No probs, and to be honest, I wish I had found a more diplomatic way to say what I said about your post. 
-FrL-
Frylock: As regards Will’s wiring v. Will’s brain, the difference is that the wiring is genetic, the brain is the organ in operation. All I’m saying, and I don’t think it’s deep or clever, is that the mere ability to produce language doesn’t meaningfully determine how the ability is used. As regards who has argued we need to understand how volition works to accept that it’s real, I never asserted anyone did (which isn’t to say no one has). I was describing my approach, in response to your paraphrase of the same. I thought your paraphrase was incorrect, and was explaining what I’m actually trying to do. As regards why the microscopic level should be neurons rather than atoms. In point of fact, I don’t care, but when I see determinists argue from the microscopic level (e.g., the Tom Wolfe essay I linked above), they talk about neurons. Whereas I can’t recall ever having seen determinists argue from the atomic level. As regards compatibilism, the usual definition is that volition and determinism are compatible. Pro-volition and agnostic on determinism (not far from my position) isn’t compatibilism by any definition I’ve seen, but I don’t feel strongly about it.
RaftPeople: As regards the random v. determined (or caused) dichotomy, frankly, I never see that used anywhere except in the context of the free will debate. Admitedly, if you were to ask physicists, chemists or other natural scientists whether the dichotomy is valid, they probably would agree. But, if you were to ask psychologists, sociologists, linguists, historians, economists, anthropologists, legal scholars or other practitioners of the “soft” sciences, I doubt you’d get many takers. So I dispute that there’s anything like a consensus on the issue. Whereas I don’t think anyone in any discipline would dispute my assertion that if theory conflicts with observation, it’s theory which yields. As regards what I’m saying, I agree that both of your paraphrases are true, so to that extent you’re right. But neither is really my point. Rather, I’m saying that I want to establish by observation whether volition is true. If so, understanding how it happens is secondary and dispensible. That is, figuring out how it works would be nice, but it’s not a necessary condition to making the observation. As regards Dennett, I agree that his ascribing volition solely to humans is wrong; indeed, I stated the contrary in my first post (#47). More interestingly, you seem to be agreeing with Dennett’s compatibilist stance. Care to elaborate? Honest, I don’t care tuppence about nondeterminism. I’ve just never seen a development of the compatibilist position which holds up.