Free Will is an illusion

Great Debates
181

[QUOTE=Dr. Love]

[QUOTE=RaftPeople]
I guess I get stuck on the low level details. Unless I can see a mechanism for choice other than deterministic processes within the brain, then one part of me thinks that we can solve the former problem all we want but we are just fooling ourselves. I am able to set aside that part of me that wants to know the mechanism, assume it’s there and try to figure out a model for free will that makes sense, but it will never be fully satisfying because the underlying question has not been answered.
[/QUOTE]

We do have people working on both issues, but the fact is that right now, no one understands the mechanism(s) for making choices. Unless someone in the thread is working on the neuroscience, the best we can do is discuss different models, see if those models fit with what we do know about the brain and with the important features of free will, and (if you’re really good at modeling) produce predictions that might be used to guide the course of neuroscience.

The problem is that most people assume that determinism is a much stronger proposition than it actually is–most assume that determination automatically means causation. As I see it, the “free” in “free will” doesn’t mean freedom from determination, it means freedom from (external) causation, which is completely compatible with determinism. I’ll try to explain.

When we discuss causation, even under the simplest model, we are discussing at least two things: causal necessity and causal sufficiency. When we ask “What caused X to occur?” a proper answer must consider both types of causes (although there is no guarantee that either will be satisfied). For example, if we wanted to know what caused the evolution of eyes, there are probably an infinite number of sufficient causes, associated with small differences in the exact mutations that appeared, the distribution of life on the planet, etc. But they all have at least one thing in common: life evolved in a translucent medium. So a proper answer to the question might sound something like “the presence of light, and some good luck,” an answer which contains information on both types of causation (note, here “luck” should be interpreted as “a wide variety of highly diverging initial conditions”). Determinism, however, is a statement only about causal sufficiency (i.e., that any complete description of a state of the universe is sufficient to determining all subsequent states).

Furthermore, when we want to know about causal sufficiency, we generally want to know about minimal causal sufficiency, the smallest set of causes that suffice to produce the event in question. The truth of determinism gives us just the opposite, maximal causal sufficiency. Suppose that event C0 is a sufficient cause of event X. Now introduce event C1, such that C0 and C1 are not mutually exclusive. Then it follows that C0 + C1 is also a sufficient cause of X. For example, if being hit by a semi is enough to kill me, then being hit by a semi in July is also enough to kill me. Given this, there is no reason to favor C0 + C1 to C0 by itself as the cause of X, and good reason (simplicity) to do the opposite. Thus we would say that C0 is the (sufficient) cause of X.

Given these two issues, we have no reason to assume that the truth of determinism plays any role in how we determine the causes of an individual’s behavior.

Well, for some reason, the board isn’t letting me preview my post, so I really hope the coding works out.
[/QUOTE]

I deleted the stuff I think was causing a problem with this post, now I’m going to read it

182

[QUOTE=Randy Seltzer]

I’d pick it up and give it to her. Just because I have no free will doesn’t mean I should be a dick - see Calvin’s arguments.
[/QUOTE]

So you would freely choose not to be a Dick? :smiley:

183

[QUOTE=Valteron]
So you would freely choose not to be a Dick? :smiley:
[/QUOTE]

No, he allowed the sum of his prior experiences, coupled with internal genetic influences determine his actions.

184

valteron what side of this argument are on. It seems like you’re arguing that his actions will be determined, but yet your “little old lady” example proves exactly nothing in the larger context of the debate: In particular, as established by determinists earlier in the thread, to argue determinism (as opposed to determinable actions) you have to argue from the complete system: ie. that you have no other course of action not that an observer familiar with the observed is familiar with the targets previous actions.

I stand by my position of free will on the basis of Occam’s Razor. Namely, that the illusion of free will (the notion that I am sitting here, of my own will, whatever the ultimate source of that will is choosing the particular words that I’m typing is SO COMPLETE that there is no reason to suppose that I do not have free will (since all observable evidence points to me choosing my actions), and that the burden is on the determinists to prove not that they could predict my response in general, but that I had no other choice of what to write down to every comma and word used

185

[QUOTE=enigm4tic]
I stand by my position of free will on the basis of Occam’s Razor. Namely, that the illusion of free will (the notion that I am sitting here, of my own will, whatever the ultimate source of that will is choosing the particular words that I’m typing is SO COMPLETE that there is no reason to suppose that I do not have free will (since all observable evidence points to me choosing my actions), and that the burden is on the determinists to prove not that they could predict my response in general, but that I had no other choice of what to write down to every comma and word used
[/QUOTE]

Well, I imagine the simplest explanation is that the molecules in our brains follow the rules of matter/energy and that either the brain is a deterministic process, or mostly deterministic with some random influences (QM).

Because nobody can define a physical mechanism that allows for free will (undeterministic processes but also non-random) I don’t think we can really make that assumption. I don’t think we have enough information to make either position the default position.

Are there any experiments that could be performed that might tip the scales one way or another?

186

[QUOTE=RaftPeople]
I deleted the stuff I think was causing a problem with this post, now I’m going to read it
[/QUOTE]

:smack: Thanks. I had no idea what the problem was… as far as I can tell, I had a "" where I should have had a “/”.

187

Arguably, the idea of the inability to ascertain quantum states means that the current “cutting edge” physics suggests that it is impossible to determine at any level the future state of a system, thus an extrapolation from observed physics to the contention “but it might be some process that we don’t understand yet” is unsubstantiated, thus again leaving me with the complete illusion of free will, and a physics system that suggests that at some level (the electrical level our brain operates at) it is impossible to determine the future state of a system from the present state. Ergo, free will seems to be the most obvious conclusion

188

[QUOTE=enigm4tic]

I stand by my position of free will on the basis of Occam’s Razor. Namely, that the illusion of free will (the notion that I am sitting here, of my own will, whatever the ultimate source of that will is choosing the particular words that I’m typing is SO COMPLETE that there is no reason to suppose that I do not have free will (since all observable evidence points to me choosing my actions), and that the burden is on the determinists to prove not that they could predict my response in general, but that I had no other choice of what to write down to every comma and word used
[/QUOTE]

But aren’t you confusing “choice” with “free will”? The fact that you make choices doesn’t prove free will. Look at a computer program: it is designed to make choices, based on input. But the choices are determined by a precise algorithm, and the program itself cannot alter this algorithm (unless it was programmed to do that).

What if your brain is like a computer program (albeit a highly complex one)? Yes, you make choices, but these choices are based on available input processed through the circuitry of your neural structures. Why do you type a comma in a particular place? Well, perhaps you learned in 2nd-grade English that commas go in certain places in a sentence. That pathway is formed in your brain. It was formed that way because you were taught that in 2nd-grade. If you had been taught differently, you would have formed a different pathway.

Aha! - you say. But what if I decide not to type a comma just to trip up lowbrass? How do you know you don’t have another “circuit” that on the input “lowbrass is arguing with me”, switches to the “don’t type a comma” pathway. And of course the brain would be constantly re-programming itself as it goes, but that still doesn’t prove it isn’t deterministic. I could write a program that is capable of altering itself, couldn’t I?

If you contend that your actions are not precisely determined by the physical structures of the brain which have no choice but to form themselves based on genetic code and whatever outside influences exist at the time, then exactly what physical mechanism is allowing this “free will” to take place? Or do you contend that computers have free will?

189

[QUOTE=enigm4tic]
Arguably, the idea of the inability to ascertain quantum states means that the current “cutting edge” physics suggests that it is impossible to determine at any level the future state of a system, thus an extrapolation from observed physics to the contention “but it might be some process that we don’t understand yet” is unsubstantiated, thus again leaving me with the complete illusion of free will, and a physics system that suggests that at some level (the electrical level our brain operates at) it is impossible to determine the future state of a system from the present state. Ergo, free will seems to be the most obvious conclusion
[/QUOTE]

1 minor point: QM randomness, while generally accepted, is not the only possible solution. The jury is still out as to whether there could be other explanations that are consistent with observations but are not actually random (this is from some physics professor’s web site Q+A).

But assuming QM randomness, how does that get you any closer to free will?

At some point, you need a mechanism that is non-random and non-deterministic. What type of mechanism is that? How would you describe it? How does it interact with matter/energy?

190

[QUOTE=Dr. Love]
…
[/QUOTE]

I agree.

191

Tried to post last night, but the hamsters were in the server.

RaftPeople, the position I’m advancing is that we have volition, i.e., the ability to make choices. This is importantly different from classic libertarian free will because I don’t think the will is entirely free. On the contrary, it is unfree in lots of ways. Some are trivial. For example, I can’t choose to act differently than I choose. Others aren’t trivial. For example, I approach any decision within the context of who I am, including my gene code, my upbringing, my environment, my abilities, my limitations and, indeed, my whole life history. That these things limit and influence my choices is obvious. Where I part company with determinists is over whether these things determine my choices. Rather, I think volition is a behavior of the brain in which it weighs, compares and eventually chooses among competing influences.

Why do I think this? Partly it’s as simple as that’s how I experience life. Determinists dismiss this as an illusion, and I can no more refute that than I can refute Descartes’ demiurge (the notion that what I perceive as reality may be nothing more than some demon pushing my buttons). But, until someone can show me it’s an illusion, I’m persuaded by my perception, just as I don’t lose sleep over the theoretical prospect of the demon. So, I believe that I chose to live in San Francisco, that I chose to eat a burrito for lunch and that I chose to participate in a debate over determinism. It’s not so much a matter of developing a model which reduces the number of paradoxes. It’s a matter of developing a model which makes practical sense of the world.

Hence my bringing up ethics, law and morality. Volition is bedrock in modern criminal law. Practically every offense has two components, an action and a mental state, usually intent. If that assumption is incorrect, our criminal justice system is as perverse as the one lampooned in Samuel Butler’s Erewhon.* And it’s not just law. We make judgments about and assessments of people every day, e.g., forming opinions about friends and filling out performance reviews. Many of these include assumptions of volition. For example, we get annoyed with people who are tardy, in part, because we believe they have the ability to be on time.

  • "Prisoner at the bar, you have been accused of the great crime of labouring under pulmonary consumption, and after an impartial trial before a jury of your countrymen, you have been found guilty. Against the justice of the verdict I can say nothing: the evidence against you was conclusive, and it only remains for me to pass such a sentence upon you, as shall satisfy the ends of the law. That sentence must be a very severe one. It pains me much to see one who is yet so young, and whose prospects in life were otherwise so excellent, brought to this distressing condition by a constitution which I can only regard as radically vicious; but yours is no case for compassion: this is not your first offence: you have led a career of crime, and have only profited by the leniency shown you upon past occasions, to offend yet more seriously against the laws and institutions of your country. You were convicted of aggravated bronchitis last year: and I find that though you are now only twenty-three years old, you have been imprisoned on no less than fourteen occasions for illnesses of a more or less hateful character; in fact, it is not too much to say that you have spent the greater part of your life in a jail.

"It is all very well for you to say that you came of unhealthy parents, and had a severe accident in your childhood which permanently undermined your constitution; excuses such as these are the ordinary refuge of the criminal; but they cannot for one moment be listened to by the ear of justice. I am not here to enter upon curious metaphysical questions as to the origin of this or that–questions to which there would be no end were their introduction once tolerated, and which would result in throwing the only guilt on the tissues of the primordial cell, or on the elementary gases. There is no question of how you came to be wicked, but only this–namely, are you wicked or not? This has been decided in the affirmative, neither can I hesitate for a single moment to say that it has been decided justly. You are a bad and dangerous person, and stand branded in the eyes of your fellow-countrymen with one of the most heinous known offences.

Further, volition is consistent with other things we notice about behavior. As mentioned in my first post, what happens when an alcoholic goes on the wagon? In a sense, this is precisely the sort of thing Frylock mentioned. Can one change ones will? Apparently so. An alcoholic can decide he/she doesn’t like the trajectory of his/her life, reach in and change it. It’s very difficult, but it can be done (apparently about 5% per year succeed). As mentioned upthread, I draw similar inferences from ADD and OCD. Notably, there are quite a few mental disorders which respond to medication, meaning that therapy restores, for example, impulse control. To me, that says ordinarily we have it and it’s part of the wiring of the brain. Why is it there? Presumably, as Pábitel suggested in Post #58, because it was adaptive. Just as we have the wiring to produce language. Hence my bringing in Shakespeare and Springsteen. The wiring didn’t produce Hamlet or Born to Run. They did.

Finally, there’s the little problem of our inability to model the brain on a computer. Bottom-up programming as you describe doesn’t get us there. Rather, the brain seems to be a collection of top-down algorithms which somehow produce decisions. Whether they’re volitional or determined is what we’re discussing. Consider this. Here we are, egad, almost forty years after the making of 2001: A Space Odyssey. Are we close to building a HAL 9000? Will we ever be able to build one? If we do, wouldn’t it be fair to say one quality which would distinguish it from the computers of today would be volition? Or, to pick a more whimsical (also fictional) example, isn’t that the best way to describe the fifth invader fleet?

192

Pbear42, the Tom Wolfe essay you cite is titled “Sorry, But Your Soul Just Died.” I read it excitedly, because it reminded me of a thought experiment that does a fair job in arguing for determinism. Alas, I was disappointed that Wolfe did not deliver as I had hoped. So here’s my best attempt.

Imagine that tomorrow, someone invents a Soul-Killing Pill. When swallowed, the SKP will eliminate the soul and all possibility of free will. The physical body will be completely unaffected. The person essentially becomes an extremely complex computer/robot.

What will the effects of this pill look like for the outside observer? The pill does not stop any vital systems from working. The heart continues to pump blood. The diaphragm continues to contract regularly, filling the lungs with air. Electrochemical reactions continue to jump synapses in the brain.

The individual who takes the Soul-Killing Pill does not behave any differently from an individual who still has Free Will. He doesn’t even notice the difference himself. His brain continues making decisions and taking actions, whether the decisions regard which finger to use to scratch his nose, or what chord progression to use to compose “Born to Run,” or whether to begin drinking again after years of sobriety.

It seems to me that you are engaging in Dualism; the Ghost-in-the-Machine philosophy. Would I be off-base in thinking so? If you are a Dualist, the preceeding thought exercise will not advance my argument.

193

First, as regards dualism, you have misread me. I have consistently described volition as a behavior of the brain. Don’t believe in no Ghost in the Machine (thank you, Gilbert Ryle) and don’t believe in no soul (AAMOF, I’m an atheist).

Second, as regards your SKP thought experiment, to be candid, it seems to me you’re assuming the conclusion. Whether someone taking such a pill would have observable changes in behavior is the question, not the answer.

194

What led me to believe you are a Dualist:

I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you seem to see a difference between the “wiring” and the individual. I, personally, do not.

195

Ah, but that’s not Dualism, or anything like it. Go back to Post #70, where I developed the idea in more detail.

So, sure, Will had the wiring. but that’s not the same thng as saying the wiring wrote Hamlet.

196

[QUOTE=PBear42]
Ah, but that’s not Dualism, or anything like it. Go back to Post #70, where I developed the idea in more detail.So, sure, Will had the wiring. but that’s not the same thng as saying the wiring wrote Hamlet.
[/QUOTE]

Aha. This is precisely the part of your argument that I don’t buy.

Please: Explain the actual difference between “Will” and “Will’s wiring.” I think this might help to further the debate.

197

[QUOTE=PBear42]
Why do I think this? Partly it’s as simple as that’s how I experience life. Determinists dismiss this as an illusion, and I can no more refute that than I can refute Descartes’ demiurge (the notion that what I perceive as reality may be nothing more than some demon pushing my buttons). But, until someone can show me it’s an illusion, I’m persuaded by my perception, just as I don’t lose sleep over the theoretical prospect of the demon. So, I believe that I chose to live in San Francisco, that I chose to eat a burrito for lunch and that I chose to participate in a debate over determinism. It’s not so much a matter of developing a model which reduces the number of paradoxes. It’s a matter of developing a model which makes practical sense of the world.
[/quote]

There is certainly nothing wrong with making a model that makes practical sense of the world, especially w.r.t. a topic as difficult as free will. There is value in that.

But I don’t it actually answers the question about determinism or the mechanism for free will. I guess I don’t believe you can have determinism at one level (reaction to prior state including QM randomness), and have “free will” at a higher level. Somewhere there has to be a mechanism that allows for it, unless it is the combination of deterministic and random influences (I think someone mentioned this earlier).

While we have a looooong way to go, and I firmly agree that procedural programming/rule based systems/expert systems, etc. will never get us there, I do think we are making progress with neural networks.

As for top down vs bottom up, I think it’s a little of both and a little of neither and a bunch more.

198

[QUOTE=Randy Seltzer]
Aha. This is precisely the part of your argument that I don’t buy.

Please: Explain the actual difference between “Will” and “Will’s wiring.” I think this might help to further the debate.
[/QUOTE]

I agree with Randy on this, to me there is little if any difference between the two.

199

Randy: It’s not that hard. Will had the wiring to produce language. So do you and I. But, the writing of Hamlet was an act of creation, not produced by the wiring. Nor by his other influences. If you have another theory of how the play was written, please provide.

RaftPeople: I notice that you skipped over almost all of my post, especially the hard part of how we construct an ethical, legal or moral system not grounded on volition. Also, what about alcoholism, ADD, OCD and tardiness? And, for that matter, you didn’t actually answer the questions posed in my last paragraph. Observe, please, that I’ve never advanced the QM theory of free will, which I agree isn’t a free will theory at all. Heck, I’m not even defending free will, but rather only volition. As for whether volition is deterministic or random, the answer is that it neither. What philosophers might choose to call it bothers me little. Self-caused or uncaused will do. If it exists or, more importantly, is useful as a model, the label is trivial.

Randy II: Now that I think of it, you’ve said nothing about 95% of what I’ve written. It’s your thread. Do you really have nothing to say?

200

[QUOTE=PBear42]
Randy: It’s not that hard. Will had the wiring to produce language. So do you and I. But, the writing of Hamlet was an act of creation, not produced by the wiring. Nor by his other influences. If you have another theory of how the play was written, please provide.
[/quote]

You’re not answering the question. An “act of creation”? What is doing the creating? A soul?

Let’s not get testy. I’m just trying to get to the crux of your argument. Please excuse me if I don’t respond point-by-point.