At what point would he have become vexatious:eek:
The legal question is whether the language of the statute requires a prisoner who wins a monetary award against prison guards to deduct 25% from that award pay his attorney’s fees, or whether the district courts have discretion to determine the percentage, up to 25%, to be deduct from the award.
In the American legal system, the litigants pay their own attorney fees. Contrast this with other legal systems (e.g., the British system) where the losing party generally has to pay the winning party’s attorney fees. However, the American system contains some statutory exceptions to the American rule. For example, under the EAJA, private litigants who win a judgment against the government may recover attorney fees from the government if they can show the government was not substantially justified in defending its action in court. The statute at issue here is similar in that it allows prisoner plaintiffs who win a judgment against prison officials to obtain attorney fees from the defendant prison officials. However, the statute includes the language in dispute which requires (or allows courts discretion to determine, according to the plaintiff) that the attorneys fees be deducted from the monetary award the defendants were ordered to pay. The prison guards (along with the several states) are arguing that the statute requires a portion (25%) must be deducted from the award they have to pay plaintiff. The prisoner plaintiff, on the other hand, is arguing that the court has discretion to order the percentage, up to 25%, that must be deducted from the award to pay his attorney. The plaintiff, of course, would prefer this interpretation because it means he potentially gets to keep more of his award. That is, if the court orders that only 1% of the award must go to attorney fees, defendants would be on the hook for the remaining amount of attorney fees that must be paid to plaintiff’s attorney. The prison guard defendants would prefer the other interpretation because it means they potentially have to pay less in attorney fees.
Here’s a more detailed explanation of the issues:
The easiest way to get there is to find an issue that the federal circuit courts (the intermediate federal courts) have split on. For example, the federal circuits were split for years on whether a defendant’s silence prior to being given *Miranda *warnings could be used in the government’s case-in-chief, or only for impeachment purposes. SCOTUS takes up cases where there is a “circuit split” more frequently than other types.
This is a bit narrow. Appellate courts sometimes do serve as courts of second opinion; they do not address whether a trial court properly accepted some evidence over other evidence, but they do address whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the relevant burden of proof.
For example, Steve and Jeff testify in a civil case, and they disagree such that one or the other must be lying. Whether the trial court properly accepted Jeff’s testimony over Steve’s is not an appellate issue. However, if Jeff’s testimony did not establish a necessary fact, that is an appellate issue.
42 U.S. Code § 1997e(d)(2) reads:
Emphasis added.
So, according the the defendants, the court must (“shall”) apply a portion of the judgment to “satisfy” the award of attorney’s fees. The question is does “satisfying” the award of attorney’s fees mean “satisfy fully” or “satisfy a little”? A related question is whether “shall” means that the court shouldn’t have discretion.
Using your hypothetical where you win $100, assume your attorney’s fees are $20. The judge also orders the defendants to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. The defendants’ argument is that the judge must take the full $20 in attorney’s fees from your $100 award because that would fully satisfy the attorney’s fees and it’s less than the 25% of judgment cap.
If you won a $100 judgment and had $30 in attorney’s fees, the defendants would argue that the court must set aside $25 to satisfy the attorney’s fees, i.e, the full amount under the 25% cap.
The plaintiff’s argument is that the judge only has to award some amount, even $0.01, from the judgment to partially satisfy the attorney’s fee requirement, and can require the defendants to pay the rest of the attorney’s fees. This really is the same thing as saying that the judge may order attorney’s fees to be paid from up to 25% of the judgment. But if the statute was intended to just offer discretion to the judge, why does it say they judge “shall” do something rather than that the judge “may” do something?
It’s ambiguous drafting. Congress could clarify what they meant if they don’t like the court’s interpretation.
In theory, one can request US Supreme Court review from any decision where no other further appeal is available. Thompson v. City of Louisville originated from a conviction for disorderly conduct in the Police Court of Louisville, a court where the stakes were so insignificant that state law did not provide for any appeal to any court. Thompson’s lawyer thus sought review directly from the US Supreme Court, arguing that the conviction was constitutionally defective. The S.Ct. accepted the case and vacated the conviction.
The lawsuit wasn’t groundless, repetitive or harassing. He just told a lot more people about it than he needed to!
Was that a not-so-subtle hint to Kentucky to smarten up and create an appeal path?