I think part of the confusion in this debate is that air superiority is not an on/off switch. One can have ‘partial’ air superiority.
True air superiority examples would be D-Day June 1944 (though the Allies planned for only partial), early in the German invasion of the Soviet Union (1941), Any U.S. conflict after Korea. However, having partial air superiority is not the same as total in that you are still being contested though you still tend to have the upper hand.
Stalingrad and Korea after the Chinese came in were, IMHO, partial, not total.
I have noticed this strange thread of “inevitability”, always and everywhere from people who have in no way studied the events. It was not inevitable. Nothing is inevitable except possibly the heat death of the universe. And even in the ordinary human course of events, South Vietnam was more than holding is own against N-V in the period between U.S. withdrawal and the withdrawal of support (which happened well after the former). It had not lost territory and had built up its political support.
South Vietnam had the messyness of a young semi-democracy. However, It did not face any significant internal betrayal (as the N-V guerrilla/infiltrators had largely been shut down). More to the point, the silly leftist myth of a united N-V was absolute nonsense. They obtained an retained power through the brutal use of repression and force, combined with extreme nationalism.
As I have pointed out, we did achieve our war aims. The war was success to the limited degree the military was allowed to fight it. I do not say that events would have intrinsically gone easier had they pushed into N-V territory to conquer - t might well have been worse. But just as North Korea was kept viable only by the massive support of Russia and China, so was N-V.
Simply put, while there is a rational argument S-V would not have survived, it is a an unintellectual myth that it could not, or even that the odds were obviously stacked against it. This concept relies on a hazy and leftist-myopic narcissistic view of events.
I think a lot of people are missing the spirit of the OP’s question. The way I interpret the OP’s question, he wants to know if a nation has suffered a TACTICAL defeat in a major battle despite having air superiority. He is not interested in the ultimate outcome of the war itself.
For example, the Battle of Hue or Khe Sanh are specific battles in the Vietnam War.
And specific to the OP’s question, the French had air supperiority at Dien Bien Phu, however they suffered a huge tactical and strategic defeat.
My point was that closing the air gap wouldn’t have meant nearly as much if the planes didn’t have radar, which was only just coming into use. Had effective airplane-based radar not been developed for two years, or snorkels come into use two years earlier, the outcome might have been very different, even after the air gap was closed.
It depends what you mean by “complete air superiority”. I just finished reading “Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu” by Bernard Fall. The French certainly had air superiority in the sense that they had planes in the air and the Viets did not. However, it ends right about there.
The French didn’t have enough planes. The planes they did have had to fly from too far away. The weather often boxed DBP in. And most of all the Viets had very good anti-aircraft defences, which were essentially winning the battle of the skies, albeit not from the skies.
I’m really not sure that all amounts to “complete air superiority”.
Again, how about the battle of Kasserine Pass? (North Africa 1943, Rommel defeats U.S. forces). Not sure if the Allies had complete air superiority or just the upper hand; what’s the verdict?
I think you could say Allies had total superiority at MarketGarden…though I could be wrong. So I think that is a contender.
Korea 1950…I’m still not convinced Allies had total air superiority…while the Allies had partial control I think there was some serious contention.
Dien Bien Phu is another contender IMO.
Kasserine Pass? I don’t know…while the Allies had partial, I don’t think it was total. I think the Allies had some issues with forward airbases and so didn’t have a large presence. I do remember reading that the Germans used Stukas at Kasserine…so pretty sure it wasn’t total air superiority.
While people bring up total conflicts like U.S. in Vietnam and Russia in Afganistan…I think the OP is after battles.
Dien Bien Phu counts. To me Total Air Superiority means versus enemy air. AA defense…IMO shouldn’t matter. If you have air superiorty but the enemy has huge AA defenses then that is part of the ground forces fighting it off.
If we omit 1-sided air dominance where the enemy has good AA defenses as not being ‘air superiority’ I think this is being unfair to the ground pounders. If you wish to define ‘total air superiority’ as can also bomb and straffe ground forces with inpunity that will eliminate most/all the contenders.
I thought before I scrolled down that Korea might not count, given that air superiority only existed by day and the Chinese moved about so much at night.
It is arguable that the Germans had air superiority at the Battle of Verdun, but didn’t win (if there was a winner in that butchery). However, that probably demonstrates ground attack was far less effective than in later wars.
I’d forgotten about Debrecen. Happened about the same time as MarketGarden IIRC and was part of the ‘September miracle’ IIRC.
I’m not sure if Soviets had total air superiority. The Germans, while not being able to contest all that much on the Eastern front in late 44 could contest, get parity or even partial air superiority over small sections of the front when they wanted to…and they did this often.
Debrecen, IIRC happened when Romania switched sides and so the Soviets were way beyond their logistics but tried anyway. I don’t know about air in this battle but my hunch is that this battle was one fought without a huge input from air.
The Fench had total air superiority. The problem was, the strategic genius (Gen. Navarre) had decided to place his force in a valley surrounded by high hills (which he didn’t occupy). The VietMinh then moved in heavy artillery, and kept blasting away at the French garrison. French air support wasn’t of much use, then.
I guess locating your force where it was easily trapped, and could not be resupplied was a stroke of genius! And (of course) NOT HAVING A RETREAT/ESCAPE OPTION MUST ALSO BE COUNTED AS EXCELLENT GENERALSHIP!
Well…to be fair he did that to provoke the Vietnamese to attack. He wanted a battle. It probably wasn’t a bad plan except…for well…you know…ACTUALLY FIGHTING IT. What a moron.
The U.S. did something similar at Khe San (sp?)…except the Americans had the firepower to actually do it plus actually fought the battle rather then act like a dim 6 year old that the French acted like at Dien.