F-35 v. A-10

[Oakminster]

@Try2B_Comprehensive

Let me repeat one of my quotes:

The A-10’s role isn’t an exotic one-off like a 15 sided star bolt. It’s the most useful contribution the Air Force could make to any conventional war.

Mr. Sprey is simply wrong. Establishing air superiority over the battlefield is Job #1. Without that, close air support is not possible.

[Try2B_Comprehensive]

@Oakminster

Mr. Sprey is simply wrong. Establishing air superiority over the battlefield is Job #1. Without that, close air support is not possible.

I don’t know, Mr. Sprey was an empiricist. Maybe he has become dated, but I doubt he was wrong in his time. Maybe he hasn’t become dated- I don’t know where this debate is going to end up.

I guess that introduces a new motive for the Air Force. My author says they are (or were) influenced by Giulio Douhet’s theory that strategic bombing could defeat any foe, not air superiority.

But do we need the F-35 for air superiority? Because it seems like we need the A-10 for ground support.

[Dissonance]

@AK84

How successful is A10 going to be in an era of MANPADs and organic Air Defence for armoured formations?

It performed just fine in 1991 facing just those threats in Desert Storm, and those were the expected theats it was designed to face in Central Europe if the balloon ever went up and it was called upon to chew up Warsaw Pact armored collumns with 30mm cannon fire. The extreme redundency in flight systems controls, the titanium bathtub, and the odd engine arrangement were all there because of these threats. The A-10 could (and did) survive hits from MANPADs because only one engine would be lost and it could still fly with only the other surviving engine. There are photos of an A-10 that lost its right engine to a shoulder fired missile here.

@Ravenman

1. Are we going to have more wars in the next 10 or 15 years where we will have tactical air bases that are not threatened by modern integrated air defense systems? Let’s face it, if the A-10 were to fly into China, Russia, Syria, Iran, or even North Korea, those environments would threaten even stealthy aircraft, and the A-10 simply wouldn’t stand much of a chance against extremely lethal SAMs. We used it in countries that have basically never had an effective air defense system (Iraq and Afghanistan), plus we used it without being contested. Same argument applies to those who think that Predator UAVs have rendered tac air obsolete. Let’s make that judgment when someone finally starts shooting back.

Iraq had a very effective and relatively modern Integrated Air Defense System before Desert Storm; destroying it was the first step in the initial air campaign in 1991. 2,000 AGM-88 HARMs were expended in Desert Storm, ~200 were fired in the opening minutes of the war. Prior to the war US aircraft would frequently make high speed approaches to the Iraqi border and turn back at the last minute; apparently the intention was to panic Iraqi radar operators to switch to their WARMs (WAr Reserve Mode) and met with some success. Baghdad remained mostly off-limits for the duration of Desert Storm except for F-117s and cruise missiles.

@Ravenman

ETA: plus, there’s zero chance the Army will take he A-10. Just guess what the Army wants more: hundreds of airplanes that cost ten grand an hour to fly, or maintaining 450,000-ish soldiers? There’s no question that the Army would rather have 450k soldiers and no A-10s, rather than 395k soldiers with A-10s. The Army is getting rid of Kiowa Warriors, fercrissakes, because they’d rather maintain their force structure.

The Army (and Marines) almost got the A-10 back in 1990, it was only the Air Force backing down that prevented it from happening. The Air Force wanted to replace the A-10 with the A-16, a ground attack variant of the F-16. When things came to a head, bolding mine:

The Block 60 did not go into production and the A-16 became wrapped up in the debate about close air support. The supporters of the A-16 project wanted the USAF to replace its A-10A Thunderbolt IIs with A-16’s, arguing that the A-10 was too slow to survive above a high-tech battlefield. Detractors argued that the A-16 had insufficient range and load-carrying capability to make an effective attack aircraft, and, in addition, it would be too vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft fire.

The Army argued that the Key West agreement of 1948 (under which they were prohibited from operating fixed-wing combat aircraft) was now obsolete, and that the USAF’s A-10’s should be turned over to them for use alongside AH-64 Apache helicopters. In 1990, Congress decreed that some USAF A-10A’s and OV-10 Broncos be turned over to the Army and Marine Corps beginning in 1991.

However, all of these plans came to naught on November 26th, 1990, when the USAF was ordered to retain two wings of A-10 aircraft for the CAS mission. No order for the A-16 was ever placed.

[Try2B_Comprehensive]

@Ravenman

It’s hard to respond to the specifics of an article when it is behind a paywall.

I know, that’s the trouble with this source. Let me give you another example

Two years later, the United States deployed a huge force to Saudi Arabia in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. No A-10s were included in the initial air deployment. Legend has it that General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief of the expedition, was well aware of the plane’s potency against enemy armor, so he demanded of his air commander, General Charles Horner: Where was the A-10?
“Oh,” replied Horner, “the F-16s can do the job.”
“Don’t give me that Air Force political bullshit,” snapped Schwarzkopf. “Bring me the A-10!”
It was a wise decision. While precision-guided bombs and missiles captured the imagination of the media and the public, thanks to the new CNN-funneled video footage they provided, these weapons turned out to be less useful at destroying targets- especially if the targets were moving. It was left to 144 grudgingly deployed A-10s to dispatch the bulk of the Iraqi armor, along with truck convoys, radar sites, and other crucial targets. Some A-10s even flew off “hasty bases,” rough strips secretly laid deep inside Iraq’s western desert, the better to hunt for elusive Scud missile launders. So useful did they prove that Horner, by all accounts an emotional character, was inspired at the war’s end to send a signal back to Washington stating, “The A-10 saved my ass.”

[Dissonance]

@Ravenman

The utility of the A-10 has unquestionably been bolstered due to the total lack of any IADs in Iraq and Afghanistan, same as the Predator.

There’s a good article on Iraq’s IADS in 1990 and its destruction in 1991 here.

Australian Aviation published two brief reviews of Iraq’s electronic order of battle, in November 1990 and April 1991. The Iraqi IADS was a composite system which integrated European and Soviet search and acquisition radars, and a range of Soviet and European SAM and AAA systems, all tied together with a French built Kari C3 (Command/Control/Communications) network. While smaller than the now defunct Soviet system in central Europe (Western TVD), the system had a respectable capability and comparable if not higher density of SAM and AAA systems, with considerable redundancy in communications links and hardened C3 facilities.

        Organisationally the IADS was split into three principal elements, a national fixed site strategic system using fighters and SA-2 and SA-3 systems covering key airfields and strategic air defence sites, operated by the Iraqi air force. This system was supplemented by Republican Guard operated SAM and AAA systems covering key nuclear, biological and chemical warfare facilities. Finally, the Iraqi army had its own mobile radar, SAM and AAA systems tasked with protecting both fixed sites and units in the field.

        Geographically the national IADS was split into several large zones, in each of which were located central local C3 facilities, one or more large hardened airbases and a network of communications links to fixed radar and SAM sites. Control of the whole network was centred in hardened facilities in the vicinity of Baghdad. While microwave links were used extensively, these were backed up by landlines.

        The structure of the system reflected the Soviet Air Defence Force (PVO) and Army Air Defence (PVO-SV) models respectively. The strategic air defences employed large GCI/EW (Ground Controlled Intercept/Early Warning) radars such as the Soviet P-35M and P-37 Bar Lock, which were used for wide area surveillance and early warning, these large MTI (Moving Target Indicator - ie low PRF) E/F (2.6-3 GHz) band systems being situated at key geographical locations to cover principal air bases and population centres.

It goes into considerable depth on systems and deployment in the IADS, plans, preperations and the execution of destroying it.

[Kobal2]

The notion of replacing A-10s with F-35s and expecting similar results is like something out of The Pentagon Wars.

@Alessan

Hmm, you’re right. OK, so just *two *countries - the U.S. and Russia.

Might be because only those two have enough warbucks that they can spend them on stuff like single-task airframes. Everyone else, we just make do.

@Ravenman

1. Are we going to have more wars in the next 10 or 15 years where we will have tactical air bases that are not threatened by modern integrated air defense systems? Let’s face it, if the A-10 were to fly into China, Russia, Syria, Iran, or even North Korea, those environments would threaten even stealthy aircraft, and the A-10 simply wouldn’t stand much of a chance against extremely lethal SAMs. We used it in countries that have basically never had an effective air defense system (Iraq and Afghanistan), plus we used it without being contested. Same argument applies to those who think that Predator UAVs have rendered tac air obsolete. Let’s make that judgment when someone finally starts shooting back.

SAM sites and ground-based anti-air defenses are basically a waste of money these days outside of MANPADS (which don’t work against high-altitude threats). The second someone flips their radar on, a half-dozen anti-radiation missiles get launched at it. Or the location gets triangulated and catches a JDAM within 5 minutes. Or it appeared on satellite imagery and was obliterated days before with a cruise missile.
It’s already what happened during the first Gulf War, and that was 20 years ago (dear god, we’re all old…). Now add stealth drones to the mix and… yeah.

2. The Air Force, Army and Navy have basically equal shares of the defense budget. Because of Pentagon politics, that isn’t going to change (with the one possible exception of the Navy getting some extra money for the new ballistic missile submarine to maintain one leg of the nuclear triad). Every additional cost of sustaining something comes at a price of giving something else up. Is it worth sinking literally billions of dollars to rewing and upgrade the A-10 when is simply will not be useful in high-end conflicts, like if we go to war with China? Keep in mind that it would be giving up buying F-35s or other modern capabilities.

It’s generally cheaper to maintain or upgrade older models than it is to come up with new stuff. Also, anyone bringing a cost-saving argument to the table when that table has an F-35 on it clearly hasn’t been paying attention. This thing doesn’t burn jet fuel - it runs on briefcases full of tightly packed C-notes :).

[the_diego]

“Most effective weapon”? I’d say it’s the ICBM’s if there are still any around. Among its other flaws, the A-10 can’t provide air superiority over an area. Updated migs will shoot it down.

[Grumman]

@the_diego

Among its other flaws, the A-10 can’t provide air superiority over an area. Updated migs will shoot it down.

Neither can a Hercules, but that doesn’t mean transport capacity isn’t important. If the Air Force wants to be a one trick pony of air superiority and nothing else, they should be funded as such.

[the_diego]

Well, if, over a theater of operations, you have F-15’s keeping the skies clear of enemy fighters and bombers, and you have A-10’s attacking enemy ground forces, while C-130s are maintaining a steady stream of supplies, who usually holds the critical role, the one role whose absence will preclude the others?

[pullin]

@Try2B_Comprehensive

You’d think the Air Force would continue (or update) this program, but instead it appears that the whole fleet will be scrapped, and its missions handed off to the B-1 or the $200 million, still nonexistent F-35, …

Minor nitpick (bolding mine): I wandered down to the factory floor last year to have a look at number 100 as it went down the line.

[Ravenman]

@Try2B_Comprehensive

I know, that’s the trouble with this source. Let me give you another example

Ok, I enjoyed that apocryphal exchange. But relying today on what happened with a weapons system 23 years ago is questionable at best. Would you have proposed to that during Operation Desert Shield, US commanders should have been held to the most effective weapons systems in use in 1967?

@Dissonance

There’s a good article on Iraq’s IADS in 1990 and its destruction in 1991 here.It goes into considerable depth on systems and deployment in the IADS, plans, preperations and the execution of destroying it.

I should clarify that when I spoke about Iraq earlier, I was referring to 2003 onwards - hence the reference to Predators.

@Kobal2

SAM sites and ground-based anti-air defenses are basically a waste of money these days outside of MANPADS (which don’t work against high-altitude threats). The second someone flips their radar on, a half-dozen anti-radiation missiles get launched at it. Or the location gets triangulated and catches a JDAM within 5 minutes. Or it appeared on satellite imagery and was obliterated days before with a cruise missile.

Your view of air power is at odds with the Israelis and South Koreans, who have both decided that fourth generation fighters don’t stand a chance against the modern air defenses in Iran and North Korea. Perhaps you might want to call up their ministers of defense and say, “Hey, I heard you were going to buy some fifth generation fighters. Don’t do that! Just drop a bomb on those SAM sites! kthxbye!”

It’s generally cheaper to maintain or upgrade older models than it is to come up with new stuff. Also, anyone bringing a cost-saving argument to the table when that table has an F-35 on it clearly hasn’t been paying attention. This thing doesn’t burn jet fuel - it runs on briefcases full of tightly packed C-notes :).

First, that’s a reasonable point about upgrading versus buying new. However, there’s no upgrade for the fact that the A-10 is forty year old technology, that it is going to increasingly fall behind as our competitors continue to modernize, and I don’t think its a good bet to assume that we will have total air supremacy in future wars as we have had in recent ones. For example, I look as the massive fleet of Predators we’ve bought over the last 8 years and think: what the hell are we going to do with all of those?

And the second point on cost: you totally misread what I wrote. I didn’t say the F-35 was cheaper, I don’t know where you got that from. I said that limiting modernization of Air Force capabilities to keep a weapons system if questionable future utility is a very questionable proposition. Plus, I said later in my post that anyone who suggests that we could design and build a new CAS-dedicated aircraft that’s cheaper than the F-35 is in la-la land, because (a) the two major Air Force tacair modernization programs over the last two decades have proven that we can’t build anything new cheaply; and (b) the Augustine principle in which the whole DOD budget will someday soon only buy one new fighter that must be shared between the Navy and the Air Force still seems alarmingly accurate.

But let me ask two general questions for the “save the A-10 crowd.” First, where do you expect the US to fight its next few wars? And second, we know the A-10 can’t fly forever - what factors will lead to its inevitable retirement, and why don’t those factors exist today (or in the next several years)?

[Try2B_Comprehensive]

@pullin

Minor nitpick (bolding mine): I wandered down to the factory floor last year to have a look at number 100 as it went down the line.

Thanks, I did not know things were so far along. I’ve only heard stories of delays. Maybe this debate is too late.

@Ravenman

Ok, I enjoyed that apocryphal exchange. But relying today on what happened with a weapons system 23 years ago is questionable at best. Would you have proposed to that during Operation Desert Shield, US commanders should have been held to the most effective weapons systems in use in 1967?

I think the gist is that the A-10 is ‘the most effective weapon in the Air Force’ because it is apt at the most useful thing the Air Force can do (as determined by statistical analysis of military outcomes from WWII forward)- provide close air support. If something from 1967 could fill this role well then that plan would have worked fine. It looks like we’re headed to a future where aircraft cost 10x what the A-10 costs without being able to perform its mission nearly as well.

I am not saying the F-35 is useless- it actually seems quite dangerous. But for all the trillions scheduled to be spent on the F-35, it seems like the A-10 will be missed because it simply delivers more battlefield utility.

But let me ask two general questions for the “save the A-10 crowd.” First, where do you expect the US to fight its next few wars? And second, we know the A-10 can’t fly forever - what factors will lead to its inevitable retirement, and why don’t those factors exist today (or in the next several years)?

I expect future wars to be like the recent ones- Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan. I don’t expect to fight China.

Hey, I could be wrong, that’s why I started the thread. The A-10 will get retired because of its age. But we won’t have anything that can provide such good close air support, which seems useful in any conflict. Has that changed?

[smiling_bandit]

@Ravenman

Ok, I enjoyed that apocryphal exchange. But relying today on what happened with a weapons system 23 years ago is questionable at best. Would you have proposed to that during Operation Desert Shield, US commanders should have been held to the most effective weapons systems in use in 1967?

…Yes. You do know that they mostly did. Military equipment doesn’t change over very fast, and newer isn’t always better. Should they have ditched the M-16 for whatever happened to be “new”?

First, that’s a reasonable point about upgrading versus buying new. However, there’s no upgrade for the fact that the A-10 is forty year old technology, that it is going to increasingly fall behind as our competitors continue to modernize, and I don’t think its a good bet to assume that we will have total air supremacy in future wars as we have had in recent ones. For example, I look as the massive fleet of Predators we’ve bought over the last 8 years and think: what the hell are we going to do with all of those?

OK, Ravenman, I want you to know this isn’t personal, because you’ve hit a huge nerve with me. You’ve delved into some less-known fallacies. But these are ones which piss me off when applied to this kind of topic.

(1) The really nice thing about an A-10 is that it doesn’t need a lot of advanced technology to be effective. Fighter-Bombers have a historically significant role in warfare. As it happens, that role can also be filled without a lot of advanced tools, because big guns and short-ranged missiles haven’t actually changed that much. You don’t need it stuffed to the gills with avionics and you don’t need engines pushed to the limit.
(2) The other really thing which comes from Point (1)? It’s cheap as hell. You can field an entire A-10 wing for the price of one new jet.
(3) In practice, those fancy new jets haven’t proven to be all that effective.
(4) You don’t usually get to decide when you’re going to fight, and often you don’t get to decide whom you’re going to fight. Sometimes, you can’t operate a super-jet.
(5) Logically speaking, you’re arguing that all military appropriations should exclusively go to establishing air superiority. You assume that’s almost the sole purpose for an air corps (in fact, air superiority is a secondary purpose), and seem to believe that it’s not worth fighting unless you have it. This is so utterly and completely wrong it’s hilarious. If it’s your view, then, we may as well forget war entirely as we will have thrown our hands in the air, as it were, and told everyone that we’re too cowardly to fight unless we’re handed victory.

I said that limiting modernization of Air Force capabilities to keep a weapons system if questionable future utility is a very questionable proposition. Plus, I said later in my post that anyone who suggests that we could design and build a new CAS-dedicated aircraft that’s cheaper than the F-35 is in la-la land, because (a) the two major Air Force tacair modernization programs over the last two decades have proven that we can’t build anything new cheaply; and (b) the Augustine principle in which the whole DOD budget will someday soon only buy one new fighter that must be shared between the Navy and the Air Force still seems alarmingly accurate.

(1) The only possible question about utility is whether or not we will eventually have more effective drones. That may well be, but for the next few decades that’s a possibility, not a certainty. The A-10 is proven, and if we have drones to supplant it, then we’ll have drones which function a lot like the A-10.
(2) Thus far, the A-10 get shot up by guys with machine guns a lot more than it gets shot by missiles, because it’s an extremely flexible craft. Maybe not much for fighter-duels, but it carries a lot of armaments, can fly very low in rough terrain, and can deal with damage and problems and keep going. Which means it’s often able to evade enemy defenses that other airframes can’t avoid.
(3) The Air Force, on the other hand, seems to actively desire Hanger Queens simply as a lifestyle choice.

But let me ask two general questions for the “save the A-10 crowd.” First, where do you expect the US to fight its next few wars? And second, we know the A-10 can’t fly forever - what factors will lead to its inevitable retirement, and why don’t those factors exist today (or in the next several years)?

(1) I don’t know. Hopefully not North America. And if I don’t know we won’t possibly need the A-10 under any circumstance, it’s proven that it deserves a hella big chance to function.
(2) Hell, restart the damn line. The technology is known, the money is actually pretty cheap, and if military procurement wasn’t a complete mess it should even be cheaper. Let me paint you a different picture: just imagine if we had ten times the number of A-10’s in our arsenal? We’d be able to deploy entire air fleets, put landing strips for them on any godforsaken rock on the planet, and drop enough firepower on anyone opposing a ground advance that the rest of us would wonder who called for a country-scale fireworks display?
(3) Then, if you like, start a drone study.
(4) If there’s anything which needs justification, it’s the goddamn jet programs the Air Force keeps screwing up. They constantly develop new technology that never seems to actually see combat. Perhaps, just perhaps, because they’re building advanced jets that are so expensive they can almost never be risked. And in war, the man willing to risky nothing often wins nothing. Let’s say that you’re right and in the next war we end up facing someone like China, or even a China-Russia alliance. Losing an A-10 would be tough, but what happens with we lose a billion dolllars worth of super-advanced jets in a day? Will the Air Force do what’s necessary to fight, or will they back off? And what happens when they don’t have any more jets to run?

You can’t run a military for the sake of one arm, no matter how important that arm is. You have to be able to fight even if the other guy completely cocks up his job, and if I were to pick one branch fop the military to lay money on to do just that, it’d be the Air Force.

[Dissonance]

@Ravenman

I should clarify that when I spoke about Iraq earlier, I was referring to 2003 onwards - hence the reference to Predators.

Ok, but if that’s the case you’re deliberately ignoring what was by far the A-10s heaviest operational combat use where it both performed splendidly and faced an effective, modern IADS; one that was likely or certainly superior to what Iran, Syria, or North Korea have today. Trying to ignore the existence of an IADS and go about performing CAS is asking to take losses, but so is ignoring an IADS and performing deep strikes against strategic targets with fast movers. That’s why the Air Force (and Navy, and Marines) have devoted so much thought and effort on Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, why taking apart Iraq’s IADS was the absolute first task of the 1991 war and why it would be the first task of any future war against Iran, Syria, or North Korea.

But let me ask two general questions for the “save the A-10 crowd.” First, where do you expect the US to fight its next few wars? And second, we know the A-10 can’t fly forever - what factors will lead to its inevitable retirement, and why don’t those factors exist today (or in the next several years)?

For question one, who knows? Nobody in 1945 expected the US to fight its next war in Korea, and nobody in the 1980s was planning on the next war being in Iraq. As for question #2, the A-10 is perfectly flyable until 2040, cite.

The A-10 will receive a service life extension program (SLEP) upgrade with many receiving new wings.[30] The service life of the re-winged aircraft is extended to 2040.

The B-52 is a far older aircraft and is going to serve into the 2040s.

[turner]

The A-10 is an outstanding and survivable aircraft. When I was a Lieutenant in the late 80s, we were looking for a replacement for a CAS Aircraft Among the candidates were an A-16–an F-16 variant. It was too fast and had too short a loiter time over the target area (minutes). One of the interesting concepts was a P-51 Mustang variant–relatively cheap, relatively robust. You could build hundreds of them. Once the Soviet’s fell though, nobody cared anymore.

The A-10 is truly a glory to behold in flight. Crazy maneuverable, that gun is fearsome and again, it was designed to fly with about 10 ft of wing missing. Capt Kim Campbell flew her jet home after having one engine and all hydraulics knocked out. Try doing that with a 35 or a 16

[silenus]

We are never going to fight a major war against an enemy with state-of-the-art aircraft on any quantities flown by trained pilots, so there is zero need for the F-35 in any way, shape or form. Upgrade what we have and spend the savings on this little thing called diplomacy.

[Kobal2]

@the_diego

Among its other flaws, the A-10 can’t provide air superiority over an area. Updated migs will shoot it down.

With all due respect, that’s a silly argument. That’s like saying “among its other flaws, a fork cannot cut meat”.

@Ravenman

Your view of air power is at odds with the Israelis and South Koreans, who have both decided that fourth generation fighters don’t stand a chance against the modern air defenses in Iran and North Korea. Perhaps you might want to call up their ministers of defense and say, “Hey, I heard you were going to buy some fifth generation fighters. Don’t do that! Just drop a bomb on those SAM sites! kthxbye!”

Israel and South Korea don’t have the combined arms resources, the tech edge or the sheer manpower & numbers of the American army.

But let me ask two general questions for the “save the A-10 crowd.” First, where do you expect the US to fight its next few wars?

I expect more of the same - small wars with guerrilla groups, large wars with well-equipped guerrilla groups, maybe a week long romp to roflstomp some other third world nation-state fielding 1960s equipment as prepwork for… a guerilla war. The largest entity I could possibly see an armed conflict with would be North Korea, a war that would be scary, destructive and very very short, since it’d piss off China on top of NATO.

Anything bigger and it’s nukes as far as the eye can see, which is not very far for very long.

And second, we know the A-10 can’t fly forever - what factors will lead to its inevitable retirement, and why don’t those factors exist today (or in the next several years)?

Why does it need to ? At some point I suppose the airframes themselves will be too old and worn, accidents and maintenance costs will become too much of a pain in the ass. That being said, from what I hear the A-10 is actually a dream to service compared to more fiddly planes, so who knows. If push comes to shove, for my money, just build new A-10s to replace the old - should certainly cost less than some new whizbang chrome-fest of a jet design process.

But other than that, as long as it performs its role admirably, which it does, why throw a perfectly good airframe away ? With the possible exception of the F-22 (and then again, that one actively tries to kill its pilot, so :p), for my money the A-10 is the best aircraft design of the last 60 years. It’s not sexy, sure, but it works. It’s nimble, it’s nigh-unkillable, it’s scary good at flying at lawnmower altitudes and lo, Hell followeth with it.

[Magiver]

@Ravenman

It’s hard to respond to the specifics of an article when it is behind a paywall. The utility of the A-10 has unquestionably been bolstered due to the total lack of any IADs in Iraq and Afghanistan, same as the Predator.

There was a proposal a couple years ago to build a Super Tucano; a prop driven airplane with 50 cal guns and optimized to CAS. It probably would have done a very good job in those wars, too. But that doesn’t mean that a Super Tucano would have an enduring place in the Air Force (or Navy, as it happened to be).

A Super Tucano could be developed in some capacity to function as an A-10. But the A-10 was designed to be an A-10 and not modified to be an A-10. It does what it does very well and it’s not a question of replacing it because it’s too expensive to build. It’s a function of supporting it in a shrinking budget.

So while there really isn’t a plane that could replace it there are planes that can fill in in it’s absence if the need arises. That means an F-35 isn’t a perfect fit for the A-10 but it can get by. An A-10 can’t begin to fill in for the F-35.

But that’s a simplistic academic question that can’t be the only one asked in answer to budget constraints. An F-35 is very expensive. Losing one of those is like losing 13 or more A-10’s. Is it 13 times more survivable? If it’s truly budgeted as a dual use plane then losing one takes away it’s use in other roles so the overlapping utility accelerates the vacuum created by it’s loss.

I would think we could build 3 less F-35’s and retain the already sunk cost of 39 A-10’s. It seems prudent on a base budgeting level. And even if an F-35 is a better dual-use vehicle that doesn’t mean you can train a pilot to be all things. The best test is to simulate it in battle and see where we stand. Technology changes so rapidly that the A-10 may be an antique or become the next B-52 with new technology extending it’s usefulness. The reality of swarm weapons is being realized so an A-10 may make an excellent queen bee supporting a fleet of small drones. Imagine a flight of 10 cheap drones acting in unison around one A-10. They’re cheaper and more expendable than the A-10 but have the capacity of a manned aircraft to guide them in real time.

[Werekoala]

I’ve maintained for over 20 years that we’re wasting money on many of our advanced aircraft programs simply because, as stated above, we’re not going to be facing swarms of Gen-5 fighters anytime soon, if ever. If I had my way, we’d be producing state of the art F-14s (with concurrently upgraded Phoenix-equivalent missiles and avionics), more A-10s, and 21st Century B-52s, because they all do (or did) their job exceptionally well, could be made even more effective with moden production and avionics, and would be a damn sight cheaper than the magic carpets we seem hell-bent on producing.

[usedtobe]

When discussing the USAF, remember that we still have manned strategic bombers when the same job could be done with missiles (an argument going back to the 1950’s) and manned fighter-bombers (tactical bombers) even though the tactile bombing can be done MUCH cheaper by drones.
At least the drones have pilots (in the US), so maybe the reactionaries will accept them.

If the put Gatling guns on larger drones, they will maybe back-into a new A-10.