# Does it violate free will if the person was never given the desire to do something in the first place? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [December 2, 2025, 10:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339 "2025-12-02T22:09:00Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 23
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 1:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/441 "2026-02-02T13:41:34Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > I don’t know what I don’t know. But the problem is that you are claiming to know something, namely, that the probability of the evidence (seeing evil, seeing orange) given the truth of your hypothesis (tri-omni God, orange-hating John) is smaller than the probability of seeing that evidence given the falsity of the hypothesis. This is mathematically equivalent to saying that ‘observing the evidence should lower my belief in the hypothesis’. The problem is, you don’t know that. So you’re implicitly asserting knowledge you don’t have. I’ll give a short demonstration of this for the curious: > **Summary** > > Let H be the hypothesis, E the evidence, and \neg H denote the falsity of the hypothesis. Bayes rule tells us how to adjust the belief in H upon encountering the evidence E: > > P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H}{P(E)}\cdot P(H) > > Now the question is, when is P(H|E)\ > \frac{P(H|E)}{P(H)} = \frac{P(E|H)}{P(E)}\<1, > > which directly leads to P(E|H)\ > By the law of total probability, we have that > > P(E) = P(E|H)\cdot P(H) + P(E|\neg H)\cdot P(\neg H). > > For this to be larger than P(E|H), it suffices that > > P(E|H) \< P(E|\neg H), > > because then, any addition of P(E|\neg H) weighted with some positive P(\neg H) will make the result bigger than P(E|H). > > Consequently, only if P(E|H) \< P(E|\neg H) is it rational to lower belief in the hypothesis upon observing the evidence. > [@Mijin](#): > > Because we don’t know that. We have no expectation of _any_ amount of orange. If that were true, that is if the expected value of orange were exactly zero, then in fact any observation of orange would directly make the hypothesis that John abhors orange logically false, because this entails that the probability of seeing orange given that John abhors orange is exactly zero. If there is any positive probability of seeing an orange item on John even though he abhors orange, then the expected amount of orange seen on him is likewise greater than zero. In this as well as in the case of the PoE, we know that there is a positive expectation of seeing the respective kind of evidence because we know the intersection of cases where the hypothesis is true with cases where we see the given evidence is non-empty. > [@Mijin](#): > > Can you clear up the inconsistency about what you said about hell? If I am living in a literal hell, having my skin burned off daily, do I have _any reason whatsoever_ that an omnimax (including perfectly loving) God exists? > Because in post 220 you said no, and then later you are suggesting that gratuitous suffering does give us grounds. I’m being perfectly consistent: we have no reason to believe any amount of evil to be inconsistent with the existence of God, as long as we have no information on the amount of evil to expect in a world with a tri-omni God (except that it is non-zero). The arguments that certain instances of evil are gratuitous give us exactly this information, and to the degree that they are inductively convincing, reduce the probability of the truth of the hypothesis (i.e. God’s existence). It yields exactly the information that is needed: something we are less likely to observe given the hypothesis of a tri-omni God than we would be given its falsity. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 1:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/442 "2026-02-02T13:44:58Z")
> [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > I’d say no. Both because the obvious option of _"don’t_ create people and stick them in a hell" exists, and because it renders the question moot. If “good” is indistinguishable from “evil” there’s there’s no _reason_ to make a distinction between them or care about them. You’re right, but I should say there was a typo in that post you quoted. I meant to say “any reason whatsoever **to doubt** that an omnimax God exists?” Because this is the absurd bullet that was bitten back in post #220 – that _no_ observation of suffering gives us reason to doubt that there’s an all-powerful, all-loving god because there’s a hypothetical universe where these things are compatible. A line of reasoning that could be used to defend any claim, no matter how unlikely or absurd. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 1:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/443 "2026-02-02T13:54:06Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > But the problem is that you are claiming to know something, namely, that the probability of the evidence (seeing evil, seeing orange) given the truth of your hypothesis (tri-omni God, orange-hating John) is smaller than the probability of seeing that evidence given the falsity of the hypothesis. Correct. _Of course_ I expect the probability of seeing John in orange to be lower than a random person, if the claim were true, all else being equal. Do you think the probability of seeing someone in blue, given the claim that they adore blue, and seek to maximize blue in their surroundings were true, is higher than a random person? Well John’s hatred of orange could be rephrased as maximizing all colors that aren’t orange. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > > [@Mijin](#): > > > > Because we don’t know that. We have no expectation of _any_ amount of orange. > > If that were true, that is if the expected value of orange were exactly zero No, you misunderstood me here – I’m not saying it’s your fault, this was just an ambiguous sentence in English. I am saying that _we don’t have_ an expected value of orange. Not that we expect it to be zero. We are not setting any line or expectation. Merely that the more orange we see, the more we doubt the claim. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > as long as we have no information on the amount of evil to expect in a world with a tri-omni God (except that it is non-zero) And that right there is the flaw in the logic. Well, one of them. We do not have any reason to expect non-zero orange or non-zero suffering. The fact that a universe with omnimax God and suffering is not known to be impossible tells us nothing because: 1. That hasn’t proven that it is possible. As I said upthread, if I refute an argument against my dark matter model, it may yet be impossible for other reasons. 2. It’s adds nothing to probability. Because the number of possible worlds is infinite (especially since we are adding supernatural agents). The p value of any given world, sans evidence, is zero. This is why we don’t use “set of worlds” reasoning in real life – you can almost never conclude anything. ---
**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 2:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/444 "2026-02-02T14:19:59Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > I also think that the notion of omnibenevolence that involves choice isn’t quite so uncommon. I’ve above already referred to some relevant passages from Aquinas that at least seem to allow such an interpretation, and he at least [allowed for the possibility](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm) that God could do evil if they so chose I quoted that Aquinas passage too. The antecedent is God’s will: he is saying if God’s will was to do evil, God would do evil, and the proposition as a whole is true, but he denies that God’s will can ever be to do evil (for that would imply privation). ~Max ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 2:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/445 "2026-02-02T14:28:37Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > Correct. _Of course_ I expect the probability of seeing John in orange to be lower than a random person, if the claim were true, all else being equal. Then you’re both bringing in additional data (i.e. the information you gathered by sampling the amount of orange on lots of other persons; recall in the PoE case, you only get a single world to investigate), and making unwarranted assumptions (that John should be expected to be free in his selection of colors). As I said, _given_ such assumptions, it’s an entirely reasonable case, but without them, you’re just committing a logical error. And this is really the crux of the problem: you keep accidentally smuggling unwarranted background assumptions in that may be reasonable in everyday cases, but whose heuristics fail to apply for more general situations. Here, it’s that you generally expect people to have a high degree of control over the colors of their possessions, which is entirely reasonable; but it’s not true in general, and for God, it may be entirely true that there is no possibility of getting rid of more evil. You’re applying intuitive reasoning to a case where you have no relevant intuition to appeal to, and thus miss how your statements fail to generalize. That’s why I prefer some rather more contrived, but also more easily controlled scenarios, as in the raisin analogy: there, it is absolutely plain that you don’t have the information necessary to decide whether a raisin cookie should negatively impact our belief. > [@Mijin](#): > > I am saying that _we don’t have_ an expected value of orange. Not that we expect it to be zero. Great, because that is exactly what it means to have no further information. Then, it’s exactly the case that you don’t know whether evidence should increase or decrease your confidence in the hypothesis, because if you know nothing about the expected value, you know nothing about the probability with which we should expect to find evil, orange, or raisins. > [@Mijin](#): > > And that right there is the flaw in the logic. Well, one of them. We do not have any reason to expect non-zero orange or non-zero suffering. So you’re saying you disagree with the FWD now? Because that we have a non-zero expectation of evil is exactly its conclusion. If the FWD is apt, then there are worlds in which God exists, and evil does, too, which means there is a finite probability for there to be evil in a world in which God exists, which means there is a non-zero (but unknown) expected value of evil in a world where God exists. Those are just all logically equivalent statements. > [@Mijin](#): > > The fact that a universe with omnimax God and suffering is not known to be impossible Again, you’re still getting this the wrong way round. It isn’t merely not known to be impossible, it’s known to be possible. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 2:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/446 "2026-02-02T14:33:12Z")
> [@Max\_S](#): > > I quoted that Aquinas passage too. The antecedent is God’s will: he is saying if God’s will was to do evil, God would do evil, and the proposition as a whole is true, but he denies that God’s will can ever be to do evil (for that would imply privation). Agreed, but there is a difference in the notion of omnipotence depending on whether the counterfactual is true. @Voyager, as far as I understand, claims that omnibenevolence is such that God would be absolutely prevented from doing evil, even if it were their will to do so. I think an entity which, were their will such as to do evil, could, is entirely as omnipotent as one that actually does evil, because there is no constraint on their powers. ---
**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 2:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/447 "2026-02-02T14:36:36Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > Otherwise you could never do any inductive reasoning. The problem is in the inductive proposition - it is disanalogous to most theist’s belief in God. To wit, if I know John hates orange because I am John and I know what I hate, then it does not matter how much orange I see in John’s world. ~Max ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 2:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/448 "2026-02-02T14:48:23Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Here, it’s that you generally expect people to have a high degree of control over the colors of their possessions, which is entirely reasonable; but it’s not true in general, and for God, it may be entirely true that there is no possibility of getting rid of more evil. That’s just another example of trying to “defend” God by postulating that he’s far, far less powerful than _we_ are. A helpless God is not a tri-omni God, however. Arguments like this don’t work because they directly contradict observed reality. We _know_ they are false. And no, labeling observation of the physical world “intuition” doesn’t make it true. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 2:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/449 "2026-02-02T14:54:58Z")
> [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > Arguments like this don’t work because they directly contradict observed reality. We _know_ they are false. And no, labeling observation of the physical world “intuition” doesn’t make it true. And as usually, you’re cordially invited to consider the actual argument rather than merely making bland declarations. ---
**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 3:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/450 "2026-02-02T15:01:30Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > Do you think the probability of seeing someone in blue, given the claim that they adore blue, and seek to maximize blue in their surroundings were true, is higher than a random person? Well John’s hatred of orange could be rephrased as maximizing all colors that aren’t orange. Best as I can tell, your original example with John can be rephrased: If an agent repeatedly engages with X voluntarily, then it is unlikely that the agent strongly dislikes X (all else equal). But you suggested that even if John doesn’t voluntarily put on the orange clothes, that is still evidence against his hatred of the color. So the less agreeable: If an agent repeatedly engages with X, then it is unlikely that the agent strongly dislikes X (all else equal). But this assumes agency, a property that doesn’t necessarily extend to God given Plantinga’s free will defense. At least not with the same connotations that give the proposition its sense. Recall that Plantinga denies compatibilism, yet assumes God must act omnibenevolently as a matter of necessity. In the alternative, all else may not be equal for God vis a vis John if the instrumentality of engaging with X is disanalogous. Perhaps most importantly, engagement is disanalogous. God engages with literally everything if you assume God sustains all creation. ~Max ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 3:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/451 "2026-02-02T15:05:04Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > And as usually, you’re cordially invited to consider the actual argument rather than merely making bland declarations. I did consider it and argued against it, throwing out insults doesn’t change that. And an insult is not a counterargument, it’s an evasion. ---
**Author:** ![Voyager](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/voyager/32/133_2.png) [@Voyager](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Voyager)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 5:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/452 "2026-02-02T17:03:53Z")
> [@Max\_S](#): > > Therefore, while Reformation theologians like Luther and Calvin moved away from suffering as a virtuous act, they still characterize suffering and natural evil as a direct consequence of humanity’s knowledge of good and evil. None of them were aware of the reason behind natural disasters, or of ways the world could have been designed to prevent them. They might just as well justify God from the placement of the stars in the actual firmament. (It wouldn’t surprise me if they did.) And I don’t get how natural evil stems from the knowledge of good and evil. Did God create plate tectonics after the fall? Would they not realize that the supposed children of the unfallen couple dying in an earthquake is bad? I’d read that stuff, but it would come after reading some of the Talmud which comes after reading the unread books in my library, so I’d not get to it until long after I find out for myself - or if I live to 120 or so. ---
**Author:** ![Voyager](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/voyager/32/133_2.png) [@Voyager](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Voyager)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 5:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/453 "2026-02-02T17:10:42Z")
> [@Max\_S](#): > > Can God do something that does not maximize good while staying omnibenevolent? I think the correct answer is no, because that would be logically impossible. But the traditional definition of omnipotence does not include impossible acts. Thus, if there is such a God, and if there is evil, such evil is necessary, and God’s act of allowing such evil is at least neutral if not good. > > Now, I recall that you said this conclusion is circular. That is not so; the problem of evil is an attack on the consistency of Christian beliefs, not a demand for proof of its premises. Any proof of consistency is necessarily circular. Doing evil is only logically impossible if omnipotence and omnibenevolence come only as a package. It is possible for an entity which is only omnipotent, so doing evil is not impossible for an omnipotent being per se. That’s the reason it is logically impossible for a being to be both. This has nothing to do with circularity. The circularity I mentioned was justifying omnibenevolence in the light of evidence against it by claiming that an action by god is good because god is omnibenevolent, though we may not know how it is good. That only is a plausible argument for prescriptive omnibenevolence. You can’t really use it for descriptive omnibenevolence, though I suspect it would be easy to retreat back to it. ---
**Author:** ![Voyager](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/voyager/32/133_2.png) [@Voyager](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Voyager)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 5:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/454 "2026-02-02T17:22:17Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Agreed, but there is a difference in the notion of omnipotence depending on whether the counterfactual is true. @Voyager, as far as I understand, claims that omnibenevolence is such that God would be absolutely prevented from doing evil, even if it were their will to do so. I think an entity which, were their will such as to do evil, could, is entirely as omnipotent as one that actually does evil, because there is no constraint on their powers. Not quite. An omnipotent being could do evil, but he would then no long be omnibenevolent, in the prescriptive sense. (Or, more accurately, never was.) If a prescriptively omnibenevolent being could not do evil, due to its nature, it would not be omnipotent. If it is descriptively omnibenevolent - doing no evil up to this point - no problem. It becomes almost omnibenevolent, and the description changes slightly, but I’m not sure it is logically impossible. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 5:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/455 "2026-02-02T17:32:10Z")
Geez a lot to reply to. Here we go: > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Then you’re both bringing in additional data (i.e. the information you gathered by sampling the amount of orange on lots of other persons; recall in the PoE case, you only get a single world to investigate) Take out the random person then. All that’s needed for the analogy is that the person has control over their environment. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Here, it’s that you generally expect people to have a high degree of control over the colors of their possessions, which is entirely reasonable; but it’s not true in general, and for God, it may be entirely true that there is no possibility of getting rid of more evil. Omnimax God has absolute control, by definition. It is not me smuggling in an assumption, it is you throwing in claims that e.g. we know there must be a non-zero amount of suffering. We don’t. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Great, because that is exactly what it means to have no further information. Then, it’s exactly the case that you don’t know whether evidence should increase or decrease your confidence in the hypothesis, because if you know nothing about the expected value, you know nothing about the probability with which we should expect to find evil, orange, or raisins. Nope. Whether observations support a claim does not require setting some “anticipated level”. I don’t need to say in advance what level of suffering I expect an omnimax god would allow – we only know by definition that his _goal_ is zero. We can speculate about mitigating factors, but we don’t know that there are any. Any amount (and there’s a fuckload of natural suffering in the world, so this is all a bit silly) supports the claim that he’s not omnimax or doesn’t exist. And again, before anyone says it: “supports the claim” doesn’t necessarily mean conclusive. This kind of reasoning from observation is never certain, but just as I can reason that my neighbour whose entire home, car, clothes are emblazened with manchester united badges probably likes manchester united, so I can reason that a god with absolute power over this universe presiding over a fuckload of suffering probably isn’t perfectly loving (or doesn’t exist). > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > So you’re saying you disagree with the FWD now? Because that we have a non-zero expectation of evil is exactly its conclusion. If you mean Plantinga’s argument, I don’t think it supports your claim about it. As evidenced by the cites I gave earlier – and it hasn’t gone unnoticed that on 3 times of asking you haven’t produced a cite that Plantinga’s argument defeats the evidential problem of evil. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > It isn’t merely not known to be impossible, it’s known to be possible. No it isn’t. The default skeptical position is that we neither know something to be possible, nor impossible. The logical problem of evil suggests that the existence of an omnimax god and suffering is an impossible state of affairs, and plantinga’s argument defeats that. Fine – it’s shown that one argument for that state of affairs being impossible failed. That is not the same thing as proving that it is possible. If you want to say _as far as we know_ it’s possible, then fine, but of course this cannot be used for the kinds of inferences you are trying to make. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 5:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/456 "2026-02-02T17:45:42Z")
> [@Max\_S](#): > > The problem is in the inductive proposition - it is disanalogous to most theist’s belief in God. It’s analogous to the premises of this problem. If we’re taking the position that I think you’re alluding to again – of suffering being a good in itself – then the problem of evil basically doesn’t exist in the first place. My response to that line of argument would be to point out the extremely random and often unfair distribution of suffering. And how suffering persists even when the person can do nothing about it – what’s the benefit to the pain suffered in terminal cancer for example? And if the response to that is to shrug and suggest it makes sense from a god’s point of view, then we’re back to “mysterious ways”. > [@Max\_S](#): > > But this assumes agency, a property that doesn’t necessarily extend to God given Plantinga’s free will defense If anyone has agency, it’s omnimax god. We can’t use the _hypothesis_ that external factors might tie god’s hands, to then set as a _premise_ that god’s hands are tied. We don’t know that anything limits god. We don’t know that he couldn’t make a universe with free will and no suffering. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 2, 2026, 6:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/457 "2026-02-02T18:43:41Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > All that’s needed for the analogy is that the person has control over their environment. Which is exactly what you don’t know, but assume anyway. > [@Mijin](#): > > Omnimax God has absolute control, by definition. It is not me smuggling in an assumption, it is you throwing in claims that e.g. we know there must be a non-zero amount of suffering Again, if we didn’t know that, the logical PoE would work, and any amount of evil at all would conclusively disprove the existence of God. Either the logical PoE works, or we should expect a non-zero amount of evil, because it is exactly the fact that God and evil can coexist that both defeats the logical PoE and means that there is a non-zero expected amount of evil. > [@Mijin](#): > > Whether observations support a claim does not require setting some “anticipated level”. I have explicitly demonstrated how differences in the expected amount lead to a different effect of evidence. You haven’t offered any counterargument beyond blanket denials like this. > [@Mijin](#): > > I don’t need to say in advance what level of suffering I expect an omnimax god would allow – we only know by definition that his _goal_ is zero. But the question isn’t what the goal is, but whether that goal can be attained. And we now it can’t always—again, otherwise, the logical PoE would work. We don’t know to what degree it can. But that degree is exactly what determines the effect of the evidence we have. Take again the basic logical picture (which you have so far ignored). Two propositions being compatible means that you can’t appeal to one as evidence against the other. The structure of the argument you’re proposing is: 1. There are things that are both square and red. 2. This is a red thing. 3. Therefore, it probably is not a square. This is, I trust you’ll agree, clearly invalid. But it’s exactly what you’re proposing: 1. There are worlds in which there is both a tri-omni God and evil. 2. This world contains evil. 3. Therefore, there probably is no God. Now, of course you’re going to say, but God is opposed to evil, so the analogy would only work if squares were opposed to being red. But that doesn’t do anything: the question, in the end, is whether squares have any say in the matter. It’s outcomes that matter, not intentions. In the end, it’s just a numbers game: does God, or the squares, or whatever, ultimately have the power to make their will manifest in a relevantly increased fraction of cases? And the only answer we have at this point is that we don’t know. We know they can’t always do so, but we have no information on whether they almost always or almost never get their wish. Any stipulation to the contrary is an unwarranted assumption without further information. (Again, that already follows from the simple fact that the two propositions are consistent. But for some reason, this never seems to get through to you.) Take again the visualization I provided: [![](https://i.postimg.cc/FK9KN4xy/Plantinga.png) ](https://i.postimg.cc/FK9KN4xy/Plantinga.png) The FWD ensures that the area of G\cap E is non-zero. Each of the worlds in this overlap has some certain amount of evil. Therefore, there is a non-zero expectation for a certain quantity of evil within any world in the set G, because this just amounts to the average over all the elements of this set, and will be positive as long as some of these elements have some non-zero value of evil. But whether or not the evil in the actual world then should be surprising, given that there is a tri-omni God, depends on that average. And since we don’t know that, we simply don’t have the information to assess this. > [@Mijin](#): > > Any amount (and there’s a fuckload of natural suffering in the world, so this is all a bit silly) supports the claim that he’s not omnimax or doesn’t exist. This directly contradicts your earlier claim that you believe the FWD works. Because it is only possible for _any_ amount of suffering to cast doubt on God if G\cap E is empty. > [@Mijin](#): > > And again, before anyone says it: “supports the claim” doesn’t necessarily mean conclusive I don’t know why you keep banging on about this; I have no problem at all with inductively established conclusions. In fact, all of the calculations I gave are explicitly about assessing the likelihood of a claim, not definitely showing it to be true, so the point you’re defending against here just isn’t one anyone has raised, as far as I can tell. The question is merely whether you can _validly_ decrease your belief in a hypothesis, given the evidence you point to. > [@Mijin](#): > > If you mean Plantinga’s argument, I don’t think it supports your claim about it. As evidenced by the cites I gave earlier As noted, the cites say exactly what I’ve been saying, namely that the FWD means that just pointing to the existence of evil doesn’t suffice to cast doubt on God’s existence. That you just ignore that I’ve pointed this out several times now doesn’t make it any less true. > [@Mijin](#): > > and it hasn’t gone unnoticed that on 3 times of asking you haven’t produced a cite that Plantinga’s argument defeats the evidential problem of evil. Because, for the third time now, that’s not a claim anybody is making: > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > > [@Mijin](#): > > > > This is sad at this point, so let’s cut back to the chase: do you have a cite for anyone that believes plantinga’s argument solves the evidential problem of evil? > > As I already told you: > > > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > > > > [@Mijin](#): > > > > > > Does anyone claim that Plantinga’s argument solves the evidential problem of evil? > > > > No, and neither do I. The claim is merely that one needs to posit additional information, such as ‘in a world created by a tri-omni God, there should not be more evil than…’. Without this, there simply is no evidential case possible. > > Again, every formulation of the evidential problem of evil appeals to further arguments, including the one in your own cite. There is always a premise to the effect that there is _gratuitous_ evil in the world, i.e. evil exceeding that which we would expect a tri-omni God to permit. Every valid formulation must include something like this: it is the only way such an argument can gain purchase. > [@Mijin](#): > > No it isn’t. The default skeptical position is that we neither know something to be possible, nor impossible. Except, of course, if its possibility has been demonstrated, which it has—that’s the FWD. > [@Mijin](#): > > The logical problem of evil suggests that the existence of an omnimax god and suffering is an impossible state of affairs, and plantinga’s argument defeats that. And it does so by explicitly showing it to be possible. It constructs a case in which suffering exists despite there being a tri-omni God, which by direct demonstration shows it to be possible for such a case to exist. > [@Mijin](#): > > If you want to say _as far as we know_ it’s possible, then fine, but of course this cannot be used for the kinds of inferences you are trying to make. Again, that would be false: barring any counter to the FWD, we indeed do know that it’s possible for there to be a world in which God and evil exists. If you accept the FWD, then you accept this, too. I mean, still, I’m curious: if what you’re saying were right, then evidential arguments would not need to make any reference to gratuitous evil, Rowe would not need to argue for cases of suffering that a tri-omni God both could and would prevent, and so on. Why do you think people go through all this rigamarole? Why do your own cites state, over and over again, that evidential arguments must appeal to evil so great that it can’t plausibly be reconciled with the existence of a tri-omni God, if, as you say, any amount of evil serves to create doubt? ---
**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\ **Post date:** [February 3, 2026, 2:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/458 "2026-02-03T02:27:01Z")
> [@Voyager](#): > > It is possible for an entity which is only omnipotent This is a controversial claim, rejected by Augustine and virtually all Christians in history, except the Gnostics and Manichaeans. ~Max ---
**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\ **Post date:** [February 3, 2026, 5:54am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/459 "2026-02-03T05:54:39Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > It’s analogous to the premises of this problem. Maybe so, but I don’t see how. > [@Mijin](#): > > If we’re taking the position that I think you’re alluding to again – of suffering being a good in itself We are not. You singled out Reformation theologists a few posts back so I dropped the virtue ethics. > [@Mijin](#): > > if the response to that is to shrug and suggest it makes sense from a god’s point of view, then we’re back to “mysterious ways”. So long as there is no contradiction, that is … (Checks thread) a win condition for the libertarian free will theist who assumes the existence of God before confronting the evidentiary problem of evil. > [@Mijin](#): > > If anyone has agency, it’s omnimax god. > We can’t use the _hypothesis_ that external factors might tie god’s hands, to then set as a _premise_ that god’s hands are tied. We don’t know that anything limits god. We don’t know that he couldn’t make a universe with free will and no suffering. We know that God’s power does not contradict itself. No square circles. And we know that God is omnimax, as you say. These are just part of the nature of God, not external factors (by definition there is nothing external to God). Therefore if you want to show a contradiction, you must do more than admit ignorance as to whether there is unnecessary suffering. You have to go the extra step and show that there actually is suffering to which an omnibenevolent being would not abide. If you choose to work the evidentiary problem of evil, you have to show that observed suffering implies the existence of unnecessary suffering. This is impossible, in principle (not practice), because belief in God is not inferred from evidence and the existence of God implies nonexistence of unnecessary suffering. Hence: “Then I will also confess to you, That your own right hand can save you.” If you want to show that observations of suffering provide strong evidence against the existence of God, without assuming the existence of God, that’s a very different debate… ~Max ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [February 3, 2026, 12:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/460 "2026-02-03T12:29:01Z")
> [@Max\_S](#): > > > [@Mijin](#): > > > > If we’re taking the position that I think you’re alluding to again – of suffering being a good in itself > > We are not. You singled out Reformation theologists a few posts back so I dropped the virtue ethics. Probably you’re confusing me with someone else, as I haven’t mentioned Reformation anything. But to re-iterate my point: the description of the problem of evil assumes that evil (I prefer the word “suffering”) is a negative in itself and an omnimax god would want it to be as close to zero as possible. As Hume put it: “Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent…” Also the OP goes with that premise. So, if you want to suggest the idea that suffering is a net good in some way, and is a necessary step for the soul or whatever, then that’s fine as a proposed solution to the PoE. But you were suggesting it was an assumption that \*I\* was making, and I am not; I am just engaging with the argument, which has that as a premise. > [@Max\_S](#): > > > [@Mijin](#): > > > > if the response to that is to shrug and suggest it makes sense from a god’s point of view, then we’re back to “mysterious ways”. > > So long as there is no contradiction, that is … (Checks thread) a win condition for the libertarian free will theist who assumes the existence of God before confronting the evidentiary problem of evil. I genuinely don’t understand your response. But yeah, if we’re satisfied with “mysterious ways” then there’s always a “win”, because it’s a universal solution to any objection. > [@Max\_S](#): > > We know that God’s power does not contradict itself. No square circles. And we know that God is omnimax, as you say. These are just part of the nature of God, not external factors (by definition there is nothing external to God). Agreed. > [@Max\_S](#): > > Therefore if you want to show a contradiction, you must do more than admit ignorance as to whether there is unnecessary suffering. Firstly, this seems like an allusion to the logical problem of evil, which is not the argument I am making or have made at any point in this thread. Necessary suffering might exist, sure. But secondly, again, I’m engaging with the argument on its terms, I haven’t changed anything. That random acts of death and suffering make people doubt a loving god exists is not something I’ve invented. My argument, which is basically just restating the evidential problem of evil, is that, all else being equal, we would expect an all-powerful being that wants suffering to be zero to make a world with zero suffering. If there are mitigating factors that mean God must allow N suffering then the burden is on those that propose such factors to define them, explain how they tie an omnimax God and also relate it to the amount of suffering we actually see. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339.md?page=22) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339.md?page=24)