Empirical philosophy

I beg your pardon; “proof” should have had quotation marks surrounding it.

Irrelevant. My argument is that knowledge of the principle of noncontradiction has to be in place before I can acquire any other knowledge. That I may now reason that argument out doesn’t take away from the argument’s conclusion that I could not have done so without already having at least that one principle in my guidebook. I could not have discovered that the principle of noncontradiction was a prerequisite for making observations unless I first had knowledge of the principle of noncontradiction. The observation I made in that post is of the principle’s necessity in obtaining knowledge, not an observation of the principle itself. One could of course observe that principle, but they still would not be able to observe the principle without first knowing the principle, so it is different than all other observations.

You cannot learn the principle of noncontradiction. If you did not already know it, then your discovery that “A v ~A” would not exclude the proposition “A & ~A” or “~(A v ~A)”. Excluding those propositions would be essential to concluding “A v ~A”, therefore you would not be able to learn it. It must be unlearned knowledge.

** The Vorlon Ambassador’s Aide**

It depends.

If interacts with = awareness of

I am not awareness of the operations of my internal organs, do they exist?

I am not aware of my brain functions, do they exist?

I have never perceived my brain, do I have one?

The difference is even though I am not interacting with or aware of many body organs and their functions at this moment their existence is taken for granted.

Whereas the existence of something that does not exist and that has never been an object of my observation is not taken for granted.

Then there is the question of how much precision we can apply to the word “you” ?

I agree with RexDart in a manner of speaking.

Distinction is required for this universe to be; simply by considering reality to be the things that interact with me, I divide the ultimate nature of existence (or the Tao, or God, or whatever term you prefer… lacking a name for it, I usually call it the Totality) into two parts.

The Totality has no distinctions (which is the same as saying it has all distinctions). No reality could ever describe it (which is wrong, because that would be an accurate statement about it [which is wrong, because that would be an accurate statement about it… ad infinitum])…

Ah. I make a distinction between your mind (which generally does not model the workings of your body) and you, which by necessity interacts with those things.

If I sneak up behind you so quietly that you don’t perceive me, and hit you on the head, are you injured?

** The Vorlon Ambassador’s Aide**

wrote:

So this italicized you is the body?

My point was, I believe and assume many things exist that I do not presently perceive and those beliefs impact what I do perceive, and therefore have an existence in their effect, to some extent.

Although those beliefs and assumptions etc. are included in the present moment, which alone exists.

That’s my point, I’m not aware of you sneaking up but I am aware of the hit.

Does cause and effect only come into existence upon perception?

The body, emotions may be injured. But if there is injury the awareness of that injury is not affected.

Apparently if I sneak up behind you and tab you on the shoulder you start turning around before any signal reaches the brain.

Why would anyone who cares about philosophy want to erase the distinction between empirical and logical knowledge?

–It won’t change the meaning of these words, because the distinction is well established not only in philosophy but also in ordinary language; and

–if such a change could be accomplished by someone, somehow, it would just serve to consign that someone to irrelevance, not only in philosophical discourse, but also as a speaker of the english language.

The idea that logic consists of “empirically examining what we wish to learn about” is just completely absurd. It only demonstrates that the speaker misuses language and is therefore irrelevant.

and how exactly do you plan to prove this statement? statements about logic can’t be logically proved. they can only be taken as granted, understood empirically. that leads me to understand that logic is in fact an empirical construct.

and how exactly is it “misusing” language? how in general, for that matter, may one misuse langauge?

Consider this: when children are taught basic mathematical procedures (say, long division), they often misunderstand the procedure. This misunderstanding can be remarkably persistent.

If a child is working on a long division problem, and they get the wrong answer because they’re not going through the procedure properly, generally the child won’t notice this. To check their work, they just run through the procedure again, produce the same answer, and conclude that they’re right.

How do you actually know that a logical argument reaches a conclusion? The same way the child knows the answer to the long divison problem.

The long division can be checked (if the child wishes to do the work) by using multiplication. The logical argument can also be checked, by considering what the statements within it mean. As long as we consistently use a given set of symbols to refer to different interactions, it’s all good. :slight_smile:

If logic is only a construct of our minds, why worry about it? We can change it as we wish. If logic is part of the universe, we can understand it by examining the universe.

Distinctions, which involve the respective affirmation and negation of paired concepts, are what the universe is all about.

To start with, “taken as granted” means not empirically.

“Empirical” in our language, means derived via the senses.

If you wish to say that logic is “empirical examination” of thought, you are misusing the words “logic” and “empirical” which means, you cannot mean what you say. Why speak in a void?

empirical
logic
I respectfully challenge your claims.

VAA

I think that this statment ignores the fact that logic is the study of the models. To say the models aren’t “real” is a bit odd. Suppose I were to make an object in the shape of a car, and replicate every (exterior) detail in 12:1 scale. Is this really a car? No, it’s not a car. It’s a model. But it’s still real. It’s really a model. As long as we restrict our statements to its properties as a model, the fact that it’s not a car is hardly relevant. For instance, if I were to collide the model car with a model wall, and state that the model wall destroyed the model car, any protestations that we don’t know whether a real wall would destroy a real car would be out of place. I have no need to look at what happens when a real car collides with a real wall to make statements about their model counterparts. In the same way, I have no need to examine real thoughts in order to make statements about a model of thoughts (although I think that describing logic as a model for thoughts is simplistic).

Are you arguing that if we can gain understanding of a subject by examining the universe, then that subject must be empirical? Theoretically, somewhere in the universe there is an omniscient being, and we can gain understaing of any subject by asking it questions (and asking it questions would be a form of examining the universe, since this being is part of the universe). To say that, therefore, everything is empirical strikes me as rather silly.

Admittedly, my ideas about reality are a bit odd.

Consider the following claims:

A reality is any set or group of elements that can mutually interact.

It’s possible for two equally valid realities to exclude each other, in which case neither is “real” to the other.

It’s also possible for a reality to contain sub-realities. A sub-reality would be perceived as information or configuration from within the “deeper” reality.

Thus, not all things that are real are real in the same way. A model, an idea, a thought – all these things are real. Change the configuration of their root reality, and they cease to exist.

Many things actually exist on several levels of a reality-hierarchy simultaneously. For example, most living creatures constantly repair and recycle the chemicals that make up their bodies; as a result, any given atom in their bodies is unlikely to remain a part of them for very long. The “creature” is a configurational category that remain more-or-less constant while the deeper layer of reality constantly changes.

But, isn’t the problem of modeling (which is rooted in the empirical) that it is either:

a. an approximate representation of the exact problem

or

b. an exact representation of the approximate problem

and that, thru empirical measuring, we hope to converge to a solution approaching the “real”?

Problems with modeling: how can you ever determine if your model is correct?

Granted, it’s never possible to perfectly model anything in the universe (barring IPD, Powers forfend), but even if the phenomena we’re interested in are sufficiently vague to permit approximate modeling, we can only detect mistakes. We could probably come up with a model that explains everything we’ve previously seen, but there’s always the chance that we’ll be surprised.

Even more broadly, the only way the model would necessarily be correct would be if it were the thing being studied. The model is a 100% accurate representation of itself. Unless a person believes that his or her mind is the ultimate, deepest level of reality (and thus is God), their ideas cannot be considered to be necessarily correct.

It came from Mr. Spock in Star Trek IV, which is apparently where Vor learned his philosophy.

Surely science is about explanation rather than ‘truth’. It’s not whether the ‘model’ is about some kind of ultimate ‘reality’ but whether it powerfully (in terms of predictable consequences) explains phenomena. A model’s current ‘correctness’ lies in it having withstood potential and critical refutation; it will remain ‘correct’ until it is refuted or superseded by a more over-arching model.

Knowledge doesn’t legitimize itself by its pedigree but, rather, by its openness to criticism.

Science is about falsification. It does not tell what is true. It tells what is false. See Science as Falsification, an excerpt from *Conjectures and Refutations *, by science philosopher Karl Popper.

Hey, another Popperian!

You’re forgiven being a Libertarian - well, almost.

Um, thanks — well, nearly. :wink: