We have essentially repeated what the British did in Irag, in the 1920’s. the difference being, we are attempting to install a secular west-leaning government. The British chose (instead) to set up a monarchy (they picked a Hashemite prince to be King of Iraq). This was successfuul-the monarchy lasted till 1957, when the Baath Socialist party took over.
As for Afghanistan; it was never under the control of a central government. The king paid bribes to the local warlords, and that was that.
Because by using the term ‘win’ you are assuming facts that are clearly not in evidence. Unless you define ‘winning’ as ‘smashing a lot of stuff up’ quickly.
Which The Army War College doesn’t
But if you want to redefine ‘winning’ in a narrow ‘yay us!’ way and do your little happy dance you just knock yourself out. But try and do it out of sight of any of the friends and relatives of the thousands of dead soldiers and hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqi’s.
Don’t expect the rest of us to join in either.
Does this have anything to do with the question asked by the OP: No. Are you therefore answering a question that has no value wrt whats being discussed? Yes.
See above.
Only for those who don’t seem to be able to wrap their heads around what was being asked.
-XT
How the White House defined victory in 2003
So - 4 years on and we aren’t even close to meeting the Short Term definition. And in answer to the OP.
No - the US war fighting performance remains as woeful as it was in Vietnam regardless of how effective it is at breaking stuff and killing people. You can’t just redefine the terms ‘win’ and ‘victory’ to come up with a happy answer.
I define winning the way the OP defined it.
“I put victory in quotes because I realize we are far from done, I am referring more to the quickness in which we toppled their governments, and dissolved their armies.”
In that definition, we were impressive. If you want to use a different definition, which would portray the military in the worst possible light, you could start a new thread.
I could define ‘having sex with Angelina Jolie’ as catching 5 minutes of a Lara Croft movie too. And I use the common definition of ‘victory’ as my cites show. Including Bush’s definition.
The Iraqi’s and the Taleban are still in the field fighting. And no amount of hand-waving and defining things to suit yourself can make that fact change.
You COULD…but its probably best if you don’t, as its a stupid comparison. Lets take a step back and look at what the OP was asking for (since its obvious you didn’t actually bother reading it):
S/he is asking if the initial victories were impressive…despite the fact that a LASTING victory has not (and perhaps never will be) achieved. Your reply? Well, we haven’t gained a lasting victory. Um…no duh. That isn’t what the OP was asking.
Let me put it another way and see if this works. The French achieved several large military and political victories in Spain early on. Were these victories impressive? Is the criteria for them being ‘impressive’ or ‘unimpressive’ only based on the fact that eventually things went south for the French army in Spain and ultimately they were driven out?
The answer is no. If we are observing and commenting on the initial victories, we are doing so in isolation, looking at them as frozen moments in time. If the debate is to talk about the wider context of how the French did, or what those early victories actually MEANT wrt later history, then your type of observation would have some value. As it is, its simply a distraction from the question being asked.
Not that I’m holding out much hope, but perhaps you can see where I at least am coming from here.
I’ll briefly comment on this part of the hijack though. In the case of the Iraqi’s this is factually wrong. In fact, the Iraqi army is NOT still in the field fighting…nor is there even a remnant of the original Iraq government that is attempting to maintain operations in the field. There is an INSURGENCY going on…but thats something completely different. So, here you are just flat wrong.
In the case of the Taliban you are correct…they ARE still in the field (AS the Taliban) and the Taliban government (such as it is) still is attempting to maintain coherent operations. However, they are far from regaining control of the government at this point, so only time will tell if THEIR operations are ultimately futile.
-XT
XT, as tagos points out and I asked priorly, pray tell, what exactly have you “won” in either country? I doubt Michael Jordan would define “victory” thusly:
Iraq World’s No. 2 Failed State
– my highlights.
And once again, bazillions of tanks/armoured vehicles, aircraft carriers galore, planes and helicopters up the kazoo VS an almost non-existent Taliban Army and an Iraqi force that was a shadow of the one you’d already blown away in '91, hardly impresses me, nor do I buy your argument that you’re the only nation that could have pulled it off. Sure, when you spend as much as you do on “defense,” (almost 50% of the world’s total, which is simply nuts, imperialistic and paranoid) you obviously have the best and shiniest killing toys. But don’t for a minute, think that because of that you are anywhere near invincible.
Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan…there to remind of that. And note that we’re talking Third World Nations here. See, the other Big Boys have nukes. And they only need to land a few to make it a wash. M.A.D. Still works you know. With the Bush Era of naked greed and imperialism, is it really any wonder that other countries want to join the club? In fact, wasn’t North Korea in Bush’s infamous “Axis of Evil”? Hmm…wonder why you didn’t invade them?
The floor is yours. Fell free to fill it with rolleyes.
BTW, spot-on, marshmallow. Very well put.
Tagos, It’s not my frick’n definition that we are talking about. Its the OP’s. If you want to start a discussion asking if we are winning the war in Iraq right now, I’ll chime in and tell you that it’s up in the air, that we have not won that yet. Perhaps that will placate you. You can use what ever definition you want in your thread. But the OP stated:
“I realize we are far from done, I am referring more to the quickness in which we toppled their governments, and dissolved their armies.”
What part of you does not understand that he is not asking about the war now, but about the initial victory? How could that be more clear? As I said, if you want to grind an ax about the current actions in Iraq, there must be about two or three active threads on that now. You should take your arguments there.
I thought it was impressive, although marred by several major strategic blunders. Had it been led by a more impressive President, the sheer impressiveness of it would be pretty damned impressive.
Red, as I’ve already explained to tagos your question is irrelevent to the point the OP wanted to debate. I’m sorry that you can’t seem to wrap your mind around that fact…I’ve done my very best to make it clear.
Maybe someone else would like to further hijack the thread by going off on the tangent you seem bound and determined to go off on…but personally I think that what you are drooling to debate has ALREADY been debated to death around here. The only reason I wandered into this thread is it seemed something more interesting to debate, instead of the same ole same ole.
-XT
What all do you consider to be ‘major strategic blunders’ (assuming you aren’t talking about the biggest blunder…that of going into Iraq at all)? Just curious.
-XT
Well, not bulldozing Abu Grahib early on, seeing as it was a major symbol of the repression of the regime the Americans overthrew in the name of freedom. The willy-nilly firing of Ba’ath Party members from various governmental, educational and military posts was a mistake, since many of them were low-level but effective technocrats who knew how to run the system but were not actually part of the repression. The dismantling of the Iraqi army instead of co-opting it… basically the Americans kept what they should have tossed and tossed what they should have kept. A stable bureaucracy and military with a population free from fear is critical to establishing what westerners would recognize as “democracy” and this, as far as I can tell, ain’t happening. By way of historical analogy, although the various surviving leaders of the Nazi party could be put on trial at Nuremberg, it was not necessary nor desirable to arrest and/or prosecute everyone who had been a member.
The Frontline episode “The Lost Year in Iraq” summarizes the strategic failures fairly well, I believe, including describing how getting appointed to an important post in Iraq required little more than claimed loyalty to Bush’s ideals, as opposed to actual experience. The disparity between these well-meaning but clueless appointees (including Paul Bremer) and the more experienced military and diplomatic officers is tragically amusing.
In short, pre-invasion Iraq was not in a state of anarchy requiring the creation of a completely new government and military. Many of the Iraqis who had joined the army or the Ba’ath party had not done so to become miniature Saddams (indeed, anyone who tried risked being summarily eliminated); they did so because the extra money and prestige made their lives easier. They could have transferred this pseudo-loyalty to the Americans, as long as the Americans paid them, and the governmental/military structures could have been preserved. A democratic Iraq (indeed, any democratic nation) requires hierarchical non-democratic structures to take care of the day-to-day operation (picture life in the U.S. if all military, corporate and governmental decisions were put to a vote or, at the opposite extreme, left to the whim of whoever was in the office that day). A good bureaucrat or a good military officer or a good teacher can be good at his job regardless of who is running the overall system. These bureaucratic, officers and teachers are critical to Iraq’s long-term stability and the Bush policies had them all fired, forcing them into exile or the insurgency. It was as if, not satisfied with merely stopping the locomotive of Iraq, the Americans had steadfastly derailed the entire train, including boxcars and flatbeds that could have been extremely useful once the train got restarted.
This isn’t a particualry deep analysis, I realize, but it summarizes my impression.
I wasn’t asking about winning, I know we haven’t won anything. I was looking at it from a pure military standpoint. Did we accomplish something impressive?
XT I think hit the nail on the head with many of his comments, so thanks for that.
XT, I can’t believe that you really believe what you wrote.
Any intelligent observer of Iraq has concluded that many, many remnants of the Iraqi government (you know, the Ba’ath party members who used to run the government) are forming the core of the insurgency.
Do you really deny this, or am I misreading what you wrote?
Because if you deny this, then your otherwise strong arguments are considerably weakened in my opinion.
If we are looking for a single, crucial turning point of this war, then Paul Bremmer purging Ba’ath party members (heavily armed, BTW) from the Iraqi government works for me.
Yes, I believe what I wrote…and I think its accurate. YMMV…we’ll see.
Well, its debatable as to how extensive the former Ba’athists and former Iraqi military types make up the current insurgency. I’m not denying that they make up some non-zero percentage of it however, nor that they weren’t instrumental especially early on. I think both things are true and both have solid evidence behind both of those statements.
The point I was making is that they do not REPRESENT the former government, nor are they acting in any kind of cohesive or unified way WITH THE GOAL OF RE-ESTABLISHING THE FORMER GOVERNMENT. There IS no former government in exile, striving to re-establish its former position, There IS no cohesive former Iraqi units that are part of a unified plan to re-establish Ba’athist rule…no structure of any kind that has ties back to the former Iraqi military. What we have is a rather disjointed insurgency that are made up of many fragmentary or fractured groups (including but not limited to former Ba’athists…who in turn represent SEVERAL splinter groups) with dis-similar aims and goals (where they have any aims and goals at all).
This is very unlike what we have in Afghanistan where the Taliban DO represent both a government AND a military force in exile, with a (somewhat) cohesive structure, aims and goals (of course we ALSO have a lot of fragmentary groups similar to what is happening in Iraq at the same time).
Well, I do deny it…at least, I’ve seen no evidence to the contrary. It wouldn’t be the first time my opinion was thought to be wrong though…just ask Red sometime. 
If you have a cite that shows that my position is in error though I’d be more than happy to take a look.
Thats fine…but again its beyond the scope of what the OP was asking. IOW, I’m NOT looking for a crucial turning point of this war (or the one in Afghanistan) because thats not what we were debating.
-XT
Including the Shia part of the insurgency? Is there a Ba’ath underground government controlling the Sunni insurgency? I’ve never heard of it. Sure, Sunnis who used to be in the army and government have the skills and motivation to be important in their insurgency, but that is a lot different from them being the continuation of the government.
We have two wars in Iraq. The first, against Saddam’s government, we won. The second, against the insurgency, we’re not doing so well at.
As for the war we won, given that we did this before, that we had years to plan it (since before 9/11 it seems) and that Saddam was weakened, I don’t find even the logistics that impressive. Good, but not impressive. There was no real time pressure, except to attack before the summer. GW I, where we were less prepared and had to move more quickly in a new environment, was far more impressive.
He he. Good one.
Pretty good summary. And you can also add that the logistics back then where far more complicated, having a real coalition of what? About seventy nations on board? And obviously a much stronger Iraqi military back then…that was still shredded in, literally, days.
But we didn’t actually invade the country. We pretty much pounded the Iraqi who were in fixed positions (a la their previous experience in the Iran/Iraq war). Again however, its not a contest…GW I was certainly a VERY impressive display of military and logistical skill on the part of the US AND the coalition. And you are right to note that the US did most of the heavy lifting logistics wise in GW I. This doesn’t make what we did (initially) in GW II any less impressive however.
We’ll just have to agree to disagree then. I don’t know how to explain to you just how truely impressive both the logistics AND the military capability shown in both GW I and GW II (and in Afghanistan) were quite impressive. I’ll leave it by re-stating something I said earlier:
When every nation can do something its ordinary. When only a few nations can do something its impressive. When only one nation can do something its…quite impressive. What we did in both Afghanistan and Iraq were quite impressive from a military and logistics standpoint (though perhaps ultimately futile)…even from our own standards.
I’ll leave you with one last thought…think about the British role in GW II, about how the British military today is perhaps one of the finest military forces (outside of the US) in the world…and how much military force they brought to bear, and how they BROUGHT it to bear in Iraq. Then consider the various nations who DID help us in Afghanistan, and ask the same questions. Then, with that in mind, take a fresh look at what the US did in both of those cases. If you do and you come to some conclusions I would be very interested in your thoughts.
-XT
It’s mostly irrelevant.
- source “Winning Wars”, The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection
It can be strongly argued that dissolving the Iraqi army was a huge blunder. The Key Findings and Policy Recommendations from a workshop report, “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Role”, issued by the National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2002:
It would appear that DoD and the Military leadership ignored it’s own advisors with regards to stabilization. Now if the goal were purely to topple the government and dissolve the military very quickly, they did quite well. However, that seems a bit at cross purposes with creating a stable post-war environment. The speed with which we pushed across the country allowed a good deal of Iraqi military to slip across borders into Jordan, Syria and Iran, or dissolve back into the general populace, where they have become the part of the insurgency/civil war problem. Since this has a net effect of breeding terrorists, this also does not lead to the Administration’s stated goals of keeping the world safe from terrorists.
Everything I’ve been reading indicates that we do NOT have the ability to control these countries by simply becoming brutal. We don’t have the forces in country, in either Afghanistan or Iraq to do this. We could certainly control pockets, but short of laying waste via WMDs of our own, this does nto seem like a possibility.
Given that we are repeating the some of the exact lessons we should have learned in Vietnam, although we have achieved many tactical victories, we are in grave danger of again winning all of the battles but losing the war.
- source “Toward an American Way of War”, Dr. Antulio Echevarria, Lt. Colonel U.S. Army, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College