# Full Faith and Credit re: expungement **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [October 14, 2009, 1:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775 "2009-10-14T13:38:52Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![UltraVires](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/ecccb3/32.png) [@UltraVires](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UltraVires)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 1:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/1 "2009-10-14T13:38:52Z")
First, I will say that this is a hypothetical and nobody is my lawyer, etc. Let’s say that a person had his criminal arrest record expunged under West Virginia Law 61-11-25 which concludes with this: [QUOTE=WV Code 61-11-25] If the court finds that there are no current charges or proceedings pending relating to the matter for which the expungement is sought, the court may grant the motion and order the sealing of all records in the custody of the court and expungement of any records in the custody of any other agency or official including law-enforcement records. Every agency with records relating to the arrest, charge or other matters arising out of the arrest or charge, that is ordered to expunge records, shall certify to the court within sixty days of the entry of the expungement order, that the required expungement has been completed. All orders enforcing the expungement procedure shall also be sealed. (e) **Upon expungement, the proceedings in the matter shall be deemed never to have occurred**. The court and other agencies shall reply to any inquiry that no record exists on the matter. The person whose record is expunged **shall not have to disclose the fact of the record or any matter relating thereto on an application for employment, credit or other type of application**. [/QUOTE] Boldings mine. If the state of Florida (or any other state) were to say that this person MUST disclose any expungements or arrests which have been expunged, would such a policy not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution since they don’t give credence to this order issued by a competent court of jurisdiction from a sovereign sister state? Again, I hope this question passes muster on the board since it doesn’t pertain to anything having to do with me or anyone else I know. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 1:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/2 "2009-10-14T13:40:54Z")
> [@jtgain](#): > > Again, I hope this question passes muster on the board since it doesn’t pertain to anything having to do with me or anyone else I know. It’s fine. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 2:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/3 "2009-10-14T14:06:07Z")
No. > [@](#): > > under the Full Faith and Credit Clause one state need not recognize a pardon issued by a sister state for an offense committed in that sister state. The United States Supreme Court in Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 34 S. Ct. 576, 58 L. Ed. 843, (1914), addressed the issue of whether the State of New York was required to recognize a pardon granted by the President of the United States to a person previously convicted of a federal felony. 1 The Court concluded that the presidential pardon operated only with regard to the sovereign that issued it and, therefore, the pardon had no “extraterritorial effect.” The Seventh Circuit later applied the converse of the Court’s ruling to conclude that the United States was not required to recognize a pardon granted by the governor of Montana to a person who had previously been convicted of a felony in that state. Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972, 95 S. Ct. 1392, 43 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1975). The Thrall holding has been accepted in a number of jurisdictions. See White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. 1981) (Texas sheriff not barred from firing deputy who failed to indicate at the time of hire that he had been convicted of a felony in California even though that conviction was later expunged), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S. Ct. 1731, 72 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1982); Yacovone v. Bolger, 207 U.S. App. D.C. 103, 645 F.2d 1028, 1036 (United States Postal Service in deciding whether to employ someone convicted of shoplifting in Vermont was not required to recognize Vermont’s pardon of the offense), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 159, 70 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1981); Groseclose v. Plummer, 106 F.2d 311, 313-14 (9th Cir.) (California not required to recognize Texas pardon), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 614, 60 S. Ct. 264, 84 L. Ed. 513 (1939); Delehant v. Board on Police Standards and Training, 317 Ore. 273, 855 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Or. 1993) (Oregon not required to recognize Idaho’s expunction of defendant’s Idaho conviction); State v. Edmondson, 112 N.M. 654, 818 P.2d 855, 858-59 (N.M. App.), cert. quashed, 112 N.M. 641, 818 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1991) (New Mexico not required to recognize Texas’ expunction of defendant’s Texas conviction); In re Jeb F., 316 Md. 234, 558 A.2d 378, 379 (Md. 1989) (State of Maryland not required under Full Faith and Credit Clause to admit into its bar a person convicted of armed robbery in New York even though that person had received a certificate of relief in New York absolving him of all disabilities resulting from his conviction); Ballard v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of City of Evansville, 452 N.E.2d 1023, 1025-26 (Ind. App. 1983) (Indiana not required to recognize Arizona’s expunction of Arizona conviction in deciding whether to continue policeman’s pension); Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Ky. 1976) (Kentucky Bar Association not required to disbar an attorney simply because he had been disbarred in Ohio). Integral to many of these courts reasoning is that one state is not barred from prosecuting a defendant for the same offense which a sister state tried him, assuming both states have jurisdiction over the defendant in the cause, under the dual sovereign doctrine. See Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033, 98 S. Ct. 765, 54 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1978). It is thought that if a second state could subsequently try the defendant for the offense notwithstanding the first state’s final disposition of the case, then obviously the second state would not be bound by the first state’s pardoning of the offense. _Hoffman v. State_, 922 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). Contrariwise, a few courts have recognized that they can expunge sister state convictions. See _Barker v. State_, 62 Ohio St. 2d 35; 402 N.E.2d 550 (1980). ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 2:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/4 "2009-10-14T14:21:14Z")
This reasoning is typical of the courts cited in my previous post: > [@](#): > > Finally, a contrary result is not compelled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. > > It is not at all clear that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to criminal matters. See Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970) (state not required to enforce penal judgment of sister state); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (suggesting that state cannot enforce penal judgment of another state, including one for a monetary penalty). But see Farmland Dairies v. Barber, 65 N.Y.2d 51, 478 N.E.2d 1314, 489 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1985) (full faith and credit requires New York to abide by New Jersey criminal judgment stating that it could not be used in civil proceeding). Even assuming that it does, we believe that it would rarely, if ever, compel one state to be governed by the law of a second state regarding the punishment that can be imposed for a crime committed within the first state’s boundaries. As the United States Supreme Court said in a somewhat difference context, “Full faith and credit does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state; rather, it is for this Court to choose in each case between the competing public policies involved.” Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951) (Wisconsin must recognize Illinois cause of action for wrongful death). > > A state cannot express its public policy more strongly than through its penal code. When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets the punishment for the offender, it is conveying in the clearest possible terms its view of public policy. Full faith and credit ordinarily should not require a state to abandon such fundamental policy in favor of the public policy of another jurisdiction. > > For example, perhaps the most compelling judgment by another jurisdiction would be a verdict of acquittal in a criminal trial. Yet full faith and credit does not bar a state from prosecuting a person for violation of its own statute despite an acquittal by another jurisdiction on a charge of the identical conduct. See Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1977) (state and federal robbery charges), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978); cf. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1984) (under dual-sovereignty doctrine, two states can punish defendant for same offense without violating Double Jeopardy Clause). > > Even when a state’s criminal laws are not involved, full faith and credit does not require the state to recognize expungement of a conviction by the state in which the conviction was rendered. In Ballard v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 452 N.E.2d 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), the police pension fund board discontinued Ballard’s pension pursuant to a statute permitting such action if the pensioner was convicted of a crime constituting a felony. The felony had been committed in Arizona. An Arizona court had entered an order setting aside Ballard’s conviction and restoring his civil rights. The Indiana court affirmed the action of the pension fund board, stating: “It is the declared public policy of Indiana that police pensioners who are convicted of a felony may have their pension benefits terminated…. The Full Faith and Credit clause does not require a state to apply another state’s law in violation of its own legitimate public policy.” Id. at 1026; see White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 685 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (expungement of California court record did not prohibit Texas sheriff from firing deputy for failing to disclose California detention in his employment application), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982); Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974) (full faith and credit did not prohibit IRS from denying firearm license to person whose prior state conviction had been pardoned). But see Farmland Dairies v. Barber. > > Turning to habitual-offender statutes in particular, the deterrent and punitive purposes of those statutes argue strongly in favor of upholding their provisions against any challenge under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Thus, it is not surprising that other jurisdictions have determined that the clause does not prevent a state from using as a predicate offense for its habitual-offender statute an offense in another state that has been pardoned, see United States v. Maroney, 373 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1967); Groseclose v. Plummer, 106 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 614 (1939), or that could not be used for habitual-offender sentencing in the other state. See State v. Calvin; People v. Dippolito, 88 A.D.2d 211, 452 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1982) (New York could use for habitual-offender sentencing a California conviction for burglary that would be felony in New York but was misdemeanor in California). But cf. People v. Willis, 79 A.D.2d 1036, 435 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1981) (without reference to Full Faith and Credit Clause, New York court refuses to use for habitual-offender sentencing a Texas offense that, because charge was dismissed, could not be used for such purposes in Texas). The policies behind the decision of Texas not to use a probated conviction for habitual-offender purposes, which have been analyzed above, are not so compelling that full faith and credit requires that the Texas rule prevail over New Mexico law. _State v. Edmondson_, 112 N.M. 654, 818 P.2d 855, 858-59 (N.M. App.), cert. quashed, 112 N.M. 641, 818 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1991). ---
**Author:** ![Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/7cd45c/32.png) [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Elendil_s_Heir)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 4:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/5 "2009-10-14T16:39:04Z")
Interesting - I didn’t know that. I disagree with the holding, though. This is one nation. An expungement or pardon in one state should be an expungement or pardon for all. If the state in which the offense was committed is willing to let bygones be bygones, why shouldn’t the other 49? ---
**Author:** ![Si\_Amigo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/si_amigo/32/2877_2.png) [@Si\_Amigo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Si_Amigo)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 5:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/6 "2009-10-14T17:02:39Z")
So how do other states find out if your record has been expunged in another state? I thought the whole point of expungment was that your record was sealed and that it could not be accessed without your consent. I ask because I have a friend who commited a drug felony back in the eighties, got his record expunged and is now an big gun collector who hasn’t had any problems getting guns from dealers in other states. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 5:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/7 "2009-10-14T17:35:30Z")
> [@Si\_Amigo](#): > > So how do other states find out if your record has been expunged in another state? I thought the whole point of expungment was that your record was sealed and that it could not be accessed without your consent. I ask because I have a friend who commited a drug felony back in the eighties, got his record expunged and is now an big gun collector who hasn’t had any problems getting guns from dealers in other states. In some of the cases, it isn’t explained. In others, like _Delehant_, the person discloses the information on an application. Many of the others involved pardons, restoration of civil rights, or regimes under which completion of probation requires dismissal of the case, all of which leave an obvious paper trail. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 5:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/8 "2009-10-14T17:44:43Z")
> [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](#): > > Interesting - I didn’t know that. I disagree with the holding, though. This is one nation. An expungement or pardon in one state should be an expungement or pardon for all. If the state in which the offense was committed is willing to let bygones be bygones, why shouldn’t the other 49? I was actually more surprised by the line of cases that permits one state to expunge a conviction from another. Of course, if sister states were required to recognize expungements (or expunctions) the combination of these two doctrines would offer all sorts of opportunities. For example, you could get convicted of a non-expungeable crime in Michigan, move to Ohio and get it expunged, and then return to Michigan, where you could demand recognition of the sister state expungement of your home state conviction. 😃 Of course, the doctrines are two sides of the same coin, so changing one would likely change the other one, but I bet it’d take a while for all of that to get worked out. ---
**Author:** ![UltraVires](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/ecccb3/32.png) [@UltraVires](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/UltraVires)\ **Post date:** [October 14, 2009, 6:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/9 "2009-10-14T18:16:03Z")
Thanks GFactor. I am still left scratching my head. Full Faith and Credit isn’t for concealed carry licenses, check. Not for gay marriage. Check. Not for driver’s licenses. Check. Not for a judicial act of expungement. Check. So, what part of a state’s judicial proceedings ARE held to be binding on another state? I mean [QUOTE=COTUS] Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof [/QUOTE] I can’t think of a more straightforward example of a “judicial proceeding” than an expungement hearing/order. In fact, (not that I would ever do it) but I feel that if the state of Florida were to ask a person “Have you ever had an arrest record expunged in another state?” that he should be able to legally answer “No” because he has a Court Order from a sovereign state saying that he does not have to “disclose the fact” and it is judicially deemed to “never have occurred”. I’m sure that Florida would disagree, though. ---
**Author:** ![Markxxx](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/5daacb/32.png) [@Markxxx](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Markxxx)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 5:00am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/10 "2009-10-15T05:00:11Z")
> [@Si\_Amigo](#): > > So how do other states find out if your record has been expunged in another state? I thought the whole point of expungment was that your record was sealed and that it could not be accessed without your consent. I ask because I have a friend who commited a drug felony back in the eighties, got his record expunged and is now an big gun collector who hasn’t had any problems getting guns from dealers in other states. It depends on how the record is catorgorized. I worked for a temp agency and they had me doing clerical work at a bail bond company so I was able to access a service to check records for criminals. It’s pretty easy to spot a pattern. Sometimes the record will say sealed. Other times previous records will say something like “pardon applied.” Then the record was screwed up and the attorney did the paperwork over so nothing shows, but didn’t get that first screwed up record fixed. Some states (but not all) do allow you to simply ask “Have you ever been arrested for a felony.” Now this is “iffy” ground in the OP case as his quote read " any matter relating" The thing with pardons and expunged or sealed records is they create gaps in paperwork that are obvious, IF you’re looking. For most jobs a simple (and cheap - about $29.00) search is all they do and nothing shows. But you can dig deep into court records, but that costs. Or even better, go to the court and get the actual records, where you often find much more info out. As I said the thing is paperwork procedes in a usual order and a seal or expunge or pardon, disrupts that fairly obvious. So you will not know what happened, but you know something did, the you can ask that person. As a person who’s worked in H/R laws are nice, but they are very easily gotten around, ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 1:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/11 "2009-10-15T13:05:55Z")
> [@](#): > > A state cannot express its public policy more strongly than through its penal code. When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets the punishment for the offender, it is conveying in the clearest possible terms its view of public policy. Full faith and credit ordinarily should not require a state to abandon such fundamental policy in favor of the public policy of another jurisdiction. > > For example, perhaps the most compelling judgment by another jurisdiction would be a verdict of acquittal in a criminal trial. Yet full faith and credit does not bar a state from prosecuting a person for violation of its own statute despite an acquittal by another jurisdiction on a charge of the identical conduct. This raises an interesting point. Can a state refuse to recognize an acquittal by another state? In his recent staff article, Bricker points out that some pre-Civil War courts in Northern states did not enforce the federal Fugitive Slave Act by jury nullification. And after the war, courts in some Southern states used jury nullification to acquit white defendants accused of crimes against black people. Could a state have refused to recognize these acquittals? For example, could Alabama in 1855 have enacted a law which prohibited anyone who had ever been accused of illegally harboring a slave in any state from voting or holding public office in Alabama - even if they had subsequently been acquitted of the crime? Could Oregon have enacted the same law about people accused but aquitted of lynching in 1955? ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 1:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/12 "2009-10-15T13:39:42Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > This raises an interesting point. Can a state refuse to recognize an acquittal by another state? I think the language you quoted suggests they probably could, at least if they did their own factfinding. It’s actually an easier case than you might expect because of a procedural issue. Challenges to the right to office are usually done through a writ called quo warranto. > [@](#): > > A quo warranto proceeding under the common law lies only to test the defendant’s right to hold office de jure. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 256, 438 A.2d 88 (1980). “In a quo warranto proceeding, the **burden is upon the defendant to show a complete title to the office in dispute**.” State ex rel. Gaski v. Basile, 174 Conn. 36, 38, 381 A.2d 547 (1977). > > A quo warranto action is a civil proceeding. 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Quo Warranto § 6. Thus, because the burden of proof in quo warranto actions is on the defendant, \*\*the trial court must find that the defendant met this burden by a preponderance of the evidence \*\*in order to find for the defendant. Stephen _Deguzis et al. v. Dana N. Jandreau_, 27 Conn. App. 421; 606 A.2d 52; 1992 Conn. App. LEXIS 172 (1992) (Emphasis added.) So not only is the burden different from a criminal trial, but the burden is often on the defendant. What if, for example, the statute simply says, “no office shall be held by anyone who has illegally harbored a slave”? Joe Abolitionist is elected to office, and \*quo warranto \*proceedings are initiated. Can an Alabama court determine that he did, in fact, harbor a slave–even though he was acquitted of criminal charges? Sure. In fact, the acquittal isn’t even relevant, and definitely has no preclusive effect because of the differeng burdens of proof. E.g., _State Farm v. Carter_, 154 Md. App. 400; 840 A.2d 161; 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 187 (2003) (reviewing law nationwide). ---
**Author:** ![Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/7cd45c/32.png) [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Elendil_s_Heir)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 2:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/13 "2009-10-15T14:23:28Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > …Could a state have refused to recognize these acquittals? For example, could Alabama in 1855 have enacted a law which prohibited anyone who had ever been accused of illegally harboring a slave in any state from voting or holding public office in Alabama - even if they had subsequently been acquitted of the crime? Could Oregon have enacted the same law about people accused but aquitted of lynching in 1955? I agree with **Gfactor**. States historically had broad latitude in regulating the ballot and officeholding eligibility. In the Jim Crow era several Southern states restricted the ballot to those whose grandfathers had been entitled to vote, IIRC, disenfranchising the great majority of blacks whose grandfathers had been enslaved. Those laws stood for far too many decades - along with literacy tests and the poll tax - despite the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. ---
**Author:** ![Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e8c25b/32.png) [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Really_Not_All_That_Bright)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 2:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/14 "2009-10-15T14:32:35Z")
> [@Little\_Nemo](#): > > Could a state have refused to recognize these acquittals? For example, could Alabama in 1855 have enacted a law which prohibited anyone who had ever been accused of illegally harboring a slave in any state from voting or holding public office in Alabama - even if they had subsequently been acquitted of the crime? Could Oregon have enacted the same law about people accused but aquitted of lynching in 1955? In theory? Certainly not; it would be a clear violation of the 14th Amendment. I see **Gfactor** suggests that the other state could, but it would have to hold a trial first, and I think you’re asking if it could be done administratively. In practice? Sure. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 2:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/15 "2009-10-15T14:57:26Z")
> [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](#): > > In theory? Certainly not; it would be a clear violation of the 14th Amendment. I see **Gfactor** suggests that the other state could, but it would have to hold a trial first, and I think you’re asking if it could be done administratively. I was also ignoring any federal or state constitutional problems with the law other than the possible full faith and credit issue. We could remove some of the complications if we modernized the statute: “no person shall hold office if he has committed fraud in the process of originating or applying for a loan.” Two scenarios: 1. Bob the Builder is elected, but was charged with, and acquitted (based on nullification) of, mortgage fraud based on his conduct as a mortgage broker. Joe the Plumber files a quo warranto action seeking his removal from office. He asserts the acquittal as proof that he didnt’ do it. He loses. 2. Bob the Builder seeks inclusion on the ballot, but his application is denied based on the fraud charge. He follows the state administrative procedures to appeal the denial, as evidence that he didn’t commit fraud. He loses all adminstrative appeals, and the state courts affirm the administrative decisions. In either case, I don’t think FF&C saves him, under the current caselaw. All that said, I can see problems with a law like **Little Nemo** proposed, which hinges entitlement to office on merely being accused of a crime. I suspect courts would strike a statute like that down on other grounds. And similarly, if in scenario 2 above, he was denied ballot access and the sole basis for concluding that he did the crime was that he’d been charged with doing it, I suspect courts would find the decision arbitrary and capricious and overturn it. ---
**Author:** ![Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e8c25b/32.png) [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Really_Not_All_That_Bright)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 3:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/16 "2009-10-15T15:25:42Z")
In either scenario, we’d have to assume that the facts of the case pretty much establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he _did_ do it, yes? ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 3:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/17 "2009-10-15T15:32:10Z")
> [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](#): > > In either scenario, we’d have to assume that the facts of the case pretty much establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he _did_ do it, yes? As I pointed out above, in the quo warranto case he’d have the burden of proving, by a _preponderance_ of the evidence, that he was qualified for office, which means he’d have to prove that he didn’t do it. These aren’t criminal cases, and the burden of proof is less than in a criminal case. ---
**Author:** ![Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e8c25b/32.png) [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Really_Not_All_That_Bright)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 3:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/18 "2009-10-15T15:52:20Z")
Does the acquittal not constitute a preponderance of the evidence by itself, even if it’s bogus? ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 3:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/19 "2009-10-15T15:55:54Z")
> [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](#): > > Does the acquittal not constitute a preponderance of the evidence by itself, even if it’s bogus? No. And in many jurisidictions it probably wouldn’t even be admissible. ---
**Author:** ![Gfactor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/9de053/32.png) [@Gfactor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gfactor)\ **Post date:** [October 15, 2009, 4:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/full-faith-and-credit-re-expungement/513775/20 "2009-10-15T16:11:29Z")
> [@](#): > > Our research reveals that many jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether a prior acquittal or nol pros is admissible in a subsequent civil case involving the same operative facts. Almost without exception, when the acquittal is not an element of the civil claim, these jurisdictions prohibit admission of an acquittal or a nol pros in a later civil proceeding involving the same or similar underlying conduct. See, e.g., Rabon v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 306, 309 (4th Cir. 1987)(“We adopt and apply here the rule that a federal trial court commits reversible error when it permits the plaintiff in a suit for fire insurance proceeds to present evidence of his nonprosecution or acquittal on related criminal arson charges”); McSweeney v. Utica Fire Ins. Co. of Oneida County N.Y., 224 F.2d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1955) (applying South Carolina law and stating: “Since the burden of proof on the moving party to establish the crucial facts is heavier in a criminal than in a civil case, and there is a dissimilarity of parties, it has generally been held that an acquittal in a criminal case is not admissible in a civil action as evidence of the innocence of the accused.”); United States v. Burns, 103 F. Supp. 690, 691 (D. Md.) (In a case in which the insurance beneficiary was acquitted of murder of the insured, “records in criminal cases are not admissible in evidence in civil cases, although both [cases] arise from the same facts.”), aff’d, 200 F.2d 106 (4th Cir 1952); Morrison v. State, 267 Ala. 1, 100 So. 2d 744 (Ala. 1957)(“Verdicts in criminal cases are not admissible in civil cases arising out of the same transactions.”); Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 156 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Ark. 1941)(involving a case in which the insurance beneficiary was acquitted of killing the insured, and stating: “The record of the criminal cause is not competent evidence in the civil action.”); Carvajal v. Adams, 405 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 1981) (precluding evidence of prior acquittal on criminal charges arising out of the civil case), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1982); Eggers v. Phillips Hardware Co., 88 So. 2d 507, 507 (Fla. 1956)(concluding that testimony by police officers that they did not arrest the defendant for violation of traffic laws was not admissible because “evidence of defendant’s conviction or acquittal in a criminal proceeding is not admissible in a civil suit against the defendant arising out of the occurrence which formed the basis of the criminal charge against him” and evidence of an arrest is the first step towards disposition of a case); State v. Dubose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477, 481 (Fla. 1943)(“An acquittal in a criminal prosecution does not constitute evidence of innocence in a subsequent civil action based upon the alleged criminal act, and is not admissible in favor of the accused in a civil action to prove that he was not guilty of the crime with [\*\*169] which he was charged.”); C.L. Maddox, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 567 N.E.2d 749, 758, 153 Ill. Dec. 791 (“Evidence of an individual’s prior acquittal in an earlier criminal proceeding is inadmissible in a subsequent [\*\*\*20] civil action.”), appeal denied, 139 Ill. 2d 594, 575 N.E.2d 912, 159 Ill. Dec. 105 (Ill. 1991); State v. Roach, 83 Kan. 606, 611, 112 P. 150, 152 (Kan. 1910)(noting that, in an injunction action, evidence of a prior acquittal for selling intoxicating liquors was inadmissible because different standards of proof in criminal and civil trials make criminal verdicts inadmissible in a civil trial based on the same occurrence.); Billy’s Serv. v. American Ins. Co., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 641 N.E.2d 713, 713 (Mass. 1991) (“Evidence of an acquittal in a prior criminal trial is not admissible in a civil trial involving similar issues.”), review denied, 419 Mass. 1102, 646 N.E.2d 409 (Mass. 1995); Elliott v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 701 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. 1985) (Evidence of prior acquittal in criminal arson case not admissible in insured’s civil action against insurer to cover the loss because of “inherent differences” between civil and criminal trials); Penn. Turnpike Com. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1963)(“In the case of a judgment of acquittal or nolle prosequi, Pennsylvania has consistently [\*\*\*21] followed the rule that the criminal judgment is not admissible as evidence to prove that the defendant did not do the act complained of.”); Bobereski v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 105 Pa. Super 585, 161 A. 412, 415 (1932)(concluding that evidence of a nolle prosequi is inadmissible in a subsequent civil trial); Tennessee Odin Ins. Co. v. Dickey, 190 Tenn. 96, 228 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Tenn. 1950)(“‘The acquittal of the plaintiff upon an indictment … is not entitled to any effect as evidence in a civil action, as an answer to the defense of [the crime], or as tending to show, that, in fact, the plaintiff did not commit the [crime].’”); American General Fire and Cas. Co. v. McInnis Book Store, Inc., 860 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex. 1993)(“An acquittal in a criminal action is not ordinarily admissible evidence in a subsequent civil prosecution involving common fact issues.”); State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638, 641, 6 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 278 (Tex. 1963)(“Ordinarily, acquittals in criminal actions are not admissible as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings involving common fact issues.”); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 355 S.E. 2d 579, 582, 3 Va. Law Rep. 2345 (Va. 1987) (The trial court correctly excluded evidence concerning the disposition of the criminal maiming case in a subsequent civil suit to recover under the insurance policy.); Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 930 P.2d 382, 393 (Wyo. 1991)(“Evidence of an acquittal of criminal charges is not relevant in a subsequent civil trial relating to the same incident.”). _State Farm v. Carter_, 154 Md. App. 400; 840 A.2d 161; 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 187 (2003). 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