It may be helpful, in understanding the Banach-Tarski paradox, to first consider some much simpler examples of the same phenomenon:
Suppose you had a stick of some particular length. If we allow ourselves to cut it up into infinitely many pieces of a certain sort, and then move those pieces around, we could re-arrange this into a stick of twice the original length; specifically, we could carve the original stick into one piece for every point upon it, and then move each of those points twice as far from the end of the stick as they started. We’d end up with all the points on a stick twice as long. That is, we could turn [0, 1] into [0, 2] by carving [0, 1] into infinitely many single points, then translating each single point appropriately. In this way, we could carve a body up, then move each piece, then end up with something larger. (Note that this depends on conceptualizing bodies as just collections of discrete points…)
“Well, c’mon”, you may say. “Of course if you could split things into one piece for each point, you could pull that off. That’s an ungodly number of pieces; uncountably infinite, even. What if I restricted you to using larger pieces and less of them?”.
Well, let’s try another example. By a rational angle, I mean an angle which is a rational multiple of 360 degrees [that is, an angle which, when rotated by repeatedly, eventually brings something back to where it started]. Suppose I have a circle. I’ll consider two points on the circle to be “in the same club” if the angle between them is a rational angle. This organizes the points of the circle up into a number of disjoint clubs. Next, select one (just one) point from each of these clubs, and drop some red ink on it. (Go ahead, just randomly pick one point from each club and drop red ink on it). The resulting collection of red points we’ll call V. Note that, since every point on the circle is in the same club as one and only one point in V, every point on the circle is a unique rational angle away from a point in V.
Thus, we can carve the circle up into one piece for every rational angle, each piece being a correspondingly rotated copy of V. So, since there are countably infinitely many rational angles, a circle can be carved into a collection of countably infinitely many rotated copies of V.
But any countably infinite collection can be split into two countably infinite collections (think of splitting the integers into the evens and the odds). So we can split a circle into a countably infinite collection of rotated copies of V, which is as good as two countably infinite collections of rotated copies of V, which is as good as two circles. In this way, we can carve up one circle into countably infinitely many pieces, then re-arrange them to get two circles. [Again, this depends on our viewing the body of a circle as nothing more than a collection of discrete points]. In that way, we can again increase the length of string with suitable cuts and re-arrangements.
“Well, alright, you managed to use only countably many pieces there, but that’s still an infinite number of pieces. Can you do the same sort of thing with only finitely many pieces?”
Yes, you still can, and along similar lines to the last example, but with some more technical cleverness. That’s the sort of cleverness that Banach and Tarski used to re-arrange one sphere into two using only finitely many cuts [but, again, as above with the circle, depending on A) being able to make infinitely many random choices and, even more importantly, B) conceptualizing the sphere as nothing more than a collection of discrete points].