Free Will is an illusion

[Randy_Seltzer]

Sorry, I had to abandon my thread for a while. I’m back for a bit.

@According to Pliny

If you can’t tell whether you have free will or not, then it doesn’t matter whether you have it or not.
Answering the question won’t help you.

You’re right in that this is merely a thought exercise. The belief in free will is basically equivalent to free will itself. It just depresses me to no end to consider that free will ergo consciousness ergo sentient life as we know it is a sham.

@Mangetout

I don’t think it creates an easier ride for arguments in favour of freewill, but I believe the above premise [all things can be traced to respective causes] is false. As I understand it, some of the things that happen at subatomic and quantum levels don’t need a cause; they just happen, or not (or a superposition of both happening and not happening at the same time).

I know nothing about quantum physics, so someone please correct me if I’m wrong: it’s not that subatomic physics is purely random, its just that we don’t understand the mechanisms that make it work… yet.

But as you say: even if quantum physics does introduce an element of randomness into the universe, does that affect free will or the illusion thereof?

@Revenant Threshold

Of course, the problem here is that Randy’s argument is not just a scientific one, but a logical one. It’s possible there’s a flaw in the logic rather than the science, and i’m sure many people will come in soon to point out such flaws (if they haven’t I will, but for now I need sleep).

Spot-on. I’m not arguing science, really. It’s more of a philosophical/logical argument. I know my premises do not constitute a classical deductive argument, but beyond that, I’d love to hear my logical flaws (when you wake up ).

@AHunter3

We’ve done this before, and recently at that.

I’m a guest and so I can’t search. I’ve been looking for anything like this for a couple of months and haven’t noticed anything. Could you provide a link please?

Refutation 1: In our universe, there has only been one event and no prior cause exists. Or, rather, the division of our ~15-billion-year-old universe into separate “events” is a mental convenience and an illusion. It’s an illusion we find useful, but don’t get too carried away. Every “event” is a subdivision of the whole. As Alan Watts says, the preceding “event” no more causes the “event” that follows than the head of a cat entering the living room “causes” the cat’s tail.

I don’t see how this is a refutation. Fine. Everything is one long “event.” So theoretically, we should be able to apply laws of physics/science/whatever to determine the course of this one event, from beginning, to present, into the future.

Nope. Can’t even model the weather. Didn’t you read your Chaos theory? In order to model the entire universe, the computer would have to be as complex as the universe it is modeling, which quickly becomes a recursiveness problem if nothing else.

You’re fighting the hypothetical. Quit it.

@DSeid

Randy, meet Spinoza.
[snip]
He’s someone you should get to know.

Hooray! I love having new friends!

@mangetout

Also, consider that if this is true, you had no choice but to start this thread; you had no real creative control over the choice of words used to express your argument against free will; you are sitting there thinking you disagree with people about free will - only it’s not you thinking at all, it’s just something the universe happens to be doing right now.

You will either answer me on this, or you will not, but the words will not be chosen by you; they couldn’t have been anything other than whatever they are.

I know. Depressing, isn’t it?

[E-Sabbath]

Well, then, if free will is not an artifact of predictability nor an artifact of randomness, then clearly, the predictability or not of the universe has no bearing on this discussion, and the computer-predictor is irrelevant.

What is the difference between having free will and having the illusion of free will?

[DSeid]

Randy, as to your request for a link to a recent thread: here you go.
As to your depression: really, read Spinoza. He got over it, you can too. My own bottom line: the illusion is real to us.

[Diogenes_the_Cynic]

@E-Sabbath

What is the difference between having free will and having the illusion of free will?

Moral culpability.

[Darryl_Lict]

@Randy Seltzer

Consider - In the next thousand years, assuming we live that long, humans will create the ultimate computer (please spare me the reasons for technical impossibility: there is ample time in this example to overcome them; plus this is a thought exercise). This computer will be capable of “modeling” the entire universe. Let’s take this computer and link it up to some piece of matter (okay, fine - a piece of fairy cake), from which it can extrapolate the existance of the whole universe, down to the last subatomic particle 20 billion lightyears away.

Forgive me if I’m wrong, but doesn’t Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle guarantee that we cannot predict the position and time of a particle due to the fact that our observation of said particle introduces an uncertainty into the time and position of said particle. Therefore we cannot predict absolutely where any particle will be and therefore not be able to predict future history.

The other question is how can we possibly build a computer that can model the entire universe when said computer would have to be larger than said universe in order to model all particles within the universe?

[Diogenes_the_Cynic]

The predictability is kind of beside the point. It’s the determinism that matters.

[Frylock]

Lets be clear. What’s a free will?

-FrL-

[Randy_Seltzer]

@Frylock

Lets be clear. What’s a free will?

-FrL-

While poking around trying to find a suitable answer to this question, I came upon the concept of Laplace’s Demon (wiki)

In short, it appears that while many philosophers (esp. Enlightenment philosophers) have thought along these same lines, a gentleman by the name of Pierre-Simon Laplace described my argument in 1814 with eerie similarity:

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.

Laplace replaces my “computer” with an ambiguous “intellect,” often called “Laplace’s Demon.”
The thought experiment of Laplace’s Demon is sometimes used by determinists to argue against free will (as I am doing). Check the linked wiki for counterarguments against Laplace - although in my view, they all fight the hypothetical instead of the issue at hand.

But, back to Frylock:
My (again amateur philosopher) view of free will is, I suppose equavalent to “self-determination.” I dunno. The concept of “free will” seems pretty intuitive to me, but I understand the need to define terms in order to frame any debate. How would *you * define free will?

[Frylock]

@Randy Seltzer

While poking around trying to find a suitable answer to this question, I came upon the concept of Laplace’s Demon (wiki)

In short, it appears that while many philosophers (esp. Enlightenment philosophers) have thought along these same lines, a gentleman by the name of Pierre-Simon Laplace described my argument in 1814 with eerie similarity: Laplace replaces my “computer” with an ambiguous “intellect,” often called “Laplace’s Demon.”
The thought experiment of Laplace’s Demon is sometimes used by determinists to argue against free will (as I am doing). Check the linked wiki for counterarguments against Laplace - although in my view, they all fight the hypothetical instead of the issue at hand.

But, back to Frylock:
My (again amateur philosopher) view of free will is, I suppose equavalent to “self-determination.” I dunno. The concept of “free will” seems pretty intuitive to me, but I understand the need to define terms in order to frame any debate. How would *you * define free will?

What do you mean by saying people “fight the hypothetical rather than the issue at hand?” Laplace’s argument, as you’ve presented it, is the hypothetical. He seems to be saying “There could be such an intellect, therefore, free will doesn’t exist.” Its perfectly valid to argue against this by saying there couldn’t be such an intellect, and by saying that supposing there could be such an equivalent is just to beg the question against those who do believe in free will.

How would I define free will? Well, when I say I have a free will, I mean that on some occasions, I am presented with a situation in which I believe it is within my power to do A or not to do A, and in which I deliberate over whether or not to do A, and then as a result of this deliberation, do in fact either do A or fail to do A, for the reasons that were given the most weight in my deliberation.

I do not think that my claim requires that it be logically or metaphysically possible for me to have done otherwise than I actually end up doing. So if your argument is “The universe is fully determinate, therefore there is no free will,” and if by “free will” you mean what I mean, then your argument doesn’t work.

But definitions can be better or worse, so there’s no reason for us to just end it by saying “we’re talking about different things, then.” Does the thing I’m talking about exist? Is my concept closer to satisfying the “intuitive” notion of free will, or is some other concept closer, or what? And so on.

A final point. Your argument seems to rely on a premise that the history of the universe is fully determinate. But this is not what contemporary physics is telling us, is it? A probabilistic history of the universe is determinate, but a claim that a history of the universe in terms of discrete particles and events is determinate would be controversial at least, wouldn’t it?

-FrL-

[Diogenes_the_Cynic]

@Frylock

Lets be clear. What’s a free will?

-FrL-

Self-determining, but (presumably) non-random volition. It’s an incoherent concept because volition cannot determine itself without being random. The will must either be externally determined or random (or randomly externally determined). Any construct involving a cognitive, internal control of one’s own volition leads to an infinite regress of “meta wills.”

To put it more simply, it feels like we are always following our will (and we are), but we have no control over what our will actually is. We can DO what we want, but the wanting itself cannot be internally determined without an infinite regress of wanting unless it’s random.

[Frylock]

@Diogenes the Cynic

Self-determining, but (presumably) non-random volition.

By “self-determining” I take it you mean nothing determines the outcome other than the outcome itself?

By non-random I take it you don’t mean “predictable,” but something else. I take it you mean being such that some kind of necessity attaches to the outcome, though it might not be absolute or determinate necessity. Something like that?

It’s an incoherent concept because volition cannot determine itself without being random.

I don’t follow this, though this may be because I don’t understand your terms. It seems to me that it could be true that:

1. Nothing determines the outcome other than the outcome
2. Some kind of nonabsolute, nondeterminate necessity attaches to the outcome.

Whats “nonabsolute” or “nondeterminate” “necessity?” Some examples might be probabilistic necessity, or teleological necessity. (By the latter I mean the necessity we are talking about when we say something “is supposed to happen” for some purpose or other. Crudely: If I have good character, then we can explain my honesty by saying it happens because its supposed to happen. Its being such that it is supposed to happen doesn’t guarantee that it actually happens. Nevertheless, it constitutes a kind of necessity that attaches to its happening.

The will must either be externally determined or random (or randomly externally determined).

Lets say the will is not externally determined–that given a particular situation, a will could do A or could refrain from doing A. You are saying that that will’s choice to do A or not to do A must be random. My question is, what’s wrong with that? Why does that amount to an argument against the existence of free will?

Any construct involving a cognitive, internal control of one’s own volition leads to an infinite regress of “meta wills.”

To put it more simply, it feels like we are always following our will (and we are), but we have no control over what our will actually is. We can DO what we want, but the wanting itself cannot be internally determined without an infinite regress of wanting unless it’s random.

[/quote]
I’ll try to remember to come back to this. I think its a different argument than the one you’ve offered above, but I also think my question “what’s wrong with random” can also be asked here.

-FrL-

[AHunter3]

@Frylock

Lets be clear. What’s a free will?

-FrL-

A loss leader from a cut-rate attorney’s office, but that’s not important right now…

[E-Sabbath]

So, what is the difference between predictability and determination?

Does it change if you look at it from different point of views? That is, from within the normal flow of space-time, compared to an all-observing third party point of view?

If one has the illusion of free will and the illusion of moral culpability, how is it different from the real thing?

In short, I feel this boils down to putting Descartes before de horsies. I think, therefore I am. I think I think, therefore I think I am.

I could be a computer simulation, but I can’t tell. Therefore, I should act as if I’m not, and as if I… and by extension, the rest of y’all, are real.

And thus, since I can not tell that I do not have free will, I should act as if I do, and that I have the moral culpability it entails.

Es verdad?

[Diogenes_the_Cynic]

@Frylock

By “self-determining” I take it you mean nothing determines the outcome other than the outcome itself?

No, the will determines the outcome (if by “outcome” you mean a choice or action), but something has to determine the will. Following the will is not the same thing as determining the will.

By non-random I take it you don’t mean “predictable,” but something else. I take it you mean being such that some kind of necessity attaches to the outcome, though it might not be absolute or determinate necessity. Something like that?

I don’t follow this, though this may be because I don’t understand your terms. It seems to me that it could be true that:

1. Nothing determines the outcome other than the outcome
2. Some kind of nonabsolute, nondeterminate necessity attaches to the outcome.

Whats “nonabsolute” or “nondeterminate” “necessity?” Some examples might be probabilistic necessity, or teleological necessity. (By the latter I mean the necessity we are talking about when we say something “is supposed to happen” for some purpose or other. Crudely: If I have good character, then we can explain my honesty by saying it happens because its supposed to happen. Its being such that it is supposed to happen doesn’t guarantee that it actually happens. Nevertheless, it constitutes a kind of necessity that attaches to its happening.

Lets say the will is not externally determined–that given a particular situation, a will could do A or could refrain from doing A. You are saying that that will’s choice to do A or not to do A must be random. My question is, what’s wrong with that? Why does that amount to an argument against the existence of free will?

First, I think you’re erroneously defining the will as synonymous with choice (“outcome.”) A seeming choice is necessarily determined by will, but the will itself requires its own determination. The individual does NOT have the option of going against his will (because it would require the will to do that, you see?), it only seems that way. There is no way not to follow the will and there is no way to decide what the will is going to be without another will to decide it (and another to decide that one…regressum ad infinitum). The only way to avoid either the ininite regress or external determination is with an onboard, internal “random number generator.” You ask what’s wrong with that? Well, nothing is logially problematic about it, but it does remove any classic ideas of moral responsibility associated with libertarian free will and it removes any cognitive control.

I’ll try to remember to come back to this. I think its a different argument than the one you’ve offered above, but I also think my question “what’s wrong with random” can also be asked here.

No, it’s the same argument, even though i might not have done a good job of articulating it. I always have a great deal of difficulty getting across what i’m trying to say with this subject. What seems to be like a very simple and intuitive point to me has for some reason proven extraordinarily difficult to communicate to others at times.

[Bryan_Ekers]

I 'unno, debating free-will/determinism is like debating string theory. Even proponents haven’t the slightest idea how to prove it.

[RaftPeople]

@Frylock

What do you mean by saying people “fight the hypothetical rather than the issue at hand?” Laplace’s argument, as you’ve presented it, is the hypothetical. He seems to be saying “There could be such an intellect, therefore, free will doesn’t exist.” Its perfectly valid to argue against this by saying there couldn’t be such an intellect, and by saying that supposing there could be such an equivalent is just to beg the question against those who do believe in free will.-FrL-

Forget about the intellect or the computer and focus on the point that, quantum mechanics aside, the macro-world appears to follow deterministic rules. Whether we have the computing power to predict every particle’s position or not, there sure seems to be pretty strong and consistent evidence that any given particles position is based on the previous state of the universe and the application of some rules.

[Frylock]

@Diogenes the Cynic

No, the will determines the outcome (if by “outcome” you mean a choice or action), but something has to determine the will. Following the will is not the same thing as determining the will.

Okay, so, we’re trying to figure out what you mean by “A free will is self-determining.” A free will determines itself. Okay, but “determines itself” doesn’t really mean anything. We have to ask, “Determines what about itself?”

Determines the choices it will make?

First, I think you’re erroneously defining the will as synonymous with choice (“outcome.”)

You’re probably right, and I hope the question above clears up my confusion.

A seeming choice is necessarily determined by will, but the will itself requires its own determination.

In other words, something must determine the will. But, as I said, determine what about the will? “X is determined” makes sense to me only for some X’s, and for all those X’s it does make sense to me for, X is an event. But a will is (I presume) not an event.

The individual does NOT have the option of going against his will (because it would require the will to do that, you see?),

I would have said the individual is the will for the purposes of discussions of this type on this topic.

it only seems that way.

I would never have said that it even seems that way. I can’t imagine someone thinking it is possible for a person to act against his own will. I can imagine someone thinking it is possible for a person to act against his own real desires, but that’s different.

There is no way not to follow the will

I wouldn’t say a person follows his own will, because I would say the person is his will. My will determines that I type this post right now. I’m not following my will in doing so–rather, I am the very thing that determines that I type this post right now. In other words, I am the thing I just called “my will.”

I just wrote a paragraph in which I tried to suggest a way to distinguish between myself and my will, but I deleted it because I just wound up convincing myself even more surely that there’s no such distinction. My will is what makes the choices I make. I am what makes the choices I make. So I am my will.

and there is no way to decide what the will is going to be without another will to decide it (and another to decide that one…regressum ad infinitum).

Why not the same will at every level? (I have an idea what the answer might be, but I just want to check.)

The only way to avoid either the ininite regress or external determination is with an onboard, internal “random number generator.” You ask what’s wrong with that? Well, nothing is logially problematic about it, but it does remove any classic ideas of moral responsibility associated with libertarian free will and it removes any cognitive control.

It doesn’t remove cognitive control if the thing doing the cognizing ultimately is just and exactly a particular set of randomly generated embodied states.

Given this set of states is of a particular kind, (i.e., crudely, the kind giving rise to rationality) moral predicates still apply, as well.

We’ve had this discussion before, haven’t we?

-FrL-

[Frylock]

@RaftPeople

Forget about the intellect or the computer and focus on the point that, quantum mechanics aside, the macro-world appears to follow deterministic rules. Whether we have the computing power to predict every particle’s position or not, there sure seems to be pretty strong and consistent evidence that any given particles position is based on the previous state of the universe and the application of some rules.

This is not true. There are plenty of phenomena whereby non-deterministic quantum phenomena have effects on the macro level. Many views about the interpretation of QM (and I think the mainstream view is included here) say that nothing about the state of the universe at T1 can determine whether or not a geiger counter will click at T2.

-FrL-

[Randy_Seltzer]

Frylock - I, too, have trouble divorcing the concept of “self” from the concept of free will. Which is why I find this philosophy profoundly disturbing:

1. My Free Will is illusory
2. I am my Free Will
   -> My conscious existence is illusory :eek:

In other news…
Frylock - re: fighting the hypothetical. I think your above post (#38) is quite telling of why we seem to disagree on this point. I think that a) no quantum effect is truly random and b) even if it were, it would have no observable effect on our “clockwork universe”. However, my attitude arises from a near complete ignorance of quantum mechanics. You probably know more about it than I do, so I can see whence your hangup might come.

Just for a second (for the sake of argument), let’s say that tomorrow some physicist figures out the rules governing subatomic particles and intratomic energy - and that said rules are calcuable and predictable. In such a situation, would you agree with determinism; that there is no free will?

In still other news…
E-Sabbath, I agree that there is little practical application of this particular philosophy, but of how many philosophies can it be said that there are practical applications? The only practical upshot I can think of (at the moment) is that determinism allows us to disregard musings of other “universes” splitting off our own as different events happen in each. (i.e. “Is there another universe in which 3 fewer grains of sugar fell on my corn flakes this morning? How about 4 fewer? How about an ostrich instead of sugar?”)

[Orbifold]

@Randy Seltzer

Just for a second (for the sake of argument), let’s say that tomorrow some physicist figures out the rules governing subatomic particles and intratomic energy - and that said rules are calcuable and predictable. In such a situation, would you agree with determinism; that there is no free will?

Just for a second (for the sake of argument), let’s say that tomorrow a sad-faced clown hands me a big purple book that predicts the outcome of every baseball game, correctly, forever.

This is the problem with hypotheticals. A hypothetical which flies in the face of what we know about this universe is useless in reaching conclusions about this universe. The issue of the determinacy or indeterminacy of quantum effects is at the foundation of your entire argument; if you try to sweep that under a hypothetical rug then suddenly we’re just arguing about a hypothetical alternate universe, and grand claims like “Conclusion: there is no such thing as free will” are completely baseless.