You’re never psychologically affected by things that don’t exist. (If they didn’t exist, they couldn’t affect you.) Besides, information has properties like anything else.
My main point is that the distinction between information (a set of relationships) and things (which are perceived as being “more real”) is ultimately false. They differ only to the degree that we perceive them as being different.
Obviously you are. You see interactions, and say they don’t exist. Or am I supposed to infer that what you see doesn’t affect you psychologically?
Perhaps you should abandon materialist metaphysics and shoot for some nice idealism. They don’t try to deal with matter there, and as you might guess have a strong monist leaning. 
Berkeley is a good start.
What?! Where did you get that?
There’s no difference between materialism and idealism. The consequences of the philosophies are the same. It’s just the philosophers who maintain (against all reason) that they’re different.
Did I ever tell you the parable about the philosophers’ convention and the pies a la mode?
Zwaldd wrote:
Is it possible that possible does not equal not ruled out?
He just ruled that out by defining “possible”, Lib.
[sigh]
What’s the color of an electron, erislover?
Yep. Depends on your definition of ‘equal’. I’m using it as ‘means’.
On one hand, I think you’re quite right. On the other, I have not found myself really promoting monism so what do I know. 
Which reason are they against for thinking two distinct philosophies are in fact distinct? Matter exists, and is only matter, there is no mind. Mind exists, there is no matter, and only mind. What greater difference could there be? The consequences are the same? The substantive denial of phenomenal reality versus the explicit statement/belief that it is all there is?
I’m pretty sure I won’t enjoy it, but no. Shoot. 
Electrons do not have phenomenal content.
TVAA said:
Fascinating, Jim.
Seriously, though, how can interactions be – let alone be just there – if they don’t exist? Does there exist?
**
A group of philosophers met in a restaurant to argue philosophy and enjoy their dinners. Everything went smoothly until the time came for desert. All of the philosophers ordered apple pie a la mode. However, one of the philosophers began to complain. “I specifically asked for my ice cream to be placed on top of my pie, and you’ve placed my pie beneath my ice cream.” The waitress replied, “But sir, you have what you asked for.” The philosopher answered, “No! I asked for the pie to be beneath the ice cream, and you’ve placed the ice cream on top of the pie. I demand that you take it back.” The waitress replies, “It’s the same either way! Those conditions are equivalent!” The philosopher demanded to speak with her manager.
The end result is exactly the same.
Would you like some pie?
Really. Do photons have phenomenal content?
How do you define ‘there’ without referencing something else?
It’s not that interactions are non-existent. Existence is not a term that can be applied to them, any more than we can say electrons have a color.
So what can we say about them? Both the natural languages of everyday speech and the unnatural languages of mathematics and logic lack terms to describe this concept. What underlies existence?
Exactly. This is the problem with definition. Once we define something, we can find ourselves having to define the terms of the definition, and define those terms ad infinitum.
Or that a navel orange gets 10 mpg, I suppose. But interactions do exist – I’m interacting with you right now. Does ‘now’ exist? It’s obviously relative, as the ‘now’ at which I type this is not the same ‘now’ at which you read it. Is it?
Is this what you’re saying, that ‘interaction’ is a convenient way of speaking of something which seems to be a mutual action or influence but which we really know nothing about – much in the way we speak of ‘now’ or ‘the present’ etc, although (or because) we really don’t know what time is or if it exists?
If this is what you’re saying, how is empirical philosophy significantly different from faith? What makes them mutually exclusive?
Or, if interactions physically *or *mentally affect us in any way (they do, don’t they?), yet don’t exist, how is this significantly different than a supreme being which we really don’t know anything about (or if it exists) but which someone may appear to have interacted with and, as a result of that interaction, found their way of thinking and/or behaving changing?
I don’t even know what existence is. It’s surely not limited to consciousness, or perception and perhaps not even to physicality. The only way of speaking of existence, or what might underly it, with any satisfaction at all seems to be through the use of metaphor, myth and symbol.
posted by ** Fatwater Fewl**
THe word “us” that you used is undefined, in the same way that " I " or “you” or “supreme being” is.
When you say:This is the problem with definition. Once we define something, we can find ourselves having to define the terms of the definition, and define those terms ad infinitum.
it also applies to the " I " writing and reading these words.
Is the awareness of a thought an interaction? If so, what’s is interacting with what?
We can’t say awareness is interacting because that’s just another thought in awareness, ad infinitum. If we don’t know the subject involved in the interaction, then we don’t know who knows. If A in the interaction of A—B, is an unknown, can we say there are any interactions at all?
Iamthat
Which is why " I " asked this:
Because TVAA had said “interactions don’t exist, they’re just there.”
How do thoughts proceed without interacting? When we connect two thoughts such as “The apple was on the tree. The apple is now on the ground” to produce a third thought “Apples can fall from trees” what is happening? Can we describe [not define] our thoughts as interacting? I don’t know, but it would be convenient to be able to.
I guess what I’m thinking is that description is a better word than definiton for such nebulous things as interactions, " I’s " etc.
As I understand how the working of the eye correlates to the theory of photons, yes, it is possible for single photons to register in our eyes. The phenomenon is seeing, the explanation of seeing is the interaction of “photons” with our eyes. So in this case we can place a man in a completely dark room and strike his eye with a single photon and say: “This is a photon.” I do not believe electrons can have such a phenomenal definition.
Anything that exists has a phenomenal definition (to me): a photon. I also have phychological definitions: an electron; the matter of their existence is arbitrary (to me). They help to explain in terms of symbols, words, concepts, and so on (anything that itself is not a sensation) themselves and phenomenal things. So we can say they are a shorthand or a communication device and say they don’t exist, or we can say they must exist if phenomenal things exist because these are really a part of them (in some way). The play between psychological definitions (actually saying “This is a photon”) and phenomenal definitions ([I sensed something]) is far outside ontology IMO.
I suppose that depends on what you consider “the end”. In how I phrased things above, I would consider the difference between idealism and materialism to be a psychological one. But psychological differences remain important to me.
…Worse yet, the poor waitress nearly threw her apron down and quit right there when the next philosopher demanded a new spoon. Someone, you see, had slipped him one with the concave side reversed, clearly an unacceptable substitution for a spoon. “But it’s the same thing!” she said again, and to prove his point he used the spoon to separate a small bite of pie, struggled to get it on his reversed spoon, and while raising the precariously balanced bit of pie to his mouth it slipped off.
“Now I insist you give me a new spoon! This one doesn’t work the same at all.”
“But it’s the same!” she cried in exasperation.
Posted by ** Fatwater Fewl**
I don’t think there are any interactions without awareness for whom would there be interaction to or for?
Thoughts don’t know anything or mean anything to each other. The observation creates the relation and possibly the appearance that they are interacting.
Are you certain that we don’t agree? You seem to understand the parable quite well.
[MDSL]: My hand is not an autonomous thing. It is a part of my body which is an autonomous thing. Thus, the hand is a part of a thing.
[VAA]: So your body is a thing. Could you tell me why your body is autonomous, instead of being influenced by external factors?