Sure, but its importance shouldn’t be to the exclusion of all other principles.
The problem is, you can do just as much harm with or without intent. And in areas other than those controlled by law, ordinary people expect other ordinary people to take greater care when their actions might inadvertently cause greater harm.
To me, failure to take normal precautions against doing substantial harm to someone is the same thing as intentional recklessness. There may not be intent to cause harm, just an implicit decision to be a greater potential danger to those around him, and offload the increased risk onto the rest of the world.
AFAIAC, if such a person causes harm to another, he should be just as legally liable as the person who caused the same harm intentionally. Six of one.
I’d excuse a child or a retarded person from knowing or being able to intuit what the obvious precautions would be in a situation where notable harm might easily be inflicted. But that’s about it.
If a bunch of kids are playing in the backyard next door, and I decide it’s a good time to cut down a tree on my property that could potentially fall where the kids are playing, I should be on the hook for more than civil damages if the tree falls on one of them, because it’s pretty obvious what a falling tree can do to someone, and that should override my lack of intent to do them harm.
Don’t’cha think? I mean, the fact that I meant no harm should be neither here nor there if the consequences of screwing up were obvious and nontrivial, and I failed to take the obvious precautions - in this case, choosing a better, safer time to cut the tree down.
If the law sees this as a really important distinction - “I intended to try to make the tree fall on those kids when I cut down that tree” v. “Sure, I suppose I knew that if I cut down the tree, it could fall on them and cause great bodily harm, but I certainly didn’t intend to do so when I cut down the tree” - then I have a real problem with that, and will unhesitatingly say that the law is an ass.
The distinction between intending to cause harm by doing obviously potentially harmful action X, and doing X but not intending the harm, with the same likelihood of causing harm in both cases, is for me a distinction without a difference.