:smack:
Where on earth did you hear this? 
Cite?
Now see, this is not my understanding.
The communist Viet Minh movement was given the North part of the country in the partition at the 17th parallel in 1954, while the Viet Cong were the anti-South-Vietnamese-government forces south of that line.
The crucial mistake the US made in assessing the situation, in the eyes of my college history professor at least, was that they assumed the Viet Cong civil war was in fact an attempt by communist North Viet Nam, backed by China (despite the fact that Viet Nam and China hate each other) to take over. So we started a war with North Viet Nam.
Bah, it may be trite to some, but the US lost simply because its leaders lost the political will to fight, not because it was defeated militarily. No great mystery there, despite all the handwringing and praise for the stoicism and bravery of the Communists. Moreover it was American media / citizens at home who waged and ultimately “won” this political fight, not the Communists, who were fairly inactive the last several years of the war, militarily speaking, until the US pulled out. Despite its plummetting casualty list and the Communists’ increasing weakness, the US chose to cut and run, desert their allies, because the politicians believed the war had lost the popularity contest, and were worried about them losing theirs. Some guy wrote a book along these lines a year or so ago, think I saw him on CSPAN talking about it. Didn’t know until then how bad the US had actually militarily beaten the Communists until then, as all you hear is how the US couldn’t ever pin down the enemy, was flailing about, etc., much like what we are hearing today about Iraq.
No, not trite, but a completely fabricated revisionist history created to (1) make some people feel better, (2) help some people get elected, and (3) help some people in power pull the wool over people’s eyes.
You’ve bought into some prime, grade-A, Texas-sized cow cakes, my friend.
Rather, some political leaders opened their eyes and saw that other political leaders were (1) lying through their teeth or (2) self-deluded to the point of incompetence.
Yeah, as George Bush told the Vietnamese recently, if we had done things right, we’d still be there, killing and being killed.
Okay, I’m getting the feeling I’m getting whooshed here. Good one; you got me.
I presume you apply this logic even-handedly when considering French military defeats (which was the reason for my light-hearted “surrender” comment).
It’s doubtful that the initial involvement was made on this basis. When we were providing material support and advice to the French, it was pretty much a bribe to nail down their support against Soviet expansion in Europe. “You help us keep the Soviets out of Western Europe, and we’ll help you get your colonies back in SE Asia.” That wasn’t really a politically palatable reason, so the ‘domino theory’ was invented as a noble-sounding purpose. But then, when the French gave up, that justification made it hard for the U.S. to gracefully bow out as well; and before long, the State Department was full of people who really believed it …
War isn’t about winning military battles; it’s about getting your enemy to stop fighting you. Killing them is just one way to do this.
Yes, the Americans were doing quite well at killing the Vietnamese (something like several million casualties vs. a couple hundred thousand), but when there was no good reason to be there killing people, it makes no difference.
The US number was closer to 58,000. Apropos of nothing, about 51,000 American lives were lost at the Battle of Gettysberg. cite
I think he was referring to casualties, and not deaths.
From “How North Vietnam won the war”, Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Aug 3, 1995. pg. A8 (Interview with Bui Tin)
Gettysburg. Actually, the 51,000 is an approximation of casualties, meaning both dead, missing and wounded. Most of the casualties were wounded. 51,000 FATALITIES would have shattered both armies; a one-battle fatality rate that high - about 30% - would have shocked a 19th-century army out of any operational capability until it was rebuilt. It would have been nearly impossible for an army that beaten up to even move as a cohesive unit.
Actually figuring the fatalities at Gettysburg is difficult because “missing” could include guys who were dead or who simply ran away, a common occurrence in the Civil War; some guys ran away from the army a half dozen times. This is especially true of Confederate numbers, which were poorly kept, as opposed to Union numbers, which were kept as carefully as possible. Total fatalities could have been as low as eight or nine thousand or as high as 20 thousand; most educated guesses I’ve seen are around 10 to 12 thousand.
Oh, right, you mean the truth. Nah, we don’t indulge much in that anymore in this country. As someone who was there, I can tell you that we weren’t allowed to shoot back without clearance from HQ, even when we had confirmed intel that mortar tubes were being set up outside our perimeter. Carpet bombing had minimal effect on tunnel dwellings, since we didn’t have bunker-busters back then. Air strikes by fighters in our area always guaranteed retaliatory rocket attacks that night. The enemy NVA was hardcore, tough sonsabitches who rarely knew the meaning of ‘retreat’. The VC were impossible to identify, much like the illusive enemy in Iraq. When an Iraqi sniper takes off his stocking mask, he looks just like any other Iraqi. When a VC traded in his black pajamas for his work clothes to come on a military installation, nobody was the wiser. You can’t shoot them all, you can’t bomb their cities without killiing a lot of innocents, although armchair soldiers like to spout such total nonsense like ‘turn it into a parking lot’. Real tough talk from people that have never seen combat and ruin, sorta like our prez and his cabinet.
Essentially. The bulk of the Viet Minh forces transformed into the North Vietnamese Army after partition. A minority based in the south did form a nucleus from which the Viet Cong were raised. But the Viet Cong ( NLF ) were semi-distinct ( if junior ) as a political and political force. However after being badly mauled in 1968 they were increasingly supplemented and replaced by NVA regulars.
Not trite, so much as not the whole story. I won’t go so far as to say that internal political pressure didn’t weaken the U.S.'s will to sustain the fighting. But that political pressure was self-inflicted damage. Tet was such an immense shock to the psyche because Westmoreland had just declared the war all but won, a ridiculous assertion in retrospect. The United States legitimately lost the propaganda/political war both at home and in Vietnam ( where the corrupt SV governments never seemed terribly viable ) and were legitimately stalemated on the ground. That they inflicted far greater casualties than their opponents and won virtually every key battle ( eventually ) is fact. That the NVA/Viet Cong could ultimately afford those losses ( however painful they were in the short term ) and keep right on bleeding the U.S. seems to be largely accepted these days as well.
It was an untenable situation.
- Tamerlane
I would like to suggest that anyone interested in the Vietnam war, especially the lead-up to it, read Lederer & Burdick’s The Ugly American.
Just to add to this, the US had no way to bring their logistical superiority to bear, because whatever losses in material the North sustained, they were always made good with Soviet/Eastern bloc replacements.
Not exactly that, either. The domino theory was around before Vietnam became an issue – Eastern Europe, Greece and Turkey, and, especially, Latin America and Korea had the domino theory invoked.
On the other hand, the easiest way for a weak/corrupt/authoritarian regime to get American aid was to claim “we need help to fight the Communists.” That’s probably more the mindset behind the initial decision to aid the French.
This is and the rest of cite are essentially true. The North Vietnamese admitted as such. They were soundly defeated, exhausted in the Tet offensive, and were astonished and heartened that in the West press the events of Jan 1968 were interpreted as an American defeat.
The Americans never “surrendered” in 1975. In accordance with the Paris peace talks, the Americans had withdrawn from Viet Nam. In violation of the peace accords, the North Vietnamese attacked the South, and in the absence of the Americans, defeated the ARVN forces.
I was in the Marine Corps in 1975 when Saigon fell. I remember the events very well. No American forces surrendered in 1975 – perhaps some individuals were taken captive.
The crucial point at which Vietnam started to go to hell was the cancellation of the 1956 election that under the 1954 Geneva Accords was supposed to result in a democratically elected government for independent Vietnam. The division into North and South was meant to be only temporary, with the country reunifying after the election. France and North Vietnam had signed the Geneva Accords, but the United States and South Vietnam refused to sign.
Ngô Đình Diệm refused to allow the elections because it looked like Hồ Chí Minh was going to win. Diệm had also used troops to coerce voters in the 1955 referendum in which he took over the South Vietnamese government. And the United States backed him on that. The South Vietnamese government therefore lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens. The United States first backed Diệm and then had him overthrown due to a belated realization that it was Diệm’s antidemocratic policies that were responsible for the conflict and the lack of popular support for the South Vietnamese government. I think the cancellation of the election in 1956 was where the pooch really got screwed.