I once heard that the chinese advance in Korea vs the Americans was one of the fastest advances ever… confirm ? So yes even infantry can make impressive advances. Supplies on a truck are better thou.
Actually (leaving aside your beneath-contempt remark about the “frenchies”), North Africa started out as Mussolini’s adventure. Once the British were knocked out of the region, Hitler may well have pulled the Afrika Korps out and left it to the Italians.
No, that meant that you didn’t hear about guerrilla activity, but not necessarily that it didn’t happen.
That’s true. The main Polish resistance was called the Armia Krajowa, and it was extremely active throughout WWII, both as a fighting force (mainly acts of sabotage), and in getting information to the British. The Armi Krajowa is most famous for the Warsaw Uprising, which took control of the city of Warsaw from August 1 to October 3, 1944, with somewhere between 35,000 and 50,000 men. The Germans retook the city, and the Home Army was wiped out (and then the Russians moved in, happy to have let the Germans wipe out a native Polish resistance force), but they did hold the Germans off for two months.
There was also a smaller Communist underground (which would organize as thethe Lublin Committee), which was directed by the Soviets, and a smaller Jewish underground (the Z.O.B…the Jewish Fighting Organization), which is most famous for the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, which took control of the Warsaw Ghetto from April 19, 1943 to May 16, 1943.
In his book Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian gives some of his own theories about why the attack against the Soviets in 1941 failed to achieve decisive results. One of his theories, surprisingly enough, is that German armored vehicles were actually inferior to those of the Soviet Union almost as soon as the war started, in terms of armor, armament, and track wear.
One particularly vivid incident happened sometime in 1940, when Hitler invited some Soviet observers to view German tank technology. Hitler directed that they were to be given unfettered access to all aspects of German tank production. When the Soviets were shown the Panzer Mark IV and told it was the German main battle tank, the Soviet observers accused the German demonstrators of holding back, and insisted on seeing the real German MBT. There Germans were telling the truth, and the reason for Soviet skepticism became evident a few months after the invasion of the USSR when the clearly superior T-34 arrived on the battlefield.
(The Soviets also learned quite a lot from the visit. It appears that they somehow contrived to purchase two PzKpfw IIIs and then evaluated them against the T-34 before the invasion, which resulted in some improvements.)
Guderian also repeatedly mentions one particular incident which was particularly annoying to both Guderian and Hitler. While the Panzer Mark III was in development, Guderian’s insistence on a 50mm main gun was overridden in favor of the 37mm gun. Then, just prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler was swayed by arguments in favor of more firepower and decreed that the PzKpfw III be refitted with the long-barrel 50mm gun. For some inexplicable reason, probably as a cost-saving measure, the armaments board in charge of the refit changed Hitler’s decision and fitted the PzKpfw III with a short-barreled 50mm main gun which, it turned out, did not have the power to penetrate the armor of the T-34 unless it managed to hit the exhaust grating for the T-34’s diesel engine.
Guderian claims that within months of the invasion of the USSR, the entire German tank line was outclassed by its Soviet rivals, and that only superior doctrine and tactics allowed the Germans any success at all. That might be an excessive assertion, but it’s probably true in part–Guderian, after all, was one of the chief conceptualizers of the German tank designs, so by criticizing the designs of the vehicles he is indirectly blaming himself.
That’s one comparatively small and very myopic explanation, but compounded with the horrid problems of tread and engine wear, the lack of rail supply and attendant fuel shortages, the muddy roads and the early onset of frigid weather, and the inability of the horse-supplied infantry to keep up with the mechanized units, well, the Germans just didn’t have a chance against the Soviets–on paper. The fact that the Germans did much better than they probably should have is actually a testament to the success of blitzkrieg tactics, but it does not credit Hitler or anyone else for making the initial strategic decision to attack.
Hear, hear!
Sure, American and British tanks may have been generally inferior to their German counterparts. But when I can keep 4 mediocre tanks on the battlefield, when your 4 uber-tanks have since broken down due to a lack of parts, ample mediocrity prevails.
I highly recommend ‘Why the Allied Won’, by Richard Overy. He makes a very good argument that it wasn’t so much a case of Germany losing the war, as it was of a superior Allied army winning the war.
Whoa, panzers on ‘Modern Marvels’ (on The Hitler Channel). Gotta go.
One other factor that absolutely contributed to Germany losing the war were the “no retreat” orders. In modern mechanized warfare (panzer divisions were the first) it is crucial to respond to every parry and thrust of the armored penetrations.
The Germans fought a fairly decent retreating war against the Soviets despite the fact that they all could have been – and many were – shot for retreating.
One example, if the Sixth Army had been permitted to fight its way back out to the rescue forces that got within earshot of Stalingrad many of the ?hundreds? (at least many tens) of thousands captured would have escaped to fight another day. Take this idiocy and project it out over every major battle on the Eastern Front once Hitler decided that bravery (stupidity) could overcome deep armored penetrations.
The irony is, he should have known better. His generals invented the strategies that defeated them.
I agree whole-heartedly with one partial exception. The “no retreat” orders in the USSR during the first winter’s fighting in 1941-42 did make some sense. The Germans were taken by surprise both by the ferocity of the Soviet counteroffensive and the severity of the winter, which was the worst on record in a long time. There was no prepared line to fall back to, and retreating would have meant abandoning heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery, and supplies, as well as worse casualties through exposure to the elements than was already happening. Remaining in place, establishing all-round defenses where needed and weathering the storm as best they could was perhaps the least damaging of the options open to them. At the time, the Soviets still hadn’t fully recovered from the losses, of among other things, the artillery needed to break prepared positions. The result at the end of the winter’s fighting was a very erratic and fluid front line, punctuated by places where the USSR had been able to make great advances when bypassing German prepared positions, and German forces at times in an exposed salient or altogether surrounded where the Soviet forces hadn’t been able to do so. To some extent, Hitler took from this the faulty lesson that simply ordering “no retreat” would solve problems. One of the reasons he believed that the forces surrounded at Stalingrad in 42-43 could be properly supplied through the air was the success in doing so at Demyansk in 41-42.
Because he intended to make sure that it was short, as he knew that was the only way he could win. Germany did not have the manpower or economic resources to win a long drawn out war of attrition with his likely coalition of enemies. He had to win quickly or not at all. Blitzkrieg served the Germans very well as long as he faced enemies that could be taken down in a quick campaign. When the blitzkrieg finally failed, in Russia in 1941, and the war became one of trading man for man Germany was doomed. Blitzkrieg was a realistic strategy that took into account Germany’s strategic circumstances. Even the failure of blitzkrieg in Russia is as much to do with political factors as military ones. Russia suffered appalling losses in the opening months of the German offensive, losses that no other state could have survived. The Russian leadership also doubted it could survive and Stalin was calling for terms as early as August 1941 which in the circumstances can only have been very favourable to Germany. Hitler turned the offer down as he was confident he could achieve total victory and so wouldnt need to negotiate. This counts as one of the greatest missed opportunities in history in my opinion.
While you are right, the Germans were ill-prepared to defend the lines they were told to. Here, the “winter coat” factor should be mentioned. Hiter, in classic stubborness, refused to believe the war would last until it got cold. So, German families had to supply the soldiers with winter coats, if they could, for quite a while. Of course, getting anything to the front was near impossible: again, logistics.
The lines the Germans were protecting were unimportant in the context of modern armored warfare. They hadn’t actually captured Leningrad, Moscow, or all of Stalingrad. So, rather than be cut apart little-by-little by the weather and entreched defenders, the Germans should have built the defensive lines you mentioned they did not have (til the German border), and fallen back to them. This would have helped the logistical nightmare the Germans had a great deal. Not to mention morale and all the casualties due to exposure and frostbite.
And, of course, Hitler should have done everything he could to avoid a war of attrition that the Germans could never win. Instead he played right into the hands of the Soviets and lost lots of men and equipment, rather than let his highly professional officer corps decide when pulling back would be the best option.
Pulling back 20 miles is only a short tank drive. Regaining the miles is much easier than replacing soldiers and equipment.
Its my understanding that its something of a myth that Hitler had not provided for winter clothing from a belief that the war would be quickly won. IIRC winter clothing was manufactured but was sitting in the railheads in Poland and there were always higher priorities in moving supplies forward, especially ammunition.
I agree with your broad point about the hold fast orders but have to agree with Dissonance’s winter 41-42 point. Most of the army being infantry divisions, and with huge losses of such limited motorised transport as they had, and without winter clothing I cant see that retreating on foot in the middle of a severe winter in the face of a major Soviet offensive could have helped their position any.
Well if the Germans had won… how did they expect their troops to survive “garrison” duty in Russia ? 
This winter clothing thing seems overdone… perhaps better winter clothing was necessary ?
Do remember that the casualty ratios of Germans to Soviets was immense. Soviets took horrid casualties. I don’t remember the figure now… but it surpasses US ratios in Vietnam and Korea. Germans were fighting in top form for most of the war… and it still wasn’t enough to stop the Tank Armies of the URSS. These ratios might have induced German officers think that the Soviets simply couldn’t keep up with so many losses… even big nations can only take so much damage.
Winter clothing was sent along. The problem was that
A) There wasn’t enough of it,
B) It wasn’t as good as Russian winter gear, which was famously warm and comfortable, and
C) The winter warfare needs of an army in garrison are totally different from the needs of an army fighting in the field. An army fighting in the field is exposed to the elements pretty much around the clock. An army in garrison is not. Anyone living in a cold climate knows that you can get away with day-to-day life just wearing a warm jacket and gloves… but if you were outside 24 hours a day you’d need far, far warmer clothing. It’s a matter of continuous exposure.
The Germans also had trouble in terms of their equipment being, in some cases, unsuited to extremely cold temperatures.
That’s not entirely true, and goes back to the old myth of incompetent Russians beating the skilled Germans with pure numbers. That’s simply not the case. The Russians took enormous, horrific casulaties in the first few years of the war, but they were also losing at the time. Later in the war, after Kursk, the casualty ratio was essentially even - and that’s when they were winning. The Germans were NOT outfighting the Soviets after mid-1943.
German misunderstanding of the impact of Soviet losses also had a lot to do with bad intelligence. It’s a largely forgotten part of the war, but German intelligence was generally, and in some cases horrifically, inferior to Allied and Soviet intelligence. Germany’s intercept and EW capabilities were badly outclassed by the Allies and Soviets, their foreign intelligence service was not good to start with and by 1943-1944 was almost completely compromised, and their processing and dissemination of intelligence was generally poor, not least because of Hitler, who discouraged subordinates from providing him with accurate intelligence; this could not be said of Stalin or any of his senior staff, who as near as I can tell encouraged subordinates to deliver bad news quickly and clearly so they could act on it.
The Germans in 1941-1942 quite simply screwed up their damage assessment of Soviet losses. They badly overestimated the damage they had caused, and they did not accurately assess existing Soviet reinforcements or the USSR’s capacity to replace equipment. When the Soviets brought fresh divisions from the East to fight in big battles, like Moscow and Stalingrad, it kept surprising Germany. I can’t remember precisely how big the enveloping force at Stalingrad was, but it was huge, something like fifty-sixty divisions; the Germans didn’t know they existed until they attacked. That’s a pretty big army to not notice.
There was a strong, direct correlation between Soviet casualty ratios and Soviet success. It was when they started fighting better and smarter that they really started delivering knockout punches.
Good points… but did the soviets ever get “even” casualty rates… or less lopsided ones ?
I thought that Napoleon was the inventor of modern logistics, He was pretty famous for managing large amount of troops very efficiently… but he was a damm frog so he doesn`t count
The german lost for the same reason that they lost WWI, namely they were too few and their enemies too many. Germany could have defeated any one of their enemies easily, it was their combined strenght that finally destrioyed the 1000 years Reich.
Actually, he was Corsican, proving the first rule of French Warfare- the French can only lead when they are NOT being led by a Frenchmen. See also, Joan of Arc.
And Napoleon screwed up majorly in his invansion of Russia too, showing his logistical skills need some work.
Actually, he was Corsican, proving the first rule of French Warfare- the French can only win when they are NOT being led by a Frenchmen. See also, Joan of Arc.
And Napoleon screwed up majorly in his invansion of Russia too, showing his logistical skills need some work.
Well Boney did say “An army marches on its stomach.”
But any large scale military enterprise from the beginning of time has had to pay attention to logistics - or fail.
The British Navy at the height of its power in the age of sail could only function with the help of its bureaucrats, huge shipyards, hospitals and scientific research into navigation, weaponry, and the health of its sailors.
America didn’t invent logistics in WWII, but they could devote huge resources to it, what the US had was its enormous industrial capacity- and its isolation, no bombs raining down on its factories.
But yes, the unglamorous war-winners were things like the Liberty ships, Jeeps, Trucks and DC3s
Napoleon just gave up on wagon carried supplies… that was his “secret”. Spread out the troops and get them moving fast and eating from wherever they are. (Foraging and buying/robbing food)
In the Russian winter and in Spain this didnt work… and he failed.
As for the French… are there other examples of the French winning being led by a non Frenchman ? (Joan being a Frenchwoman… ) Thou saying Napoleon isnt french is like say Puerto Ricans or Alaskans are not americans…
** Rashal Mani** good to meet you in a threat NOT about the ME. The latest thinking in military history is veering to the view that the French Revolutionary/Empire armies did actually do anything very different to previous practice, i.e this whole foraging business being a myth. Not a myth that they did it but rather that EVERYONE did it. There was simply no other way to produce enough food and especially horse fodder for the army otherwise. As long as an army kept moving however, and through “fresh pastures” so to speak, there was plenty to eat. It was when it stopped for a seige or concentrated to fight a battle that the problems began. And foraging cannot produce any reasonably amounts of powder, ball and shot or military spares so all those had to be dragged along by everybody, including the French.
From what I have read it was more Napoleon’s decision to fight a move of movement, to simply march fast, concentrate faster at the last minute for battle and then get moving again to new unlooted lands that gave him the huge logistical advantage he had.
Spain and Russia, and Poland in 1807 too, presented different problems due to their low population densities and so the strategy was not so successful there, and the French were not flexible enough to successfully adopt a different strategy (like Wellingtons of taking alone most of what he needed, but moving slowly as a result, and actuall PAYING for the rest to encourage local supply to meet his demands).
I know I recommmended them in my first post but they are really worth reading: “Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton” by Martin van Creveld, and “Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present” edited by John Lynn. An analysis of Napoleonic warfare is addressed in both.