Neither are you. Were you planning on it?
Transient and part time employees won’t fit well in this system. I don’t know how the German system works but just because it works there doesn’t mean it will work well here. Some employee representation would be useful and there are companies here in the US that have employee ownership programs. I think it’s just too broad of a rule to fit the circumstances and it lacks any reciprocal obligations for the employees. At will employment creates a problem, neither emploiyee or employer are obligated to each other. Contracted employees would change the picture.
Also, this doesn’t make sense for privately owned companies, and it would dissuade companies from going public and encourage public companies to go private.
Most McDonald’s employees are employed by a franchisee that operates one or more restaurants, very few of which bring in over a billion dollars in revenue, so those employees would not be covered by this bill. (Presumably some McDonald’s employees work for corporate owned restaurants and they would be covered by this bill, as would those at corporate HQ.)
The company may find that by having workers on the board helps the workers understand the difficult decisions the board sometimes has to make and fosters cooperative and collaborative efforts for problem solving. It may also find that the workers have different insights and creative ideas for addressing problems. Having “a seat at the table” isn’t always just about counting votes. It may or may not be a good idea to mandate such an arrangement, but I wouldn’t label the idea as “absurd.”
I did. In the OP I made an argument concerning point #4. I stated my reservations about it.
Since then I hadn’t posted at all other than my reply to Crafter_Man. Excuse me for not hanging on this thread and not posting every 10 minutes. I have other things happening in my life.
My not posting is not equivalent to someone simply stating the way things are as if it’s an argument. We all know what the law requires of corporations. The question is whether it would be beneficial to modify that.
Part of the point is to change that. If we’re going to treat corporations like citizens, we shouldn’t accept that they are universally psychopathic. If the sole purpose of a corporation is enriching its shareholders, this doesn’t just allow for grotesquely immoral behavior, the moment such behavior is profitable, it basically demands it. Be it making the product more addictive, more exploitative to customers, making life hell for the workers at that company, aggressively outsourcing even profitable factories… A corporation in this conception is basically forced to be evil the moment the opportunity presents itself. It’s also obligated to push back at attempts to make that evil illegal or unprofitable.
Sure, if you ignore everything I mentioned above, externalities, long-term sustainability of the company, and something like 90% of what Current Affairs writes about.
It’s just an example of the potential problem. I’d like to know more about the German system before that’s used as justification for this. I don’t see why an employee who may just pack up and leave tomorrow should have a vote in this, or where the 40% figure comes from, or how this is supposed to make anything better for employees or corporations. I’m not against regulating very large companies in the public interest but I’m not so sure that item 2 in this plan is doing anything useful.
I think it might be a valid argument if you were going to apply it to new companies. But not to people who already paid for property with certain rights.
I think it is. If you just want ideas you can always just ask. This sounds like it’s about representation.
I doubt if many actual workers would end up on the boards. (Most board decisions would be over the heads of workers.) They would just select people to represent their interests.
I think the first is too vague to be useful, and the vagueness could make it counterproductive rather than just meaningless
On the second I agree with comments saying it can’t be classed as ‘absurd’ (overall) since the general concept is used in other successful countries (not only Germany). It comes down more IMO to a difference in opinion how similar the US really is to other rich countries, and the real overall benefits of their systems. That’s at the root of much of my skepticism of ‘why can’t be more like Europe?’ in many of the contexts in which it comes up.
Here, besides the basic nature and demographics of the societies, it seems to ignore specific differences in the corporate world for example the generally greater health of ‘old line’ industries in Europe v the US, but stronger position of the US in leading edge industries. It also ignores the increase in the market value of US corporations as a % of the world total, but especially compared to Europe. There’s something seriously right going on when the US share of capitalization of the MSCI All-World index now exceeds 50%, v more like 30% 30 years ago, and during a period of rapid growth in developing economies, though again not Europe. Corporate value creation is not the solution to all US societal problems of course, nor gteed to persist, etc. but it’s a positive not to be ignored as it sometimes seems to be. The thought process seems to be to look at the end point of what one likes about eg. German society v US, then jump to the implied conclusion the US end point would match more closely if it adopted some corporate governance policy far upstream of the end point. I don’t find it compelling at all.
The campaign finance proposal is unlike the others overtly partisan. I wouldn’t pretend to make an argument for/against it that supposedly has nothing to do with whether it’s perceived to help Democrats and left-leaning causes (the second more than the first, relatively little of direct corporate political money goes to candidates or parties, more often to issue advocacy).
The last just seems like different words for the status quo that violating the law in a serious way can be the effective end of a corporate entity, but just makes it vaguer and IMO mainly introduces more avenue for political pressuring of companies which I’m convinced would be counterproductive.
And like any such proposal it’s subject to the ‘water finds its own level’ nature of the modern economy. Which in part gets back to the difference between the US and some other countries societally and politically. If there’s a societal consensus that workers should automatically be represented on boards of big companies that’s one thing. If it’s rammed through at the peak of the political cycle for one party by a couple of votes that’s another, both in terms of it getting reversed and the way people will feel about finding ways around it (merge into overseas company, go private, etc).
People buy and sell shares of stock every day, but if they own the stock on the day of the shareholder voting, they get a vote. Board members come and go as well. As do CEO’s and other top executives. It would certainly be a significant change (in the U.S.) to say employees are part of the company and should have a say in its governance, but I’m open to the idea.
While not the same thing, some Universities have a faculty, or even a student seat, on the governing board.
I wouldn’t agree with that even in principle. The ones who own the company make the decisions.
If I hire somebody to mow my lawn, I don’t think I need to consult him before I decide to move. Even if it isn’t certain that the next homeowner might not want his services.
Regards,
Shodan
Why do we tolerate the existence of such an entity? Wouldn’t it be better to replace it with an entity whose purpose is to provide useful products and services? It seems to me that the profits are, at best, just a way of keeping score, of measuring which products and services are more useful than others, but there’s a lot of distortion in between the usefulness of products and the profitability of a company.
The profits are not “a way of keeping score”, they’re a way of enforcing that the products and services are useful. (Otherwise profits suffer.)
Sure there’s distortion, but no one has yet come up with “an entity” which has less distortion, to my knowledge.
I still don’t get how 40% gets us to magic, though. I mean, if I get to be on a board with a second board member of my choice, and the other three board members are Donald Trump and Donald Trump Junior and Eric Trump, then I’m guessing that we’ll witness a steady procession of 3-2 votes, y’know?
Yes, I get that the idea is for me and my pal to win over one of those Trumps so the three of us can outvote the other two. But I also get that, were it just those three Trumps to begin with, one of them could win over another to outvote the third; and so I’m of course guessing that, either way, care is taken to ensure that all three will cast their votes the right way: it’s how those three get on the board to begin with; it’s the primary qualification; it’s what lets you add two more and have no trouble at all ensue. Am I wrong in figuring that’s the go-to counter-tactic?
Without looking too deeply into it, don’t workers collectives in Finance utterly crush big banks when it comes to ethics and customer satisfaction? (and, y’know, not committing fraud?)
If things would work the way you describe, then there would be no point in having the 40% representation to begin with.
The way I see it playing out is that it’s not always clear what’s in the best interests of the company/shareholders and there could be differences of opinion. In some cases it could be that the same proposals which clearly advantage the workers might also be advantageous to the company. But if you have 40% worker representation on the board, then there’s a thumb on the scale, so to speak. So that if 80% of the shareholder board members think such-and-such approach benefits the shareholders, and 20% think the worker-friendly approach does, then that 20% combined with the worker-appointed 40% wins out.
But in any event, the notion that these representatives would influence the board in favor of the workers seems to be the entire premise of the proposal, as above.
Without looking too deeply into it, I would guess the reason big banks are nonetheless outperforming workers collectives in Finance is because their advantage in offering other goods and services that the public prefers outweighs any workers collective advantage in not committing fraud.
I mean, they also commit a lot of fraud. There’s that. And they’re willing to take risky bets that worker’s collectives generally won’t - which is a great idea if you know the government will bail you out, but a pretty lousy move if that’s not a given.
workers are not stakeholders. They get paid whether or not there is a profit. So the whole idea falls apart.
They don’t get paid for very long if there are no profits. Or they may not care about profits and could use their representation to put a company out of business in a misguided attempt to preserve their jobs.
They’re still stakeholders. They want the company to prosper. They don’t get paid very long if there ins’t a profit.