I see you are again beset on all sides, Lib. I won’t join in the dance of the MOAPG this time, but merely sit by the mirrored wall while you teach the steps to the class, joining me only when you get chance. (However, if you find time to explain why a “Being” is granted Supremacy (and therefore NE) rather than some other entity, I would be grateful.)
I will concentrate on your contention that the universe is contingent.
First you suggested that the universe was contingent on energy. Now you ask whether it is contingent on spacetime. You also appear to stipulate that any explanation I give be supported somehow by direct observation.
Other than directing you to a previous thread (which you contributed to), I’m afraid that before embarking on further explanation, I must ask you to supply me with a little more focus: Why do you believe that the universe is contingent on spacetime? Is God contingent on goodness, consciousness or any other of its supposed characteristics?
Bizarre idea. One can imagine a universe without energy. It is, if you like, modally possible.
The inferences are sound, this:
is not. The thing G in the above is the “all good god” of Christianity. He combines every positive quality. He is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, omnibenevelent. These qualities cannot be sensibly combined in our brutal, violent universe. The object G does not exist.
I’ve been thinking about the competing proofs some more. Libertarian and I offer proofs that differ only by one initial premise:
Libertarian’s Premise #2: <>G … “It’s possible that God exists.”
Pochacco’s Premise #2: <>~G … “It’s possible that God doesn’t exist.”
(Libertarian has attempted to dismiss my Premise #2. But he can do so only by asserting G … which is the thing he’s trying to prove. I can just as easily dismiss his Premise #2 by asserting ~G.)
Given that the proofs are otherwise identical, we can use them to deduce:
Libertarian: <>G -> G … “If it’s possible for God to exist, He does.”
-and-
Pochacco: <>~G -> ~G … “If it’s possible for God not to exist, He doesn’t.”
Perhaps someone with a better knowledge of modal logic than I could help me here. Under S5, aren’t <>G and <>~G equivalent? It seems like they should be.
Then consider this:
Axiom: <>G = <>~G
L: <>G -> G
P: <>~G -> ~G
<>G -> ~G … substitution of axiom into P
<>G -> G & ~G
“If it’s possible for God to exist then God exists and God doesn’t exist.”
Whoops! Logical contradiction.
I think what we’re seeing here is similar to a “divide by zero” error, a place where the result of an operation is undefined. An interesting logical cul-de-sac, but hardly proof of a Supreme Being.
And Hawking DEFINITELY exists, god’s existence is, apparently, in some doubt (or we wouldn’t be having this discussion). I’ll leave it to the reader to say who is “greater”.
In any case I don’t see any reason for preferring <>G over <>~G as a premise.
In fact, one could argue that the lack of physical evidence for G is a good reason to prefer <>~G over <>G. Occam’s Razor. If there is no evidence for an entity, it’s reasonable to doubt its existence.
You raised a couple more points of objection on my end. I think some have been addressed already. One point is the hyperdimensionality of God. If you’re adding dimensions numerically, you’re still going to have to face the problem of infinite regress.
Another point of contention is talking about “multiple universes where the laws are different”. “Multiple universe” is self refuting. And even if it wasn’t, what does it mean to suggest the existence of laws where a being can think but not exist? Or that something comes from nothing at all. These are phenomenon that must interact with the other universes – you can’t seperate a universe where something comes from nothing at all from one that doesn’t, if you contend that they both exist. This goes back to my point on undecidability - which is what “something from nothing” at all is. In declaring it, assenting to such a necessity, you’re effectively assenting to an aspect of existence that acts as a backdoor that’s always able to refute the stability of your own claim… as it’s non-deterministic. This renders the purpose for stating the claims necessity as self refuting.
Logic is a tool used to model reality. No model is a perfect representation of reality. If a model ever became perfect, almost by definition it would cease being a model and actually be a reality. Reality reserves the right to behave in ways not accurately predicted by models. Once you’ve finished up answering all the questions put to you already, if you would kindly prove that the logical framework known as S5 is an inerringly accurate model of reality. It should be noted that even breaking logical models down into just those which use modal logic still presents a very broad range of possible models. In a great many of these models your proof doesn’t work. When asserting that this proof would be a death blow to existentialism you are implicitly asserting that S5 is an inerringly accurate model of reality.
Assertions based on models, as yours is, are far less convincing(IMO at least) than assertions based on reality. You can’t beat something with nothing.
You misunderstood my statement. The adverb modified “exists”.
One, it was not a boolean algebra exercise, and two, the link was for Supreme Being, not supreme being. You read the wrong definition.
I challenge you to show that that is the case. Suppose it were possible for some entity to be a Supreme Being, but not a necessary being. If that were the case, then there would exist a necessary being (your snowblower, for example) and a Supreme Being. Since a necessary being IS a Supreme Being, we would have two Supreme Beings, which is impossible.
I didn’t take anything as a given. As you yourself imply, I showed steps. What you need to do is show the steps that justify your premise that necessary existence need not exist.
That’s nonsense. The proof couldn’t be more transparent.
I don’t know what you mean by the object of the proof. The *conclusion * of the proof is not G, but G. Unless you are defining God in some other way, step 9 of your proof is absurd. It is like reaching an inference about a bachelor’s wife.
Proofs don’t boil down. To borrow from you, your handwaving does not constitute a rebuttal.
Actually, as I stated more than once in the OP, I had hoped to discuss existence as a predicate. Hartshorne’s MOP was for reference in discussing Kant’s objection to Anselm’s argument.
No. Not unless you define Socrates as comprising all possible existence.
Yes, I think it is. These are analogies, not precise models. The legs represent perceptions of the being, not cross-sections of it. The being’s essence is transcendental, since it cannot not exist.
That’s a rather remarkable thing to say. If scoffing were spit, I’d be drowning here. I believe I made a legitimate demand. If the universe is contingent on nothing, then it is not contingent on any of the laws of physics. That makes postulating the universe as necessary existence untenable given the modus tollens of that statement.
Actually, there are contexts with the *known * universe in which all bets are off. The mathematical singularity that describes the center of a black hole, for example, is an undefined solution.
I don’t know of any deductive proof that does not have undefined terms. Peano’s proof that 1 + 1 = 2 used several undefined terms, including “successor”.
No, it doesn’t.
I did not make that statement. But keep in mind here that we are talking about metaphysical greatness, not epistemic greatness. The MOP uses a metaphysical modality. As Kant put it:
“The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence. It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things - in other words, in that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary.” — Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
I don’t understand either clause of that statement.
Well, reductio ad absurdum usually means a process of refutation by which you assume the opposite of your hypothesis and work toward a contradiction. I say usually, because Russell and Whitehead defined it as a logical wff: (~p -> p) -> p, but that strikes most people as just a bit weird. At any rate, whether the same argument can be used for the IPU depends on how you define IPU. If you define IPU as necessary existence, then you’re just using another word for God.
When?
It ought to be discarded for *every * purpose save one: the inspection of modality. But to discard it for that purpose is rather myopic.
I don’t know what you mean by “close”, but there is no ethical implication to be taken from an ontological argument. Sentient
Well, that’s what a being does — it be. That is, it exists.
Well, I do believe that the universe is contingent on energy. I’ve seen nothing to convince me that even the concept of a universe without energy is coherent. Perhaps a universe with energy that has no capacity to do work, but not a universe without energy period. But the reason that I demand empirical evidence is that the universe is observable empirically. If a man says that so-and-so is in a book, then the way for him to prove it is to show you the book, assuming you have eyes.
The universe is contingent on spacetime (and energy, for that matter) for the same reason that an ocean is contingent on water. God, however, is contingent on nothing because He exists in all possible worlds — that is, He cannot not exist.
Epistemically, perhaps, but so what? Epistemically, it is possible that the square root of 100 is 40. But can you describe a universe without energy metaphysically? I can’t.
I have no idea why you feel the need to bring all that baggage to the argument when none of it is intrinsic to it. And the object G does exist, as has been proved.
No. G is merely one inference in the tableau. What he proved was G.
Define your G. I defined mine, and ~G -> ~(G), which is ridiculous.
Technically speaking, an argument is 5-valid if and only if it is valid for every non empty set of W (possible worlds). The definition of <> is taken from , as ~~. Therefore, <>~ would be ~~~, or simply ~. Hence, they are not identical. The statement, “God possibly does not exist” is equivalent to the statement “It is not necessary that God exists”. The statement “God posssibly exists” is equivalent to the statement “It is not necessary that God does not exist”. In other words, “~” is K-valid but not 5-valid.
Neither of those implications is tenable.
That’s exactly right. And of course, by the RN, one or the other obtains, since G -> G.
You seem to have a fine grasp of Anselm’s argument, but you shortchanged Hartshorne’s just a bit.
Well, I can prove that necessary existence is true in S5, if that helps.
Definitions:
Let A = “for every”
Let E = “there exists”
We need to show that the open modal formula Ey(y = x) is true for every interpretation.
Just as you need to show the steps that it might exist. You can’t just handwave and say “Well, it’s obvious!” It doesn’t seem at all obvious to me that necessary existence must exist. Prove it.
Here’s your definition of necessary existence:
G->G
Please show me the logical operations that you used to derive
~~G
from that definition. Otherwise you’re just dancing in air.
I repeat, your contention that the premise ~G is “primae facie absurd” is can be represented thus:
~(~G)
This is the same as asserting:
G … “God must exist.”
That’s an awfully strong claim. One that I’m not will to accept without some proof … .
I mean, if you feel comfortable just asserting G without proof, why bother with all 10 steps in your original proof? Just use the simpler proof:
G … “God must exist.”
G … “God exists.”
I agree. My competing proof equally transparent. It’s now incumbent on you to demonstrate why the premise
<>G
is intuitively obvious, while the alternate premise
<>~G
is “primae facie absurd”.
I fail to see any absurdity. I never assert G, so arriving at ~G in the 9th step doesn’t violate any rules of logic. I’ve used your definition of God. The only difference in our two proofs is the second premise. You either need to rigorously prove that your second premise is supported by your definition of God (while mine is not) or surrender the field.
I’m not rebutting your proof. Your proof is perfectly valid, given its premises. As is mine. Now you need to prove why your premises are supported are mine are not.
You have proved God exists. Using the same tools I have proved that He doesn’t. You must either show the flaw in my reasoning, or admit that the tools you’re using are inadequate to the task at hand.
I do see Modal logic as valid, but it does not follow that God comes from it
More obvious it could not be:
Modal logic like, flat land, belongs to a different universe. Even being generous and accepting that a god can be proven in that logical contraption, (and there are problems with that assumption) the reality remains: like flatland, modal logic does not give us the god that our ancestors thought it was out there or that it could interact with us.
Is that a typo, or is my browser being exceptionally stupid, or am I being obtuse? From where I’m sitting “G” is a statement not a definition.
I think I know what you meant to write, but I’ve learnt that guessing only makes the discussion harder. If you’ll just clear this up, we can get back to what you wanted to debate.
Thanks. (Apologies if I missed this being addressed before now, I didn’t spot it…)
It might be equally said that energy is contingent on the universe it exists in. It is harder to conceive of energy existing outside of spacetime than a spacetime with no energy. Personally I believe that spacetime and mass/energy are at some deep level the same thing. I do not see that it is necessary for one to be said to be contingent on the other. They could simply be different manifestations of the same thing. But metaphysically I believe we can imagine a universe with nothing in it just as we can imagine one with no life in it.
I’m not the one who brought the baggage in. If you will look down you’ll see that you are the one holding the claim check for those bags. You have defined G as necessarily existing in all possible worlds (G). You have then attached the attributes of the traditional God of the three monotheistic religions, attributes which include but are not limited to those I enumerated above. These attributes are what makes the concept incoherent. This is basically what turns G into something analogous to “the set of all sets that are not members of themselves”. It’s something we can think about and make statements about but that remains nonsensical.
If you strip away the theological baggage you can keep axiom 2 but axiom 1 : G->G is in danger. This is “God’s existence would imply his existence in all possible worlds”. This only makes sense with the idea of the god who is all powerful and all-surpassing. But that makes no sense in the face of an arbitrary and evil universe full of suffering.
So everything which exists is a being, agreed? If so, such language is a little ambiguous: I would suggest thing or entity as words which are general enough in scope to accomodate such a meaning. “Being” (eg. human being, extraterrestrial being etc.) very definitely alludes to some kind of sentience or personhood, and if such quaint anthropomorphism is not supposed to be implied then can we, at the very least, proceed by calling God an it rather than a He?
Not all aspects of the universe are observable empirically. Indeed, “other universes” (and I personally prefer the term “other regions of the universe having different characteristics to this part”) may very well be both theoretically and practically impossible to observe directly. However, I already admitted that the “multiverse” was still in the mystical realm of faith & maths in the previous thread, and this is to get off the point.
You contend that the universe is contingent but God is not.
I contend that the universe is contingent on nothing because it exists in all possible worlds. The universe cannot not exist. God, OTOH, is contingent on Love in the same way that an ocean is contingent on water.
You think materialism is mystical. I think anthropomorphism is mystifying.
Is there any way to stop this carousel before it makes us nauseous?
Finally Lib, I did promise to minimise the crosstalk here for your convenience, but I couldn’t ignore this:
Are you not using “God” as just another word for NE?
I think “Being” is a gerund here, but I’ll be happy to call it anything you wish, including X14-87J so long as we understand that when we say X14-87J what we mean is an entity that is ontologically perfect. I really don’t understand why the point is important. Why be so terrified of a term? Why not use a term that is sensibly derived? Necessity is ontological supremacy, and existence is beingness. Necessary -> Supreme : Existence -> Being.
But you just asserted that not all aspects of the universe are observable. If that is the case, how do you know that it comprises all possible worlds? In other words, you have no epistemic basis to claim that what you cannot observe (which you say exists) is even part of the universe at all.
I think you meant that God is contingent on goodness, rather than love, but even so it is the other way around. Without God’s existence, goodness would have no aesthetic value. And there would be no mechanism for its facilitation.
Ontologically, yes. Others
But a universe with nothing in it is, well, nothing.
G implies nothing whatsoever about those traditional attributes. Whether such attributes comprise a coherent concept is so far removed from the debate as to constitute a red herring.
That depends on how you define evil and whether it in fact exists. Light exists, but does darkness? Heat exists, but does cold? Evil may be defined as merely the absence of goodness, and sin as the obstruction of goodness. If man is a free moral agent, then sin is his own doing. Why blame the maid for your house being messy when you won’t even let her in the door?
If it were a premise or an inference, it would be a logical statement. But when stated as a definition, it merely identifies God as that which exists necessarily. Consider, for example, Euclid’s third definition in Elements: “The ends of a line are points.” That is indeed a statement, but its purpose is to define a line.
That’s rather amphibolous. No one is suggesting that God comes from modal logic. Do you believe that right triangles come from the Pythagorean theorem?
No one is suggesting that it does. All the MOP speaks to is the modality of His existence. Nothing more.
You should see others from there as well, like “In the literature, there has been great resistance to the idea that the argument which Anselm gives is one which modern logicians would not hesitate to pronounce invalid. But it is very hard to see why there should be this resistance.”
That page, incidentally, is criticizing the success with which various versions of the MOP have rendered Anselm’s original. The criticism focuses on what the authors have added to or taken from the OA. Note especially that it does not criticize Plantinga’s MOP at all, and it is derived directly from Hartshorne’s.
It is not a criticism of an argument per se to assert that it does not change someone’s mind. When a man rejects the conclusion of an argument whose premises are acceptable and whose inferences all follow logically from one another, then the man is either intellectually ignorant or intellectually dishonest. Just like creationist scientists, he will grasp at any straw to contradict a conclusion that he does not like.
That’s not my definition of God. It is a conditional implication that may be taken inductively from the definition of God. Because it is inductively derived, it is stated as an axiom, or premise.
The Law of Substitution for the predicate calculus. If I define X as .99999…, then I may write 10X - X = 9.99999… - .99999…, since X and .99999… are identified as equivalent. The definition of God (G) is G.
I just did, at the very end of the post before yours.
An empty spacetime in the shape of, say, a hypertoroid is different from an empty spacetime in the shape of a hypersphere. Both differ from “nothing”. How can “nothings” be differentiable.
It is not a red herring. It is absolutely central to the debate. If G has no such traditional attributes then your “God” cannot be differentiated from the universe, primal energy, the “ground of being” or the callous deist clockmaker god. These might be interesting concepts but they all lead to practical atheism. Why bother.
The old Christian apologist’s “man fucked up why blame god”. I won’t even bother with this.
