Why, sure it does. Open a thread to have a debate about the Prime Minister of the United States. You will be told two things straighaway: (1) that there is no Prime Minister of the United States, and (2) that as a consequence, the position doesn’t even mean anything here.
Well, you were a bit more civil this time, I must say. Still, you are hereby assigned to read Dale Carnegie’s eternal best seller, How to Win Friends and Influence People, linked to herein. Quine, incidentally, was a self-indulgent hack.
Pardon me for interrupting your train of writing, but now that you mention Russel, I see that it looks like you attempted to adapt Russel’s extension of Frege’s theory of descriptions to your assertion about the south pole.
Russel’s whimsical observation about France’s King is formulated something like this.
Let there be a current King of France, called x:
(∃x(Fx))
NB: it is important to note that there was no King of France by that time
And let it be the case that there is not more than one King of France (i.e., if y is the current King of France and x is the current King of France), then:
(∀x(Fx → ∀y(Fy → y=x)))
Aver further that for every King of France (x), the King of France is bald.
(∀x(Fx → Bx))
Russel held that because the first statement is false, then a conjuction of the three statements must also be false (in FOPL, but not necessarily in other logical systems, where the truth condition is more controversial).
In your case, there was no need for biconditionality, nor all the flopping about with respect to xs and ys, because by definition there is only one South Pole. (In Russel’s case, there could have been two Kings of France. Henry VIII of England, for example, took on the title for a time.)
Be that as it may, it just doesn’t come across well in an informal setting like this. The whole purpose of logic is to examine statements for truth. We can talk plainly here, like people in a room. Just because we do so does not make what we say horseshit.