the war, and a huge amount to gain if they did, as history has proven.
It could well be interpreted as a desperate gamble, and its why despite the fact that so many people still think highly of Ms Thatcher, including many Americans who post on this message board, I still tend to think of my friends and colleagues who died down there, and what was really at stake in a wholly preventable war, engineered to simply ensure Ms T
…engineered solely to ensure that Ms Thatcher remained in power and to defeat the democratic process in the UK.
As a postscript to all that, years after all this, Dr David Owen was being interviewed on tv and the subject of the Falklands war cropped up.
He was the defence secretary of the administration that sent me down to the Falklands in 1977, so one would expect him to be rather well informed, as it was on his instructions that we went.
It turned out, to my surprise, that not only had the mission I was on deterred Argentine agression, in fact he stated that it had ocurred on two previous occasions, so it appears there were at least three events where Argentine aggression was prevented, with a force of just a few ships and subs.
Given this revelation, why is it that on the fourth occasion, with an unpolular government, this was not done ?
Now you know why I despise the Conservatives in the UK.
One would think that if this scenario were true, the opposition parties would have raised it in Parliament.
[QUOTE=casdaveIt turned out, to my surprise, that not only had the mission I was on deterred Argentine agression, in fact he stated that it had ocurred on two previous occasions, so it appears there were at least three events where Argentine aggression was prevented, with a force of just a few ships and subs.
Given this revelation, why is it that on the fourth occasion, with an unpolular government, this was not done ?[/QUOTE]
In part because of the expense. The deployment of RN forces to the South Atlantic was extremely expensive, and the perception in government was that since there hadn’t been a war the previous time, they’d wasted the money sending HMS Dreadnought. That sending *Dreadnought * might have prevented war is not the way politicians and high ranking madarins tend to think.
I realize that sounds stupid, but trust me; governments are more often stupid than malicious.
Might I recommend some reading; Col. John Hughes-Wilson gives a terrific accounting of the UK’s series of screwups stumbling into the war in his Military Intelligence Blunders (since republished as Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups, featuring a new chapter on 9/11 - ISBN 0786713739) and it’s clear from the evidence he presents that the UK was guilty of gross stupidity and misreading of the evidence, but not of deliberately starting a war. It’s simply not true that the Thatcher government saw this coming at let it happen; they were kept largely in the dark of the ugly truth of the matter by the Home Office and consequently a thousand people died for no good reason (ralph124c’s casualty numbers are totally wrong.)
Britain was lucky, though. At the onset of war the Argentines had a total of six Exocet missiles. 30 more were on order. Had they ever received them, Argentina would have won the war; the Royal Navy could not possibly have stayed anywhere near the Falklands in the face of more Exocet launches.
The amazing success of the Exocet led to major overhauls of most modern navies, as they added additional anti-missile systems to deal with such threats.
The Home Office kept the government in the dark, yet on three previous occasions they kept them informed, and action was taken ?
As I said,earlier, ‘don’t tell me and I won’t ask to many questions’ is a far better explanation of what happened, and because its deniable enough, blame is not readily apportioned.
Given the landings in South Georgia, why was our governement supine in its practical response ?
It was a desperate gamble by two desperate governments, one would win out and the other would not.
If anyone can explain why we had this astonishing lapse in intelligence, given that we had high level sources in Argentina, Chile, the US and of our own, that it was one of the UKs routine ‘watch’ areas, I simply do not believe that this was anything but a deliberate connivance, it suited all concerned except Galtieri, especially when you consider that it was the final thing to push a dictatorship over a precipice to which it was already headed.
What was achieved was a stable Conservative administration in the UK, instead of the nuclear disarming Labour party of the time, which would certainly have alarmed the US, it removed a dictatorship, reduced the territorial threats from Argentina to Chile, allowed a more stable and democratic process to begin in Argentina which pleased the US no end.
Given that all these outcomes were fairly predictable should Argentina lose the war, I just somehow don’t think there is much liklehood that it was just down to natural incompetance at all, rather it was a contrived incompetance, so that responsibility could not be pinned down on anyone.
As for why it wasn’t raised previously, in the euphoria of a post war victory it just would never have flown, and much of it was subject to restrictions until the papers referred to in the BBC link were released to the public domain.
I’m not disputing the fact, but that seems an awfully long time considering the Belgrano had a couple of escorts. The submarine’s captain has said the loss of life would’ve been less if the escorts didn’t try and sink the submarine, but 2 days chasing one submarine when there are survivors in the water?
As an aside, the governor at the time recently said if the Argies didn’t try and take the Falklands by force then they would own them by now.
How many times do you think that we should have sent a RN task force down to the Falkland Islands before it finally came to blows? The revelation that Argentina had repeatedly shown aggression wrt the Falkland Islands significantly strengthens the case for the war, not diminishes it.
The Falkland Islands are a British overseas territory. The UK Armed Forces are tasked with defending the UK and her territories. The Falkland Islanders themselves want to remain associated with Britain.
If there’s anything to lament, it’s the fact that a show of force was not made in 1977 instead of pussyfooting around the Argentinians :rolleyes:
…er, there was a show of force, or haven’t you been reading this thread fully ?
What more should have been done in 1977 ? Its very difficult to engage an opponent if you never encounter them, and they never came out to greet us.
In answer to your question about how many times we send units down to deter invasion, the answer seems pretty obvious to me, as many times as is necessary if it is likely to prevent war.
You surely must know the saying by Churchill about ‘Jaw jaw’, well the same is true of deterrance, unless somehow you are able to come up with a reason why deterrance is actually somehow inferior to killing a few hundred individuals and the ultimate fiscal cost of actual warfare being placed at over £4billions.
As for the expense of deterrance, I seem to recall that the cost of the Trident sub program was well over £8billions, seems to me that sending a few ships down to the South Atlantic every few years is a rather small price to pay, given that most of the costs associated with such an operation would be incurred anyway, that’s why we have such things as standing armed forces.
I’m wondering if I’m being whooshed here, perhaps folk in this region are somewhat less well informed that I had supposed.
It doesn’t help that there are homeless veterans, looking very much like Vietnam vets from the '70s, permanently camped out pretty close to the Pink House (the Argentinian presidential palace in Buenos Aires) underneath a big banner that says “Las Islas Mavlinas son Argentinas!”
A show of force? Is that what the Royal Navy considers a secret fleet consisting of three war ships? Sure looks like the Argentinians were intimidated – that’s why they invaded five years later.
For a start, the existence of a threat from Argentina should never have been kept secret. Argentina should have been warned publicly, in the strongest possible terms, that any invasion would be treated as an act of war.
No, we have standing armed forces in order to defend territories from foreign aggressors. Like what happened with the Falkland Islands.
One of the reasons that Galtieri & co invaded the Falklands was that they were in serious trouble back home. I’m not sure that simply keeping HMS Endurance on station would have deterred them. As for the Exocet threat, the missiles needed to be got into firing range of the ships, and the Harriers were quite good at preventing that. Read Sharkey Ward’s Sea Harrier over the Falklands for his version of events. Do note that it’s his personal experiences, not a history of the whole war.
You really did mean what you said didn’t you ? I wasn’t being whooshed after all.
You may think a small force of three warships is not a deterrant, however I believe you will find that on this occasion, and two previous ones, there was no war, despite Argentina making preparations for one, what do you imagine made them change their minds ?
The particular submarine selected for the role would have been capable of inflicting extremely heavy damage had they tried anything, it would almost certainly have been given the role of taking out their carrier, which it would have succeeded in doing, it was far more capable than any of their anti-submarine abilities at that time, and the trip from Argentina to the Falklands would have simply been an 800 mile turkey shoot for HMS Dreadnought.
Don’t forget that in 1977 they did not have exocet, and we did, nor did they have any type 42 destroyers, which we were stupid enough to sell them, far from being some little minor irritant that force of two frigates, one hunter killer sub and half a dozen anti shipping equipped helicopters would have presented a formidable opponent, enough to make the cost of any of their plans exceed their ambitions.
See my one of my previous posts, we send RN units down as many times as is necessary, as you mention, its why we have a standing force.
The fact is, that Galtieris government was on its last legs, if they had not invaded, there is a very strong possibility it would have collapsed fairly soon anyway, the failed invasion hastened it and made it absolutely certain it would collapse.
Just how do you have a show of force ?
Lets imagine we had sent a large fleet down to the Falklands in 1977, just what would have done ?
They never came out to engage us, so what would have been the point of sending more ?
I wonder if you think that maybe we should have sailed the 800 miles or so over to Buenos Aires and perhaps carried out a shore bombardment ? I can’t think of any other way to demonstrate our power, other than by sailing impotently up and down the coastline for a few weeks.
Do you believe with any certainty that had we just sailed around in the area that this would have had any bearing upon a desperate dicatorship at all ?
It’s far more likely that they would instead have made far more extensive preparations in the years between 1977 and 1982 and the resulting conflict would have been much more bloody.
It may seem strange to you, that the possibility of Argentine aggression was not made more public, but actually you are very wrong indeed, it was made very public, time after time, from the scrapping of the Ark Royal in its true carrier format when it had a complement of Phantoms, to various passport issues, through to the scrapping of HMS Endurance, the possibilty of Argentine aggression was flagged up lots of times, you obviously missed it all, but then, so did the majority of the British public, it was done, you just never noticed it.
At the time it was felt that diplomacy would be more effective, rather than holding a gun to Argentinas head, which would more than likely have been used by Argentine nationalists as evidence of British oppression and used to bolster the dictatorship, rather than make them back down, its just as likely they would have become even more aggressive when faced with some threat which would have been used in propaganda, its what dictorships do.
It turns out that diplomacy was not effective, but sending RN units down time after time was, and very likely would have been effective another time, the dictorship would most likley have collapsed, but the war need not have ocurred.
Its really easy for a poster on this board to be wise after the event, and say that diplomacy could never have worked, but then, those without the power and responsibility, and with the benefit of hindsight often say such things.