Quick note (I’ll respond to everyone’s excellent comments later when I have time) to erislover Re: Popper.
We have to consider “undefined” as well as “true” and “false”. The negation of truth is undefinition and falsehood, the negation of falsehood is truth and undefinition, the opposite of false is true, the opposite of true is false.
you know, i said earlier that all knowledge is empirical. i think i’d like to take that back now.
i’ll stick with empirical and a priori knowledge are the same though.
in order to reason anything a priori, you need to understand logic, which i contend is an empirically determined construct.
on the other hand, in order to accept any knowledge as valid, you have to believe in the validity of SOMEthing before hand. you have to believe a priori that the knowledge you gain empirically is valid.
so it seems one form of knowledge cannot exist without giving some credence to the other beforehand.
there seems to be a problem here. how is it reconciled? is it enough to consider the same form of knowledge?
Some of you seem to be confusing Empiricism with Rationalism and theories of truth and mind. While these are related, they are not the same, and in some cases these theories are mutually exclusive. Simon Blackburn is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and author of “Spreading the Word” (1984), “Essays in Quasi-Realism” (1993), “Ruling Passions” (1998), “Truth” (1999), “Being Good” (2001) and the text I will quote from, “Think” written in 1999. In “Think” Blackburn writes about, among many other things, the distrust of pure or “unaided” reason in particularly British philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries such as John Locke (1632-1704), although some small part of Locke’s writings are rationalist. Blackburn says, “For these philosophers, the best contact between mind and the world is not the point at which a mathematical proof crystalli[s]es, but the point at which you see and touch a familiar object. Their paradigm was knowledge by sense experience rather than be reason. Because of this, they are labelled empiricists, whereas Descartes is a card-carrying Rationalist.” (Blackburn, Simon (1999) “Think”, Oxford University Press. p.42) As you now see the empiricist bases his understanding of reality on that which we can measure and test, those sensations we experience as a result of our interaction with outside material world. That we can for the better part trust our senses is a given in the empirically based argument.
Modern science is based largely in empiricism and so far as other theories of knowledge go, empiricism has undoubtedly serves us well. Unfortunately empiricism is not taught as the best way to seek knowledge in many of our societies, thus superstition, religion and the wrongful assumption of genuine knowledge is widespread. Let me state as a point of interest that as an atheist I find “Ontological Empiricism” to be a contradiction in terms, as that which does not exist in any measurable or material sense cannot be proven empirically, thus God or any gods cannot exist independently of the human mind or thinking.
The question of whether we can trust our senses is an old and good one, Descartes performed a famous thought experiment in which he postulated that an “Evil Demon” inputs to our minds everything we sense in order to obscure reality and truth, from that point he was only able to conclude the existence of himself. This is where the famous saying: “Cogito, ergo sum” or “I think, therefore I am” comes from, a more accurate translation is actually “I am thinking, therefore I am”. As Blackburn wrote, “The Demon cannot simultaneously make both these things true: I think that I exist [and] I am wrong about whether I do [.] Because if the first is true, then I exist to do the thinking. Therefore I must be right about whether I exist… However, I cannot think that I am thinking when I am not. For in this case the mere fact that I think that I am thinking guarantees that I am thinking. It is itself an example of thinking.” (Blackburn, Simon (1999) “Think”, Oxford University Press. p28) For many, as with Descartes, this was unsatisfactory, surely the existence of more then just ‘self’ is provable?
A reconstruction of Descartes above point is included in “Think”, “I cannot doubt that I exist. I can doubt whether things extended in space (‘bodies’) exist. Therefore, I am not a body”. At a glance or to the shallow thinker this seems plausible; it seems to prove the existence of something like a soul, something that is provable yet immaterial. However when the same logic is used in the statement, “I know who my father is; I do not know who the masked man is; so, my father is not the masked man.” A fallacy can be identified; this fallacy is called the “masked man fallacy”. Descartes came to believe, by applying the idea of causation, that what we are thinking must be caused by something outside of the self, that his having some vague idea of perfection implied a cause. Blackburn wrote, “This implies that only a perfect cause, that is, God, will do. Hence God exists, and has left the idea of perfection as an innate sign of his workmanship in our minds” with perfect God as the creator or the cause Descartes must believe that there is no deceiver, now god inputs to our senses and God would never lie as lying is not part of perfect goodness. In this argument Descartes uses the idea of causation in thinking an idea of perfection must be the result of the perfect, God. Of cause Descartes was a pure rationalist and as such testing this idea in material reality did not occur to him at the time. Descartes uses his ‘proven’ God as proof that what we perceive is necessarily true. The argument Descartes developed from this point is known as the “Cartesian Circle”, but I’m right of track now… (Blackburn, Simon (1999) “Think”, Oxford University Press. pp. 28-37)
The Scotsman David Hume (1711-76) was critical of Descartes saying, “There is a species of scepticism… It recommends universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: Or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.” Blackburn continued, “The veracity (truthfulness) of our senses and reasonings is itself part of the foundation [or starting point].” The fact that in our experiences our faculties do for the most part work well, that evolution has given us very good ways of knowing reality for the purpose of survival, is called “non-rational” or “natural” foundationalism. There is nothing irrational about this theory, it simply does not stand as “Demon proof” as some would like. Hume’s thinking helped greatly in the development of Empiricism generally. (Blackburn, Simon (1999) “Think”, Oxford University Press. pp. 40-42)
This, I hope, has helped people understand empiricism and what lend to it, keep in mind I am a student of philosophy and not a Professor. I have tried to be clear but there really is a LOT to it. Questioning empiricism is a good thing to do, as we should all understand this theory and contending theories.
ERISLOVER–
“…But is it just me or are you, in (4), calling the immediate objects of sensation sort of automatically knowable (psychologism, I believe the term is)?..”
Let’s define “the immediate object of sensation” operationally, thusly:
Your eyes are open in a lighted room. You hear a sound (which serves only to mark the moment) and take note of whatever is present to your mind that has visual form (as opposed to, say, auditory form or tactile form–etc.). It is no more than a visual This. It has neither parts nor passions: for you have not yet attempted to analyze the experience, to make comparisons, to take note of its “parts.” IMHO, you can only notice five or six “things true of it”; and those things are not what we usually think of as analytic details, but rather such as “it is colored (as opposed to monchromatic)”, “it is diverse (as opposed to purely simple and undifferentiated,” “it is ‘located’ in the visual field (as opposed to quasi-spatially diffuse”–abstract generalizations, if you will.
That sort of experience is a species of what I would mean by “the immediate object of sensation”. And I am saying that the sorts of elements referenced above are examples of immediate direct “knowings” that cannot possibly be controverted, as the set of them is PRECISELY what one means by “This.”
Thus “This” = That. Eh?
since i’m playing skeptic today, there is something i’d like to note.
“i ask whether or not i exist, and since i cannot ask this unless i exist, i exist.” was descartes’s reasoning on the issue. and i take issue with his reasoning.
it seems pretty clear to me that this argument is circular. suppose we do not assume that i exist. then it is not at all clear that I am asking whether or not i exist. that is, to say “i think, therefore i am” assumes beforehand that there is an “i” that is doing the thinking. we cannot claim to think or ask unless we assume we exist.
though it certainly seems like i am the one asking the question, there is no way to be sure of this.
hawthorne:
Thanks for the great link! I have to admit that I had completely missed the implications of ”semantic holism” in Quine’s critique, and was having some difficulties making the leap from his analysis of ”empirical dogmas” to his assertion that scientific theories are ”a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience.” And to think – the answer was there right under my nose the entire time!
*I couldn’t agree more – in fact, this is one of the conclusions I arrived at in my paper, almost word for word.
Lib:
*Well, actually, to be technically correct, you’ve not even said that. Rather, you stated categorically that ”Science is about falsification. It doesn’t tell what is true. It tells what is false.” I wonder how you square that claim with the many discussions here, and even over at talk.org, in which scientists dogmatically insist that evolution is a ”fact”?
But anyway, I disagree. Actually, your assertion above is one good example of why: it presents a very truncated version of what scientists really do when they work. In particular, it misses a crucial element of scientific research: interpretation. Before passing judgement on experimental results, working scientists have to interpret those results. It is only after that creative act is accomplished that they can begin to ascertain whether or not a given experiment has falsified a given hypothesis. And, in many cases (maybe all cases), the way in which the results are interpreted determines the final judgement on whether or not a ”falsification” has occurred (this is the implication of Quine’s critique, I think). That was certainly the case with Popper’s flagship example, General Relativity; the results from the 1919 solar eclipse observations could just as easily (and rationally) have been interpreted as a falsifying instance of the theory. Popper conveniently fails to mention that, or investigate its implications, in C & R.
erl:
I’m not sure if I understand your notation correctly, or your argument; but I suspect I see where you’ve gone wrong.
The falsification criterion is a ”metaphysical principle,” just like the ”verification criterion” turned out to be. However, Popper does not share the logical positivists’ disdain for metaphysics; he sees clearly that science can’t define itself in terms of itself, but must be based some kind of axiomatic principle that, in its turn, is not scientific.
In other words, you’ve fallen into the trap of attempting to evaluate the falsification criterion as if it were a scientific principle. It is not. It is a metaphysical principle designed to help us sort out what we might reasonably call ”science” from non-science and pseudo-science. In C & R Popper states clearly that he is not concerned with problems of meaning, or even the truth content of statements. He is only concerned with locating a useful demarcation criterion between ”scientific” statements and all other sorts of statements. That there are true, non-scientific statements doesn’t particularly bother him.
You write, ”All falsification is done by theories of falsification.” I’m not sure what you intend with this claim. You then go on to point out, ”Therefore we never know whether a theory is false, for that would require a theory being true (the theory of falsification in question) which is already forbidden.” If I understand you correctly, then you go astray as follows:
Popper’s criterion is not itself concerned with the truth and falsehood of theories. Rather, it is concerned with separating scientific statements from non-scientific statements.
Popper’s criterion does not forbid a theory from being true. Rather, it regulates what we can and cannot safely, rationally, and logically assert about a scientific theory, or hypothesis. In other words, we can make true assertions that do not fall into the category of science. Many scientific theories, as well, may, in fact, be true. But Humian skepticism regarding induction forbids us from conclusively asserting truth; we can only conclusively assert falsehood.
The falsification thesis cannot be treated like a scientific theory, and its validity must be assessed in a different manner. As guideline, or principle, informing empirical research, I think it is quite useful; it requires of the researcher an open, skeptical, questioning frame of mind in his/her work, and even in relation to his/her own ideas/theories, and always reminds him/her that, no matter how certain he/she may feel he/she is about a given idea, he/she can always be wrong. As a demarcation between science and everything else, on the other hand, I think it fails to hold water.
Does any of that make sense?
P.S. Hmmm, though… the claim that “All scientific theories are falsifiable” does appear, at least at first glance, to be an empirically grounded statement that is, in itself, falsifiable. That is to say, if we can locate a theory that we consensually agree is “scientific,” on the one hand, but that is nevertheless “unfalsifiable,” on the other, we would have falsified the criterion. In fact, one of my major objections to Popper’s criterion stems from precisely that: I assert that many theories generally considered scientific are, technically, unfalsifiable. Clearly, falsifiability must be a normative, rather than a descriptive, element, of Popper’s view regarding science…
Well Mr Svinlesha, I am going to have to take issue with your (1). He is concerned with the Popper version of true and false, which is corroborated or falsified, the latter of which is accomplished through the set of basic statements that will be in direct conflict with the theory.
But here is the problem. “[basic statement x] is a natural effect/ happenstance/ etc” is what it takes to falsify a theory. You can see that this itself can be falsified.
And now, I remember your paper well, Mr S, and I can’t say I’ve disagreed that the process of demarcation has failed.
RE: evolution is a fact: The way science is presented to me bothers me greatly. I understand it gave us microwaves and transistors, but I wasn’t arguing that. Same thing with the comment, “You just don’t understand what scientists mean by ‘theory’,” something often said in response to the infamous, “Evolution is ‘just’ a theory”. To tell the truth, I think scientists think their theories mean a whole lot more than they do (or possibly ever could).
I want to clarify this.
Suppose we have a falsifying statment “Data x is acquired.” Now we receive data x. Have we falsified the theory? Of course not: one erroneous or suspect set of data is not enough to trash a theory. Such an effect, to be considered as significant, must itself be reproducable. Notice that this then fulfills the criteria for a theory! True, the level of complexity of this theory is not the same as the one we set out to falsify, but the complexity of a theory is not itself a factor in whether or not something is a theory in the first place. In fact “Data x will always be acquired” is just such a theory that would falsify our hypothetical theory.
erl:
Yeah, I might have been a little too categorical there, actually. But I’m kinda at a loss as to what you mean with the last clause of your sentence. As I understand Popper, falsification occurs when empirical observations fail to conform to observation statements (i.e., predictions or hypotheses) logically derived from a given theory. In other words, a hypothesis is falsified by ”evidence,” not ”statements.” Or perhaps I’ve misunderstood you?
*Actually, Popper discusses precisely this problem in Replies to My Critics, vol. 2, and probably elsewhere as well. I agree with you that, potentially at least, the problem seriously weakens the strength of the criterion.
Popper writes that a good scientist does not, and should not, give up his theory in the face of a single falsifying result, because unexpected intervening variables, for example, could conceivably contaminate the data, and so on. Thus, a good scientist is tenacious, and maintains his theory in the face of contradictory evidence, at least for while. But at some vague, undefined point, the data against a given (false) theory becomes overwhelming; and when a scientist continues to cling to his favorite theory after that point (by ”immunizing” it against falsification via ad hoc hypotheses, and so forth), he falls off the wagon, and is no longer practicing “science.”
However, with regard to your example above, we can nevertheless say that your theory (whatever it may be) is falsifiable: it was falsified, in fact, by data x. By Popper’s reckoning, that makes your theory ”scientific.” (How you chose to react to that falsification is a different issue.) A scientific theory can be falsified; it is precisely that characteristic, in fact, that allows us to label it ”scientific.” The problem with pseudo-scientific theories, on the other hand, is that, for one reason or another, they cannot be falsified; there exists no data x that could possibly falsify them, because they are formulated in such a way that no matter what data x might be, it can always be interpreted as confirming the theory in question. According to Popper, that is.
*I think I see your point. But consider it this way:
Let’s say that I’m an alien from another dimension, and that I have no experience with gravity, statistics, or coins (although I have read Popper, extensively). For reasons to be explained at a later date, I suddenly appear in this dimension, and decide to perform an experiment. I borrow a coin from somebody (yeah, I know this is a lousy example, but bear with me for a minute) and toss it 10 times.
By an incredible stroke of luck, it lands heads up on every toss.
I then formulate the following hypothesis: Coins, when tossed, always land “heads up.” On the basis of my experience, this is not an unreasonable first hypothesis.
I then toss the coin an 11th time, only to discover, to my surprise, that it has landed tails up. How should I react to this situation?
Well, one possibility would be to go, “Oy! Guess I was right out!” While I might not be able to derive a general law from this experience, I could at least, reasonably, rule out my first conjecture as wrong, because it has been falsified. You’ll note that I do not have to assert that the coin will land tails up again in order to do this. One counter-example, arguably, would be enough to falsify the thesis, without the assertion that such an event will necessarily occur again (i.e., that is reproducible in theory).
Of course, I might be a stubborn inter-dimensional alien, and say, “Hmmm…I guess the wind was blowing that time… I’ll try it again and see what happens.” Also a fairly reasonable response. I toss the coin ten more times, and this time I get: 4 heads, 6 tails. Now, even if I still can no longer derive an underlying law that governs coin-tossing, I would have a difficult time asserting that my first conjecture was true against the backdrop of my experiences.
In other words, falsification, as intended, serves as a means to check false inductive inferences.
On the other hand, the example above is extremely simplified; in the real practice of science, I agree that the decision to assume that a falsifying result will repeat itself is also an inductive inference (I think). So there is some room to wonder if Popper really got around induction as cleanly as he would have us believe.
Mr Svinlesha (you are absent for too long at a time! :))
No, I know Popper stresses the distinction. I said “the latter of which is accomplished through the set of basic statements that will be in direct conflict with the theory” meaning that for every theory proposed there are a set of observations that will falsify the theory. The falsifying observation is to the basic statement as corroborating evidence is to the theory. I know Popper was a big realist so I suppose it makes sense for him to stress the distinction, but here I see no harm in letting it slip. But it is important to note that the falsifying statements will come as a consequence of the theory, and the search for evidence from there (which we then determine to be fallin gon one side or the other, or neither as the case may be). His dismissal of not putting forth a theory of meaning acts as a crack in the foundation here. I recall a few people noting that the underdetermined nature of statements can cause problems 
Exactly… this problem surfaces because the falsification of a theory involves a theory of falsification. That’s my read. I must admit I never read anything other than The Logic of Scientific Discovery, however. I should look for his later clarifications. I should also move on, some have told me, to Kuhn. Maybe. I’m still plodding through Quine, his prose is friendly but I seem to be having a hard time of it. :shrug:
Well, I’ll agree that it is falsifiable. I won’t agree that the observation of x will falsify it (motivated by the above considerations) (or that we can even say it is x).
But the problem isn’t that it landed tails, but that your might respond, “Hmm, I didn’t throw it the same way that time.” And you could wind up with two theories: when it lands heads, and when it lands tails. This is the problem I face with it. In most cases it is our narrow minds (our scientific paradigms) that only have us inspect data in a certain way. Popper’s theory certainly doesn’t put it forward. Worse yet, he mentioned how personal opinion doesn’t enter in to it (his whole motivation for having a demarcation of science!), and yet without human intervention into the process we can’t get anywhere.
Has anyone ever noticed I got a hard on for critiquing Popper’s theory? 
Well, I think a rigorous theory of meaning dispelling Quine’s et al commentaries regarding analytic statements would serve to elucidate the nature of basic statements and close the gap between statements and the existence of to what those statements refer. I do not recall any other serious issues with his work. But this is a huge problem, IMO, because the acquisition of terms (understanding their meaning, new constructions, etc) in a language is very certainly and empirical process. Can his demarcation actually exclude it? (I never saw anything that indicated otherwise, and so tended to disregard his bantering about not putting forward a theory of meaning).
erl:
Thank you! For what it’s worth, it’s always a pleasure discussing these issues with you, good sir.
Anyway, I’m not as absent as you might think. I just don’t have the time, or the energy, to participate like I used to, so I only post if I really feel like I have something worthwhile to contribute. But I’m still here quite often, lurking in the background.
On topic, then:
*Again, I’m not sure if I follow your reasoning here. As I understand Popper, the ”set of observation that will falsify the theory” is potentially infinite. Any observational results outside the very narrow range predicted by the ”scientific” hypothesis will falsify that hypothesis. This is really the beauty of Popper’s idea (if I can call it that); it allows us to escape the ”irrationalism” that would otherwise be our only possible basis for ”objective knowledge,” granting that we accept Hume’s critique of induction.
Hume claims that inductive reasoning is fundamentally illogical/irrational. We can’t prove, by means of logic, that events will continue to repeat themselves in the same manner, and we therefore cannot logically generalize from specific instances to general laws. Popper’s falsificationism, however, allows us to escape this dilemma. To do so, we begin by admitting that all the general laws we have induced are, fundamentally, speculations (or, in his own words, conjectures). Due to the limitations imposed upon us by the logical weaknesses of induction, therefore, we can only go forward by trying to falsify our generalized, irrational conjectures – that is, by discovering that our inductive conclusions are incorrect. It is a kind of via negativa, like the sort proposed by Pseudo-Dionysios the Aeropogite, the 4th century gnostic; constrained from grasping truth ”positively,” we can only come to know her by discovering what she is not.
I’m not completely sure, but I think his avoidance of a ”theory of meaning” is connected to his rejection of the ”verification theory of meaning (VTM).” The Vienna Circle originally welcomed Popper’s work because they misunderstood it as a ”falsificationist theory of meaning.” Popper rejects that interpretation, just as he rejects the VTM.
As I see it, there are two basic ways to go about criticizing the falsification criterion:[ul][li]You can attempt to criticize the internal logic Popper employs to articulate and justify the criterion.[/ul]An example is the typical argument, ”The falsification criterion isn’t falsifiable, therefore it’s a contradiction in terms.” Personally, I figure that Popper was a better logician in his sleep than I will ever be awake, so I don’t see much hope in following this route. At any rate, I’m not ready to tackle refuting the arguments of one of the 20th century’s foremost logicians.[ul][]You can attempt to criticize the practical application (or usefulness) of the criterion.[/ul]This approach might claim, for example, that the criterion is too restrictive (rules out fields of study that should be considered scientific, such as evolutionary theory or cosmology); too permissive (includes fields of study that shouldn’t be considered scientific, like Creation Theory); too ambiguous (some broad theories might include both falsifiable and non-falsifiable elements – how do we assess their status?); too simplistic (see my response to Lib, above, for an example); or simply misleading (fails to accurately capture the historical development of science, and the real work that scientist do). To my way of thinking, this second option is the way to go with Popper, if you wish to criticize his work: logically correct, but hardly a good description of ”science.”[/li]
Assuming that the above isn’t a false dichotomy, then I can’t really tell on which side of the fence your critique lands. At first I thought you were criticizing the logic behind falsification; you asked if anyone saw a weakness in your presentation, and since no one else responded, I decided to give it a shot. But in the discussion that’s followed since, it appears that your criticism is really a practical one. As in the examples below:
Aye…there’s the rub. To begin with, we must interpret the data in order to decide whether or not it has falsified a hypothesis in the first place. That’s where my coin analogy is misleading, because interpreting which side a coin lands on is a fairly straightforward process. Interpreting the statistical results of the measurement of an extremely small fluctuation in the reading of a certain type of radioactivity, produced by a certain isotope of a certain gas (in this case, argon, I believe), based on a Geiger counter report built upon the assumption that that sort of radiation reflects a certain chemical composition in a tank of chlorine that has reacted with massless particles emitted from the center of the sun, on the other hand – that, my friend, is an entirely different ball of wax. (Talk about underdetermination!)
After interpreting the data, scientists must also negotiate with each other over its actual significance; did it really falsify the hypothesis? Taking the case above, did the infinitesimally small fluctuations measured actually falsify the theory that stars are powered by fusion? As you say: sure, the hypothesis is falsifiable; I’m not so sure data x falsified it, however. Scientists negotiate with each other, utilize various rhetorical tricks in the literature, attempt to establish networks of ”trust,” and eventually, consensually agree that, ”Hmmm…that seems about right.” It’s a social, human activity. This is an externalist account of scientific development. It employs explanatory mechanisms beyond ”the logic of scientific discovery” to describe scientific activity. Popper’s account, on the other hand, is internalist. For what it’s worth, there are weaknesses and strengths in both perspectives.
I also found Quine difficult to grasp, despite his straightforward writing style. I only read his “Two Dogmas,” however, since as far as I know, it is the only essay relevant to what I’m interested in. You should find Kuhn, on the other hand, to be a breath of fresh air. May I suggest his ”Essential Tensions”? There are several short, very readable and interesting articles therein; they changed my thinking on science quite radically.
Svinlesha wrote:
I do not see how that contradicts that science is about falsification. In fact, you seem to support the point. The scientists are bringing their interpretation to bear for the purpose of determining “whether or not a given experiment has falsified a given hypothesis” as you put it.
Eris wrote:
Well, yes, but that speaks to the shaky foundation upon which science is built, not to what is the intention of science. Every deductive system is necessarily petitio principii and is consistent only if it cannot prove its own axioms.
Lib:
I don’t quite know how to address this response…we may have to settle down and define some terms first.
If you were to say to me, ”Sometimes science is about falsification,” I could do nothing other than agree with you.
If you were to say, ”Science is about falsification. It doesn’t tell what is true. It tells what is false,” I would say that that is an oversimplification, really, of scientific activity; that it is misleading to categorize science in this manner, because scientific research is much more complex than that, usually.
If you were to claim that scientists ”merely … conduct experiments to determine whether their hypotheses are false,” I would point out that many sciences are in no sense experimental, and that many abstract scientific theories are, arguably at least, unfalsifiable. Paleontologists, for example, cannot conduct an experiment to falsify the hypothesis that Tyrannosaurus Rex was predator.
I read Popper as seeking, by means of the falsification criterion, to remove the problem of interpretation from science. In a sense, his entire theory is designed around this problem of irrationality/interpretation, and quite ingeniously, I might add. Thus, for example, he believes a good scientific theory makes specific, falsifiable predictions such that, should we encounter observations which fail to accord with the predictions, we could safely state that the theory is falsified, without recourse to interpretation – much like my simplified coin experiment, above. It’s easy to see directly whether a coin is lying heads up or tails up, and the result of the test requires little – arguably no – interpretation at all.
To deal with the fact that different scientists may quibble over different theories, one arguing that data x falsifies a theory, the other arguing that it does not, he suggests that when considering this issue, we must keep in mind the fact that the falsifiability of a theory, on the one hand, and the response of researchers to a falsification, on the other, belong to two entirely different ”worlds.” A given researcher can deny that x falsifies his favorite theory, but that does not reflect, actually, upon the theory itself.
My response to this particular line of reasoning is as follows:[ul][li]Interpretation preceeds falsification. This implies that the judgement, ”Data x falsifies theory Theory X,” is determined by how the scientist interprets data x. In other words, falsification is a chimera. We call it “falsification,” but in actuality, it is interpretation. As I mentioned earlier, regarding this point: Popper’s flagship example, the results of the 1919 test of General Relativity, could quite as easily, and rationally, have been interpreted as falsifying GR.[/li]
[li]Dividing theory and subject into two different worlds creates a false dichotomy. Theory, experimenter, and interpretation of experimental results are inextricably intertwined; we are all, ultimately, subjective in our judgement of the facts that we believe in. Two scientist can reasonably disagree over whether or not a given data set is correct, or if it really falsifies a theory, and so forth. Their assessments cannot be usefully detached from their personalities.[/ul]I just want to reiterate my earlier point: as a guideline for empirical research, falsification is useful. I work as a psychotherapist, myself, and constantly seek ”falsify the hypotheses” I might have about my patients. Popper would, of course, immediately repudiate the claim that such activity allows me to characterize myself as a scientist. I myself know, from personal experience, that falsification and interpretation are inextricably interwoven.[/li]
As a criterion for demarcation between science and non-science/psuedo-science, on the other hand, falsification doesn’t hold water. In fact, I’m inclined to agree with Larry Laudan, who argues that the issue is not terribly relevant:
Did that clarify anything?
Anyway, as you have no doubt noted, I have an entire array of arguments against the falsification criterion.
Wow, get busy for a few days and look what you miss!
Mr. S, how’s that baby of yours?! I haven’t crossed threads with you since you took your “paternity leave” many months back. Glad to read your insightful postings yet again.
Please allow me to put in my small contribututions -
First off: Knowing what is false does not imply that we know what is true, only that truth is not contained in what we know is false.
But more to the meat of the discussion: Science is not about falsifiability; falsifiability serves science’s intent. I’ll repeat myself from a past thread
DSeid:
9:28 AM, 28 May, 2002, by C-section.
Birth weight: 3115 grams
Birth length: 50 cms
Name: Isaac Houston (Svinlesha)
Nowadays, at a little over 8 months, harmonious, happy, intelligent, sleeps well, very good health, probably weighs more than 10 kgs (haven’t weighed him recently). He’s great, mother’s great, I’m great. Thank you kindly for asking.
Regarding this:
I have no problem in general with such a perspective, but must point out that Popper would; for him, falsifiability is a necessary, indispensable characteristic of any theory that we would label ”scientific.”