This is only somewhat true. Most interesting and useful economic results demonstrate quite the opposite: individual decision-making under constraints leads to quite irrational collective outcomes. Even the basic belief, that people buy the best and cheapest in equilibrium, is subject to some heroic assumptions. There are big problems with the Walrasian equilibrium: researchers like Hirschman have demonstrated convincingly that under certain constraints, if a society cannot quite nail Walras, it is actually worse off the more its conditions approximate but do not quite reach those of the Walrasian model.
Under certain circumstances, if you take this model to its logical conclusion, you end up with 100% dissipation.
This is not even wrong.
Rationality has a very strict meaning in this context. Rationality places no constraints whatsoever on the decision-making capabilities of the actors and it certainly does not require perfect information. You demonstrate breathtaking disregard for what economists actually do with statements like this. For example, there is a very large subfield of game theory devoted to “games of imperfect information” in which the players are presumed to be rational maximizers.
Rationality is very “thin”: it only constrains the structure of individual preferences. The objection that people “aren’t rational” is typically misinformed and superficial. It tends to hijack debates on actual economics and sends them off to normative hell.
Formally speaking, “rationality” requires only two things:
- Completeness
All possible outcomes must be well-specified to the extent that they can be meaningfully compared against each other. In the set of preferences over ice cream, you have to be able to compare vanilla to chocolate to strawberry and all permutations thereof.
- Reflexivity
This just means that a given outcome has to be at least as good as itself. Vanilla must be at least as good as vanilla. Most people do not think this is a very challenging assumption.
Transitivity is nice but very frequently not required for rationality. The rules we use to elect officials are not transitive.
You can make all sorts of useful arguments that people misevaluate probabilities on the margin, that payoffs are not symmetric, etc. Cutting edge economists incorporate these innovations quite regularly into their research. But the objection that “people aren’t rational” or that rationality imposes huge and ridiculous constraints is quite misinformed.
This is somewhat less wrong. Competitive markets are social welfare maximizing. Capitalism typically requires private ownership. This distribution of property rights is not implied nor does it imply competitive markets. This distinction is important because half-understood principles can drive really bad inferences.