God, and existence as a predicate

[Liberal]

Friend

I didn’t assume ~G v ~~G , I only assumed ~G. “It is necessary that God does not exist.” How can that be self-contradictory?

I just plugged your premise into the proof, substituting it in place of mine as you suggested. Then, I worked through the predicate calculus until the conclusion. The conclusion was identical to your premise. The step you quoted, ~G v ~~G is just an excluded middle — either it is the case that it is necessary that God does not exist or else it is not the case that it is necessary that God does not exist. A or Not A. It is self-contradictory because it states that a being defined as existing necessarily necessarily does not exist. That is the nature of contradictions and tautologies: contradictions prove everything, and tautologies are proved by everything.

Well, if we’re going to start asking for definitions of everything, how about definitions of “free”, “moral”, “agent”? You can play that game till the cows come home…

No, that’s a game that I definitely don’t play. I’m on record many times over condemning the practice of demanding circular definitions. But I wasn’t asking you for a definition of everything, merely a definition of what you said existed that disproved God’s existence. That seems rather critical, doesn’t it? What I did was give you a definition that does not require Her nonexistence for evil to exist.

No, it’s not. My argument was “A implies B, B is false, therefore A is false.” A= God exists, B= God reveals self. The fallacy you refer to is of the form “A implies B, A is false, therefore B is false.” My argument is valid (I don’t know it’s latin name, I’m sure you do), the second form is not.

It’s a modus tollens, and you’re right. I misread your statement, and I apologize. But it still isn’t clear why something that exists must make its presence known to everyone. Do electrons exist? Many people are completely ignorant of them. Ontological significance does not require epistemological verification. Were that not the case, science would be wasting its time since if there is anything we don’t already know, it cannot exist.

Well, this is part of the point I’m trying to make. What sort of “possible worlds” are we talking about? In modal logic, it makes a difference. Who is going to decide which possible worlds are metaphysical possibilities?

A possible world is a world with at least one true statement. A possibility is metaphysical (as opposed to epistemic) if it makes an ontological commitment. For example, “it is possible for it to rain” is a metaphysical possibility, but “it is possible that it is raining” is an epistemic possibility.

Indeed, on looking over the thread again I see you have been doing just that. My apologies.

Thanks. No problem.

One more point: I admit I don’t understand “necessary existence”. In an earlier post you implied that someone’s snowblower existed necessarily. Really? My snowblower exists in all metaphysically possible worlds? I find that hard to believe. My snowblower didn’t even exist ten years ago. Is the world of ten years ago not metaphysically possible?

Well, his snowblower existed necessarily because what he did was call necessary existence his snowblower. It’s similar to the XJ-14 thing that Steven wants me to call God. In logic, there is a difference between A and “A”. The former is a thing; the latter is a statement about the thing. There is a difference between a thing and its label. You may call necessary existence God, Dieux, Deo, snowblower, or XJ-14. It’s just like the difference between the number 2 and the numeral “2”. The latter merely denotes the former. You can call the number 2 Two, Shackrack, or Nodsbocket. But if what you mean is 2, then what you mean is 2. With necessary existence, same same.

It would help me a lot if you could give some examples of things that exist necessarily.

Metaphysically speaking, there is only one. That’s because there can be only one. And we’ve been discussing it in quite some detail. Epistemically, it is a different matter. Any tautology is necessarily true.

[GIGObuster]

@Libertarian

Gigo

You and Steven are pretty much echoing each other. Some people find God to be relevant, significant, and useful. Still, I doubt if you will apply your principle of practicality evenly and acknowledge that the result of the MOP, God’s actual existence, extends to the real world and real lives of billions of people. Some people don’t even like God. Some don’t care. And everything in between. Just as with Mount Everest, interactions and ramifications differ. But truth has nothing to do with being practical — what is practical depends on what you’re practicing. I don’t find my wife’s bras to be practical, but she does. Either way, they exist.

Actually, compared to “The God”, bras have a better track of showing themselves to man, it just depends on the woman I suppose.

Once again, I have to repeat that see modal logic as valid. However, adding an specific god to it, as in the OP, is not convincing since you depend on too many “ifs” to make it so.

“There is already a contradiction in introducing the concept of existence – no matter under what title it may be disguised – into the concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking of solely in reference to its possibility. If that be allowed as legitimate, a seeming victory has been won; but in actual fact nothing at all had been said: the assertion is a mere tautology." - Kant

I have my own suspicions on the nature of god; I don’t need to base a belief in his existence on what -in hindsight- is really a terrible way to constrict god.

[Liberal]

I don’t need it either. It’s just one tool in the box. Still, I find the assertion that necessary existence is in any way limiting to be … just bizarre. With due respect to the self-appointedly infallible Mr. Kant, he failed to consider existence as an expression of bounds, with all existence contingent upon that which is necessary.

Note

My wife and I are going in for LASIK surgery this morning. Best case: I can post tomorrow or this weekend. Worst case: I can never post again. Likely case: Sometime next week.

Speaking of modalities…

[Anduril]

One question, Libertarian: How does this show that <>~G is a flawed premise? Can you clarify it for someone who’s not well versed in Modal Logic?

[Liberal]

It’s a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition. In other words, it’s like saying, “It is possible that a glass full of water is empty”.

[Anduril]

@Libertarian

It’s a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition. In other words, it’s like saying, “It is possible that a glass full of water is empty”.

If that’s the case, wouldn’t it mean that the conclusion is already in the premise? If one cannot even raise the possibility of God not existing, how could one arrive at a conclusion that denies God’s existence? If your assessment is correct, isn’t it fair to say that the method is slanted against any attempt towards proving God’s non-existence?

Is the falsifiability criteria relevant here?