I’d say these kind of proofs are fascinating in their own right, and if i was convinced of the existance of god by them I would say they are the most improtant thing in the world.
As far as I can see the proof is valid, but I still don’t see any reason for the first premise, so it’s still inhabiting an abstract world for me.
Lib, can ‘God exists -> God necessarily exists’ be broken down any further? You haven’t just plucked this out of the air, but I still don’t get why it’s a reasonable assumption for God, but not for anything else.
I guess what amazes me is that hardcore materialists, who for the past hundred plus years have preached the virtues of rational thought, categorically reject the modern modal argument for God’s existence (without offering serious rebuttal) while declaring that they would accept as evidence sufficiently dazzling magic tricks.
Eris
Oh, certainly, I agree. Those are tautologies. But the Tisthammer proof offers none of those, although someone in that thread combined the definition with the second axiom and pulled a tautology together. Oddly, he formed his question something like this: “How do you know that the most perfect possible being is possible?”. And I told him that the inference is self-implicated.
Shade
Because of the way God was defined. The most perfect possible being is a being that is as perfect as possible in all possible worlds. Existence in all possible worlds is called necessary existence. God is the convergence of all such, and thus is unique.
That’s what Truth and I were arguing about once Newton conceded the validity of the proof (and in doing so, as a materialist, demonstrated an incredibly honest intellect). It doesn’t seem reasonable that a being who is perfect in only some possible ways, but not all, merits equal greatness with the being Who is perfect in all possible ways.
When you use a word that strong to describe work as good as Tisthammer’s, it’s going to raise eyebrows. Perhaps you should publish, and show all those incompetent materialist philosophers who have labored over Hartshorne’s work for forty years exactly where the mumbo-jumbo is. I’ve heard objections over Becker’s Postulate and cries about fairness with premise 9, but you are the first that I have heard call it mumbo-jumbo.
My fault for poor wording. I’ve typed the equivalent sentence so many times that I’ve begun leaving out the fairly self-evident qualifier; thus, the sentence should read: “The greatest possible perfection [that can exist] exists in all possible worlds”. Thanks for catching that.
Hmm… Inasmuch as some people (certainly not you) are thinking that the letter “G” has been assigned qualities of perfection by Tisthammer et al, I’d better be even more specific: “The greatest possible perfection [that can exist is that which] exists in all possible worlds”.
I know folks who can be given a sheet of standard musical notation, and sing it while reading it. They can look at sheet music and have a pretty good idea if it’s good music or not, all without immediately experiencing it in the usual way. I’m certain they could get into rather occult (for me) discussions about aspects, virtues, and flaws of the way a particular bit of music is notated.
Now, I can see a page of musical notes, and it does nothing for me. Certainly I grasp that the marks higher on the bars are higher notes, and that different ones last for different amounts of time, and some notations modify the sound of those notes and of the silences between them, and that the notation does all that in what’s actually a very rigorous mathematical way–but I don’t get the same meaning that a musical sight-reader does.
The analogy is a bit strained, but I think it holds.
**
But you’re wrong. The bear must dance “as perfectly as possible.” If there is no objective definition of “perfect dancing,” “dancing” cannot be an attribute of “God.” This is why Lib is wrong when he says that any ontological conclusion on the nature of “God” is “an irrelevant non sequitur.”
** Lib, you must be analogy impaired. The proof isn’t talking about toaster ovens because there is no objective definition of the “perfect toaster oven.” Rather, what constitutes the perfect toaster oven depends on a subjective definition of the perfect toaster oven. My definition, however, met all the criteria and worked perfectly well with Tisthammer’s proof. You may argue that Tisthammer blew it and that my definition wouldn’t work in some other ontological argument. However, that is a different debate.
**
This is, of course, completely beside the point. The precise issue wasn’t whether these beings are “equally great” merely whether they exist, as per the proof.
**
Actually, this is a good point. There is no objective definition of “good” and “evil.”
[hijack]
FTR, I’ve already lost this post once. This happens a great deal more on the new board than it did on the old.
[/hijack]
I love you, Truth. You’re my favorite debating partner. You listen. And you respond thoughtfully. It reminds me of my early days with Spiritus Mundi, a man who, in my opinion, has a peerless intellect. In those days, I got pretty hotheaded with him and our arguments devolved into arguments (if you’ll forgive the amphiboly.) I’ve matured a bit since then, and I’m not going to let that happen with us.
We’re two ships passing in the night, just as Spiritus and I were. The mistake I made then was to take it personally. I’m not going to do that now. Based on our debates so far (yours and mine), I trust your intellectual integrity.
First, an ontological conclusion can draw inferences about nothing but existence and the nature of existence. It cannot draw inferences about the the nature of things that exist. When we build ontological arguments about God, we can build nothing more than arguments that prove or disprove whether He exists as defined. That’s why the perfection aspect is in the definition itself, so that we know that we’re talking about “that for which there can be no greater conceived” (to use Anselm’s more primitive construct.)
As I said before, it isn’t a matter of objectivity or subjectivity. Rather, it is a matter of whether your knowledge of existence is mediate or immediate. You don’t have to speak to the nature of the perfect toaster to discuss it ontologically. You merely have to posit whether it exists. Based on how you define it, you may then proceed to state your axioms and draw your premises into a conclusion.
But, there is a difference — an important difference! — between a perfect thing and a thing that is all perfection. Consider, by way of analogy, the objections by materialists to Becker’s Postulate. What they don’t like is what they see as an equivocation with the adverb. Likewise, here, my problem with your assertion about the perfect toaster is not as to whether you can or cannot prove that the perfect toaster exists.
My problem is with whether you can use the same proof that Tisthammer or Oppy used to prove anything about your toaster. I’ll give you axiom 2, but not axiom 1. If the perfect toaster exists, it does not exist necessarily because it is not the perfect toaster in every possible world. You have only mediate knowledge about your toaster. Your toaster might not work at all in a world without heat, for example.
The only thing Tisthammer blew (if indeed he did — I still lack verification) is the biconditionality of God’s existence onto His necessary existence. And quite honestly, the argument, as presented, is valid as is. I just need the biconditionality for an ancillary point you and I discussed.
The problem with your definition is that it excludes perfections. You and Hartshorne seem distracted by the urge to draw broader metaphysical conclusions than are warranted from an ontological treatment. Whether God is panentheistic in nature is not, and cannot be, implied from an argument that deals, not with things at all, but merely with existence.
But. Then. You. Can’t. Use the same first axiom. No, no, you can’t.
You just simply won’t get me to agree that a being who does not necessarily exist in all possible worlds necessarily exists. Maybe we have to simply agree to disagree at this point.
I will meet you halfway, though. If you can draw the first axiom as a conclusion from a sound set of premises that begin with your definition and an axiom we can both accept, then I will accept that conclusion as though it were the axiom itself. Fair?
Thanks for the reply, Lib (and sorry for butting in on the argument, you and Truthseeker are amazing to listen to)
I’m getting there. My problem is with this sentance.
I’m hoping we can all agree a perfect sphere always exists as a concept, and that in some possible worlds some exist (if something matches this concept) and in others it doesn’t. That would make me define perfect as something like ‘there is no better in any possible world.’
How does this differ from your definition? How can perfection of God spill across possible worlds whereas that of toasters doesn’t?
Surely you realize your argument is nonsense? Why would someone who draws a circle on a saddle argue that the concept of circle does not include this particular circle they have just drawn? There is no circle that is not part of the concept of circles, that would be a very obvious self contradiction. As much as you clearly do not like this argument, it can also be used to refute your “proof.”
Your concept of god is that god is the greatest possible perfection, and that god exsts. There is no way any real god can be greater than the god that exists in your conception. That would be a self contradiction. Therefore, you have proven that your conception exists. Existence in reality, removed from your conception (and in that case removed from the proof itself) is irrelevant and remains unproven.
Just try to be logical about this Lib… how could existence make god greater when god is already perfect in your conception? If that were possible, you would have to throw out your conception of god, as you have defined him, and with it throw out the entire proof.
The argument you allude to in the OP has been debunked many times. I never got past the first post because there was no reason to debate the issue. To make the arguement simple:
Definition of God: God is a perfect being.
Assumption: To be perfect God must exist in reality.
Therefore: God must exist because of the definition of God.
The problem with this logic is the definitions involved. First, what is perfect? I have the idea in my mind of the perfect hamburger. Does that mean the hamburger must exist just because I came up with the idea of the perfect hamburger?
Logic can be twisted to prove just about anything. At the same time logic does not have anything to do with physical reality. For example, light can be viewed as a wave and a particle at the same time. How can a particle be a wave? No one really knows but it has been proven to be true.
Perhaps my wording was a little over the top so let’s go at this a little differently. The question was: Do the various logical proofs of the existence of God have any substance?
The particular reference in the question was to your exposition in another post of one particular proof which depended upon two bases: 1) The definition of God as the greatest of possible perfections; and 2) The statement that something that is the greatest possible perfection must necessarily exist. There followed some symbology that was supposed to prove something about God necessarily existing.
My point is that your stated bases define God into existence and the symbology is superluous. It seems to me that “the greatest possible perfection” is somewhat incoherent. “Perfection” is defined as “without fault.” That is to say that a " perfect being" has the empty set as its set of faults. So to speak of “most perfect” denies the definition of “perfect” and lacks precise meaning.
However, even assuming that a comparative of “perfect” is possible, there is no reason to assume that the “most perfect being” is the God of the Bible just because a “most perfect being” exists necessarily. Any other supernatural entity which can’t be sensed in any way whatever, such as a bunch of undetectable little men guiding individual events and communicating with each other telepathically, would serve just as well.
I maintain that your two premises are circular in that you define a particular god into existence in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of your premise about necessary existence and then purport to show that the God, as defined for the purpose of existing, exists. And, as I said and as others have said, your argument implies the arbitrary claim that the definition fits only the God of the Bible, when really it would fit any god or any other concept using undetectable entities equally well.
Perhaps the forty year discussion you speak of occurred, not because there is substance to the “proof,” but rather just because people like to “discuss” things."
Okay. Then let me put it another way, in the form of a rhetorical question. If there is a being Who is as perfect as possible in every possible world, how would you describe a possible being who might be greater?
Some worlds might not have spheres at all. In a world with only 2 dimensions (rather than 3) plus time, a sphere could not exist; only circles. And why is a sphere any greater than a hypersphere that might exist in a world with 4 dimensions plus time?
Because the attributes that we assign to God (like power and knowledge) are immediate. We don’t see them with our senses but with our reason. A toaster might not even work in a world without heat, and thus toast nothing at all. But a being might possibly exist in such a world Who can know as much about it as possible.
If you draw a circle on a flat surface, its area is exactly pi times its radius squared. But if you draw a circle on a hyperbolic surface, like a saddle, for instance, its area is greater than pi times its radius squared. Furthermore, if you draw your circle on a spherical surface, like a globe, for example, its area is less than pi times its radius squared.
I’m not sure you understand what self-contradictions are.
[…incredulous stare…] Well, I would appreciate it if you could tell me how to be more logical than drawing modus ponens and modus tollens inferences and such through a modal table.
I’m afraid you’re a few decades behind the times. The ontological arguments from Anselm, Goddel, Descartes, et al were adapted, beginning in the late 20th century, as arguments using S[sub]4[/sub] modality. No one here, but you, is addressing the old arguments.
That is a woefully inaccurate rendering of the argument. The definition is wrong. The assumption is random. And the conclusion is a non sequitur. Heck, Tisthammer’s proof isn’t even a syllogism.
I’m puzzled as to why this analogy is such a point of contention. A circle is not defined as a geometric figure with an area that is pi*r[sup]2[/sup]. It is defined as a geometric figure with every point on it being the same distance from a point called the center. The distance is measured along a “straight line” in whatever surface on which the circle is drawn.
The concept of circle includes all the circles you could ever draw, Lib. No matter where you draw a circle it is still a circle. Which is where the self-contradictions I spoke of are found - you cannot draw a circle that is greater than the concept of circle. That is, in fact, a self contradiction.
perhaps you would have understood more if you quoted more than a fraction of a sentence?
Ackkk! No! It proves that He exists, not that He exists necessarily. Necessary existence is implied from the definition and is merely possible.
Oh, there’s nothing so mysterious about it. Ever since Godel, perfection has been defined for the argument as X, such that for every X, [~P(X) -> P(~X)], where P is a constant symbol of type <<0>> (you can read it as “positiveness”).
Have I not repeatedly stated my agreement that that is the case?
You’re hallucinating.
The “thing” that I would like to discuss is what Jayjay asked about. Your hissy fits about vague discomforts notwithstanding, you’ve made no dent in Tisthammer’s proof.
The proof isn’t talking about toaster ovens because there is no objective definition of the “perfect toaster oven.” Rather, what constitutes the perfect toaster oven depends on a subjective definition of the perfect toaster oven. My definition, however, met all the criteria and worked perfectly well with Tisthammer’s proof. You may argue that Tisthammer blew it and that my definition wouldn’t work in some other ontological argument. However, that is a different debate.