Does one need faith in inductive reasoning?

[Voyager]

@II Gyan II

And how do you receive their statements? Primarily via your visual and auditory faculties.

Of course we do. And by induction, and lots of experiments with them, their relative reliability has been demonstrated. We can cross the street after looking both ways, and be relatively sure we won’t be run over by a car our senses have missed. We go to school, read our texts and our tests, and get good grades, since we have clearly read the same stuff as everyone else.

As I said, we can’t trust our senses 100%, as our experience has shown. But the position that we can’t trust them in controlled situations like the reading of instruments is pure nonsense. I trust that you don’t live in the way you are suggesting, always doubting your senses, for if you did you couldn’t even respond to me.

[Voyager]

@Thudlow Boink

I think Gyan’s point is that, in order to read the instruments and know what the measurements are, we still have to use our senses. We can’t leave our senses completely out of the process; we have to use (and, therefore, rely on) them at some point.

I was hoping that he has a better point than that. That position I consider sophomoric in the literal sense - as a sophomore I suffered through a Theory of Knowledge class where a couple of students harped on the “we can’t really know for sure” them the whole term. The professor probably wanted to strangle them, and I would have helped.

[straight_man]

@Voyager

Of course we do. And by induction, and lots of experiments with them, their relative reliability has been demonstrated.

…and you have just demonstrated begging the question perfectly.

[II_Gyan_II]

@Voyager

We can cross the street after looking both ways, and be relatively sure we won’t be run over by a car our senses have missed.

The issue here is whether our relative certainty requires an assumption or do we “know” it to be the case? Secondly, I make the same judgement, but in the back of my head, I treat it as requiring an assumption. Hence, this is a purely functionalist stance (i.e. I choose to make inferences in this way), requiring no endorsement of the stance of objective and/or constant reality, hereby referred to as ObRl.

But the position that we can’t trust them in controlled situations like the reading of instruments is pure nonsense.

And how are you assigning the attribute of “controlled” to a situation? What’s your process?

I trust that you don’t live in the way you are suggesting, always doubting your senses, for if you did you couldn’t even respond to me.

I don’t doubt my senses at all. In fact, I’m and have been arguing completely the opposite. Once you admit the possibility that the senses (and the mind, by extension) can be deceived, you throw everything into a loop. The reason being that you are always your mind. You only see, hear, think, dream with the same mind (I will entertain arguments to the contrary). Now, you can take this line of reasoning further down two paths

a)that when the mind’s integrity is questioned, everything is suspect. This is the “sophomoric” response and it is usually rejected on functionalist grounds (“surely, you don’t live your life that way”) without tacking the philosophical quandary (how does one show validity non-circularly?). I’ll write more on this below.

b)à la Russell’s paradox, you create a taxonomy of mental operations and believe/declare that operations of types A, B, C are susceptible to illusion (e.g. cursory glance to compare table lengths) and types D, E, F are reliable. This is the implied but unacknowledged approach adopted by you, when you claim that “controlled situations” can give us reliable results. The problem here is that you have no external or independent method to verify this schema. You use the same mind employing from within the same set of operations (A…F) to decide their integrity and set up these distinctions.

In the end, the issue is ill-framed. As I mentioned in an earlier post, due to the perceived presence of other subjects (and probably even the constant Self), there’s an assumption of a common i.e. constant independent reality across subjects. So, we end up using functionalist criteria but couch our interpretations in terms of ObRl. Let me use the earlier illustration to present this in concrete terms.

1)Upon first look, table A looks larger. But you believe that senses can be deceiving and hence, using inductive inference, entertain the possibility that it may be happening in this instance as well.
2)You bring out a tape measure, obtain a pair of numbers, and compare. Again, based on past experience, you do this because you believe that this method has shown itself to be more useful by providing consistent results. However, because of the committment to ObRl, you believe this as showing that the senses can be deceiving, given that you don’t believe the table to have changed, since absent forces, the independently existing table possesses the same attributes. Hence, any deficit is in your mind. Whereas, I use the ruler because I use inductive inference for purely functional reasons. This requires an assumption. If the assumption is unacknowledged and/or considered unjustified, it’s called faith.

[Apos]

How is it in any way sensible to declare that one has “faith” in induction when the very principle states upfront its limitation and unwarranted axiom? How can one be said to both have faith that the sun will rise tomorrow, and to know it via induction? The two are incompatible. The whole point of induction is doing away with faith: we instead state upfront the unwarranted axiom we are making, based not on any conviction that we have proven it, but rather because it has a good track record of utility.

[II_Gyan_II]

@Apos

How can one be said to both have faith that the sun will rise tomorrow, and to know it via induction?

One doesn’t know it via induction, but in rhetoric, one says that ‘one knows that the sun will rise tomorrow’, whereas one says that one has faith in Christian doctrine. In the former case, the belief, actually based on induction, is presented as a piece of knowledge whereas the point of the OP is that it too is an assumption and furthermore, since the whole point of problem of induction is that a good track record is not evidence for induction being true, an unjustified one. Hence ‘faith’.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

@II Gyan II

And the more parsimonious answer, to me, is No. If Change is the most fundamental characteristic of sentient existence, then that ought to include all “laws” as well. There may be no “ground”. It’s turtles all the way down, and the only constant is change, and that includes the “rate” of change and other calculus-inspired metafunctions of change.

I think there is a confusal of metaphysical and epistemological issues here, and in your later post (although this may actually represent a deeper commitment of yours, rather than a philosophical conflation). Change may be the most fundamental characteristic of sentient experience, but sentient experience is a latecomer to the universe, and the universe is not structured according to our experience. Thus, there may be (and I think are) laws, and the change that governs our sentient experience is ultimately rule-governed change.

Now of course, it is a truism that our knowledge of the universe is structured by our experience, and the question of induction is essentially a question of knowledge: does induction produce knowledge? How do we know induction is reliable? Even if there are laws in the universe, they are not directly perceivable by humans. All we can do is observe regularities and infer a law governing them. And of course our inferences are never incorrigible; we can never be certain that we have inferred correctly.

But I guess my chief complaint is that it is fallacious to infer from “Our knowledge of the universe is structured by our experience” (an epistemological claim) to “The universe is structured by our experience” (a metaphysical claim). God knows many philosophers have argued that this inference is sound. And there may be some way of arguing from the former claim to the latter. But it is not as simple as inferring one from the other; the issue is more complicated than that.

[II_Gyan_II]

@Sophistry and Illusion

But I guess my chief complaint is that it is fallacious to infer from “Our knowledge of the universe is structured by our experience” (an epistemological claim) to “The universe is structured by our experience” (a metaphysical claim).

Maybe so, and if so, your earlier passage exhibits the same mistake

Change may be the most fundamental characteristic of sentient experience, but sentient experience is a latecomer to the universe, and the universe is not structured according to our experience.

I’m only aware of the outlines of the thoughts of the German idealists, but the claim that I would posit is not that the universe is structured according to our experience, but given that experience is the sole intermediary between the perceiving subject and the external universe, it is nonsensical to assert most ontological claims. But more importantly, and this is what the idealists might be getting at, it does not matter what the universe is really like, only that one’s experience is one’s universe, for that is the only thing one ‘inhabits’.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

@Apos

How is it in any way sensible to declare that one has “faith” in induction when the very principle states upfront its limitation and unwarranted axiom? How can one be said to both have faith that the sun will rise tomorrow, and to know it via induction? The two are incompatible. The whole point of induction is doing away with faith: we instead state upfront the unwarranted axiom we are making, based not on any conviction that we have proven it, but rather because it has a good track record of utility.

I think I’m with **Gyan ** on this one. If you want to be a skeptic about induction, the point isn’t that induction can’t yield certainty–anyone would concede this. The point (according to the skeptic) is that we don’t have any reason at all to believe the conclusions of inductive reasoning. For (goes the argument) the only way to argue for induction is to argue that so far induction has worked, and so we should expect it to work in the future–itself an inductive argument. So the only way to argue for the reliability of induction is via an inductive argument–so the reasoning is viciously circular.

I want to respond to some of **Gyan’s ** points, but I may not have time tonight.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

@II Gyan II

I’m only aware of the outlines of the thoughts of the German idealists, but the claim that I would posit is not that the universe is structured according to our experience, but given that experience is the sole intermediary between the perceiving subject and the external universe, it is nonsensical to assert most ontological claims. But more importantly, and this is what the idealists might be getting at, it does not matter what the universe is really like, only that one’s experience is one’s universe, for that is the only thing one ‘inhabits’.

What the German Idealists like Kant meant, I think, is that all of our thinking is mediated by our concepts, so we cannot say (or even think) anything meaningful about the world as unconceptualized. This seems undeniable. But I get the impression from what you are saying that because we can only conceptualize the world a particular way, our conceptualization forces the world to be a particular way. So, given that change is the most basic element of our experience, the world (including its laws) must constantly be in flux. This I reject. Granted, we can only understand the world by means of our concepts; and granted, our conceptual system is not the only conceivable one. But once a conceptual system is in place, the world enforces a particular use of that conceptual system; the conceptual system doesn’t force compliance on the world. The best analogy I read once is of a strike in baseball. The definition of ‘strike’ and ‘strike zone’ in baseball is mostly arbitrary. But once the concept has been defined, there is a *matter of fact * as to whether the ball went through the strike zone and constituted a strike. Similarly, our conceptual system incorporates concepts such as “gravity”. These concepts may not be the only way to divide up the world, or even the best. But once we have established a meaning for these concepts, the world forces certain applications of them. So given our definition of ‘gravity,’ it is the case that gravitational attraction varies with the inverse square of distance. And if we make multiple measurements of gravitational attraction over time, it is up to the world as to whether these measures will change over time. It is *not * up to us, or our conceptual system, even if ‘gravity’ is in some sense an arbitary concept. (I’m not saying it is; I’m just arguing what does not follow from a concession that it is arbitrary.) So this is my basis for making the charge of conflating epistemological or conceptual issues with metaphysical ones. “We interpret the world via our concepts” does not entail “Our conceptual system forces the world into conformity with whatever concepts we arbitrarily may use.” For the world may resist being conceptualized in a certain way (as can be seen by the failure of, say, the theory of phlogiston, or the caloric theory of heat.) This isn’t to say we can speak of Kantian things-in-themselves, that is, things as they exist apart from our conceptual systems. All ontology is done via our conceptual systems. But even as we view the world through the lens of our concepts, the world tells us which of our concepts apply in which cases, which are fatally incoherent, and so forth. If we have a concept of ‘electron’ or ‘phlogiston,’ the world tells us the ontological status of the items these concepts purport to refer to. Or if the world doesn’t tell us, there are ways of eliciting this information from the world.

[II_Gyan_II]

@Sophistry and Illusion

What the German Idealists like Kant meant, I think, is that all of our thinking is mediated by our concepts, so we cannot say (or even think) anything meaningful about the world as unconceptualized. This seems undeniable. But I get the impression from what you are saying that because we can only conceptualize the world a particular way, our conceptualization forces the world to be a particular way.

This in unrelated to the topic I’m arguing about. Like I said, I’m unaware of the details and nuances of German idealism and it’ll be best if we avoid specifics of German idealism.

So, given that change is the most basic element of our experience, the world (including its laws) must constantly be in flux.

My point was different. Change is the most basic element of our experience, ergo it’s more parsimonious (for me, at least) to believe that everything is in flux, rather than believing that things A, B ,C are permanent and D, E, F… impermanent. The only difference I see is the rate of change i.e. day turns to night in ~12 hours, seasons change every few months. But everything’s in flux including these rates of change. Here, I make no claims about why that is so, only that the latter belief is more contrived than the former. And if everything changes, then there are no laws. NOW, if that is so, and if we wish to still retain the notion of some agency behind change, then the only candidate left is the Subject. Of course, here, change refers not to change of the supposed objective reality but of the subject’s perceived world. But this is a different topic than what I was arguing about.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

@II Gyan II

My point was different. Change is the most basic element of our experience, ergo it’s more parsimonious (for me, at least) to believe that everything is in flux, rather than believing that things A, B ,C are permanent and D, E, F… impermanent. The only difference I see is the rate of change i.e. day turns to night in ~12 hours, seasons change every few months. But everything’s in flux including these rates of change. Here, I make no claims about why that is so, only that the latter belief is more contrived than the former. And if everything changes, then there are no laws. NOW, if that is so, and if we wish to still retain the notion of some agency behind change, then the only candidate left is the Subject. Of course, here, change refers not to change of the supposed objective reality but of the subject’s perceived world. But this is a different topic than what I was arguing about.

Well, parsimony is only one criterion to be considered in theory choice. Other criteria are explanatory and predictive power, etc. So I think considering all criteria of theory choice, it is best to postulate that some regularities (e.g., the law of gravitation) are law-like and others (such as the rising of the sun) are not. Presumably (although the skeptic will of course say we have no inductive (or any other kind) of reason to claim we know this) the law of gravitation will not change, whereas at some point the sun will no longer rise (as it will have expanded and destroyed the earth). Occam said not to minimize the number of entities; he only said not to postulate more than you need to explain the phenomena you encounter.

PS–Bedtime in the Sophist household; will respond to replies (if any) in the AM.

[II_Gyan_II]

@Sophistry and Illusion

Well, parsimony is only one criterion to be considered in theory choice. Other criteria are explanatory and predictive power, etc. So I think considering all criteria of theory choice, it is best to postulate that some regularities (e.g., the law of gravitation) are law-like and others (such as the rising of the sun) are not. Presumably (although the skeptic will of course say we have no inductive (or any other kind) of reason to claim we know this) the law of gravitation will not change, whereas at some point the sun will no longer rise (as it will have expanded and destroyed the earth). Occam said not to minimize the number of entities; he only said not to postulate more than you need to explain the phenomena you encounter.

1)Like I said, everything may change, but evidently there are differing rates of change. Maybe G changes too slowly for our perceptual and cognitive thresholds to resolve. The human lifespan on average lasts for ~25000 days so observing the regular changing of ambient light is unavoidable. Similarly, for seasons. Knowing about long-term global climate cycles like Ice Ages et. al requires recorded memory. Maybe if we had, or in the future, have the technology, G may turn out to be perceptibly different in, say, 120,000 years from today’s measurement. The future case is an empirical hypothesis and thus theoretically can be falsified.

2)If some sort of idealism is true, then the ‘explanatory’ and ‘predictive’ power of gravity may be a self-fulfilling belief. I see no way to falsify this because, to use not quite a completely apt analogy, this is like the serpent biting its own tail i.e. Ouroboros. Wanting to test idealism indicates some sort of skeptical belief, which may idealistically lead to…

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

@II Gyan II

1)Like I said, everything may change, but evidently there are differing rates of change. Maybe G changes too slowly for our perceptual and cognitive thresholds to resolve. The human lifespan on average lasts for ~25000 days so observing the regular changing of ambient light is unavoidable. Similarly, for seasons. Knowing about long-term global climate cycles like Ice Ages et. al requires recorded memory. Maybe if we had, or in the future, have the technology, G may turn out to be perceptibly different in, say, 120,000 years from today’s measurement. The future case is an empirical hypothesis and thus theoretically can be falsified.

2)If some sort of idealism is true, then the ‘explanatory’ and ‘predictive’ power of gravity may be a self-fulfilling belief. I see no way to falsify this because, to use not quite a completely apt analogy, this is like the serpent biting its own tail i.e. Ouroboros. Wanting to test idealism indicates some sort of skeptical belief, which may idealistically lead to…

This is true, and I think this all points out weaknesses in the inductive principle that even a non-skeptic can admit. For example, the rate of the expansion of the universe is accelerating; does this mean some physical ‘constant’ is changing its value? Other things we once thought were constant (e.g., the rate at which time elapses) turned out, once we had more sensitive measuring devices, not constant at all. And the fact that so far we have observed a law to hold, within the limits of measurement, doesn’t show that it will hold in the future.

I know I’m not as fun to debate as your old debating partner Sentient Meat, but thanks for playing along!