<Googles>
Here’s a story on the subject.
Altruism isn’t morality. I believe altruism is a valid concept, I’d argue that equating it with the kind of subjective emotional reactions which seem to define systems of morality (and in turn the believers of such systems) is unnecessary.
No-one has made such a claim. The page that Der Trihs just linked mentions altruism, but it is not central to that research, nor my point.
I was simply saying that we have strong instincts of right and wrong (though these don’t necessarily map to specific actions; that’s how society gets to have some input).
I’m not sure if EN cares about such instincts, but your position in this thread has been to implicitly deny them.
I do entirely deny them. They exist as illogical subjective impulses towards snap emotional decisions, based on socialisation rather than perceivably inherent qualities of the concepts; accepting them as truth or knowledge is the primary problem.
Again, I reject this assertion. Here’s another cite with links to research showing that young infants and even babies do have some sense of morality, so it isn’t simply socialisation.
My own view is that morality is not like mathematics – you can’t describe it in purely abstract and objective terms. However, it is neither arbitrary nor irrational. Any social species will have social instincts and will consciously promote behaviours which enhance the common good.
That cite says nothing of the kind. It illustrates behavior that can be explained in many different ways, but the author brings in his own framework of right/wrong and morality.
There is nothing in that study or the article that suggests that the baby is acting due to an objective sense of morality, or any sense of morality. When I read the article I see babies reacting with empathy and compassion, and perhaps with an emotional understanding that it feels good to see people who hurt other people get hurt.
No morality beyond, “this makes me feel good, therefore it is good.”
You could call that morals if you wanted to, but I think it points to the complete subjectivity of morality, as opposed to some innate truth to right and wrong.
I said that infants have “some sense of morality”. I meant things like a vague sense of fair and unfair.
I was certainly not saying they have an ethical framework and that specific actions are mapped unambiguously to right or wrong. That would be absurd.
Also you’ll note that in my earlier posts I explicitly said that instincts don’t map to specific actions, and that I don’t think a specific morality can be objectively defined (but again: this doesn’t make it arbitrary or irrational).
Infants? Hell, try giving one dog three biscuits, and one dog only one…
As I have written elsewhere I am a moral relativist. I reject ethical nihilism for the same reason I reject the various forms of moral realism. Each side is making absolute pronouncements, but neither can produce a fuondation solid enough to justify their axioms.
For example:
This is an interesting statement, but how does one reach this conclusion? It seems unlikely to be the result of a deductive chain. Do you assert it as axiom?
The next part of that statement is one I find quite interesting:
That seems to me to be a somewhat different thesis than ethical nihilism. It seems you are not denying the truth value of ethical propositions, but rather arguing that morality is not intrinsic in actions or intentions. But that does not deny that a moral proposition can be true. Indeed, it can be viewed as a moral proposition itself, and on that you clearly believe is true. Apatr from that semantic question, though, there are entire moral philosophies built from propositions that impart no intrisic moral value to actions or intentions. Consequentialism is the easiest to point to, but there are others.
They key here is what is meant by "acceptable. If we alter teh statement slightly to remove ambiguity we might say, “in saying moral values are inherently false and arbitrary, that one immediately finds all thoughts/intentions/actions/outcomes to be morally equivalent.” And that is exactly what Ethical Nihilism implies.
What you say might be true, but it is not a statement about morality. At least not if you are an Ethical Nihilist. (If it were a moral proposition, then of course you would have to say it could not be true.) Now, SOME people would say that the social presuures, personal advantages, survival pressures, etc. that you mention are the very elements from which one can construct a moral system.
For myself, I simply observe that people have constructed moral systems from many axioms and principles, including the principle of denial, but I have no basis from which to conclude that any of them are necessarily true or necessarily false. Those who make such claims for either side to so from a foundation of hubris, not reason.
My belief put at it’s most succinct would probably best be expressed as such:
Morality is a subjective concept which makes arbitrary judgements about the supposed quality of thoughts/intentions/actions/outcomes. Being that these judgements are arbitrary, humanly invented and resulting from subjective perception, I reject the idea that these thoughts/intentions/actions/outcomes actually have any such value in reality, and so believe that any emotional reaction I feel towards these thoughts/intentions/actions/outcomes only occurs as a combined result of socialisation, utility and an evolutionary component regarding direct family/pack cohesion (which we are socialised to extend to all human beings).
Hence in logical consideration of these factors, I have learnt to reject any knee-jerk reaction towards any such thought/intention/action/outcome in the knowledge that I cannot ascribe any objective moral value to them. With this knowledge, I act in the way that is most socially useful to me and is of direct benefit to myself and I extend this self-concern to my direct family and close friends. I do not however feel compassion towards the world at large, nor would I give charity, nor act in any way traditionally considered ‘moral’ unless it is in direct benefit to me, and never if it is in any way detrimental.
My emotional response to acts generally considered ‘immoral’ is thus only ever present when something directly works against me, or those who I’ve extended my self-concern to (I know it sounds contradictory to say self-concern when related to a group, but I mean people whose existence I see as directly important to my own existence, and so concern for myself by-proxy).
I’m not entirely sure where that would place me in terms of schools of thought, though you may have a better idea than I.
There are several possible labels you might find comfortable, depending upon the nuances of how you understand “benefit to myself”.
[ul][li]If you measure it in terms of pleasure/pain, then you might be a hedonist[/li][li]If you measure it in terms of freedom from fear and pain, then you might be an epicurian (on a side note, Epicurus the Sage is a delightful graphic novel. [/li][li]If you believe seeking your own benefit is a rational goal rather than a moral goal, then you might be a rational egoist (or an objectivist, depending upon how you like the rest of Ayn rand’s ideas)[/li][*]If you believe seeking your own benefit is a moral goal, then you might be an ethical egoist (or an objectivist, depending upon how you like the rest of Ayn rand’s ideas)[/ul]
I have a question for you: why do you have any such concern for yourself?
Ethical nihilism is not the position that there are moral questions but we ignore them. It is the position that there are no moral facts in the world: nothing is morally wrong. (Or right.)
The problem is that nihilism is addressing a particular point: are there any possible moral facts?—No. Then if such an individual acts, it would not be out of morality, or would be out of a (possibly uncontrollable) mistaken sense of morality (we wish there were morals but…)
I don’t think so. But even if it did, that doesn’t demonstrate the other claim: that there is something right. If everything is wrong, you might just be an error theorist.