# Downloading Your Consciousness Just Before Death. **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 15, 2019, 10:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022 "2019-05-15T22:12:06Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 9
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 8:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/161 "2019-05-22T20:34:56Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > The way you frame this already presupposes a speculative and contentious particular view of consciousness, known as [functionalism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)). But functionalism, while it has a large following, is hardly the only game in town when it comes to consciousness; even the straightforwardly physicalist account isn’t functionalist. So on most current ideas of how consciousness works, that it’s the function of a physical brain is simply false. > > I think that both you and **wolfpup** should take a look at [Integrated Information Theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory), which posits that consciousness is either due to or constituted by the information distributed among the parts of a system in a certain way. In a simplified sense, integrated information can be thought of as the amount of information the whole of a system has over and above that which is locked in its parts. IIT then postulates that this is what consciousness either correlates with or comes down to. > > Now, I think in doing so, IIT is massively begging the question. But that doesn’t matter right now. What’s important is that IIT gives a scientifically respectable reductive account of consciousness—it shows us exactly how (what it purports to amount to) consciousness emerges from the simpler parts, and gives us objective criteria for its presence. So, IIT provides the sort of story that’s needed to make **wolfpup** ’s emergence reasonable. > > Furthermore, on IIT, consciousness isn’t a functional property of the brain. It’s a property relating to the correlations between the brain’s parts, or regions. So functionalism isn’t really the sort of obvious truth **begbert2** seems to take it to be, either. > > More interestingly, perhaps, is that on IIT, computationalism comes out straightforwardly false. While a brain has a high degree of integrated information, the typical computer, due to its modular architecture, has very little to none of it. So a computer implementing the simulation of a brain won’t lead to conscious experience, even if the brain it simulates does. > > This suffices to falsify many of the seemingly ‘obvious’ claims in this thread and shows that other options are possible. By “functional” I just meant “it works at all”. A non-functional brain is one that _doesn’t have a mind in it_. Don’t try to impune upon me any particular cognitive model. All my position requires are the following three facts: 1. Brains produce minds in the real world. 2. Brains are entirely physical (and thus, mechanical) in their operation\*. 3. Computers with sufficient memory and processing ability can accurately simulate physical objects and thier mechanical behaviors. That’s _it_. That’s all I need to prove that it’s theoretically possible to emulate minds - you may have to emulate everything in the world with even a tangential physical effect on the brain (which could include the entire universe!), but that’s still theoretically possible, and thus you **provably** can theoretically emulate minds on a computer. Proven, that is, unless you can disprove one of the three premises. And note that I don’t care _how_ the brains create minds. It doesn’t matter. I don’t care. It’s utterly irrelevant. All that matters to me is that brains produce minds _at all_. - Actually I don’t even require the minds to exist entirely in the physical realm - they just have to exist in some realm that has reasonably consistent mechanistic rules. Which isn’t really much to ask, because _nothing_ can possibly work or even consistently _exist_ in a realm without reasonably consistent rules. ---
**Author:** ![RaftPeople](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/6f9a4e/32.png) [@RaftPeople](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RaftPeople)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 8:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/162 "2019-05-22T20:37:13Z")
> [@RaftPeople](#): > > It’s referring to various studies that show you can take RNA from an animal that has learned a task, inject it into a different animal (same species) and successfully test for the trained task in the second animal. > > There are other studies that don’t specifically say anything about RNA, but have shown the ability for isolated individual purkinje cells to learn temporal sequences, which means our biology is using multiple methods for learning. Note: this is all distinct from the “normal” learning process that includes epigenetic changes to produce proteins that maintain the synapse. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 8:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/163 "2019-05-22T20:42:24Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > This is nonsense. I’m a computer programmer, and there is a literal, practical, real difference between implementing f and f’. Then it should be easy for you to point out what those differences are in the example I gave, where the physical system is completely identical in each case, and yet, can be taken to implement both f and f’. > [@](#): > > I’m not seeing any circularity, viscious or not. You’re basically saying that if you reach into a bag of red and blue balls and happen to pull out the red one, the fact that it’s red (as opposed to being blue) is due to the fact it’s a red one. No. My claim is, a system only computes once it is interpreted as computing. Computationalism says that only computations can interpret things (or exercise any other mental faculty). Thus, in order to compute, some computation must interpret a system as computing. But this is a vicious circle: if physical system P1 must be interpreted as computing C1 by system P2, and the only way it can do so is by implementing C2, then P2 must first be interpreted by P3 via implementing C3 as computing C2, and so forth. Obviously, P1 cannot interpret P1 as implementing C1, as to do so, it would have to already be implementing C1 to do the interpreting. > [@](#): > > Your argument (if it worked, which it doesn’t) doesn’t just disprove minds being computational - there’s nothing about your argument that’s specific to mind. Minds are the only sorts of things we know of that are capable of interpretation, so yes, there’s a little bit (you know, it’s key point) about my argument that’s specific to mind. > [@](#): > > It isn’t equvalent at all, of course. Your god argument is trying to pull itself up by its bootstraps; the god in question doesn’t even exist until it exercises its powers. Exactly. Just as C1 doesn’t exist before P1 is suitably interpreted, and hence, can’t be what does the interpreting. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 8:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/164 "2019-05-22T20:45:39Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > That’s _it_. That’s all I need to prove that it’s theoretically possible to emulate minds - you may have to emulate everything in the world with even a tangential physical effect on the brain (which could include the entire universe!), but that’s still theoretically possible, and thus you **provably** can theoretically emulate minds on a computer. > > Proven, that is, unless you can disprove one of the three premises. There are lots of hidden premises in your stance, but for now, I leave you with the fact that IIT is a theory satisfying your three premises on which it is nevertheless false that computation can emulate minds. ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 8:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/165 "2019-05-22T20:57:07Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Then it should be easy for you to point out what those differences are in the example I gave, where the physical system is completely identical in each case, and yet, can be taken to implement both f and f’. I don’t know what you mean by “identical”. If you mean “identical at the level of which electron is moving down which wire at the same time”, then you **can’t** be implementing both f and f’ at the same time and having them both producing the same single output. It’s literally impossible. It’s sort of like trying to pat your head and rub your belly button at the same time _with the same hand_. Or with two hands that are doing exactly the same actions on the same identical body, as the case may be. Does your argument rely on something impossible? Seriously, when we talk about calculations being a ‘black box’ where you can’t tell what’s going on inside it, it doesn’t mean that the internal calculations are experiencing multiple different program states simultaneously like schroedinger’s cat. That’s bizarre. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > No. My claim is, a system only computes once it is interpreted as computing. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Minds are the only sorts of things we know of that are capable of interpretation, so yes, there’s a little bit (you know, it’s key point) about my argument that’s specific to mind. So what you’re saying is that if everyone who knows about a computer dies the computer _magically stops working_ because it depended on the “interpretation” (which only human brains can do) knowing about it to function. Yeah, kind of not feeling that. ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 8:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/166 "2019-05-22T20:58:45Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > There are lots of hidden premises in your stance, but for now, I leave you with the fact that IIT is a theory satisfying your three premises on which it is nevertheless false that computation can emulate minds. That’s less a disproof of my argument and more a disproof of IIT - or your interpretation if IIT, as the case may be. ---
**Author:** ![eschereal](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/eschereal/32/18939_2.png) [@eschereal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/eschereal)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 9:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/167 "2019-05-22T21:09:14Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > One could theorize that the self-contained execution loop gives rise to the ‘drivers’s seat view’ but that the ‘view’ included the data handlers as well. If there is a “driver’s seat view”, it would have to be the programs top level process that handles major data traffic control. Except, even that process is just making decisions on abstract symbols that it receives from lower-level processes, without any real understanding of what they mean, apart from what the application parametrics tell it about how to handle specific data. An entire program, that seems so useful and sometimes even collaborative, is just a massive rat’s nest of **Half Man Half Wit** ’s box-of-switches-and-lights with all the switches and lights obfuscated into nanoscale silicon and metal traces. You can make it vast, but the fundamental structure is no different. > [@](#): > > This is, of course, all frivolous theorizing, but one thing that stands out to me is that I’ve never heard any other explanation for where or how that ‘drivers’s seat view’ originates. I mean sure, there’s bullshit about souls, but that just kicks the can down the street - how do _souls_ do it, mechanically speaking? Whether material or spiritual the process is being carried out _somehow_. I put forth already, that the most sensible view is that this elusive thing is merely a manifestation of the survival instinct that is hardwired into critters (of which we are). It would explain the whole “immortal soul” concept, as in, “_I don’t want to die, so it makes me happy to believe in an ectoplastic part of me that will persist forever in the Elysian Fields (or Asphodel, or Og forbid, Tartarus)_”, and so far, I have yet to hear a more satisfying explanation. > [@](#): > > And now, on to attempting to see if HMHW’s explanation makes some sense to poor old simple me, and to see if it accomplished the _literally impossible_ and draws a distinction between the function of a physical brain and its functionally exact copy. We might find out once we are able to actually accomplish that, but as has been said, the function of a program is defined by externalities. Two exact copies of the same logic-processing system will only function exactly the same way for exactly the same set of inputs. Consider that the human brain is subjected to a constant, roiling stew of hormonal inputs, and unless you can replicate the biochemistry with precision, there will be distinctions. Not to mention the ever-present survival instinct. ---
**Author:** ![RaftPeople](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/6f9a4e/32.png) [@RaftPeople](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RaftPeople)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 9:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/168 "2019-05-22T21:15:36Z")
When the word “mind” or “cognition” is used, is it assumed that consciousness is always included within those terms, or is “mind” and “cognition” ever assumed to be just the processing less conscious experience? ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 9:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/169 "2019-05-22T21:32:19Z")
> [@eschereal](#): > > If there is a “driver’s seat view”, it would have to be the programs top level process that handles major data traffic control. Except, even that process is just making decisions on abstract symbols that it receives from lower-level processes, without any real understanding of what they mean, apart from what the application parametrics tell it about how to handle specific data. An entire program, that seems so useful and sometimes even collaborative, is just a massive rat’s nest of **Half Man Half Wit** ’s box-of-switches-and-lights with all the switches and lights obfuscated into nanoscale silicon and metal traces. You can make it vast, but the fundamental structure is no different. Our current programs keep things partitioned and isolated for simplicity and maintainability. That’s not strictly necessary - you could have a program’s main loop running directly through the input, processing, storage uptating, and output phases directly each time. Or you could note that the thread(s) of execution _do_ run through all those parts each time, constantly, moving in and out of all the layers and back again. It’s really a question of how (and where) the ‘seat of consciousness’ manifests, and how it '‘feels like’ from the inside - and whether the actual implementation being partitioned interferes with that at all. (Assuming it manifests in the first place, of course.) > [@eschereal](#): > > I put forth already, that the most sensible view is that this elusive thing is merely a manifestation of the survival instinct that is hardwired into critters (of which we are). It would explain the whole “immortal soul” concept, as in, “_I don’t want to die, so it makes me happy to believe in an ectoplastic part of me that will persist forever in the Elysian Fields (or Asphodel, or Og forbid, Tartarus)_”, and so far, I have yet to hear a more satisfying explanation. But how does “survival instinct” actually “manifest”, physically speaking? Some part of the entity constantly checking the senses for threats, conferring with the memory about the threats, and prompting reactions to the threats? Survival is just a goal. A goal that is conducive to there being future generations, yes, but the thing that _has_ the goal is what I’m curious about. The thing that has the awareness of the situation to see threats and avoid them. How does it work? Between “magic” and “program execution loop”, I’m thinking “program execution loop”. > [@eschereal](#): > > We might find out once we are able to actually accomplish that, but as has been said, the function of a program is defined by externalities. Two exact copies of the same logic-processing system will only function exactly the same way for exactly the same set of inputs. Consider that the human brain is subjected to a constant, roiling stew of hormonal inputs, and unless you can replicate the biochemistry with precision, there will be distinctions. Not to mention the ever-present survival instinct. If you’re going to emulate minds in the computer you have two choices: let the minds observe and react to the computer’s inputs directly, or build a virtual “Matrix” (referring to the movie) for them to exist within. I’m thinking the Matrix approach would be _way_ more pleasant for them - computers themselves tend to be completely hamstrung with regard to input and output. Very 'Have no Speaker and I Must Scream" kind of thing. Plus of course the Matrix approach lines up nicely with the simplest, most brainless way to go about emulating minds - emulate the entire freaking room the person’s in, and get the brain (and mind) as a bonus. Expanding that to include a massive multiplayer world for them to walk around in is just a problem of scale. Once you’ve got your Matrix for the minds to live in, the minds ought to be able to get all the inputs they’re accustomed to just fine, presuming you designed the Matrix properly and with sufficient detail. Though of course you’d eventually want to tweak a few things - the whole goal here was to let the minds live forever after all. So once you have things all properly uploaded into a simulation you’ll probably want to tweak a few things rather than accurately simulating the ravages of time and all. This would of course cause the minds in the simulation to diverge in thought and action from the originals, but really, wasn’t that the point all along? ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 9:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/170 "2019-05-22T21:34:04Z")
> [@RaftPeople](#): > > When the word “mind” or “cognition” is used, is it assumed that consciousness is always included within those terms, or is “mind” and “cognition” ever assumed to be just the processing less conscious experience? I can’t speak for anyone else, but I believe all the terms all refer to the “seat of consciousness” - the “I” in “I think therefore I am”. When we look out at the world through our eyes, the mind/cognition/consciousness is the thing doing the looking. ---
**Author:** ![RaftPeople](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/6f9a4e/32.png) [@RaftPeople](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RaftPeople)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 9:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/171 "2019-05-22T21:45:20Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > I can’t speak for anyone else, but I believe all the terms all refer to the “seat of consciousness” - the “I” in “I think therefore I am”. When we look out at the world through our eyes, the mind/cognition/consciousness is the thing doing the looking. But it seems like we could have a brain that successfully models the environment and produces appropriate behavior without having conscious experience. I never liked the whole zombie argument before, but I think I see what that argument is getting at. ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 9:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/172 "2019-05-22T21:50:36Z")
> [@RaftPeople](#): > > But it seems like we could have a brain that successfully models the environment and produces appropriate behavior without having conscious experience. > > I never liked the whole zombie argument before, but I think I see what that argument is getting at. I’m of the personal opinion that it’s incoherent to think that full human reaction and interaction can be achieved by a so-called “zombie” - the mere act of observing the world, interpreting the world, and reacting to the world in an ongoing and consistent way _requires_ that the entity be aware of its environs, itself, and its opinions and memories, in the same way that a car needs some sort of engine to run. (Could be a hemi, could be a hamster wheel, but it’s gotta be _something_.) ---
**Author:** ![RaftPeople](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/6f9a4e/32.png) [@RaftPeople](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RaftPeople)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 10:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/173 "2019-05-22T22:33:43Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > I’m of the personal opinion that it’s incoherent to think that full human reaction and interaction can be achieved by a so-called “zombie” - the mere act of observing the world, interpreting the world, and reacting to the world in an ongoing and consistent way _requires_ that the entity be aware of its environs, itself, and its opinions and memories, in the same way that a car needs some sort of engine to run. (Could be a hemi, could be a hamster wheel, but it’s gotta be _something_.) I just remembered why i didn’t like the zombie idea, because it requires the person to be identical except for experience. But what I was picturing in my mind was that the operational attributes of the brain (e.g. modeling the environment, making decisions towards a goal, etc.) can be independent of the conscious experience, if the conscious experience is just a layer above that maybe only influences deciding on the goal (for example). Responding to your post: There are examples where people seem to operate correctly in their environment but don’t have awareness (e.g. sleep walking). ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 10:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/174 "2019-05-22T22:49:48Z")
> [@RaftPeople](#): > > I just remembered why i didn’t like the zombie idea, because it requires the person to be identical except for experience. > > But what I was picturing in my mind was that the operational attributes of the brain (e.g. modeling the environment, making decisions towards a goal, etc.) can be independent of the conscious experience, if the conscious experience is just a layer above that maybe only influences deciding on the goal (for example). I dunno, I feel like my conscious influence on my actions is pretty strong. I don’t _feel_ like a passive passenger in my own head (though I suppose my subconscious could just be _pretending_ to let me lead, like my mom does with my dad). > [@RaftPeople](#): > > Responding to your post: > There are examples where people seem to operate correctly in their environment but don’t have awareness (e.g. sleep walking). There’s pretty good reason to think that the human brain has two actively running processes (at least) which occasionally compete for control. And apparently if you mess with the brain physically you can split it down the middle and get two different cognitions operating in the brain at once! Brains be complicated, yo. ---
**Author:** ![RaftPeople](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/6f9a4e/32.png) [@RaftPeople](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RaftPeople)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 11:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/175 "2019-05-22T23:13:41Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > I dunno, I feel like my conscious influence on my actions is pretty strong. I don’t _feel_ like a passive passenger in my own head (though I suppose my subconscious could just be _pretending_ to let me lead, like my mom does with my dad). The more I ponder this stuff, the more I question that assumption. When I look at my behavior patterns and the behavior patterns of people I know, it sure looks like we are operating on machinery that is significantly and consistently driven by the same patterns over and over. Even though it does seem like we can react to our environment and make choices, it sure seems like that choice process is much more of a formula highly constrained by the machinery (due to nature+nurture), as opposed to an open ended consciousness based selection process. The only reason I would make a different decision (than the ones I typically make) is if there was an explicit input identifying the fact that a non-standard decision is being targeted/tested and therefore I should choose that path to prove it can be done (based on my internal motivation that would push me towards even evaluating that condition). ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 11:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/176 "2019-05-22T23:22:12Z")
> [@RaftPeople](#): > > The more I ponder this stuff, the more I question that assumption. When I look at my behavior patterns and the behavior patterns of people I know, it sure looks like we are operating on machinery that is significantly and consistently driven by the same patterns over and over. > > Even though it does seem like we can react to our environment and make choices, it sure seems like that choice process is much more of a formula highly constrained by the machinery (due to nature+nurture), as opposed to an open ended consciousness based selection process. > > The only reason I would make a different decision (than the ones I typically make) is if there was an explicit input identifying the fact that a non-standard decision is being targeted/tested and therefore I should choose that path to prove it can be done (based on my internal motivation that would push me towards even evaluating that condition). You say that like it doesn’t make perfect logical sense for people to fall into patterns. In actual fact I consciously choose to maintain my patterns, because I like the same stuff today as I did yesterday. ---
**Author:** ![RaftPeople](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/6f9a4e/32.png) [@RaftPeople](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RaftPeople)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 11:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/177 "2019-05-22T23:38:14Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > You say that like it doesn’t make perfect logical sense for people to fall into patterns. In actual fact I consciously choose to maintain my patterns, because I like the same stuff today as I did yesterday. I’m not passing a value judgement on it, I’m just saying that my analysis is leading me to believe that the patterns that drive us seem like they are stronger and further below the conscious level than I previously assumed. ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2019, 11:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/178 "2019-05-22T23:53:21Z")
> [@RaftPeople](#): > > I’m not passing a value judgement on it, I’m just saying that my analysis is leading me to believe that the patterns that drive us seem like they are stronger and further below the conscious level than I previously assumed. I guess my only real response is, brains be complicated, yo! Though, to say on-topic, _complicated_ doesn’t mean _uncopyable_. It just means that when we replicate all the neuron-states and chemical soups, we might not know what they’re doing even as we move them over. One fun (though debatably ethical) thing we could do once we _were_ emulating the brains would be to sick an AI on them and have it make multiple copies of the emulated brains and selectively tweak/remove physical elements and compare ongoing behavior afterward. We could find out which aspects of our brain’s physicality are necessary for proper mind function _real_ quick. (Hmm, removing all the blood had an adverse effect. Guess we needed that. Next test!) Given enough whittling we might be able to emulate a mind without emulating the whole brain - just the parts and processes that actually matter. (With the brain matter’s physical weight or the skull enclosing it being possible superfluous factors that could be removed, for example.) In this way we might be able to emulate minds more efficiently than fully emulating all the physical matter in the vicinity. ---
**Author:** ![wolfpup](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/wolfpup/32/10618_2.png) [@wolfpup](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/wolfpup)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2019, 12:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/179 "2019-05-23T00:11:26Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Given the lower level properties and their arrangement, do the emergent properties follow necessarily? If I fix the base facts, do I fix the emergent facts, or are there more facts left to fix? > > If the former, you don’t get the sort of emergence you claim, because then, the emergent facts follow from the base facts—and for every emergent fact, you can state the precise way it follows from the base facts. Thus, that’s the story you need to at least provide some plausibility argument for in order to have your claim of the emergence of consciousness be contentful. > > If the latter, then the base facts don’t determine the emergent facts. Then, of course, consciousness just might come 'round at some point. Somehow, for basically no reason. But also, it’s no longer the case that fixing the physical facts (‘particles, fields, and their arrangement’) fixes all the facts, and physicalism is wrong. > > It’s not a matter of believing Chalmers or not. He’s not stating this out of the blue; he’s just clearly articulating what the options are. There’s no middle ground. You either eat the cake, or keep it. If an artificial neural network like the ones used in AlphaGo starts from essentially zero skill and proceeds to play chess or Go at a championship level after a period of deep learning, where in the original base configuration can you find any “Go-like” strategy knowledge? Trivially, the game rules are built in to the program, and trivially, one might guess that building neural connections might lead to some interesting phenomena, but what could you possibly see in the components in their initial state that could lead you to make confident predictions about skill at that particular game? It would be fair to ask, for course, what the developers saw in it, and why they built it that way. The answer is that they saw only a general-purpose learning mechanism, not something that bore any of the specific primordial traits of what they hoped to achieve. Just the same way as they built a massively parallel general-purpose computer system to run it on. What actually came together was something qualitatively new, and something that many had believed was at least another decade away. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > **I’ve never doubted the role of computational theory in cognitive science.** The problem is just that the model doesn’t imply the character of the thing modeled, so computationalism just amounts to a category error. Just because you can model the solar system with an orrery doesn’t mean gravity works via wires and gears. (Emphasis mine.) Oh, my. You absolutely certainly have done exactly that, many many times throughout this thread: But if minds then have the capacity to interpret things (as they seem to), they have a capacity that can’t be realized via computation, and thus are, on the whole, not computational entities. [https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=21646134&postcount=18](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=21646134&postcount=18) Well, I gave an argument demonstrating that computation is subjective, and hence, only fixed by interpreting a certain system as computing a certain function. If whatever does this interpreting is itself computational, then its computation needs another interpretive agency to be fixed, and so on, in an infinite regress; hence, whatever fixes computation can’t itself be computational. [https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=21646502&postcount=34](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=21646502&postcount=34) The CTM is one of those rare ideas that were both founded an dismantled by the same person (Hilary Putnam). Both were visionary acts, it’s just that the rest of the world is a bit slower to catch up with the second one. [https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=21646610&postcount=59](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=21646610&postcount=59) Ignoring the incorrect assertions about Putnam that I dispelled earlier, waffling over “category errors” is disingenuous and meaningless here. The position of CTM isn’t that computational theories help us understand the mind in some vague abstract sense; the position of CTM is _ **that the brain performs computations, period, full stop** _ – as in the basic premise that intentional cognitive processes are literally syntactic operations on symbols. This is unambiguously clear, and you unambiguously rejected it. The cite I quoted in [#143](https://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=21654802&postcount=143) says very explicitly that “the paradigm of machine computation” became, over a thirty-year period, a “deep and far-reaching” theory in cognitive science, supporting Fodor’s statement that it’s hard to imagine any kind of meaningful cognitive science without it, and that denial of this fact – such as what you appear to be doing – is not worth a serious discussion. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > And that’s supposed to be arguing for what, exactly? Because computer science people have sour grapes with Dreyfus, you can’t criticize computationalism…? Seriously, I can’t figure out what your aim is in bringing this up again and again. It’s a response to your accusation that “the main determining factor in whether or not a dead philosopher is worthy of deference is whether you agree with them”. No, it isn’t. Jerry Fodor was widely regarded as one of the founders of modern cognitive science, or at least of many of its foundational new ideas in the past half-century. Dreyfus wasn’t the founder of anything. I asked someone about Dreyfus some years ago, someone who I can say without exaggeration is one of the principal theorists in cognitive science today. I can’t give any details without betraying privacy and confidentiality, but I will say this: he knew Dreyfus, and had argumentative encounters with him in the academic media. His charitable view was that Dreyfus was a sort of congenial uncle figure, “good-hearted but not very bright”. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > OK, so it’s actually just the physical evolution that you want to call ‘computation’ for some reason. And me computing sums using the device isn’t computation. In that case, as I pointed out, you’re not defending computationalism, but identity theory physicalism. Combined with your notion of strong-but-not-really-_that_-strong emergence, you don’t really have any consistent position to offer at all. I’ve been absolutely consistent that computationalism and physicalism are not at odds, and I disagree with your premise that they are. Nor do I believe, for the reasons already indicated, that Chalmers’ view that what he calls “strong emergence” need be at odds with physicalism. My evolution on this topic is that I’m doubtful that there’s much meaningful distinction between “weak” and “strong” emergence. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > It means we were wrong, that’s it. It’s hard to see how chess, or Jeopardy, translated to simple Boolean logical rules. But the fact that you can do it by computer simply demonstrates that it does; that what next move to make in a game of chess is equivalent to tracking through some ungodly-huge Boolean formula that one could explicitly write down. It’s worse than that. Even talking about some Boolean formula or algorithm to emulate consciousness is silly because it isn’t even a behavior, it’s an assertion of self-reflection. The truth of the assertion may or may not become evident after observing actual behaviors. My guess, again, is that the issue is less profound than it’s made out to be. It wouldn’t surprise me if at some point in the future, generalized strong AI will assert that it is conscious, and we just won’t believe it, or will pretend it’s a “different kind” of consciousness. ---
**Author:** ![eschereal](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/eschereal/32/18939_2.png) [@eschereal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/eschereal)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2019, 2:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022/180 "2019-05-23T02:14:16Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > But how does “survival instinct” actually “manifest”, physically speaking? Some part of the entity constantly checking the senses for threats, conferring with the memory about the threats, and prompting reactions to the threats? > > Survival is just a goal. A goal that is conducive to there being future generations, yes, but the thing that _has_ the goal is what I’m curious about. The thing that has the awareness of the situation to see threats and avoid them. How does it work? > > Between “magic” and “program execution loop”, I’m thinking “program execution loop”. How? Well first we have to find out what it _is_. How do candles work? You have to understand several “what” vectors in order to arrive at a useful answer. I suspect self-awareness/the survival instinct are analogous to something like hair: it is there, many of us are rather fond of it, it has its uses, but it does not actually do anything. It is an interesting feature. But a feature of what? Hair is a simple thing that is a result of follicular activity. Self-awareness seems to be a rather complex feature that probably arises from disparate sources (some most likely chemical), and may not be localized (just like hair). The point is, it is not evident that it actually does anything. Kind of like data tables which, in and of themselves are not active (in the way that program code is active), but our mental processes take note of it and adjust their results to account for it. So, would self-awareness be a valuable feature for intelligent machines? Perhaps. Then again, maybe not. If we just want them to do what we need them to do, strict functionality might be the preferable design strategy. Unless uncovering the underlying nature of self-awareness is the research goal, in which case, they are probably best confined to a laboratory setting. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022.md?page=8) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/downloading-your-consciousness-just-before-death/834022.md?page=10)