# Does it violate free will if the person was never given the desire to do something in the first place? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [December 2, 2025, 10:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339 "2025-12-02T22:09:00Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 234
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [January 12, 2026, 11:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339/234 "2026-01-12T11:04:17Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > The claim is at least partially empirical: whether an omnimax god exists or not is something we can support or not with empirical data. Possibly (e.g. finetuning arguments and such), but that’s of course beside the point: your claim has been that we have empirical reasons to see the existence of a tri-omni God and suffering as incompatible, which Plantinga’s argument shows is false. > [@Mijin](#): > > This isn’t your thread, and the attempt to steer everything into a “logical argument for god vs plantinga” is a hijack in my view. You do not need to argue against the points I bring forward if you don’t wish to, but I’m not going to be silenced by either this tactic or you alleging that I’m being unreasonable in not budging. You may wish to grasp for such metadebate strategies in the absence of any convincing arguments of your own, but that doesn’t prompt any action on my side. > [@Mijin](#): > > What I have said is that the existence and magnitude of suffering gives us reason to doubt that an omnimax including omnibenevolent god exists. And I have pointed out that this is a logical error (absent introducing further premises to reason from, e.g. a limit on the evil you think a tri-omni God might permit). > [@Mijin](#): > > Your position at this point is beyond absurd – that even if we lived in a _literal hell_ we would have _no reason at all_ to doubt we lived in a world made by a maximally kind, maximally powerful god. You’re free to show how the argument fails to entail exactly this; in the absence of such, this is just childish foot-stomping. You’re pointing to evidence that (validly) argues that (3) is false, _but its truth isn’t needed for the free will defense_, and hence, evidence that (3) is false simply isn’t evidence against the compatibility of evil and a tri-omni God. Even if we know for certain that we don’t live in the best possible world, that doesn’t defeat the argument. I don’t know, maybe this is the thing that isn’t clear? Again, the structure of arguing _q_ (‘there is a tri-omni God’) and _p_ (‘there is evil in the world’) to be consistent is by showing that _q_ and another premise _r_ entail _p_. But that doesn’t mean that _r_ has to be true! And all you’re arguing for is that _r_ seems probably false. There can be innumerable other premises _r’_, _r’'_, _r’‘’_ and so on such that they entail _p_. It just needs to be shown that there _exists_ one, and then, we know that _p_ and _q_ are consistent, and _no evidence against r can change that_! > [@Mijin](#): > > But go ahead and pretend again that I said something about the logical problem of evil. I’m not claiming you’re saying something about the logical problem of evil, I’m pointing out that Plantinga’s argument has implications on what you are saying (that the magnitude of evil ought to lower credence in a tri-omni God) that you aren’t taking on board. > [@PlaceboTarget](#): > > To me, Plantinga’s argument is fairly clear, though I don’t mean that in an arrogant way. What I’m really curious about is whether this reflects your own position. Well, I think the argument is obviously sound, and its implications are clear. But of course, there’s no problem of evil for me in the first place, since I don’t think there’s any such thing as a god. > [@PlaceboTarget](#): > > Many of us might be willing to accept a logical defense like Plantinga’s if the amount of suffering were not so overwhelming But again, this isn’t a factor in deciding the mere consistency of evil and a tri-omni God. It doesn’t have to be _true_ that we live in the best possible world for the defense to work, it works just as well in a world that is sheer relentless suffering. Plantinga’s argument establishes the consistency of evil and a tri-omni God unconditionally; thus pointing to certain conditions doesn’t work against the argument. One can, as I’ve pointed out several times now, of course add other premises that one might want to hold, such as that there is ‘gratuitous’ evil in the world, which no tri-omni God would permit (as in e.g. Rowe’s evidential argument). If one has reasons to believe these extra premise, which may in part be empirical (as for the question of how much evil there is in the world), then one has similarly reasons to disbelieve in a tri-omni God. But crucially, this still does _nothing_ to refute the consistency of evil with a tri-omni God, as @Mijin keeps claiming! > [@PlaceboTarget](#): > > Logic is only one of the tools we use to understand the world. It’s a powerful tool, but its structures don’t always map neatly onto lived experience. Sure, but logic is the tool that ensures that a conclusion comes out true, if the argumentation is sound. If one’s intuitions then still militate against that conclusion, one’s intuitions just are wrong—as they often are! --- _[View the full topic](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/does-it-violate-free-will-if-the-person-was-never-given-the-desire-to-do-something-in-the-first-place/1025339)._