This is the actual FAA webpage announcing the release of the final plan that @not_what_you_d_expect mentioned yesterday:
From there the interested reader can see the PDFs of what the FAA is ordering as to mechanical and procedural changes. And what’s being added to the various training syllabuses, both one-time for the MAX’s return to service and for future certification of new crews and for periodic refresher training of existing crews.
Lots of it is more detailed than will be interesting to most laymen, but there’s also a bunch of discussion about why they did what they did and also about why they didn’t do various "just one more thing"s that somebody had suggested. As such it’s an interesting look-in on the thought processes involved. Both those of the Feds and those of the other interested parties.
Reading the training syllabus in detail for the first time I see they have partly addressed one of my complaints from a few posts ago:
As well, there’s really nothing about the syllabus outline for this training that says it’s any more applicable to MAXes than to other 737s or any other Boeing or Airbus product. Instrument failures or sensor failures leading to false instrument indications, often accompanied by false warnings, are a darn hard problem regardless of type.
What they have done is add a small chunk of training along these lines to the 737NG syllabus as well. Which indicates a recognition that these sorts of difficult-to-handle situations are in no sense unique to MAXes, whether modified or as originally designed. One hopes to see that attitude spread across training for all types of complicated airplanes.