# Did the Framers intend the president to have "extralegal but constitutional" powers? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [December 21, 2005, 10:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695 "2005-12-21T22:31:37Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 16\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [December 21, 2005, 10:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/1 "2005-12-21T22:31:37Z")
From an editorial on the current domestic-surveillance controversty, by William Kristol and Gary Schmitt, in _The Weekly Standard,_ 12/20/05 – [http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/511bsnxq.asp:](http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/511bsnxq.asp:) > [@](#): > > The difficulty with FISA is the standard it imposes for obtaining a warrant aimed at a “U.S. person”–a U.S. citizen or a legal alien: The standard suggests that, for all practical purposes, the Justice Department must already have in hand evidence that someone is a problem before they seek a warrant. > > Consider the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the French Moroccan who came to the FBI’s attention before Sept. 11 because he had asked a Minnesota flight school for lessons on how to steer an airliner, but not on how to take off or land. Even with this report, and with information from French intelligence that Moussaoui had been associating with Chechen rebels, the Justice Department decided there was not sufficient evidence to get a FISA warrant to allow the inspection of his computer files. Had they opened his laptop, investigators might have begun to unwrap the Sept. 11 plot. But strange behavior and merely associating with dubious characters don’t rise to the level of probable cause under FISA. > > This is presumably one reason why President Bush decided that national security required that he not simply follow the strictures of the 1978 foreign intelligence act, and, indeed, it reveals why the issue of executive power and the law in our constitutional order is more complicated than the current debate would suggest. It is not easy to answer the question whether the president, acting in this gray area, is “breaking the law.” **It is not easy because the Founders intended the executive to have–believed the executive needed to have–some powers in the national security area that were extralegal but constitutional.** > > Following that logic, the Supreme Court has never ruled that the president does not ultimately have the authority to collect foreign intelligence–here and abroad–as he sees fit. Even as federal courts have sought to balance Fourth Amendment rights with security imperatives, they have upheld a president’s “inherent authority” under the Constitution to acquire necessary intelligence for national security purposes. (Using such information for criminal investigations is different, since a citizen’s life and liberty are potentially at stake.) So Bush seems to have behaved as one would expect and want a president to behave. A key reason the Articles of Confederation were dumped in favor of the Constitution in 1787 was because the new Constitution–our Constitution–created a unitary chief executive. That chief executive could, in times of war or emergency, act with the decisiveness, dispatch and, yes, secrecy, needed to protect the country and its citizens. The bolded part there seems to me to be supported by nothing but hand-waving. Certainly the authors make no legal or historical case for it, beyond what’s quoting above, and I can’t see how their conclusion follows. Does anybody care to try? ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [December 21, 2005, 10:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/2 "2005-12-21T22:42:52Z")
Nope. If anything, I doubt the Founders envisioned such a strong Executive as we have today, principally because they didn’t envision such a strong federal government as we have today. I suppose someone could make an argument that regardless of what the Founders intended, the President simply has the constitutional authority, and that laws restricting his authority to do things like the monitoring are unconstitutional. That’s also devoid of historical support. But it has a certain “sauce for the goose” quality to it; the left has for generations been finding support in the Constitution for things that are not written and would not have gotten the support of the Founders. But that’s a dangerous game to play. I think it’s better if we - on BOTH SIDES - read the Constitution for what the text says, period. So… nope. I can’t get on board with that argument. ---
**Author:** ![Polycarp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/82dd89/32.png) [@Polycarp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Polycarp)\ **Post date:** [December 21, 2005, 10:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/3 "2005-12-21T22:43:45Z")
In the context stated, the only conceivable implication for “extralegal” is “not authorized by statute” – and the answer is, Yes, they did. The weakness, almost absence, of an executive was one of the chief problems of the Articles of Confederation government, and the FF equipped the President with powers and duties in the Constitution itself, in Article II. Much as Congress has 17 listed grounds on which to legislate (plus those extended by amendments) and an 18th that extends its powers to anything “reasonable and proper” to carry out the others, the President has specific powers conferred on him by the Constitution and a similar sense of being able to do “what is reasonable and proper” to carry out his duties using those powers. The treaty-making power, the commander-in-chief power, are both good examples of fairly broad grants of power not depending on statute. The issue, I think, is more one of whether a President has the right to _contravene_ statute in carrying out his policies. And to that, my answer would of course be no, he is not above the law. (Cf. the Steel Seizure case from Truman’s presidency) ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [December 21, 2005, 11:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/4 "2005-12-21T23:52:12Z")
The President took an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution”. But suppose there’s a situation where the nation and its system of laws, including the Constitution, is being threatened and no legal means exist to defeat that threat? A President could then argue that by temporarily acting outside of the bounds of the Constitution he was working to preserve it overall. So I can conceive that there are situations, in times of great crisis, when the President is justified in contravening the Constitution. That said, I think these situations are very very very rare and should only be invoked as a last possible resort. And under no circumstances should the Constitution be defied as a regular order of business. I see contravening the Constitution as the equivalent of using nuclear weapons - an option that needs to be available but hopefully will never need to be used. ---
**Author:** ![Hamlet](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/hamlet/32/2818_2.png) [@Hamlet](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hamlet)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 12:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/5 "2005-12-22T00:21:54Z")
> [@Bricker](#): > > That’s also devoid of historical support. But it has a certain “sauce for the goose” quality to it; the left has for generations been finding support in the Constitution for things that are not written and would not have gotten the support of the Founders. You never, ever tire of this crap do you. Sometimes, when I’m full of holiday cheer, I imagine that you could post about the Constitution without this kind of repetitive baloney. Then reality hits. ---
**Author:** ![JRDelirious](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jrdelirious/32/9531_2.png) [@JRDelirious](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JRDelirious)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 1:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/6 "2005-12-22T01:17:19Z")
> [@Polycarp](#): > > The issue, I think, is more one of whether a President has the right to _contravene_ statute in carrying out his policies. And to that, my answer would of course be no, he is not above the law. (Cf. the Steel Seizure case from Truman’s presidency) I like **Polycarp** ’s take on this: we should expect the chief exec to reasonably have the flexibility to do things necessary and reasonable and proper to exercising his formal powers and prerrogatives, even if there’s no law explicitly authorizing him to do specific act X, Y or Z – but if there is law explicitly saying that the government may only do so by means of A, B, and C, he should not be able to do it by whatever means he pulls out of his… hat, just because he says so. If the Prez is gonna get Emergency Powers, I want it to be someone _other than himself_ who grants those powers, and who has authority to decree an _end_ to the Emergency. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 1:52am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/7 "2005-12-22T01:52:18Z")
> [@Bricker](#): > > That’s also devoid of historical support. But it has a certain “sauce for the goose” quality to it; the left has for generations been finding support in the Constitution for things that are not written and would not have gotten the support of the Founders. But as you point out, this is a game. It smacks of debaters’ points and playground arguments. It is an argument of convenience. The administration’s claim is no better. The administration claims that the [2001 Joint Resolution](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/sjres23_eb.htm) on the use of force in Afghanistan justifies warrantless wiretaps. It doesn’t. If they are suggesting that “it’s in there,” they are contradicting Bush’s own claim that judges should apply laws as written. > [@](#): > > But that’s a dangerous game to play. I think it’s better if we - on BOTH SIDES - read the Constitution for what the text says, period. > > So… nope. I can’t get on board with that argument. Of course, there is a doctrine permitting the executive to act without statutory authorization: > [@Justice Jackson](#): > > 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. 2 In these circumstances, [343 U.S. 579, 636] and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government [343 U.S. 579, 637] as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. > > 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. 3 > > 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling [343 U.S. 579, 638] the Congress from acting upon the subject. 4 Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. [Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=US&vol=343&invol=579&pageno=635#635) That’s really what this is about. Bush wants to be at the peak of his power, and suggests and absurdly broad reading of the Joint Resolution in order to shoehorn himself into paragraph 1 because if he doesn’t, he realizes that he’s in paragraph 3. Unfortunately, he’s gotten himself into a jam because: 1. He forgot(?) that he’s arguing to the same Congress (essentially) that passed the resolution that they intended to authorize him to do something that was clearly not contemplated. 2. Congress is not simpatico on this one. 3. Many constituents were already suspicious of the powers that were granted by the Patriot Act. In a case of extremely bad timing, the [Padilla](http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/056396R1.P.pdf) decision, issued today, also makes the administration appear disingenuous. It looks like Mr. Bush just overdrew on his political capital account. ---
**Author:** ![Aeschines](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/aeschines/32/16251_2.png) [@Aeschines](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Aeschines)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 1:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/8 "2005-12-22T01:57:39Z")
[contumelious sneer]Bush…[/contumelious sneer] Quick answer: No, they didn’t. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 2:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/9 "2005-12-22T02:05:27Z")
> [@Polycarp](#): > > “reasonable and proper” [quibble]It’s “necessary and proper,” which is in all fairness, quite a different kettle of fish.[/quibble] > [@](#): > > To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. > **[Article I - U.S. Constitution - FindLaw](https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1.html)** > > Article IArticle Text | Annotations  Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist Notice a couple of other things, while we’re in there. 1. It’s a power to make laws, not to act extra-legally. 2. It gives Congress the power to make laws necessary and proper “for carrying into execution . . . all other powers vested . . . in the government . . . or in any department or officer.” So Congress has the power to make laws necessary and proper for the executive to do his job–the executive does not have the power to invent them or to do whatever he thinks is required. 3. He does have the duty to “from time to time . . . recommend to [Congress’s] consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient[.]” [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article02/](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article02/) All of this suggests that he doesn’t have any sort of penumbral powers. The Constitution seems to command him to do exactly what he is being criticized for not doing–ask Congress. The intent of the Framers, to the extent that it is relevant or discernable, included one concern with certainty. The last thing they wanted was another king. ---
**Author:** ![Polycarp](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/82dd89/32.png) [@Polycarp](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Polycarp)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 3:01am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/10 "2005-12-22T03:01:53Z")
> [@Gfactor](#): > > [quibble]It’s “necessary and proper,” which is in all fairness, quite a different kettle of fish.[/quibble] > [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article01/](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article01/) I’m aware of the Constitutional wording. Did I ever say that I was expressly quoting the Constitution? “Reasonable and proper” is _my own phrasing_, with the support of _McCulloch v. Maryland_ for the first word. If Congress could only do what’s literally **necessary** and proper, then we’d all be living in Libertaria, and consulting **Liberal** as our authority on constitutional law and philosophy as she is actually practiced. > [@](#): > > Notice a couple of other things, while we’re in there. > > 1. It’s a power to make laws, not to act extra-legally. > 2. It gives Congress the power to make laws necessary and proper “for carrying into execution . . . all other powers vested . . . in the government . . . or in any department or officer.” So Congress has the power to make laws necessary and proper for the executive to do his job–the executive does not have the power to invent them or to do whatever he thinks is required. > 3. He does have the duty to “from time to time . . . recommend to [Congress’s] consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient[.]” [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article02/](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article02/) > > All of this suggests that he doesn’t have any sort of penumbral powers. The Constitution seems to command him to do exactly what he is being criticized for not doing–ask Congress. Check. Now look at Article II, which I specifically referenced. The President himself is entrusted with powers by it. Not ones statutorily conferred on him by Act of Congress, but ones deriving from the Constitution itself. While this was the foundation of the “Imperial Presidency,” it also is the ground on which most of the presidents which people remember as having done a good job based their actions. > [@](#): > > The intent of the Framers, to the extent that it is relevant or discernable, included one concern with certainty. The last thing they wanted was another king. But nor did they want an impotent government like the one they’d been dealing with for the previous six years. So they were careful to equip the President with actual power _and_ to delimit his powers. > [@Constitution](#): > > The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. > > He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. > > The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. > > He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States. ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 3:02am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/11 "2005-12-22T03:02:47Z")
> [@Polycarp](#): > > In the context stated, the only conceivable implication for “extralegal” is “not authorized by statute” – and the answer is, Yes, they did. The weakness, almost absence, of an executive was one of the chief problems of the Articles of Confederation government, and the FF equipped the President with powers and duties in the Constitution itself, in Article II. > > Much as Congress has 17 listed grounds on which to legislate (plus those extended by amendments) and an 18th that extends its powers to anything “reasonable and proper” to carry out the others, the President has specific powers conferred on him by the Constitution and a similar sense of being able to do “what is reasonable and proper” to carry out his duties using those powers. The treaty-making power, the commander-in-chief power, are both good examples of fairly broad grants of power not depending on statute. The constitution specifically states that the Congress shall have the power to enact all laws necessary and proper in order to carry out its listed powers. I don’t see any such specific language in the description of the President’s powers in Article II. All of the President’s function with one exception are subjected to congressional origination, laws, or ratification, treaties, major appointments and the like. When the senate is not in session the President can make interim appointments for the purpose of keeping the executive deparments running but such appointments expire at the end of the next senate session. The veto is the only power that the president has all by himself. I noticed that in all of the declarations of war listed in another threat, the congress specifically authorizes the president to employ the armed forces in the conduct of the war. If the president already possessed such an inherent power why would they bother with that? I think the framers intended that the president be the executive officer who executes the will of congress. The veto power is a check on congress but even that power isn’t final as it can be overridden by a congress that feels strongly enough on the matter at hand. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 3:49am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/12 "2005-12-22T03:49:23Z")
> [@Polycarp](#): > > “Reasonable and proper” is _my own phrasing_, with the support of _McCulloch v. Maryland_ for the first word. Ok. Scanned McCulloch for the language in question. Didn’t find it. While I agree that necessary has been given some judicial gloss, I’ve never seen the court apply a “reasonable and proper” test. They apply a “rational basis” test, but even that seems a litte stricter than a pure reasonableness standard. > [@](#): > > If Congress could only do what’s literally **necessary** and proper, then we’d all be living in Libertaria, and consulting **Liberal** as our authority on constitutional law and philosophy as she is actually practiced. I don’t think this automatically follows. Can you elaborate? 😃 > [@](#): > > Check. Now look at Article II, which I specifically referenced. The President himself is entrusted with powers by it. Not ones statutorily conferred on him by Act of Congress, but ones deriving from the Constitution itself. I looked. I wasn’t surprised by a somehow-overlooked necessary and proper power. Indeed, the executive’s list of powers seems pretty short. Doesn’t get anywhere close to a power to ignore the 4th Amendment, disregard statutes, or otherwise amend his own powers. > [@](#): > > But nor did they want an impotent government like the one they’d been dealing with for the previous six years. So they were careful to equip the President with actual power _and_ to delimit his powers. Now you’re equivocating. They were indeed vexed by an impotent federal government because the [Articles of Confederation](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/artconf.htm) required unanimous decisions in order to legislate, raise an army, or impose taxes. During a war, the latter two were especially limiting. But these are legislative functions. The Constitutional Convention was called to amend the articles to fix these problems. These problems are those of a legislative body–not an executive. Of course, they also wanted an executive to administer the laws (i.e., apply them) and to represent us in interactions with foreign governments. Stuff like that, sure. And they worked him into the separation of powers, checks and balances system by giving him a veto (a negative power to require a supermajority for some legislation). BTW, with respect to the intent of the Framers on the executive, Jack Rakove, in [Original Meanings : Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0679781218/qid=1135222868/sr=8-1/ref=pd_bbs_1/102-9871314-0852913?n=507846&s=books&v=glance), notes > [@](#): > > To derive a coherent theory of executive power from what Madison called these “tedious and reiterated” debates is not easy. . . . Yet the creation of the presidency was also their most creative act, and their achievement was all the more notable because leading framers thought about the executive in notably divergent ways. It was precisely because their views diverged so sharply that disagreements over the power of the presidency emerged as a potent source of constitutional controversy in the 1790s. _Original Meanings_ at 244-245 (chapter entitled _Creating the Presidency_). In other words, the Framers intentions were conflicting. What conclusions can we draw from that? ---
**Author:** ![furt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/439d5e/32.png) [@furt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/furt)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 4:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/13 "2005-12-22T04:40:06Z")
> [@Hamlet](#): > > You never, ever tire of this crap do you. Sometimes, when I’m full of holiday cheer, I imagine that you could post about the Constitution without this kind of repetitive baloney. Then reality hits. You never, ever tire of this crap, do you? Sometimes, when I’m full of holiday cheer, I imagine that you could post about **Bricker** posting about the Constitution without this kind of repetitive baloney. Then reality hits. ---
**Author:** ![Saint\_Cad](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/saint_cad/32/18907_2.png) [@Saint\_Cad](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Saint_Cad)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 5:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/14 "2005-12-22T05:43:38Z")
I think the founders took this issue into account when drafting the Constitution considering that the President as one person could act more decisively that the two committees that are Congress. Of course SCOTUS can’t even act until a lawsuit is filed, arguments heard, etc. Part of this can be seen by the being the only officer required to be a native-born citizen. I think that the idea was that anything that would require quick action would be war (power explicitly given to the President) or could be (should be) handled at the state level. For example, I believe that the Founders would have believed that Hurricane Katrina should have been dealt with by the sovereign State of Louisiana, not the Feds. ---
**Author:** ![Hamlet](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/hamlet/32/2818_2.png) [@Hamlet](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hamlet)\ **Post date:** [December 22, 2005, 1:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/15 "2005-12-22T13:08:53Z")
> [@furt](#): > > You never, ever tire of this crap, do you? Sometimes, when I’m full of holiday cheer, I imagine that you could post about **Bricker** posting about the Constitution without this kind of repetitive baloney. Then reality hits. Were “I’m rubber and you’re glue” and “Nuh Uh” already taken? Saving up “You’re stupid” and “Shut Up!” for when you’re feeling particularly original? ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [December 25, 2005, 5:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/did-the-framers-intend-the-president-to-have-extralegal-but-constitutional-powers/336695/16 "2005-12-25T17:44:48Z")
> [@Gfactor](#): > > In other words, the Framers intentions were conflicting. Could you elaborate on that?