# Exit Strategies for Iraq

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/exit-strategies-for-iraq/263509>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [September 7, 2004, 5:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/exit-strategies-for-iraq/263509 "2004-09-07T17:44:32Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 5\
**Page:** 2

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**Author:** ![Squink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/b5e925/32.png) [@Squink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Squink)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2004, 2:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/exit-strategies-for-iraq/263509/21 "2004-09-08T02:18:35Z")

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The first thing that must be done in formulating a reasonable exit strategy is to get someone put in charge of US forces who is capable of understanding that the opposition in Iraq has evolved over the past year. Mr. Rumsfeld is still talking as if the date is June 2003:

> [@](#):
>
> Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the thousand death mark approaching. The number of U.S. troops killed per day is about two per day; it’s been about the same for roughly the last year. What does that say about the resilience of the insurgency there? And was it underestimated?
> 
> SEC. RUMSFELD: There’s no question but that **the resistance is what it is. It is a combination of terrorists, former regime elements and criminals that are being paid by terrorists or former regime elements**. And they are – if you think about the fact that we have thousands of patrols every day, the coalition does, and the Iraqi security forces, which now number – at the fully trained and fully equipped are close to 100,000, and there are another large tens of thousands beyond that that are not quite fully trained or fully equipped. If you take all of those patrols, and look at the number of incidents, they’re relatively small. If you look at them from our standpoint, a single loss of life is large, and it’s a life that’s not going to be lived. I don’t know how to calculate it or calibrate it for you any better than that.

[Defense Department Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld](http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040907-secdef1281.html) (September 7, 2004)

It’s a poor strategist who allows fantasy to guide their actions.

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**Author:** ![Magiver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4491bb/32.png) [@Magiver](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Magiver)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2004, 3:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/exit-strategies-for-iraq/263509/22 "2004-09-08T03:11:23Z")

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I think the goal of removing SH and setting Iraq up as a Democracy holds many benefits:

- It takes SH out of the picture and removes Iraq as a weapons threat.

- Because Iraq is predominantly Shiite it will act as a catalyst (by example) for change in Iran (There is already a great deal of dissatisfaction with religious intervention among the youth of Iran). Iran represents probably the greatest **organized** threat to the United States today. The Iranian government has recently stepped up it’s antagonist propaganda regarding the United States. This has historically been a precursor to war in other countries (vilifying the enemy) so Iran is positioning itself for something big.

- It will provide a wealth of intelligence information from the whole region once the government has established itself.

- Currently the civil side of the Iraqi war is drawing antagonists from outside and as well as inside Iraq. To the extent that they are eliminated faster than they are created will be a function of the success of self-rule. History will rule one way or another on this aspect of the war. It would be interesting to compare it to postwar Germany and Japan given the hostile feelings over Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki (couldn’t find anything on the subject).  
To this end I would pour obscene amounts of money into covert intelligence programs and also reconstruction programs. This is where I believe the war on terrorism will ultimately be won. We already have all the tools necessary to kill people. What we need now are the tools to identify terrorists and the benevolent drive to improve the lives of those who have suffered as a result of SH and war.

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**Author:** ![Ryan\_Liam](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ryan_liam/32/3965_2.png) [@Ryan\_Liam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ryan_Liam)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2004, 4:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/exit-strategies-for-iraq/263509/23 "2004-09-08T04:46:24Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> What we need now are the tools to identify terrorists and the benevolent drive to improve the lives of those who have suffered as a result of SH and war.

Is anyone doing this?

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**Author:** ![Squink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/b5e925/32.png) [@Squink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Squink)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2004, 5:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/exit-strategies-for-iraq/263509/24 "2004-09-08T05:25:27Z")

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> [@Ryan\_Liam](#):
>
> Is anyone doing this?

There was some research into terrorist identification and dispatch rays back in the 1920’s, but what with phrenology getting discredited, the whole technology’s been moved to the back burner.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Squink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/b5e925/32.png) [@Squink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Squink)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2004, 12:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/exit-strategies-for-iraq/263509/25 "2004-09-08T12:05:59Z")

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On the other hand, great strides have been made in training up the Iraqis to defend themselves:

> [@](#):
>
> Q: General Myers, you said in response to one of the earlier questions, something about the Iraqi security forces will be enlarged or improved by December, the end of this year. I wanted to make sure I understood you more clearly on that. Because as you know, the number of the force had been touted at about 200,000, and then reduced to about 110,000.
> 
> SEC. RUMSFELD: Let me – let me, before he answers, give you the gross numbers. The numbers were zero, and then they went up to – the number being used was about 260,000 – no, no – 205,000 –
> 
> Q: 206,000.
> 
> SEC. RUMSFELD: – 206,000 – you’re right. And that number included people, as we said, that had uneven training and uneven equipment. We improved our analysis, and we’ve gotten much better visibility into the situation. We figure we may still have that many people on the rolls. But of the ones that are trained and equipped, the number now looks to be – the latest number – last week it was 105,000; now it looks to be 95,000; that is to say that are trained and equipped.
> 
> Q: 95,000?
> 
> SEC. RUMSFELD: 95,000. And Dick was talking about the projection going out between now and the end of the year into mid-'05 when that number continues to soar as we’re effective. And that number then will go up – back up over 200,000.
> 
> Q: So you think by mid-'05 – I don’t want to be – I want to make sure I understand – it should be back to over 200,000? And these would be like the 95,000, fully trained –
> 
> GEN. MYERS: Trained, there will be different leadership quality, a much –
> 
> Q: – (inaudible) – and all that kind of stuff and ready to go?
> 
> GEN. MYERS: Yeah.

[Yeah indeed.](http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040907-secdef1281.html)

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