Does no free will necessarily entail fatalism or nihilism?

I invite anybody to point out internal contradictions in my 2021 definition of libertarian free agency.

But as for the OP of this thread, absence of free will (my definition) does not imply determinism. If you allow stochastic processes that leaves the door open for random superseding causes, incompatible with fatalism. I do believe determinism implies fatalism but not necessarily nihilism (existentialism being an alternative).

I don’t think morality would cease to exist. Since I’m a Platonist I believe abstract concepts such as morality exist independently. I’m also a moral relativist, meaning I recognize existence of moral systems that I do not endorse. There are plenty of moral systems that work fine under hard determinism. Mine isn’t one of them, so in the interest of not chucking everything I believe about right and wrong, I’m willing to do some philosophical gymnastics.

~Max

But why? If “free will” had an actual mechanism that made it understandable, why wouldn’t it be free will?

Really, one of the usually-unspoken parts of the free will concept is mandatory ignorance; as soon as you can understand how a mental process works it’s not “free will” anymore. A pretty common attitude about mental faculties of all kinds I’ve noted; it’s a widespread position that if something like consciousness or creativity can actually be understood then it’s not “real”. Only things we are ignorant of are “real”.

The way I’m thinking of it, it’s the “mechanism” part, not the “understandable” part, that precludes free will.

That’s the thing, if something is “understandable” it is a “mechanism”.

I think that’s why quantum mechanics gets drawn into discussions of the mind so much, enough of it isn’t understood (and even less by the average person) that people wanting to avoid religious language can toss in quantum mechanics to install the black box of mystery they want.

Can you explain why?

~Max

Psychology? If something is “understandable” then people start thinking of it like a clockwork device instead of some mysterious thing they can attribute human “essence” to.

The whole phenomenon has little to do with reason, it’s all emotional.

Aren’t there other paths to understanding besides imagining a clockwork device?

If I understand a piece of music, that doesn’t mean I am imagining the constituent melodies and harmonies as a mechanism. Does it? Can’t understanding come from association with things other than mechanisms?

~Max

First, I don’t intend to wade through that thread, but I did read the initial post.

Second, I don’t know if you can call it an internal contradiction, but one flaw in the argument where people may disagree is when you “ask you to assume an agent may not be reduced into physical pieces or processes”.

I think the rub is where you say the choice was “inevitable”, based upon whatever. If that choice is inevitable, it must be the only outcome that could occur, so how is it a choice? It’s just a stage play. The audience of a stage play might not know what happens next or what the next line is, but the actors are just doing what the script says. There isn’t really a choice for them, they do what is next in their directions.

For the choice to be a choice, there has to be an actual option as to what could occur.

One rebuttal might be a simple analogy. You come to a fork in the road, you can go left or right. Your choice. Except you want to go to Boston and not Pittsburg, so the road that goes to Boston is the right one.

The road didn’t constrain the choice, but the desired outcome did. But desire is one of those intangibles. Does that count as a constraint from the standpoint of “free choice”, or is that not a constraint to your will, but merely a filter for you to evaluate?

As I said it’s not a rational position in the first place; the fact that it’s easy to pick apart doesn’t eliminate the emotional appeal it has for many people.

As the saying goes you can’t reason somebody out of a position they didn’t reason themselves into in the first place. And very few of the popular attitudes towards the mind are things people reasoned themselves into.

I don’t see this as a flaw in the argument or the definition. If you reject that premise it follows, and I would endorse the conclusion, that free agency (as I defined it) cannot exist.

~Max

How does your agent make decisions?

You lost me.

  • Mijin & Der_Trihs disagree with part of the OP because they believe free will is incoherent.
  • Your difficulty with finding an acceptable definition of free will is […] that if free will worked according to a mechanism that explained what determines a person’s free choices, it wouldn’t be free will.
  • If free will had an actual mechanism that made it understandable, why wouldn’t it be free will?
  • The way I’m thinking of it, it’s the mechanism part, not the understandable part, that precludes free will.
  • That’s the thing, if something is understandable it is a mechanism.
  • Can you explain why?
  • If something is understandable then people start thinking of it like a clockwork device.
  • Aren’t there other paths to understanding besides imagining a clockwork device?
  • It’s (what’s?) not a rational position in the first place; the fact that it’s easy to pick apart doesn’t eliminate the emotional appeal it has for many people. (non-sequitur?)

~Max

nm

~Max

While there may be a component “decision-making process” such as rational deliberation, no specific process is strictly required. It is only necessary that no amount of physical knowledge can ever be sufficient for one (e.g. a daemon) to derive the true probability distribution of potential outcomes.

Compare,

~Max

Because my conscious thoughts are one of the authors of that script. As I said upthread, I can’t predict your actions without simulating your brain and your thoughts.
If the universe is deterministic, then all events are essentially a fixed lattice, but your thoughts are a critical part of it. Take out your conscious thoughts and it’s a different universe. You’re not a passenger.

So the event or element that varies is this undefined and unexplainable thing called consciousness or self or identity and the thoughts of that identity.

Except doesn’t that just bury the question one layer deeper? What allows concsciousness to vary? Thoughts are informed and guided by past experience and knowledge. But for them to not be deterministic, there has to be some break, some element that is not forced, either by an external agent or by the accumulation of the situation.

If this agent, this self can choose a different option in the same situation, that’s free choice. If the situation means that the agent would always arrive at the same option, is that choice?

The physical structure and electrical state of the substrate they run on (in our cases, brains).

Right, and since such an element is impossible without invoking magic, that tells us that they ARE deterministic.

OK, if we posit an unknowable magical mumbo-jumbo soul, then free will is coherent. Just like it is coherent if we posit an all powerful creator whose direct control we can be free of.

If this agent can choose a different option, not because if prefers that option, not because it thinks that option is morally superior, not to make a point about free will but without any cause, free choice is the last thing that I’d call it.

It doesn’t have to be a magical mumbo-jumbo soul. It just has to be unknowable.

For example, imagine you and I are collaborating to write a story book. The premise is a character, the Skeptic encountering God. You get to decide what the Skeptic does and says, provided he has no unusual abilities. I get to decide everything else that happens. The project was originally my idea though, and though we agreed on our respective parts, I retain ultimate control over the project. I am the one actually putting each word to the page. I think this is a good base scenario for understanding the concept of free will.

Here is part of the finished text:

The Skeptic sees two labelled cups on a table. One has coffee and one has tea. God announces, “You are given the choice between coffee and tea. Which do you choose?”

The Skeptic replies, “If you are omniscient, you already know how I shall choose. Tell me what I shall choose, then I shall make my choice.”

God replies, “You shall choose coffee.”

The Skeptic replies, “In that case, I choose coffee.”

God asks, “Why did you choose coffee?”

The Skeptic replies, “I don’t know.”

What happened? A number of things could have happened:

  • I broke our agreement and forced the Skeptic to choose coffee.
  • Whenever you had the Skeptic choose the other drink, I would revise God’s announcement to match the Skeptic’s choice. Then you would revise the Skeptic’s choice and the cycle would repeat. However in order for the text to become finished one of us would have to give up - in this case you gave up and had the Skeptic’s choice match God’s prediction. The Skeptic character couldn’t know about this back and forth outside the storybook universe, so he wouldn’t know why he made the choice he did.

Either way, the Skeptic did not exercise free will when choosing coffee, because God announced His prediction thus making the assured outcome physical knowledge.

What about the Skeptic’s initial reply to God? That decision was made by you based in part on factors external to the story book universe. The real reason the Skeptic tries to outsmart God is because you wanted that to be the direction of the story. Whether you have free will depends on whether someone with perfect physical knowledge could most accurately predict your decisions, and I’ll leave that open for now. The can is kicked down the road a little but the definition of free will is relative to the physical/non-physical distinction. From the perspective of the Skeptic himself, did he exercise free will in his initial reply to God? Your decision was based on complex chaotic processes and only a fraction of the necessary information is exposed as ‘physical knowledge’ in the story book universe. For a character in the story book universe, the goings on between you and I occur in a non-physical substrate. No amount of ‘physical knowledge’ is enough to accurately predict the Skeptic’s initial reply. Therefore, from an in-universe perspective, the Skeptic exercised free will in his initial reply.

~Max