Oh, good!
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but
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Damn.
I was not arguing about “personhood” as requiring communication between past-self and future-self. Where did you get that? Besides, as Spiritus noted, there is communication, just one-way.
Because one can follow that it is the same biological entity existing through time and occupying essentially the same space, with a persistent consciousness. In much the same manner I can say that the cup of coffee sitting on my desk is the same one that was there one planck unit of time ago; that things persist through time in approximately the same space is a fairly customary belief. What you seem to be saying is that there is a cup of coffee in a another universe that is the same cup of coffee as mine, which it can’t be because my cup of coffee is right here. Two things occupying different space/time/universes cannot be the same thing; they may be identical atomically, but they are in different “places” and are discrete objects. You’re not even arguing that they’re identical atomically, just that for some reason you think a person who is not the same as me and is in an entirely different universe than the original me and does not share consciousness with the original me is still me.
Let’s say I scan you and produce a atomically identical person three feet to the left of you. Is this other person you? If so, what happens when the original you is killed; can you really say that “you” are not dead as long as someone, somewhere is atomically similar to you? OK, what if I produce a person next to you who is not at all atomically identical, in fact is a different sex and had a different father. Is this person still you? If the original you is killed, does that mean you really still exist, as long as someone, somewhere exists?
Your definition of personhood requires that I believe that a person in another universe with completely different genetic makeup and experiences is me. That is patently unintuitive. By that defintion, we are all the same person, which is a lovely philosophical statement but remarkably unlike our customary concept of personhood.
