# Empirical Philosophy II:  The Vengeance

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [February 10, 2003, 3:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113 "2003-02-10T15:15:57Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 8

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**Author:** ![Fatwater\_Fewl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/4491bb/32.png) [@Fatwater\_Fewl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fatwater_Fewl)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 6:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/141 "2003-02-20T18:49:31Z")

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[aside]  
By the way, **Lib** , here’s something you might be interested in:  
[http://www.confederationcentre.com/wotw4.asp](http://www.confederationcentre.com/wotw4.asp)

The painting continues to haunt the dark corners of my mind.  
[/aside]

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**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 6:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/142 "2003-02-20T18:58:53Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by TVAA \*  
> The whole point is that the “objective” levels of the world aren’t the ones inside our minds, but outside.

OK. _What_ worlds inside our minds? If everything is whatever you are saying it is (which I’m not clear on exactly so I don’t want to paraphrase it) then there cannot be any such world inside or minds, can there? Everything is objective reality, nothing distinguishes “our” matter from “that” matter.

> [@](#):
>
> We communicate: therefore we share at least one level of reality. Our mental universes clearly don’t match; this is why we disagree.

I’m not concerned with my mental world much right now, to tell the truth, I’m trying to look passed that to get to yours.

> [@](#):
>
> Well, you’re looking at what we generally call the physical world, which is merely another level of reality.

But must we talk about levels to talk about reality? Aren’t we dealing with the finger here? Something I wouldn’t mind except you already (sorta) chastized me for it, so I am confused at this turn.

> [@](#):
>
> Let’s put it this way: we might be able to discover the Grand Unified Theory, but we can never know the future by running simulations.

That’s a question of epistemology anyway. I am more concerned with the apparent demonstration of why there is an ultimate/final/lowest level to reality, upon which are only build abstractions, but whose existence is only known through these abstractions, which seems to me (again) to be less of a tower and more of an Escher woodcut. 😉

> [@](#):
>
> No. You can’t understand the levels beneath you, and you can’t understand the level you’re on. You can understand some of the worlds you create.

Very well, then, I can live with that, sounds vaguely like an epistemological debate I had here some time ago. But that epistemological debate focused highly on _a priori_ construction, and your OP suggests no such thing, so now we come to wonder: how do I know that I cannot understand the level I am on, or that I am on a level, if not by experience? And if these levels do not exist, then what am I to expereince to let me know them anyway?

Doesn’t only the lowest level exist, or is an atom a higher level of existence over a quark? (this question is to help me understand “levels”, not a question about particle physics)

> [@](#):
>
> Such is always the fate of mystics, I suppose…

😉 Now, now…

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 7:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/143 "2003-02-20T19:08:25Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Fatwater Fewl \*  
> \*\*[aside]  
> By the way, **Lib** , here’s something you might be interested in:  
> [http://www.confederationcentre.com/wotw4.asp](http://www.confederationcentre.com/wotw4.asp)
> 
> The painting continues to haunt the dark corners of my mind.  
> [/aside] \*\*

Wow. Just plain wow.

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 7:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/144 "2003-02-20T19:12:34Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by TVAA \*  
> \*\*Put a sock in it, **Lib**. I didn’t say I might not understand _you_.
> 
> From what little I’ve seen of **Spiritus** ’ posts, he’s everything you _should_ be but aren’t.
> 
> He even makes intelligent responses to arguments! Hallelujah! \*\*

Yes, I knew what you were saying, Little One. 🙂

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**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 7:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/145 "2003-02-20T19:22:47Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi \*  
> **erl** , it is always good to see you, too (even though it awakens guilt that I have yet to comment upon teh material you sent me).

Good heavens, and the longer it takes the more embarassed I will be when you finally get around to it! LOL. Well, it was a step in an ongoing struggle, at any rate.

> [@](#):
>
> I recall moments where you and I thought we could only be civil to each other if we **didn’t** talk about philosophy or economics.

😃 I have largely abandoned economic discourse here, but I still listen closely. When the major portion of Rand left me, that went with it.

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**Author:** ![Fatwater\_Fewl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/4491bb/32.png) [@Fatwater\_Fewl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fatwater_Fewl)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 7:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/146 "2003-02-20T19:38:50Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Libertarian \*  
> \*\*Wow. Just plain wow. \*\*

Yep. That was my reaction the moment I laid eyes on it.

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**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 8:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/147 "2003-02-20T20:24:06Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> It can be any manner. It’s arbitrary.

Then the answer to my question: _Is there any relationship to which you won’t attach the symbol “reality”?_ should have been, **"No."**

> [@](#):
>
> Do you have any suggestions on how such a task could be begun? I suspect that mathematics would be a good start (I don’t think current math is sufficiently complete to fulfill this function), but my skills in mathematics are far too weak to accomplish this.

If you want to approach this by teh construction of a new grammar, then I would suggest either Wittgenstein or Russell (though you will have to build upon their ideas to get where you want to be, I suspect.)

My real suggestion, though, is to specify unique terms for every unique concept that is fundamental to your metaphysic.

> [@](#):
>
> Because my experience has been that when people talk about something being “real”, that’s what they tend to mean.

Well, I can see this more now that you have (I think) dropped all modifers from the criterion of “interaction”. But what I asked about, specifically, was “reality” not “real”. My own experience concides with yours in that people often mean “things that can affect me” when they say “real”. It does not follow yours that people mean “any arbitrary set of relationships” when they say “reality”.

> [@](#):
>
> Haven’t you heard that Zen admonition before? It’s another way of saying “Look at the territory, not the map.”

I have heard it before. I understand what it usually means.

But in the context of your other statements it means exactly nothing, for you have asserted that there is no way to distinguish between the finger and the moon.

> [@](#):
>
> The deepest level of reality [is constructing models], of course.

So sentences like: **When I look at my model of the world** are also empty of semantic meaning? I suppose I can interpret “I” in that sentence as “the deepest level of reality”, but that sentence is indistginguishable from “Models!”.

To which I naturally reply, “Memories.”

> [@](#):
>
> No. We understand things. The things we understand are not the things we’re trying to model.

You contradict yourself, on several levels actually.  
[ul]  
[li]Who is doing the modelling?[/li][li]What is being modelled?[/li][li]At what level do the things being modelled exist?[/li][li]At what level do the things not being modelled exist?[/li][li]How do we understand the things which are not being modelled?[/li][li]How do we understand the ntirety of that frame (which you have declared is necessary to understand a part of the frame).[/ul][/li]

> [@](#):
>
> Frames don’t interact with anything. If they interacted with other frames, there wouldn’t be more than one frame, would there?

Therefore a frame cannot be said to exist.  
Therefore you have again contradicted yourself:  
[ul][li]The frame is the objective reality.[/li][li]‘Objective’: actually existing, as opposed to the hypothetical sense of ‘existence’ that’s excluded by my definition of the term.[/ul][/li]

> [@](#):
>
> The frame we can discuss – the concept of a frame, and the computations of its properties – is not the frame we’re in. The concept is not the reality (referencing the one we’re in), although it’s a subreality (a system of things that interact in a particular manner).

Are you saying that we are not “in” the “subreality”? How, then, can we form a concept of the frame. Are you saying that forming a concept does not require interaction?

And why do you now use “subreality” at all, when you have declared that all interactions form a reality?

Are you asserting that the “reality” of the model is a subset of the “reality” of the frame we are in? If so, then you again run into a contradiction with: **understanding any part of the frame requires understanding of the entire thing.**

> [@](#):
>
> I cannot know the complete configuration of the realities I exist in, but I can think about the properties they possess nevertheless.

Think about, yes.  
Verify, no.  
Justify assertions about given your presented model, no.

> [@](#):
>
> Did I say that? I shouldn’t have. Perhaps that’s a typo, or perhaps I wasn’t thinking when I wrote that. I’ll look over the thread and try to find where I said that.

You did. That’s why I put the passage in quotation marks. Search from the top of this page for the word “events” and you will find the context.

> [@](#):
>
> “Things” are perceptions.

Okay, things are perceptions (or perhaps what others might call the objects of perception). Are perceptions things? Or are perception interactions?

> [@](#):
>
> I perceive my fingers and the keyboard as distinct (and I have to talk about them as if they were), but they’re really not.

If they are not distinct, then in what sense can they be said to interact?  
And why, if they are not distinct, do you have to talk about them as if they were? Specifically, why do you have to do so when trying to communicate a metaphysic in which they are not?

> [@](#):
>
> There’s no true boundary between them; that boundary exists only in my mind.

So reality exists only in the mind? Welcome to nihilism.

I think you really need to tell me how “interaction” is supposed to be understood in a reality that offers no distinctions between elements.

> [@](#):
>
> I am deeply offended. There’s nothing aesthetically pleasing about this metaphysic.

I did not say that it was pleasing.

> [@](#):
>
> Are they both real in the same way?  
> Are they both physical in the same way?  
> Are there any truly non-physical computers?  
> If they can interact with physical things, can we say they’re not physical themselves?

Yes.  
That depends upon ones’ reading of “physical”.  
I have not encountered one.  
Yes. Certainly, at least until someone dicovers the graviton. Perhaps even well beyond that point, depending upon how one appreciates gestalt theory.

**Fewl**  
Thanks for the link. I was unaware of that painting before, but it a haunting image. And now I have your haunting words to pair with it. Wonderful. Are you by any chance considering additional stanzas for the other figures? I find myslef imagining what you might tell me of the hands grasping chest and arm and straining to hold up . . .

Ah well, that’s me: not enough time to appreciate what’s been given to me yet continually greedy for more. I should have guessed you were a fan of Lorca. Have you read any of his plays?

BTW, on a completely inappropriate note, have you ever listened to teh music of Dan Bern? Something about “dark olives” in this context called him to my mind, though his [Jerusalem](http://www.danbern.com/danbernlyrics.html#jerusalem) could hardly be more removed in tone or approach.

Wonderful poem. I would place it among your best.

**Lib**  
Any chance you have a link to some analysis of the endgame to that match with Unzicker? I lack the understanding to fully appreciate the position, and I would love to deepen my appreciation.

**Erl**  
I was just thinking that given the rapidity with which you devour new insights you have probably long since departed from the positions in that paper. Do you have a revised version? There’s no sense in my waxing pedantic on things you already know.

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 9:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/148 "2003-02-20T21:24:45Z")

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Spiritus

I don’t know of any particular online analysis of it, but if you like, I can give you my own. I’m not a great player or anything, but I was at one time the Class A champion of North Carolina.

The problem for Unzicker is that his queen is hanging, so if he doesn’t either move it or take the pawn threatening it, he will lose his queen. But at the same time, if he does move his queen or take the pawn, Petrosian will play 56. Nd7+. Unzicker can’t play 56… Rxd7 because his rook is pinned onto its first rank. He must move out of check, and when he does, Petrosian will play 57. Nxb6 winning a whole rook outright. Unzicker’s position is devastated even though it looks pretty solid.

Does that help?

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**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 9:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/149 "2003-02-20T21:52:23Z")

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It does. I saw the queen pin, but I was focusing my attention on the wrong side of the board (Nxe6+ and or pverloading the defensive responsibilities of the bishop). I kept seeing things that seemed _almost_ there, but not enough to force a submission. Clearing out the rook is devastating, especially when you combine it with the Petrosian’s massed strength along the two open columns.

I can almost imagine the remaining rook saying to himself, “Uh oh, here come the battering rams.”

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 10:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/150 "2003-02-20T22:09:48Z")

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A pretty instructive part of this game as well, I think, is how it illustrates the relative values of the knight versus bishop. Knights excel in closed positions like the one in this game. Petrosian’s knight was hopping all around the stonewalled pawns, while Unzicker’s bishop was pretty much just a paper-weight. Bishops favor wide open positions with pawns cleared out of the way, and that’s when their wide sweep rules. Even though bishops always stay on one color, knights always have to visit that color every other turn. Knights alternate on each move: light, dark, light, dark…

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**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 10:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/151 "2003-02-20T22:21:23Z")

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Interesting, I have always felt knights were more useful than bishops early in the game, with the balance of power shifting as the board started to clear, but I had never bothered to analyze it in terms of open/closed positions. It seems obvious now that you have pointed it out.

My other (unschooled) perception of bishops is that they are stronger for defense than offense, especially in the endgame. Is there any truth to that observation? Or is it just the beer thinking (it has been more than a decade since I have played a game sober, strangely enough).

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**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 10:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/152 "2003-02-20T22:43:30Z")

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I think that might be just beer thinking. 😃

Bishops can be vicious attackers, especially when two of them work together in harmony. Knights are generally a bit more clumsy when used in tandem. Bishops can pin, skewer, and fork, but knights can only fork. Still, knights can fork 8 squares, and bishops only 4. So, they each have tactical advantages and disadvantages.

The key to offense is the Steinitz principle that an attack must arise from a positional advantage. An attack carried out when there is a weakness in your position is premature, and against a good player will fail. But at the same time, if you have a positional advantage, you _must_ attack, or else your positional advantage will disappear! This interesting principle has been confirmed again and again. It’s kind of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics of chess. 🙂

The key to defense is a different sort of positional integrity. If you can maintain equality with your opponent as Black, then any attack that he launches will, in theory, fail. This was what Nimzowitch (who was Petrosian’s idol) taught. Defense is a struggle to establish a positional disequilibrium. For example, if your opponent attacks on the king-side, counterattack on the queen-side or in the center. That is assuming that your position is sound, of course.

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**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\
**Post date:** [February 20, 2003, 11:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/153 "2003-02-20T23:27:53Z")

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I’ve always analyzed boards states based on which “pair” was more likely to strike: a queen-bishop (diagonal) or queen-rook (file) (and this is not necessarily literal, as pawns greatly influence the diagonal game and seriously hinder the file game, which is why IMO amateur players go for pawn trades: so they can get the slightly stronger rooks out, and why they are easily beat by a diagonal game). Secondly, I always look at castle dynamics, because there are (IMO) six main games to play out in chess, depending on 0-0, 0-0-0, or no castle for each side, and I consider the game to be “on” after the first castle, which is where I start peeking for which general attack is on (diagonals or files).

Still in experimental stage, I don’t read up on chess and I don’t get to play enough. I can’t hold my own at chess clubs, but I haven’t tried in about ten years, either.

Anyway, to complete the hijack, do you have a color preference, **Lib**?

Damn, this would make a fun IMHO thread: how dopers play chess. Maybe that’s the SDMB in my head, though, because most of my IMHO threads tank in reality. [whew! Saved that one…] 😛

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**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\
**Post date:** [February 21, 2003, 12:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/154 "2003-02-21T00:41:35Z")

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Hey, do you guys do any analysis of Go?

Okay, I have a lot to try to respond to.

**erislover** : As we can use a computer to run a program that emulates a computer, any system of interactions can be considered a world in itself. To use a pop-culture reference, everything you see around you could easily be a _Matrix_-like “simulation” of the “real world”. The point that I’m trying to make is that the level we identify as the “simulation” and the level we identify as the “real world” is _arbitrary_. The blasted robot-world is a _deeper_ reality than the Matrix is, as the Matrix is composed of the relationships with the robot-world computers. Saying that the robot-world is “more real” than the Matrix is to specifiy the causative relationship between the two. Whatever is causing or emulating the robot-world is even “more real” than it is. It’s all relative, dependent on one’s perspective – until we run out of perspectives. That’s the “most real” world. I don’t know what other properties it has except that it’s the foundation of everything else.

It’s not that it’s turtles all the way down: the last turtle is standing on the edge of the universe, and there isn’t anything beneath him. _There’s nothing deeper than the last reality._. That’s all I can say about the matter.

> [@](#):
>
> **But must we talk about levels to talk about reality? Aren’t we dealing with the finger here? Something I wouldn’t mind except you already (sorta) chastized me for it, so I am confused at this turn.**

The finger is the representations we use to model what we’re discussing. We can construct many models, but to determine whether those models are true/accurate/correct, we have to look at the reality. Hence, “empirical philosophy”. There are worlds above us, which are systems of interactions that are part of our minds and within our minds, and the worlds below, of which we’re a part, but only a part.

It is necessary to understand this (which I’m fairly certain you always did) to understand why we need to be concerned with the reality we’re in.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*I am more concerned with the apparent demonstration of why there is an ultimate/final/lowest level to reality, upon which are only build abstractions, but whose existence is only known through these abstractions, which seems to me (again) to be less of a tower and more of an Escher woodcut. 😉

\*\* There are some _very_ odd logical consequences if there isn’t a bottom layer. If there’s just an infinite number of turtles (to reference that neat old story), then the computational power of any level is infinite (or perhaps undefined is the correct world), and all limitations/boundaries/definitions are voided. It’s not just that I can’t comprehend such a world: I suspect it’s fundamentally incomprehensible (a system of interactions we call a “mind” would not be possible). I have only my intuition to go on, but it’s served me well before.

> [@](#):
>
> **how do I know that I cannot understand the level I am on, or that I am on a level, if not by experience?**

To be able to understand the level you’re on, you’d need to be able to emulate it within your mind. Since your mind is part of this level, you’d need to emulate it as well. You can’t emulate your mind with your mind (unless ICD rears its ugly head). I’m told the mathematical proof of this is related to the Godel proof, but I can’t demonstrate that.

> [@](#):
>
> **Doesn’t only the lowest level exist, or is an atom a higher level of existence over a quark? (this question is to help me understand “levels”, not a question about particle physics)**

It all exists: everything is ultimately part of the bottom level. An atom is a “higher” level than a quark. Please note: “higher” does not mean “better” or “superior” in any sense, nor does “deeper” or “lower” mean “worse”. If anything, the deeper levels of reality should be considered more essential than the higher.

Ultimately, everything is just information/data/interaction. (I think this is what Buddhists mean by talking about Maya, the illusion of the world, but I’m not certain.)

**Spiritus Mundi** : When people use the term “reality”, they seem to be a very _specific_ arbitrary set of relationships. It was only when I began to consider what the consequences of these relationships were than I realized there are layers of such relationships above and below them.

Regarding the moon and finger: my interpretation of the command is that the finger are the levels of reality above us, created in our minds (the way we think the world is, and other imagined things) and the moon is the reality we’re in and/or the realities below us, which determine the nature of us.

The “I” is a system of relationships that believes it’s an individual. It’s (presumably) the computational system being modeled by a particular brain in a body sitting in front of a particular computer somewhere in Pennsylvania.

I’m not contradicting myself, although I am guilty of not being sufficiently specific.

When we say something “exists”, we mean it has interactions relative to us. A frame is something we’re embedded in – we’re a part of it. There’s nothing that the frame can be said to exist relative to.

The “frame sans us” exists relative to us. If we include ourselves in the frame, there’s nothing we can say it exists relative to, because there’s nothing _for_ it to be relative to.

The concept of a frame is a subreality. The configuration that’s the concept is a part of me (my mind) and a part of you (your mind), etc. As such, the concept is part of reality because _we’re_ a part of reality.

Calling it a subreality merely specifies its relationship to us. It’s still a part of the greater realities beneath it. Although the prefix ‘sub-’ is inappropriate, since I use ‘down’ to distinguish the greater realities… Perhaps hyperreality? But that generally implies a greater form of existence, as in higher dimensions… [sigh] I should review the works of those philosophers you mentioned to find better words to use.

All perceptions are things. All things are interactions. Perceptions are a subclass of things/interactions.

Without distinctions, the interactions cease to be different. Here’s the part I have a LOT of trouble getting into words:

There really aren’t any distinctions. The bottom reality has all interactions, which is functionally equivalent to having none. If only a subset of the interactions is considered, though, some of the sets of interactions have patterns such that “the real world” is the result.

Okay, I didn’t explain that properly. It’s the only thing close to revelation that I have… [sigh]

‘Gravitons’ are irrelevant. If the system interacts in any way with a ‘physical’ system, it’s physical. Gravity and other such forces are physical, too, after all.

When we limit ourselves to things that interact with us, we can determine whether a lot of things are real or not. For example, consider souls.

If a soul is real, it must be able to interact with the physical world. Therefore, it can be created or destroyed through such interactions. If it can’t, then it can’t act as a record of our minds or choices, and it can’t influence things that happen in the physical world… so there’s no way it can be said to be real.

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**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\
**Post date:** [February 21, 2003, 1:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/155 "2003-02-21T01:41:51Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by TVAA \*  
> Hey, do you guys do any analysis of Go?

Unfortunately, I only learned to play go within the last month or so. Absolutely fascinating game that I wish more people around me played. 🙂

> [@](#):
>
> The point that I’m trying to make is that the level we identify as the “simulation” and the level we identify as the “real world” is _arbitrary_.

Does not mesh well with

> [@](#):
>
> It’s all relative, dependent on one’s perspective – until we run out of perspectives. That’s the “most real” world.

Unless, and perhaps this is just MHO but it seems vaguely supported by your previous comments about being bound to our own frames, the most real world is solipsism. In such a case, I feel awkward accepting it as empirical… really, it seems that the world “out there”, where we get our evidence from, is already (at least) a step above the last rung on the ladder.

> [@](#):
>
> I don’t know what other properties it has except that it’s the foundation of everything else.

Which doesn’t bother me _per se_ except: do you have evidence for this position?

> [@](#):
>
> The finger is the representations we use to model what we’re discussing.

At least in an epistemological way I agree. The border of ontology is everything, so it is hard to not creep into other “fields” of philosophical inquiry. But here’s what I’m concerned with. We keep popping up a level in our discourse. You keep pointing at the moon and talking about your finger. “The finger is the representations we use to model _what we are discussing._” And ontology is going to tell us _what we are discussing_, and what are we discussing?

God _damn_ I hate ontology. I don’t know why I even walked into this thread. 😃 I hold **Lib** partially responsible for bringing modal proofs to **TVAA** ’s eyes. You’re on the list, Lib! 😉

By the way, can we still call you **Vorlon** , or what would you prefer now that your name has been shortened? Just stick with TVAA?

> [@](#):
>
> We can construct many models, but to determine whether those models are true/accurate/correct, we have to look at the reality.

Right, a thousand times right and I’ll never disagree with this ever (I might quibble but not outright disagree). Now: what is reality?

> [@](#):
>
> There are worlds above us, which are systems of interactions that are part of our minds and within our minds, and the worlds below, of which we’re a part, but only a part.

This up/down use is confusing for me. Can it be explained in terms of interactions? Am I at least understanding that interactions are the base “unit” of all “things”?

> [@](#):
>
> It is necessary to understand this (which I’m fairly certain you always did) to understand why we need to be concerned with the reality we’re in.

I think I do understand it, and that’s why I fear we’ve got quite a vicious circle somewhere.

> [@](#):
>
> There are some _very_ odd logical consequences if there isn’t a bottom layer.

While I might agree (I don’t really but I might given other things which need clarification), my concern isn’t so much for such logical consequences unless _logic is not a model_. You see what I’m saying there?

> [@](#):
>
> It’s not just that I can’t comprehend such a world: I suspect it’s fundamentally incomprehensible (a system of interactions we call a “mind” would not be possible).

It would just be limited to specific subsets of all worlds (if it were possible). Epistemological limitations would exist no matter how deep the rabbit hole goes.

> [@](#):
>
> I’m told the mathematical proof of this is related to the Godel proof, but I can’t demonstrate that.

😃 I believe this, so it’s ok by me.

> [@](#):
>
> If anything, the deeper levels of reality should be considered more essential than the higher.

Hijack: more essential _period_, or more essential _ontologically_?

> [@](#):
>
> Ultimately, everything is just information/data/interaction.

I strongly disagree with that if we are anywhere near a materialistic view of reality.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Fatwater\_Fewl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/4491bb/32.png) [@Fatwater\_Fewl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fatwater_Fewl)\
**Post date:** [February 21, 2003, 1:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/156 "2003-02-21T01:42:41Z")

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Whew! So I went out and played some chess using the positional tactics in those Petrosian games. Which worked out well for me. Meanwhile you guys were talking chess theory… Means I gotta bookmark another damn thread.🙂

**Spiritus** , you’re welcome. And thanks for the kind words. I don’t know if I’ll add any more to the poem – I like it as a trinity;) – but the other pair of hands do hold my mind.

I haven’t read Lorca’s plays. Yet. Can you recommend a translation?

Some friends introduced me to Bern in the past year. _Jerusalem_ is the song I know best. It wasn’t a conscious allusion, though I see it now that you point it out. Yep, “mountains of olives”. So, it wasn’t an inappropriate note at all. Merely an a powerfully inductive insight. An interaction, even.😃

Sorry, for the hijack, **TVAA**. Although in some strange way, I think it all fits with this thread.

I’d like to see some analysis of Go, too.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\
**Post date:** [February 21, 2003, 6:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/157 "2003-02-21T06:21:25Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by erislover \*  
> **Unfortunately, I only learned to play go within the last month or so. Absolutely fascinating game that I wish more people around me played. 🙂**

Isn’t it wonderful? I enjoy chess, and I wish I were better at it, but Go is hypnotic. It’s not even possible to assign a value to the moves until the endgame is at hand… a property chess only has for the first few moves.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*In such a case, I feel awkward accepting it as empirical… really, it seems that the world “out there”, where we get our evidence from, is already (at least) a step above the last rung on the ladder.

\*\* It depends. If you’re referring to the world of human experience, I’d agree. It’s complicated by the fact that humans exist across several (perhaps several dozen) layers.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*Which doesn’t bother me _per se_ except: do you have evidence for this position?

\*\* In a manner of speaking. The reality around me can be easily split into levels, and I can consider their relationships to each other. In all seriousness, there’s plenty of evidence for levels. If you opened up your computer, would you see these words? Yet they do exist there; they’re just in a form you can’t recognize.

The only question then is whether the chain of levels goes on forever or ceases, and there are _very_ odd consequences of its continuing.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*By the way, can we still call you **Vorlon** , or what would you prefer now that your name has been shortened? Just stick with TVAA?

\*\* As only the Ambassador himself could rightfully be addressed as _Vorlon_, TVAA or Aide would be appropriate.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*Right, a thousand times right and I’ll never disagree with this ever (I might quibble but not outright disagree). Now: what is reality?

\*\* Which one?

No, I’m joking. In general, a reality is a set of interactions that share at least one common characteristic. You might consider a reality to be defined by a way of looking at the world, if you wish to simplify matters.

Consider: when you play chess, there’s the board on which pieces are moved, and there’s the board in your mind. The simulation of the board is a world unto itself… which is part of the larger world of your mind. Your mind is in turn a part of the ‘physical’ world.

You remember the spring example, right? When students begin to learn about the ways interatomic forces operate, they’re often told to think of them as tiny springs. This makes it a lot easier to imagine the atoms interacting, which in turn makes it easier to understand some of the more basic and elemental aspects of chemistry.

But springs act the way they do because of the forces between their atoms. Understanding the phenomenon by comparing it to itself isn’t very useful, is it? So, what are the springs like? What are the forces like?

They’re defined by _what they do_. No comparisons are necessary. What’s an electron? A thing that acts a certain way. More precisely, it’s the _action_. Anything that acts that way is an electron.

> [@](#):
>
> **This up/down use is confusing for me. Can it be explained in terms of interactions?**

It’s a crude way of symbolizing the relationship of different realities to each other. The realities ‘below’ you are the ones that are simulating you, and the realities ‘above’ you are the ones you help to simulate.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\* Am I at least understanding that interactions are the base “unit” of all “things”?\*\*

Eh. That’s one way to look at it.

Consider this: are you a living organism, or a collection of billions of living organisms? (I think I’ve asked this question before…)

> [@](#):
>
> **While I might agree (I don’t really but I might given other things which need clarification), my concern isn’t so much for such logical consequences unless _logic is not a model_. You see what I’m saying there?**

Are you referring to formal logic? It’s interesting – and some of its concepts might even be elemental ones – but it’s a subset of the basic interactions at best.

We don’t assert that the universe consistently follows certain rules: we observe that it does. We can be mistaken, of course. Still, causality is necessary. (From the perspectives where the universe doesn’t have any causality, thinking beings such as ourselves don’t exist.)

> [@](#):
>
> **Hijack: more essential _period_, or more essential _ontologically_?**

I think essential _period_, although it depends on what you mean.

> [@](#):
>
> \*\*I strongly disagree with that if we are anywhere near a materialistic view of reality. \*\*

Aagh! We’re back at the beginning!

Let me try to work up a good argument…

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\
**Post date:** [February 21, 2003, 11:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/158 "2003-02-21T11:27:28Z")

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Eris wrote:

> [@](#):
>
> Anyway, to complete the hijack, do you have a color preference, Lib?

I prefer White. But I’ve always loved Bobby Fischer above any other player, and he once said, “When I have the white pieces, I win because I am White. When I have the black pieces, I win because I am Fischer.” What a guy! 😃

> [@](#):
>
> I hold Lib partially responsible for bringing modal proofs to TVAA’s eyes. You’re on the list, Lib!

I know what you mean. Consider this dialog between a Buddhist student and his Master:

**STUDENT:** Master, what are these symbols?

**MASTER:** They hold the key to life, Grasshopper.

**STUDENT:** What do they say?

**MASTER:** They say you are naive.

**STUDENT:** […incredulous…] And that is the key to life?

**MASTER:** It is the key to yours.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\
**Post date:** [February 21, 2003, 11:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/159 "2003-02-21T23:10:53Z")

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There’s no difference between materialistic and non-materialistic views of the world. It works out the same either way.

The physical world is defined by the way it acts… which is ultimately an abstraction.

What’s the difference between an electron and an accurate simulation of an electron?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Fatwater\_Fewl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/4491bb/32.png) [@Fatwater\_Fewl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fatwater_Fewl)\
**Post date:** [February 22, 2003, 8:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/empirical-philosophy-ii-the-vengeance/154113/160 "2003-02-22T08:55:22Z")

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I ordered a cheeseburger.😛

Gary Larson comes back to me too often.

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