Global Climate Change: Mitigation vs Adaption.

Okay, 50K sounds like a more reasonable number, but I still don’t understand how it can be applied in any reasonably rigorous way to an event 50 years in the future. Also, you again would have to apply a discount rate.

A quick digression: You expressed confusion about the discount rate, so let me give you a quick example. Let’s say we need to pay off a 1 trillion dollar insurance claim in 2109. We know that bill is coming. How much money would it cost us today to eliminate that liability? Well, if we earned 3% on our money, we could take out a 100 year T-Bill for $47 million dollars (if such a thing existed), and in 100 years, it would be worth a trillion bucks. So 47 million is the net present value of a 100 trillion liability owed 100 years from now. It’s absolutely critical to factor this in to any activities today that have payoffs in the future.

We have absolutely no idea what kind of effects these would be. For all we know, global efforts to mitigate damage could bring people closer together and improve the geopolitical situation. And for that matter, if you want to include that, we’ll have to include the costs today of geopolitical instability introduced by driving up energy prices and attempting to enforce climate treaties. So I’d suggest we just ignore this.

Another completely unquantifiable effect. And you’d have to consider the opportunity cost of diverting resources to those things instead of all the other things we could be doing.

I completely reject this line of thinking. The notion that you can increase economic efficiency and create economic growth through government spending is flawed, in my opinion. Every dollar the government spends is a dollar that is taxed or borrowed from the larger economy.

You can’t even make a ‘stimulus’ argument, since the debt will have to be paid back during the timeframe in question. The only way you can make the claim that government ‘investment’ will create net economic growth is if you believe that governments are better at allocating goods and services than is the market. And every history we have of government planning suggests that the opposite is true.

So again, to avoid this turning into a partisan slinging match, I suggest that this whole line of thinking be dropped.

Going forward, I suggest we focus on the following things:

  1. Come to an agreement on the discount rate. This is not going to be a trivial exercise, but we can start by figuring out the low end and high end of current estimates. Stern’s .1 % is clearly the low end, On the high end, the OMB used a rate much higher rate of 10% when calculating the present value of future lives saved. It uses this to do cost-benefit analysis of regulatory costs such as drug trials and social costs such as that of cigarette smoking. This was challenged in court and lowered to 7%. Here’s a legal brief that I believe was used to argue for a lower discount rate for human life of around 1%.

Really, there are two different discount rates we should use. One would be the discount rate against future economic damage. That I think is more straightforward - simply use the average funds rate for economic investment. The other is the ‘social discount rate’ of lives lost or quality of life in the future, and this one is much, much harder to figure out because it involves issues of philosophy and non-economic factors. One paper I read argued that you could use the current savings rates, which indicate the real preference of people for quality of life in the future vs quality of life now. I think that’s specious reasoning. I did a little scanning of the some of the literature around this, and as best I can tell most estimates fall in the range of 1% to 3%.

  1. If we can agree on that, then let’s look at the IPCCs estimates for future warming and economic damage and work the cost of the median, then work the cost of the high and low models and come up with some kind of average number. Hopefully, we can separate out economic effects from costs in terms of lives, so we can apply our different discount rates to each.

  2. Apply the discount rates, and see what we come up with for the net present value of a ton of carbon, which should tell us how drastic the solution needs to be.
    Anyway, that’s the way I’d approach the problem. If we can get that far in the debate, then we can move on to discussing how to actually implement some kind of plan to slow down warming. From this point, we’d then have to start all over on the cost side by looking at the costs of various solutions, and how much warming each one could prevent, to determine if it’s worth doing.

There is a certain irony here in coming up with a discount rate given intention’s discussion of the survey of experts’ risk assessment study. Boy, ranges vary from 0.1 to 10% and all points in between. We’ve seen returns on “secure” investments vary through recent history between those numbers and into net losses, in which case we’d be using a net negative discount rate. You’d would also need to factor in inflation wouldn’t you? More unknowns than the climate predictions and even less inclusion of the error bars!

As to how to apply the economic value of a statistcal human life, well the same as any other economic cost.

We have a fairly good idea of how to predict what the effects of refugee populations without much education or training have on regional geopolitical stability. Nature and war have provided us with quite a few test case, both internationally due to floods, famine, hurricanes, and wars, and even domestically. (Think Katrina. Even domestically with relatively small numbers from the POV of these analyses there were consequences to the stability of cities that received large “refugee” populations.) This can be modeled based on these experiences with real data.

I would not ignore the effects of rising energy prices in the calculations just because they are difficult to predict. Neither would I ignore trying to quantify the benefit of anticipatory adaptation. They may be difficult to do. I may not personally have the expertise to do them. But they are quantifiable with reasonable educated assumptions as debated as each assumption might be.

As far as cost of opportunity lost, well that is why I specifically phrased this as I did. The problem assumes a fixed available investment for dealing with global climate change in the present day. It specifically asks about how to balance the spending of that hypothetical money between the marginal mitigation efforts (trying to prevent the climate change) vs on preparatory adaptation efforts. I noted that some spending could indeed serve both purposes simultaneously (such as investments designed to facilitate energy efficient water management including but not limited to desal technology). Thinking about it, that set up somewhat diminishes the importance of discounting as it applies to each investment similarly. (Different only to the degree that infrastructure and lives may be subject to different discounting values.)

Duly noted that you reject any stimulatory effects. Some of course do not reject it. For the purposes of this exercise however the important bit is merely if X amount of spending would have significantly different stimulatory effects if spent on mitigation vs adaptation. (Or decreased harm to your POV I guess.) You are free to compare it to the option of investing it somehow in the equivalent of T-bills if you wish, but it is not part of the set up asked.

A small illustration of the kind of investment that makes the most sense: (article behind Science’s subscription wall, sorry)

To put this in context:

Let me highlight a critical part of that. Agriculture consumes 70% of the water people use. Much of the world has been experiencing an increased frequency of droughts and climate change is expected to increase that situation fairly quickly. Meanwhile improvements in plant genetics usually take decades. Richards has been at it for decades. Water takes energy to produce and to transport especially in a time of shortage. Currentlydesal’s state of the art is very expensive from an energy POV.

The time to develop the adaptations to deal with drought in agriculture is now and in a concerted effort. Just as Richards scoured the wheat seed bank to find the raw material to develop his new drought tolerant hybrids, so should the complete bank of native African crops be scoured for raw material to develop a tool box of new hybrids that can tolerate the coming conditions without irrigation and during drought conditions. The technology do desal with less CO2 emission and less expense needs research support before the need is critical as well.

We might not succeed in stopping the proverbial 40 days and nights of rain and you can’t build an ark after you’ve begun to flood. Some key investments require advance planning.

Actually, I think Africa would have the least adaptation to do, with regard to GCC. Yes, it will affect the continent severely with desertification etc., but Africa isn’t, on the whole, industrialised, car-dependent, or likely to be as heavily-affected by rising sea levels as Asia, Western Europe or the US East Coast.

Really good and interesting discussion you all are having. I just wanted to clarify one point regarding the net present value examples given by Sam Stone, so that no one else is confused.

Did anyone else read this and think, “Golly, wouldja look at the magic of compound interest! That means that if I invest $4700 today, then in a mere hundred years my great-grandchildren will be billionaires!” That’s what I thought, until I realized that Sam is off by a factor of 1000. All of the millions above should be billions. When we’re talking about the price of averting a future catastrophe, this is not small change. I know it’s only an example, but people could get the wrong idea about the magnitude of the effect of discounting.

This assumes, of course, that you’re using the standard American meanings of million, billion, etc. and not some wacky UK system where a trillion is equal to 10^18 hogsheads.

I want to bank where you’re banking!