Whatever Ireland would or would not do, was irrelevant. Ireland in enemy hands WOULD make GB’s position untenable. In Strategy you look at capabilities not intentions.
The UK occupied Iceland in WWII for pretty similar reasons.
And Madagascar since it could theaten the SLOC in the Indian Ocean.
casdave, I am afraid you seriously overstate Britain’s army’s role in the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire. From 1805 onward France had the military manpower to take Great Britain pretty much any time it set its mind to the task. The problem was getting an army to a place where it could do the job.
While it was a mere 30 miles or so from the beach camps of the Grand Army to the Southeast shores of England the Royal Navy stood in the way and France was distracted by a series of European coalitions financed by Britain. Britain and France had only two major confrontations during the Napoleonic Wars, in the Iberian Peninsula from 1809 to 1814 and again in Belgium a year later. The Peninsula was a side show in the grand scheme of things, the main show was in Central Europe and Russia. Napoleon committed nearly a half million men to the Russian invasion, lost most of them and still had enough resources to nearly pull off a miracle in 1814.
At Waterloo Wellington commanded a bare thirty thousand British and Hanoverian German troops. The rest of his force was made up of Dutch and Belgian formations. In the end it was the Prussians who accomplished the destruction of Napoleon’s last army in June 1815.
The point is that it was not British military power that keep Napoleon out of the British Isles and defeated the French Empire. It was the armies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia financed by Britain and the Royal Navy.
I’m not sure who this last was directed to, if anyone… but yes, except I’d suggest that there was some genuine “revolutionary” camaraderie between some French and Irishmen. There are a few extant letters and such.
Indeed. Of course, the British Protestants committed plenty of atrocities of their own. I just happened to be reading, for example, an account of Lord Grey, Edmund Spenser and Walter Raleigh, and their massacre of surrendered prisoners in Dingle in 1580.
That seems to often be the nature of religious wars.
The British perception of Ireland as their sphere of influence is kinda the problem, but yes.
I don’t see why crimes committed in the name of “strategy” should be morally distinct. And do I really need to go dig up the quotes from English lords and commanders about the Irish, as people? Or sub-people? Spenser said the Irish “deserve little better” than extermination.
Of course, the part about timing and allies is correct; I already noted the deficiencies in weapons and organization, as well. The story of the Irish struggle for independence is often heartbreakingly pathetic, really.
Well, an independent Ireland wouldn’t be enemy territory if Britain had not made it so.
But to be clear, I was talking more about capabilities than intentions. I was contesting casdave’s notion that,
which seems contradicted by,
The latter is more true, IMO. France could not have mounted a successful invasion of Britain. Nor could the Irish, of course. As suggested, France sought only to “diminish” Britain’s might beyond Britain.
The point I was trying to make is that, in the time period I see as relevant to this discussion (from 'Laudabiliter through the Tan War, say), Britain was never in danger of conquest. Whatever happened in Ireland, I can’t see how Britain could have been subjugated by Ireland, France, or anyone else. (Brits should take pride here, I would think.)
So it’s not accurate to suggest that “what happened to Ireland” could have happened to Britain, if things had gone slightly different or the British been more easygoing, or something.
Well, there was that Armada thingy . . .
Two thoughts:
1.) Crown Prince Louis ( the future Louis ‘the Lion’ VIII ) of France’s landing in England in 1216 was initially very successful, supported as it was by much of the ( almost 100% French-speaking and origined ) English barony. Ironically it was almost certainly the timing of the death of John of England that prevented him from consolidating his hold further. Many of the barons now preferred the promise of an extended, weak regency under a child-king ( Henry III ) to the rule of the vigorous future king of France.
Had John held on long enough to lose more thoroughly and his family been captured, France and England could have quite possibly come under a central rule. Not necessarily for long - the states may have been divided after Louis VIII’s premature death. Then again, maybe not. The French royal appanage system might have become bi-kingdom, with princes ruling large estates in both, preserving unity and extending French cultural domination. Relative to the Norman & Angevin( Plantagenet ) dynasties, the Capetians seemed far less prone to interfamilial squabbling.
2.) While the patchwork, poorly timed and compromise plan of the Spanish Armada was probably doomed, the brilliant duke of Parma’s original plan might have succeeded ( Santa Cruz’s original plan also made better sense than Philip II’s ). At least temporarily.
The hopes for a widescale Catholic insurrection were probably hopelessly overoptimistic. But I seriously doubt the English army could have held London against Parma ( probably the best general of his generation ) and his veterans. It may well have bled Spain white in the long run, but it might at least have effected the independence off Ireland and temporarily crippled England.
Well if we are going down that route of religious arguements, was’nt Ireland given to England by the Pope? So the Republic should act like good Catholics, and ask the English to return. They could start cleaning out Dublin Castle right now.
And yes although religion no doubt played a huge role, England/Great Britain/United Kingdom’s interest in Ireland was for most of its history dominated by strategic considerations. Whatever the personel opinion held about the people themselves.
It should be remembered for instance that one of the reasons for Union in 1800 was that the British government felt that the events of 1798 were caused to a large extent by the excessess of the Protestant Acendency.
There is no contradiction in the following,
The lack of French manpower is the main reason they tried to stir up unrest in Ireland, had this been successful it would have diverted English resources and allowed France a much freer hand, and of course the original intention of the rebellion, as far as France was concerned, was to push its own agenda of ‘people revolution’, which would indeed have led to a change in the ruling classes.There was a genuine belief within the hierachy that the English peple would rise up and overcome their opressors.
The finance the British provided kept action going against France through its frequently changing list of allies, but through the whole of these conflicts, right through to the final efeat of Napoleon, the British were the only nation that remained as an enemy of France, they never settled on any terms at any time or ever came to any sort of agreement, whereas pretty much of other nations that opposed France did, and often switched sides.
In other words, Britain set the example, and its defeat or elimination from the wars would have been a defeat for everyone else. Britain was, if you like, the foundation opon which the campaign against France was supported. Britain did not provide the main military resources, men or equipment, in some ways Britain was rather like the US in WW1 providing materials, finance and ultimately significant military power, especially in the colonies and at sea.
You keep talking about France’s manpower problem. Are you aware that France had more than twice as many people as Britain had in 1798?
Whilst I was not aware of that information, France also had a land war to fight, so when you look at the total numbers of forces arrayed against them, I doubt they would have been able to commit a significant portion of them attempting to occupy Britain and also maintain her own security in her own borders.
Despite the superiority of numbers, Britain still booted France out of some of the major colonies, such as India and Canada, partly because the British regimental system used locals as full soldiers and was remarkable in how they generated loyalty to Britain, it is one of the unsung and astonishing achievements of the way the British army worked.
I’ve been researching Emmet lately as his rebellion (and the '98 also) figures a bit in the genealogy of several families in Alabama and Mississippi. (Emmet’s brother and other relatives actually went to NYC, but many of his followers came to the south.) I was curious if he’s still a well known name in Ireland; he seems to have had a considerable cult in the mid and late 19th centuries (when, admittedly, all nations were having romantic exalted notions of any past fighters).
Emmet really never had a chance and his Protestantism was a part of it; some of the rebel groups from Kildare and other Catholic areas had fallings out with his faction over religion (several of his followers were not just non-Catholic but openly anti-Catholic- admirers of the anti-Catholic Napoleon [who Emmet much resembled, which I doubt is total coincidence]). Admittedly more Catholic rebels balked when Emmet turned out not to have the guns he’d promised than over religion, but religion was a contention.
Robert E. also happened to attack after Napoleon and England made peace and so the French weren’t inclined to send money or supplies. Ironically if he’d waited a few months ‘Boney’ and G3 would be at war again.
Then he had to start prematurely due to a powder explosion that let the Brits know he was stockpiling arms, then he couldn’t take a barely garrisoned castle, the only real coup was the killing of a hated Lord Justice who was dragged from a carriage, and then to top it all off he got captured because he was horny and wouldn’t stay put in a safehouse very far from his girlfriend.
Yet he was a hero in the mid/late 19th century (no idea if he’s much remembered today). I can only assume it was two things: the tight pantsand the speech (which nobody thought to transcribe at the time so who knows what it originally said).
Ah yeah he would still be known, the baul’ Robert Emmet, but probably not nearly as well known as Collins, Dev et al.
Some of what casdave writes I agree with, and I fail to see the specific bearing it has on Ireland. (This is still a thread about Irish history, I think.)
Maybe I just read too much into what may have been a poorly phrased remark about “what happened to Ireland.”
To reiterate and summarize, as clearly as possible (and then I’ll be done with this point):
I do not believe that, in the long time period under discussion, there was ever a time when Britain was in realistic danger of suffering “what happened to Ireland”–namely, a successful invasion by a foreign people*, an economic subjugation of their labor and natural resources to the benefit of those people, and the various personal and cultural oppressions that typically accompany the preceding.
Britain’s natural right (that of all nations and peoples) of self-preservation and self-determination did not grant moral authority to any of their actions in and against Ireland. Britain could have and would have remained sovereign and prosperous with an independent Ireland alongside.
There is morality in international affairs? Ah thats news.
Who said that Britain had any moral authority for it’s behaviour in Ireland?Far from it, but given the age and percieved threat it was not all that surprising.
I am putting the mindset of the British at the time, or at least the one used to drive their actions.
It is perhaps difficult to understand the sheer hatred or the way that Protestants and Catholics despised each other.
If you ever manage to go to a Celtic vs Rangers soccer match you get just a glipmse of it, trust me this is so much more than a game.
As far as the British were concerned, you don’t give your enemy even the slimmest hope, not when they are Papists and backed by a Papist power, and not only that, a papist power that is bent on crushing your overseas trade and colonies, along with an intention to conquer mainland Europe.
We seem to be forgetting things such as the Jacobite rebellion and the Battle of Culloden, and guess which foreign power was involved.
We are also missing some of the run up to the 1798 rebellion in which French ships had intended to make landfall in Ireland and supply a signifcant military force.This must have alarmed the British once they actually became aware of it - it was only sheer chance that they could not land due to poor weather.
As for Britain being subjugated, it was mostly a case of removing the head of state and replacing with a Catholic ruler, rather more than an occupation, however even by the time of the Spanish Armada this would have probably not been possible, however it would certainly have severely dented the imperialist amibitions of Britain.
Again and again we see various individuals making claim to the British throne, and had this happened there would have been a change of the aristocracy. It would have spread into the ecclesiastic establishment.
It can be argued that the intention was not to occupy Britain as such, but the social unrest and constant prospect of uprisings of Protestants in a Catholic led Britain would have necessitated the presence of a military force to maintain the state and put these uprisings down, and I would have expected this would have been provided by France or Spain - depends upon which period of time.
The uprisings in Ireland were seen as a sideshow to the main event - the war against France, but the imperative was to crush it decisively and quickly, any and all means were used to do this which is why this rebellion never had a hope.
Except the British politicians didn’t negotiate with rebels; Robert Nelson, Wolfred Nelson, Papineau and Mackenzie all went into exile for several years after the 37. They didn’t come back to Canada until amnesties were granted, several years after the rebellions. They certainly did not have any impact on the new constitutional structure proposed by Lord Durham, such as the introduction of responsible government. It was the moderates, Baldwin and Lafontaine, who led the successful reform movement for responsible government, forming the first truly responsible ministry in the Province of Canada.
As well, there was a significant difference between the Canadas and Ireland in 1798: Roman Catholics could vote in the Canadas, starting with easing of restrictions on Catholics in public life with the Quebec Act of 1774, and then the Constitutional Act, 1791, which based the franchise solely on being a male, British subject, 21 or over, and meeting a property qualification. That was fundamentally different from Ireland, where Roman Catholics could not vote until emancipation in 1829.
As a result of the Roman Catholic franchise in Canada, Roman Catholics were active in electoral politics from almost the beginning of the British governance, and the British government could not simply govern with the support of the Protestant Anglos, as was the case in Ireland. That in turn meant that there was a way for moderate French-Canadian nationalists to participate in politics and to have real influence, much earlier than had been the case with Ireland, meaning that electoral politics had greater popular support.
