# Does it violate free will if the person was never given the desire to do something in the first place? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [December 2, 2025, 10:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339 "2025-12-02T22:09:00Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 9
**Author:** ![Voyager](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/voyager/32/133_2.png) [@Voyager](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Voyager)\ **Post date:** [January 3, 2026, 7:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/161 "2026-01-03T19:58:57Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Omnipotence doesn’t depend on omnibenevolence. It’s just that an omnibenevolent entity can’t commit evil acts anymore than a circle can be square. If they did, after all, they wouldn’t be omnibenevolent anymore. There is really no great subtlety to this. Exactly why a tri-omni god is logically impossible. Omnipotence clearly requires that the god is the strongest of all possible gods in all possible worlds. No god in any world can make something too heavy to lift - that’s why we agree that not being able to do this is not an issue with that god’s omnipotence. But I can and have shown you a god who can do things the bi-omni god cannot. Therefore this god is not omnipotent. The reason I asked if omnibenevolence was involved with your definition of omnipotence was to see if your definition of it could justify your position. But no, you use the normal definition, which is fine. As for best of all possible worlds, if you are just explaining why believers buy into this stuff, fine. “Circular reasoning” is the middle name of most apologists I’ve heard. “The Bible says that God is the greatest, and we know that the Bible is true because it was inspired by God, who is the greatest.” However, if you are trying to convince anyone else, it does not work. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [January 3, 2026, 8:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/162 "2026-01-03T20:45:15Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > How? If we **know** they’re compatible—which we do, per Plantinga’s argument No we don’t. Skeptical reasoning doesn’t work like that. The argument potentially shows that a reason for believing evil and omnimax are incompatible has failed. That’s not the same thing as proving they are compatible, it would only be a “as far as we know” statement. Normally this distinction doesn’t matter of course, but since you put it in bold the correction is warranted. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Plantinga shows—_proves_, with full logical force—that it is _definitely_ not the case. If you can find a proposition _r_ such that _r_ together with _p_ entails _q_, then _p_ and _q_ are mutually compatible. Not to _your_ claim. If you have a logical proof that we have no reason to see omnimax and evil as incompatible, when by definition that is how they appear, let’s hear it. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Apart from everything else, how would you possibly assess that? What is your baseline? How much evil would you be fine with, in order to still accept it? Everything being the same, but one baby didn’t have their candy stolen at one point? Yep, that would do it. If there is any way that the universe can be improved from a suffering point of view with no effect on free will, then it’s not the best possible world. So yes, the fact that you can trivially make suggestions like this is illustrative of how dubious that claim is. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > No. A retort to the free will defense needs the establishment of the _necessity_ of less suffering. An omnimax god would want no suffering and have the means to ensure there is none. ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [January 3, 2026, 8:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/163 "2026-01-03T20:55:37Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > You might feel it in your bones that a better world should be possible, but that just doesn’t make a compelling argument—that’s just an appeal to intuition. No, it’s because the possibility of a better world is _blatantly obvious._ And even a moderately powerful god could make one, much less an omnipotent one. It would be trivially easy, in fact. The idea that this is even _close_ to the best possible world fails the laugh test; it’s just not believable. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [January 3, 2026, 10:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/164 "2026-01-03T22:53:48Z")
> [@Voyager](#): > > No god in any world can make something too heavy to lift - that’s why we agree that not being able to do this is not an issue with that god’s omnipotence. But I can and have shown you a god who can do things the bi-omni god cannot. Therefore this god is not omnipotent. Again, both gods have all possible powers. It’s just not possible to do evil and remain omnibenevolent. But that doesn’t mean that such a god is less powerful: I can’t kick you in the shin and remain a nice guy, but that doesn’t mean I can’t (read: don’t have the power to) kick you in the shin. > [@Voyager](#): > > However, if you are trying to convince anyone else, it does not work. The free will defense is obviously not about convincing anybody of the existence of God. It is intended to refute a specific attack on the possibility of God’s existence—hence, ‘defense’. > [@Mijin](#): > > No we don’t. Skeptical reasoning doesn’t work like that. > The argument potentially shows that a reason for believing evil and omnimax are incompatible has failed. That’s not the same thing as proving they are compatible, it would only be a “as far as we know” statement. I’m sorry, but that is simply false. Take a step back, go back to the argument as I have presented it, go through it step by step: what is demonstrated, logically proven, is that the premises of a tri-omni God and the existence of evil are unconditionally logically compatible and mutually consistent. That’s the entire point of the argument, and it’s logically valid, so if you want to refute it, you have to find fault with its premises. > [@Mijin](#): > > If you have a logical proof that we have no reason to see omnimax and evil as incompatible, when by definition that is how they appear, let’s hear it. That is exactly what Plantinga’s argument does: it explicitly shows that tri-omnihood and evil are compatible. If two premises are logically compatible, we can’t have reasons to (validly) think them incompatible instead, because it’s simply false that they are incompatible, and one can’t have sound reasons for believing false things. > [@Mijin](#): > > So yes, the fact that you can trivially make suggestions like this is illustrative of how dubious that claim is. Again, no, that’s just not true. This shows—at best—possibility, but this, as pointed out ad nauseam, simply doesn’t do anything wrt the free will defense. > [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > No, it’s because the possibility of a better world is _blatantly obvious._ Appeal to really forcefully presented intuition is still just appeal to intuition, only more desperate. ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [January 3, 2026, 10:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/165 "2026-01-03T22:59:33Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Appeal to really forcefully presented intuition is still just appeal to intuition, only more desperate. The evidence of my eyes isn’t “intuition”. Extraordinary claims requite extraordinary evidence; ant the claim that this world is the best possible world _is_ an extraordinary claim, to put it mildly. And, you are _still_ re-defining omnipotence to be a synonym for powerlessness. Because even a moderately powerful god could just make cancer vanish or otherwise casually eliminate all sorts of suffering. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [January 3, 2026, 11:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/166 "2026-01-03T23:49:08Z")
> [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > Extraordinary claims requite extraordinary evidence; ant the claim that this world is the best possible world _is_ an extraordinary claim, to put it mildly. I’d say you’re barking up the wrong tree, except there isn’t a tree there, and what you’re doing is hardly barking. ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 12:32am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/167 "2026-01-04T00:32:24Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > I’d say you’re barking up the wrong tree, except there isn’t a tree there, and what you’re doing is hardly barking. Throwing out insults isn’t an argument. And this isn’t the Pit. ---
**Author:** ![Irishman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/b487fb/32.png) [@Irishman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Irishman)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 2:02am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/168 "2026-01-04T02:02:56Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > That doesn’t seem to connect in any way with what I said in the quote. In fact, I explicitly say that it’s impossible for an omnibenevolent being to do anything evil. I’m sorry I didn’t make clear, that wasn’t supposed to be a paraphrase of anything you said. Rather, it is meant as an example of how massaging the definitions to fit the desired results works. It is my contention that the definitions are being massaged, not that this definition is being massaged exactly this way. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 8:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/169 "2026-01-04T08:57:30Z")
> [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > Throwing out insults isn’t an argument. And this isn’t the Pit. I’m just stating facts. You’ve been told, with cites, that this silly nonsense of ‘I can make the world better by doing something good’ entirely misses the point, both because in the type of modal argument under discussion one can only consider _complete_ worlds, and because you doing whatever good thing is naturally such that God knows you to do that, so is just part of their calculus in determining which world has the most value. In principle, you even seem to agree with this; if God didn’t consider the world in its entirety, there wouldn’t be any problem with free will, for instance. But God’s knowledge covers the entire history of the world, and thus, it is this and only this that is relevant for consideration. Anything else is just empty noises. But thanks for the junior modding. > [@Irishman](#): > > Rather, it is meant as an example of how massaging the definitions to fit the desired results works. It is my contention that the definitions are being massaged Well, I’ve given the definitions used in the argument above: > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > God is omniscient (possesses maximal knowledge), omnipotent (possesses all possible powers), and omnibenevolent (possesses maximal goodness) The only thing really relevant for the argument is the definition of omnipotence, and the only clarification of that needed is that possible here means ‘logically possible’. If you wish to hold that God could create square circles or violate logical possibility in some other way, then the argument would not go through; but then, of course, there is also no problem of evil. ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 11:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/170 "2026-01-04T11:03:53Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > I’m just stating facts. You’ve been told, with cites, that this silly nonsense of ‘I can make the world better by doing something good’ entirely misses the point, both because in the type of modal argument under discussion one can only consider _complete_ worlds, and because you doing whatever good thing is naturally such that God knows you to do that, so is just part of their calculus in determining which world has the most value. You aren’t stating facts, you are making nonsensical, baseless assertions and ignoring what other people are saying. And saying that I’m just the tool of an evil god still doesn’t make the world the best possible. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 11:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/171 "2026-01-04T11:06:04Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Take a step back, go back to the argument as I have presented it, go through it step by step: what is demonstrated, logically proven, is that the premises of a tri-omni God and the existence of evil are unconditionally logically compatible and mutually consistent. That’s the entire point of the argument, and it’s logically valid, so if you want to refute it, you have to find fault with its premises. You can’t have as a _premise_ something which is in dispute (unless you’re _refuting_ the premise by showing it leads to a logical contradiction). So you’re illustrating here how irrational the argument you are presenting is. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > That is exactly what Plantinga’s argument does: it explicitly shows that tri-omnihood and evil are compatible. No it doesn’t, it tries to show they are not necessarily incompatible, which is not the same thing. Besides, you’re just engaging in motte and bailey again, because I am talking about your claim that we have no reason to believe suffering and an omnimax god are incompatible. The validity or not of Plantinga’s argument has nothing to say to that. Defend your claim. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > This shows—at best—possibility, but this, as pointed out ad nauseam, simply doesn’t do anything wrt the free will defense. Possibility is all that is required to challenge the notion of it being the best possible world. And in terms of repeating ad nauseum; yeah, that’s all you’re doing, just digging your heels in and not taking on the points being put to you. And, in my case, I think you’ve had to resort to several bad faith tactics like the motte and bailey to keep this thing going. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 12:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/172 "2026-01-04T12:26:31Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > You can’t have as a _premise_ something which is in dispute (unless you’re _refuting_ the premise by showing it leads to a logical contradiction). I’m not trying to prove the premise—after all, I consider it to be false (provided you speak of the existence of a tri-omni God). The argument is merely intended to show it consistent with the existence of evil, which entails nothing about it being true or false. So again, that’s just logically false. > [@Mijin](#): > > So you’re illustrating here how irrational the argument you are presenting is. Not to argue from authority here, but the free will defense is _widely_ considered to be successful, both by theistic and atheistic philosophers. See [wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga%27s_free-will_defense): > According to Chad Meister, professor of philosophy at Bethel University, most philosophers accept Plantinga’s free-will defense and thus see the logical problem of evil as having been sufficiently rebutted.[21] Robert Adams says that “it is fair to say that Plantinga has solved this problem. That is, he has argued convincingly for the consistency of God and evil.”[22] William Alston has said that “Plantinga … has established the possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right thing.”[23] William L. Rowe has written “granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God”, referring to Plantinga’s argument. As I said, this isn’t just me hawking on about my personal opinions; I don’t think I’ve uttered really any original thought in this thread, all I’ve done is report on the state of the debate as I am aware of it. Do you really think you’re reasonable in thinking that all of those people considering this argument have just missed the objection you’re raising? Or isn’t it at least conceivable that you might, in fact, be mistaken? > [@Mijin](#): > > No it doesn’t, it tries to show they are not necessarily incompatible, which is not the same thing. Again, _this is not true_. It shows that the two premises of the existence of evil and the existence of a tri-omni God are not logically incompatible, because there are _possible_ circumstances where both are true. This is unequivocal. Again, take wiki (bolding mine): > Hence, if the hypothesis [that God cannot create perfect circumstances, i.e. of ‘transworld depravity’] **cannot be ruled out** , this shows that **the existence of evil is, after all, consistent with the existence of a God with the traditional attributes.** (This goes through via the principle that, if the conjunction of P and some other proposition R (consistent with P), entails Q, then P is consistent with Q. Thus, if the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly benevolent god, together with the hypothesis of transworld depravity, entails the existence of evil, (and if the transworld depravity hypothesis is consistent with the existence of a god with the three traditional attributes), then the existence of such a god is consistent with the existence of evil.) The two important things here is that transworld depravity needs to be _ruled out_, i.e. it needs to be demonstrated that God could create perfect conditions (not merely argued that this is possible), and that if this can’t be done, then the two premises of the existence of evil and of a tri-omni God are mutually consistent. There is no leeway here; this is absolutely logically strict. You have two options to refute this. One, as noted, is to show that it is _necessary_ that God could create perfect conditions. The other is to exhibit another premise, call it S, such that S yields a contradiction together with P and Q—meaning that one of them must be false. > [@Mijin](#): > > Besides, you’re just engaging in motte and bailey again, because I am talking about your claim that we have no reason to believe suffering and an omnimax god are incompatible. The validity or not of Plantinga’s argument has nothing to say to that As I have already shown, this follows directly from Plantinga’s argument. Since the existence of God and that of evil are mutually consistent, you can’t have sound reasons to think them inconsistent, since you can’t have sound reasons to believe a falsehood. > [@Mijin](#): > > Possibility is all that is required to challenge the notion of it being the best possible world. > And in terms of repeating ad nauseum; yeah, that’s all you’re doing, just digging your heels in and not taking on the points being put to you. Well, what could I be doing? You’re simply asserting the same falsehood over and over again; you’re saying that ‘possibly it rains tomorrow’ is refuted by claiming that ‘possibly it doesn’t rain tomorrow’. But it’s just not! There’s no argument needed here, it’s just logically garbage! In any reasonable discussion, this would have to be pointed out once, and then we’d move on. But you just keep claiming it over and over again, so what can I say other than that it’s logically false over and over again? ---
**Author:** ![HoneyBadgerDC](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/honeybadgerdc/32/1033_2.png) [@HoneyBadgerDC](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/HoneyBadgerDC)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 1:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/173 "2026-01-04T13:01:56Z")
> [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > No, it’s because the possibility of a better world is _blatantly obvious._ And even a moderately powerful god could make one, much less an omnipotent one. It would be trivially easy, in fact. The idea that this is even _close_ to the best possible world fails the laugh test; it’s just not believable. An all-powerful god can still only do what is doable. He can only know what is knowable. I think people conflate God with magic. We have to evolve into better beings. It is pretty brilliant that we can evolve slowly. I firmly believe that epigenetics plays a major role in this. Maybe religion is a platform of evolution. ---
**Author:** ![Irishman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/b487fb/32.png) [@Irishman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Irishman)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 7:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/174 "2026-01-04T19:37:05Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > > > odness) > > The only thing really relevant for the argument is the definition of omnipotence, and the only clarification of that needed is that possible here means ‘logically possible’. If you wish to hold that God could create square circles or violate logical possibility in some other way, then the argument would not go through; but then, of course, there is also no problem of evil. I think there might be a disagreement over what “omnibenevolent” means. Does it mean “_won’t_ do evil” or “_can’t_ do evil”? Is that even a meaningful distinction? You have argued that for a moral value action, if doing something is good, then refraining is evil. So for an omnibenevolent God, allowing the evil humans do to cause harm is refraining from preventing evil. That makes it doing evil by your argument. An omnipotent god allowing evil can’t be omnibenevolent. Human moral choice is irrelevant. God _can_ intervene. Indeed, the premise of Christianity is that he does and has. Thus his choice to intervene or not is a reflection of _his_ moral agency. His allowing evil actions to cause evil results conflicts with the claim he is tri-omni. He either can’t intervene or isn’t aware he needs to intervene or chooses not to intervene. God is not constrained by the world as a whole. He made it, and he has the ability to manipulate it at will. ---
**Author:** ![Voyager](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/voyager/32/133_2.png) [@Voyager](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Voyager)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 8:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/175 "2026-01-04T20:00:33Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Again, both gods have all possible powers. It’s just not possible to do evil and remain omnibenevolent. But that doesn’t mean that such a god is less powerful: I can’t kick you in the shin and remain a nice guy, but that doesn’t mean I can’t (read: don’t have the power to) kick you in the shin. What part of “all possible worlds” aren’t you getting? Do you think it is require for an omnipotent being to be omnibenevolent also? God B in my example is not omnibenevolent, and therefore its omnipotence is not affected by it as is the case for God A. If you don’t want to call God B a god, fine, call it a Schwartz. It still is more omnipotent than God A. I don’t know if you believe in Satan, but if you do in our universe Satan can do things that God can’t do, such as things that increase suffering. Or is everything that Satan does for the ultimate good? > [@Mijin](#): > > An omnimax god would want no suffering and have the means to ensure there is none. I suspect that the attempt to have no suffering would result in an impossible optimization problem. Think of two men interested in the same woman, possible if they have free will (and even if they don’t.) One is going to suffer. God can minimize suffering, that should always be possible, but not eliminate it. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 8:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/176 "2026-01-04T20:42:03Z")
> [@Voyager](#): > > Think of two men interested in the same woman, possible if they have free will (and even if they don’t.) One is going to suffer. Well if they’re wired up to feel negative emotions like rejection, as well as the desire of the same woman (remember we don’t choose our desires; that’s not free will, that’s on god). But in terms of the overall idea of an optimization problem, yes, I’ve already conceded that this is at least logically possible. My objections are around free will working alone as a reason for the suffering in the world including natural suffering, and the related claim of this being the best possible world. I also dispute the claim that we have _no reason_ to see omnibenevolence and evil as incompatible, but that one pretty much goes without saying. ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [January 4, 2026, 9:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/177 "2026-01-04T21:03:26Z")
> [@HoneyBadgerDC](#): > > An all-powerful god can still only do what is doable. He can only know what is knowable. I think people conflate God with magic. Because that’s what God _is._ Magic. An omnipotent god can do anything, an omniscient god knows everything; a being constrained by what is _possible_ is an “arbitrarily advanced alien”, not a god. As for religion and evolution, as I’ve said in the past I regard the inborn human compulsion towards religiosity to be the result of selective breeding. Tens of thousands of years of murdering unbelievers has bred humanity to be innately religious and irrational (and long term probably doomed the species). ---
**Author:** ![Irishman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/b487fb/32.png) [@Irishman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Irishman)\ **Post date:** [January 5, 2026, 12:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/178 "2026-01-05T00:46:43Z")
> [@HoneyBadgerDC](#): > > An all-powerful god can still only do what is doable. He can only know what is knowable. I think people conflate God with magic. Conflate? God is magic by definition. I don’t understand what is not doable for an all powerful god. I mean logical impossible like a square circle, sure, but not if the logical conflict goes to the heart of the issue under debate. What is unknowable to an omniscient god? ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [January 5, 2026, 5:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/179 "2026-01-05T05:37:03Z")
> [@Irishman](#): > > I think there might be a disagreement over what “omnibenevolent” means. Does it mean “_won’t_ do evil” or “_can’t_ do evil”? I mean, neither? ‘Omnibenevolent’ is generally considered to mean ‘maximally good’ (see above). The implication of this is that God creates the world so as to maximize moral good; the point of Plantinga’s argument is that this does not entail that the world is free of evil. > [@Irishman](#): > > An omnipotent god allowing evil can’t be omnibenevolent. Sure they can: if it isn’t possible to instantiate a world containing no evil, then the maximally good way to act is to instantiate the world containing the least of it. This is all covered in Plantinga’s argument, and I think we’re going to go in circles unless you refer to that. > [@Irishman](#): > > His allowing evil actions to cause evil results conflicts with the claim he is tri-omni. If God were to determine all actions to come out ‘good’, then there would be no moral value to these actions, and the resulting world would conceivably have less moral value than one in which there are free actions that do sometimes come out bad, but also come out good. > [@Voyager](#): > > God B in my example is not omnibenevolent, and therefore its omnipotence is not affected by it as is the case for God A. My point is that in no case is omnipotence affected by omnibenevolence. It may be inconsistent to be omnibenevolent and do bad, so making an omnibenevolent being do bad is not a possible power; but that doesn’t restrict the possible powers of the omnibenevolent being any more than those of the non-omnibenevolent one (it’s not a possible power for both these beings). Compare: it’s impossible to have sex and remain a virgin, but that doesn’t mean that a virgin can’t (read: is unable to) have sex; they’d just no longer be a virgin if they did. But having sex is within their powers, even as they are virgins. > [@Voyager](#): > > I don’t know if you believe in Satan, but if you do in our universe Satan can do things that God can’t do, such as things that increase suffering. Or is everything that Satan does for the ultimate good? Well, I don’t believe in Satan anymore than I believe in God, but at least in Plantinga’s telling, Satan’s actions are similarly free as ours. But that doesn’t mean he has any powers that God lacks. > [@Mijin](#): > > I also dispute the claim that we have _no reason_ to see omnibenevolence and evil as incompatible, but that one pretty much goes without saying. Well, again, you can’t have sound reasons to believe something false, so if Plantinga’s argument goes through, there can be no such reasons (and that, as you frame it here, omnibenevolence on its own is compatible with evil is trivial: a being that is merely omnibenevolent, but powerless, could do nothing at all to stop evil). That point doesn’t go away just from you continuing to ignore it. > [@Der\_Trihs](#): > > An omnipotent god can do anything, an omniscient god knows everything; a being constrained by what is _possible_ is an “arbitrarily advanced alien”, not a god. Of course, for a god not constrained by what is possible, there also is no problem of evil: even if tri-omnihood and evil were impossible to reconcile, that would not be a problem for such a god. ---
**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\ **Post date:** [January 5, 2026, 5:44am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/180 "2026-01-05T05:44:41Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > I mean, neither? ‘Omnibenevolent’ is generally considered to mean ‘maximally good’ (see above). The implication of this is that God creates the world so as to maximize moral good; the point of Plantinga’s argument is that this does not entail that the world is free of evil. The world is a nightmare of suffering and always has been, if _that’s_ “maximally good”, then all hail evil. If a god’s idea of “good” is more horrific than anything any human has ever done, then that god is an enemy of humanity. And plants and animals, for that matter. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339.md?page=8) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339.md?page=10)