[QUOTE=pantom]
The decision to go with a mildly inflationary monetary policy was made when the Fed was founded. Before that, we had a mildly deflationary monetary policy. An interesting distinction, but a businessman or a consumer can adjust to either environment as long as they know that it will last.
[/QUOTE]
I want to focus on this aspect, because I think our different POVs turn on it.
My lesson from the Great Depression and the Japanese experience is that deflation is an economic disaster: I confess that my attitude towards deflation borders on hysteria. If you agree with me, then it follows that a specie standard (or “basket of goods” standard) --which could lead to periods of deflation or inflation, depending upon conditions-- is a really, really Bad Idea.
Otherwise not though. It’s my burden to address the nineteenth century experience, where they had a few panics in the first half and a lot of them in the 2nd half. My take is that the labor market was a lot different back then, so that while deflation may not have been optimum, it wasn’t a continuous economic nightmare.
In a modern economy though, nominal wages are sticky downwards – they can be cut in a substantial way only through labor turnover, which means unemployment. But the latter can feed on itself – removing a demand management tool from the government is the height of folly (or rather, insert your choice of hyperbole here).
Now, to be honest, things might not be as bad as I conceive them. Actually, I understand that workers do accept nominal wage cuts under certain circumstances. Again, a really good study of the Japanese economic history, 1980-2010, would be illuminating.
Lesser points:
------ For some reason, that winds up as an argument against the gold standard, and in a crazy way, once the Fed is spanked for raising interest rates so that gold can be blamed for that Depression, for the continued existence of the Fed.
The Fed actually didn’t raise interest rates from 1929-33: rather Friedman and Schwartz criticize them for not dropping them with sufficient energy. There are a number of reasons for the Fed’s insufficiently stimulative policy.
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No general model of the macroeconomy existed --anywhere-- prior to 1936.
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They had to defend the gold standard (certainly true, but they arguably went overboard) and
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(Friedman & Schwartz’s favorite) Benjamin Strong died. Ben Strong, former chairman of the New York Fed, was held in high regard by all and would have done the right thing. But after his demise, the Fed was run by a lawyer, more schooled in the art of compromise than in economics. So when times called for aggressive interest rate cutting, the Fed disastrously split the difference.