Gavrilo Princip and the Archduke

[carnivorousplant]

@Whack-a-Mole

That link does not work (for me at least).

Works for me, sorry.
It is a cartoon of the Kaiser watching Bismark leave a ship, as though he were dropping of the pilot of the ship of state.

[BrainGlutton]

@carnivorousplant

Works for me, sorry.
It is a cartoon of the Kaiser watching Bismark leave a ship, as though he were dropping of the pilot of the ship of state.

Stupid, stupid, stupid. Bismarck spent his whole career as Imperial Chancellor making sure that whenever Germany was on bad terms with France it would be on good terms with Russia, and vice-versa, because like any sensible German he wanted at all costs to avoid a two-front war. The Kaiser was not a sensible German.

[carnivorousplant]

@BrainGlutton

Stupid, stupid, stupid. Bismarck spent his whole career as Imperial Chancellor making sure that whenever Germany was on bad terms with France it would be on good terms with Russia, and vice-versa, because like any sensible German he wanted at all costs to avoid a two-front war. The Kaiser was not a sensible German.

Wilhelm was bat shit insane, to use a technical Psychological term.

[Guinastasia]

@Whack-a-Mole

That link does not work (for me at least).

Didn’t work for me, either. Here it is on wikipedia.

[VarlosZ]

@BrainGlutton

The terms actually were pretty harsh, weren’t they?

I’ve posted this before, but, to put the peace terms in context, this passage from Gerhard Weinberg’s (excellent) A World at Arms:

@Gerhard Weinberg

The terms of the peace settlement were attacked vehemently at the time and subsequently, and these attacks coincided with the general disillusionment about the new world which had emerged from the war and the peace among the former allies. There was a popular delusion, widespread at the time, sedulously fostered in the 1920s and 1930s by German propaganda, generally believed then and remaining the staple pabulum of history textbooks today, that Germany had been most terribly crushed by the peace settlement, that all manner of horrendous things had been done to her, and that a wide variety of onerous burdens and restrictions imposed upon her by the peace had weakened her into the indefinite future. On the basis of this view, a whole series of modifications was made in the settlement, all without exception in favor of Germany. The occupation was ended earlier than the peace treaty indicated, the commissions to supervise disarmament were withdrawn, the reparations payments were reduced and eventually cancelled, and the trials of war criminals were left to the Germans with predictable results, to mention only some of the most significant changes made. If at the end of this process, Germany – a bare quarter of a century after the armistice of 1918 – controlled most of Europe and had come within a hair’s breadth of conquering the globe, there was obviously something wrong with the picture generally accepted then and later.

The adoption of the national principle as the basis for peace settlement meant that the most recently created European major power, Germany, would survive the war, her population second in Europe only to Russia’s and her industrial and economic potential less affected than that of her European enemies, since it had been on the back of their, not Germany’s, economies that the war had been fought. Though weakened by the war, Germany had been weakened relatively less than her European enemies, and she had thus emerged relatively stronger potentially in 1919 than she had been in 1913. The same national principle, added to war-weariness, which had restrained the victors from using their armies to keep the new German apart, had equally restrained them from using their armies to refurbish the old or create some new larger structure in Central and Southeast Europe. The very portion of the peace treaty that all the Germans found most obnoxious, the revival of Poland, protected Germany from her potentially most powerful and dangerous adversary, Russia. The various argument over the details of the new boundaries between Hungary and Romania, between Poland and Czechoslovakia, between Bulgaria and Greece, between Austria and Yugoslavia, all only underline two facts of supreme importance: that Germany was now actually or potentially infinitely more powerful than any of her eastern and Southeastern European neighbors, and that there was practically no likelihood of those neighbors ever joining together against Germany.

The modifications introduced into the peace settlement reinforced rather than mitigated the stronger relative position of Germany. The prime example of this was the reparations question. The Germans shook off their reparations payments by simple refusal to pay, by destroying their own currency – in part to demonstrate inability to pay – and by more than off-setting what payments were made through borrowing abroad, followed by repudiation of most of these loans in the 1930s.

This process and the international public discussion of it fed an illusion of fateful significance. Because Germany did not pay reparations, it came to be widely believed that no or almost no reparations were paid at all. This, of course, is nonsense. All the reparations were paid: the devastated towns were rebuilt, the orchards replanted, the mines pumped out and all the pensions to survivors were paid (with some still being paid). This bill was simply shifted to other shoulders, primarily the very countries that had seen their economies suffer the most from the war. This shifting of the burden of repair costs from the less damaged German economy to the more damaged economies of others thus served to redouble rather than off-set the impact of the war itself. Only when a realistic perspective is restored to an examination of the peace settlement, its nature, its impact, and its modifications, can one begin to understand how a period of supposed German enfeeblement could culminate within less than two decades in a Europe, even a world, again terrified of German might.

It wasn’t quite “peace without victory,” but the terms were far more lenient than what Germany would have offered had she been victorious, and within 20 years Germany was again the most powerful country in Europe, so apparently Germany was not too badly mistreated after all.

[VarlosZ]

I’m actually reading John Keegan’s WWI history right now. He makes the point that, had Austri-Hungary simply acted immediately and unilaterally in dealing with Serbia (instead of dithering for a month with securing German support, issuing ultimatums, etc.), it’s unlikely that that conflict would have spread to the rest of Europe. Basically, none of the other powers (even Russia) would have cared enough to intervene, and of course Austria didn’t *need *any help to take care of Serbia militarily. He also suggests that Russia committed to full mobilization needlessly, and that a partial mobilization instead, too, would likely have avoided the World War.

(Not to say that a general war wouldn’t have been kicked off by some other crisis shortly thereafter, but it’s possible the war could have been avoided altogether with more time for circumstances to change.)

[carnivorousplant]

Didn’t Russia have a treaty with Serbia that required Russia to protect Serbia?

[Whack-a-Mole]

@VarlosZ

I’ve posted this before, but, to put the peace terms in context, this passage from Gerhard Weinberg’s (excellent) A World at Arms:

The Germans shook off their reparations payments by simple refusal to pay, by destroying their own currency – in part to demonstrate inability to pay – and by more than off-setting what payments were made through borrowing abroad, followed by repudiation of most of these loans in the 1930s.

Is he suggesting the Weimar Republic killed the Deutsche Mark to the tune of over 4 trillion Deutsche Marks per dollar in exchange rates?

If so that is some kind of brilliance I am not seeing.

[carnivorousplant]

@Whack-a-Mole

Is he suggesting the Weimar Republic killed the Deutsche Mark to the tune of over 4 trillion Deutsche Marks per dollar in exchange rates?

If so that is some kind of brilliance I am not seeing.

I had no idea it was that bad.

[Little_Nemo]

@carnivorousplant

Didn’t Russia have a treaty with Serbia that required Russia to protect Serbia?

I don’t think it was a formal treaty. But it was a diplomatic understanding. Russia had declared Serbia was under its protection.

Russia was pretty much obligated to intervene if Austria-Hungary attacked. Russia had already been humiliated by its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and the Annexation Crisis of 1908. The Russian government decided it could not afford to back down in the next crisis - it would have to fight to maintain its credibility as a great power.

[Freddy_the_Pig]

@Whack-a-Mole

Is he suggesting the Weimar Republic killed the Deutsche Mark to the tune of over 4 trillion Deutsche Marks per dollar in exchange rates?

I don’t understand your question. Of course Weimar killed the deutschemark. Who else could have done it?

Their motives can be debated. I personally think it had more to do with inflating away the wartime debt they owed to their own citizens, and with financing resistance to the Ruhr occupation, than with “demonstrating inability to pay”. But it can hardly be doubted that Weimar inflated the mark to zero, by printing trillions of them.

[Little_Nemo]

@Whack-a-Mole

Is he suggesting the Weimar Republic killed the Deutsche Mark to the tune of over 4 trillion Deutsche Marks per dollar in exchange rates?

If so that is some kind of brilliance I am not seeing.

The basic idea was that they would make a show of trying to comply with the reparations schedule. But they would do it in such a way it would wreck the German economy. That would be used as justification for the German claim that paying off the reparations was impossible. The theory was that the losses caused by hyperinflation would be less than the losses caused by paying off the reparations.

The theory didn’t really work. The hyperinflation turned out to be worse than expected and wrecked all public confidence in the government. This was a major factor in the rise of the Nazi party, which obviously had a negative effect on conditions in Germany and Europe. And in the end, Germany had to pay all the reparations anyway.

[Captain_Amazing]

@Little_Nemo

The basic idea was that they would make a show of trying to comply with the reparations schedule. But they would do it in such a way it would wreck the German economy. That would be used as justification for the German claim that paying off the reparations was impossible. The theory was that the losses caused by hyperinflation would be less than the losses caused by paying off the reparations.
.

That’s not entirely true. Really, it’s worth reading Adam Ferguson’s “When Money Dies” for the best explanation of the Weimar hyperinflation.

[eschereal]

If the Austro-Hungarians had moved decisively on Serbia, I can imagine they might have absorbed it within a month or two – far more quickly than Russia could have mobilized in its defense. How would they come to direct aid of an ally that no longer existed?

[carnivorousplant]

@eschereal

How would they come to direct aid of an ally that no longer existed?

The same way the Coalition of Good Guys came to the aid of Kuwait.

[Tamerlane]

@eschereal

If the Austro-Hungarians had moved decisively on Serbia, I can imagine they might have absorbed it within a month or two – far more quickly than Russia could have mobilized in its defense.

Maybe not. Although the Russian mobilization distracted parts of the Austrian 2nd army, the forces eventually launched at Serbia were not that much less than had originally been proposed and they ended getting a bloody nose. Assuming General Potiorek makes the same boneheaded blunder he eventually did for much the same reasons ( haughty overconfidence and rushing to get a quick victory ), he may have well ended up with the same shitty results.

Not that Serbia could have held on for long. But given the incompetence shown by the Austrian command in the first campaign, I wouldn’t assume a quick walkover either.

[Captain_Amazing]

Austria’s main problem with a quick mobilization was that most of its army was on harvest leave, meaning an attack into Serbia before they got back would have been difficult.

[lisiate]

@Captain_Amazing

That’s not entirely true. Really, it’s worth reading Adam Ferguson’s “When Money Dies” for the best explanation of the Weimar hyperinflation.

Which you can find in a pdf here

[eschereal]

Now I read that Woodrow Wilson’s entry of the US into the Great War contributed to the success of the Bolshevik revolution. This apparently comes from a book by Jim Powell, has anyone read this book? Is there anything to it, or is it, as one reviewer says, a screed? Because I find it hard to fathom how a case could be made for that.

[Little_Nemo]

@eschereal

Now I read that Woodrow Wilson’s entry of the US into the Great War contributed to the success of the Bolshevik revolution. This apparently comes from a book by Jim Powell, has anyone read this book? Is there anything to it, or is it, as one reviewer says, a screed? Because I find it hard to fathom how a case could be made for that.

Let’s just say Powell is a libertarian who tends to see history through a libertarian viewpoint.