Why “Er, no”? You are restating my point exactly.
Apologies…you’re right. But in light of the original question, I think it’s just more a matter of personal verbal battering. I’m sure this has happened before. Getting WAAAAYYY off topic to attack each other personally. The weapon of choice? Intellect. With all the quoting and bashing of each other, people who came to this board to discuss savant philosophy can’t find ANYTHING productive or interesting. Just bickering.
So no, these are NOT two philosophers exploring the depths of…whatever…it’s just a couple of annoying, self-centered guys so caught up in their own argument that no one else can enjoy savant philosophy. Wow…that was a lot…
So, does anyone have anything on the original question?
In #47, you asked a question; I answered it in #48 (and you correctly rephrased that answer in #49). You offered up a remarkably different statement in #98; it was a statement so different that, had you put it in the form of a question, I’d have answered in considerable agreement.
Since you didn’t put it in the form of a question, I merely and immediately confined myself to pointing out that you were bringing up a remarkably different statement than the one we’d been discussing:
I haven’t taken issue with your claims about the need for evidence when proving that something exists; I’ve merely taken issue with your claims about whether a proposition is objective rather than subjective.
It’s not at all deceitful; you’re the one who explained that “I extracted those words directly from my dictionary’s primary definition.” If you’d wanted to skip over the primary definition to make your case with the second definition, I’d have reacted accordingly; you specified the primary definition; I shrugged and went with it.
Because your point was that “The moon is being perceived – in my imagination.” I replied that “you’re not perceiving the moon when you’re merely imagining the moon.” You replied that “one can perceive something without collapsing its wave-function – it merely has to be a hallucination”.
My point is that, in the latter case, you’re perceiving a hallucination of the moon rather than the real moon – and in the former case, you’re perceiving an imaginary moon rather than the real moon. Possibly your hallucination of the moon has properties the real moon lacks. Possibly your imaginary moon has properties the real moon lacks.
Is not the example proposition under consideration the objectivity of claims regarding the existence of the un-perceivable-cheese-moon? Is that not a claim upon whether the proposition is objective rather than subjective?
That, of course, was my Dictionary v2.1.3’s primary definition. The link I gave was to Dictionary.com (1st google result) secondary definition. The point is that when you say:
The entire reason I wanted you to supply a definition was because I’d hoped you’d provide something that backed my argument rather than yours; you have.
You are being deceitful – with the secondary definition right in front of your eyes, you wrote that bullshit above.
(Your chronology there is not very accurate. Here is the actual conversation quoted in my response.)
Yes, that was my point as well (but you previously objected to ‘perceiving’ and equated it was collapse of the wave function).
…again, yes. Neither imagining nor hallucinating the moon will collapse its wave function. That was my point. Thanks for re-stating it.
The greater point I am making is that the cheese-moon is borne out of imagining (or hallucinating) it. More likely simply imagination, of course. Imagination is wholly subjective. Now if one engages in the subjective process of imagining a hypothetical cheese-moon which cannot even in principle have any distinguishing characteristics that are observable in any objective sense (they are observable subjectively of course, in one’s imagination), then that cheese moon’s truth conditions are NOT “mind-independent”. Thus, by Wikipedia’s Primary (1st line of article) definition, it is not objective.
By the way, I’m not “unaccountably fond of” of Wikipedia’s entry – put your own source forward if you like. Wikipedia is merely common ground, which I tend toward to avoid cherry-picking sources. Similarly with my dictionary. I used the one on my computer’s primary definition. Then in defense of it I blindly took google’s first result, which in its case had it as its secondary definition. (Big whoop, btw).
I’m definitely not supposed to posit the existence of universals to account for attribute agreement for more than an hour.
Indeed it is: the question is whether the proposition is objective rather than subjective – not whether it’s true rather than false, or provable rather than unprovable.
I wrote that a particular belief struck me as meaningful; you replied as follows: “It conveys an intelligible idea, but it is not meaningful. It has not function, use, or purpose.” I stated that, according to the dictionary I was using, the primary definition of the word didn’t require the extra element in question. You posted a link to a different dictionary, which – gave a primary definition that likewise didn’t require the extra element in question.
You’d objecting to my use of the word by insisting an extra element was required; I’d correctly used the primary definition, which has no such requirement. Regardless of whether the secondary definition or tertiary definition or whatever introduces such a requirement, your objection falls apart as soon as the primary one fits – and, as you spelled out, “the definition I provided can be found in a variety of sources (here was the very first google result), pretty much all you have to do is google. Incredibly easy to verify.”
I wasn’t incorrectly using the secondary definition; I was correctly using the primary one.
It’s quite big, if I was correctly using the primary one.
But the word I objected to wasn’t “perceiving”. I objected to the claim that you were perceiving the “something” in question rather than merely perceiving “a hallucination of it” – precisely because perceiving ‘a hallucination of it’ does not collapse the wave function the way perceiving the ‘something’ would.
Perceiving the hallucination of that “something” doesn’t collapse the wave function. Perceiving the “something” in question can. I claimed you weren’t perceiving the moon when you were merely perceiving a hallucination of it or an imagined visualization of it.
And I’ve never disagreed with that point: when you perceive a mere imagined visualization or a vivid hallucination, you’re not actually perceiving the thing in question.
Not if the cheese-moon actually exists. (I’m not speaking here of the imagined one or the hallucinated one; I’m speaking of the mind-independent one that objectively exists or doesn’t, regardless of what any given mind hallucinates or imagines.)
Possibly we don’t agree on what “mind-independent” means. I don’t see that it includes any requirement of observability; indeed, the key point seems to be that said moon possesses the characteristic in question when mind-independent (in general) – which includes not being observed by a mind (in particular). Likewise, the characteristics of an imagined cheese-moon are irrelevant; the characteristics of the mind-independent moon itself are relevant.
Again, I think you misunderstand my point; I adore the Wikipedia entry, I just don’t understand why you’re fond of a cite that I feel establishes my point rather than yours, since it emphasizes the “mind-independent” criterion.
Whether the proposition is objective or subjective depends crucially on whether the proposition’s truth conditions are or are not “mind-independent.” Whether the proposition’s truth conditions are or are not “mind-independent” require us to consider the truth conditions of the proposition.
What I keep repeating:
the theorem that they exist objectively is not proven until objective evidence is found
Objective evidence cannot be found by definition, ergo the proposition’s objective truth value is undecidable: the proposition’s truth value is not mind-independent. Obviously subjective evidence can be found: the contrapositive that the truth-value is mind-dependent is true.
Obviously the fact that one dictionary’s primary definition is another’s secondary definition trivially invalidates your argument. There is not a universal standard between dictionaries as to definition numerology.
I have no idea what you are arguing any more. As I have said, of course perceiving a hallucination does not collapse the wave function. If you were perceiving the real moon then you would collapse its wave function. But you can’t by definition collapse the wave function of the cheese-moon. It has no existential purpose, use, or function. You can only perceive it subjectively; it is an idea that is not mind-independent.
It exists inside your mind. But it does not exist objectively, as I have pointed out repeatedly, it cannot exist objectively not just in practice, but in principle. It is completely mind-dependent. There is not any sense in which it can even in principle have any objectively distinguishable characteristics. Outside the mind its existential form is null. In every conceivable sense. Inside the mind, subjectively, in one’s imagination, is its only home.
That emphasis on that criterion is emphatically in my favor here. You suggest that “mind-independent” has no requirement of observability. And I say to you: mind-independent is exactly that which is observable outside the mind.
Universal? No. The dictionary ***I’d ***been working from, however, had no requirement in the primary definition. And when I pointed out that you hadn’t actually produced a dictionary of your own, you (a) posted a link to the site of your choosing, which likewise had no such requirement for the same primary meaning – and you (b) proceeded to really talk up the virtues of that cited site. “Incredibly easy to verify,” you explained, after mentioning that it was “the very first google result”; “pretty much all you have to do is google,” you added. “Apparently I have to babysit you through this process of basic communication”, you concluded.
I of course agree that whether I’d used the word correctly is incredibly easy to verify; pretty much all you have to do is google, since it’s the very first google result – which, as you say of your proffered criteria, makes it so fine a default that actually spelling it out for someone constitutes babysitting them through a process of basic communication.
So, no, primacy is not universal; it’s merely unanimous in so far as it’s shared by the definition in my quote and the definition in your link. If you’d eventually like to post a link to some other cite that builds a requirement into the primary definition, then, by all means, do so – but you’d still be wrong to object to my use of the word, since by your account it’s “incredibly easy to verify” that my usage was correct by looking at “the very first google result” (which, apparently, is so unimpeachable an approach that spelling it out for someone involves babysitting them through the process of basic communication).
It cannot be observed objectively, precisely because it’s completely mind-independent. An imagined cheese-moon is mind-dependent. A hallucinated cheese-moon is mind-dependent. A cheese-moon that isn’t being observed by a mind or perceived by a mind or whatever? A cheese-moon that doesn’t exist within your mind, but is independent of any mind?
No; requiring it to be observable by a mind would make its properties mind-dependent. The whole point is that its existence is independent of any mind.
Whether we can gain evidence of it has nothing to do with whether its truth value is mind-independent; its truth condition hinges on whether it exists when no mind is perceiving it or observing it or whatever. By comparison,
[QUOTE=Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy]
the truth condition of ‘snow is white’ is that snow is white; the truth condition of ‘Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded’ is that Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded
Read more: Answers - The Most Trusted Place for Answering Life's Questions
[/QUOTE]
Scroll down there and it includes the skinny from Wiki on it: “For example, ‘It is snowing in Nebraska’ is true precisely when it is snowing in Nebraska.” The truth condition of a proposition that it is snowing only hinges on whether it is snowing – which is a separate question from whether you can prove it or whether anyone knows it. The truth condition of a proposition that snow is white is only that snow is white – with no need to add in any extra criteria above and beyond that. The truth condition of ‘Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded’ – likewise.
The truth condition of the moon having those properties when unobserved is whether it has those properties when unobserved. Never mind whether we can prove it or whether anyone knows it; we’re merely dealing with what the truth condition is, which is as starkly mind-independent as whether it is snowing or whether the snow is white.
Hey you two,
One of you thinks that being meaningful requires only intelligibility. The other thinks that being meaningful requires an end, purpose or significance.
I’m not really sure exactly what positions you’re arguing for other than this, but this particular point does seem to be central in some way to your disagreement.
And my question is: Could your whole issue be resolved if you simply agreed to use the word “schmeaning” instead of the word “meaning” for one of the two concepts described above?
If you did that, would you basically agree about what things have “schmeaning” and what things have “meaning”?
Yeah, probably.
Near as I can tell, we would.
Yes, it is. Here is the second google result. I can keep right on going. Primary definition in my dictionary on my computer. Secondary definition on the first google result. Primary definition on the third google result. I rest my case. And note, again, the fact that it is the secondary definition of the first google result is merely due to arbitrary numerology. It is completely specious (and I contend obviously not in good faith) to repeatedly conclude otherwise. The fact that I linked to the first google result was an indication of me acting in good faith. The fact that you continue to focus on the irrelevant fact that the definition I was using was the secondary one, is in bad faith. As though the fact that I was using a secondary definition (in one dictionary – it’s is a primary definition in others, as I have demonstrated) in any way supports your original position that my use of the word was wrong.
My issue is that he is engaging in sophistry. He says that my use of the word meaning is wrong. I point to a dictionary definition that includes my use as a secondary definition. (The dictionary on my computer has it as a primary definition, out of which I directly extracted the definition he originally objected to). He begins focusing on the fact that my definition is secondary, as if to somehow prove through obfuscation that I am wrong. It is completely obnoxious.
Part of my point was, I don’t understand why either of you cares what any dictionary says.
Correct. We are considering an imagined cheese-moon. It seems that you agree with me that such a thing is mind-dependent, and so we are done.
I don’t care either. It was Waldo that brought up the issue because he rejected what was obviously a valid use of the word meaning. And even if it was not a valid use, he indeed could have recognized my intent once I pointed out the intended meaning, and given me the benefit of the doubt. Instead he created a diversion. I have only continued feeding this diversion in order to avoid the unjust appearance of him being in the right.
I’m quite sure you can. That site specifies the following primary definition: “having a meaning or purpose”. First, note the “or”. Second, follow that site’s link to “meaning” – the primary definition of which is “the thing one intends to convey especially by language”. That’s of course not a further requirement of purpose; it’s fulfilled as soon as the intended meaning is conveyed, with or without any purpose beyond just conveying that intended meaning. That’s what “or” means, y’know? Separability?
- So you say.
- Primary backs me up.
- Primary backs me up.
Also, of course, my dictionary backs me up likewise. If you think you can go on all day like this, then I’d love to see yet more of it.
You flatly declared that the belief in question isn’t meaningful. My reply: “that belief strikes me as entirely meaningful; I can understand why you’d call such a belief unfalsifiable, or why you’d reject it altogether, but it certainly seems to convey a perfectly intelligible idea.” You replied with the following blanket statement: “It conveys an intelligible idea, but it is not meaningful. It has not function, use, or purpose”
I stated – correctly – that the belief struck me as entirely meaningful. You then declared – incorrectly – that conveying an intelligible idea doesn’t suffice to make something meaningful; you then followed up by linking to multiple dictionaries that all omit the extra requirement in question from the primary definition, exactly as mine does. One of us is practicing sophistry, but it ain’t me.
Again, my point is that the mind-independent cheese-moon is profoundly different from the mind-dependent cheese-moon one merely imagines or hallucinates. Your original statement referred to the mind-independent cheese-moon rather than a moon that’s merely imagined or hallucinated.
And you could’ve recognized my intent once I’d accurately pointed out that it conveyed a perfectly intelligible idea and was therefore meaningful. If anything, I’d argue that your attempt to rule out the use of the word “meaning” requires you to rule out each valid definition – while my attempt to employ the word merely requires a valid definition: preferably, the primary one in dictionary after dictionary and dictionary.
Still, if we remain at an impasse on who should’ve deferred to whom, I’ll reluctantly address the secondary definition to point out that intelligibly conveying an idea can serve as the end or purpose in question; the significance of a concept in such a case would be signification, in which case the primary definition would naturally be a specific instance of the secondary definition. (Which makes a lot of sense, really.)
I was the first one to use the word meaning in this exchange, and immediately after your rejection of it I defined it. Here is the exchange:
I clearly and immediately corrected your misunderstanding of my use of the word meaning. Instead of accepting that clearly defined use of the word, you follow up with:
shall we break out the dictionaries again?
And from then on focus parochially on primary verses secondary definitions… as though it were relevant to anything other than your ego. You go on to perversely distort the truth:
[How does my intended definition being the secondary definition back you up? Are secondary definitions invalid?]
[No it doesn’t, despite your bizarre and incoherent attempt to argue that the “or purpose” part of the primary definition is somehow invalid because it is listed second in a definition of the form: A or B]
This is sophistry, and you are wasting our time.
I clearly and immediately pointed out that, by the definition of “meaning”, you’re incorrect to flatly declare that “meaning” requires an extra element beyond intelligibly conveying intent.
You declared that “meaning” requires an extra element beyond intelligibly conveying the intent. I correctly pointed out that it doesn’t; you replied that “meaning” does require the extra element; I asked for a cite. You provided one where the primary definition of meaning requires no such extra element (which already means you shouldn’t base a blanket statement on it), and where the secondary definition – makes it optional rather than required.
Being listed second in an “A or B” form doesn’t make it invalid; it makes it optional rather than required.
Where did I refer to the “mind-independent cheese-moon”? I have only referred to an imagined cheese-moon. I have indeed merely imagined it. I then described to you its imagined objective properties, which are: none. By definition.
In other words it cannot even be imagined to have objective properties, for there is nothing objective to imagine. There is a good analog of this: qualia, such as the perception of the color red. The perception of the color red has no objective properties. As such, it cannot even be imagined to have objective properties in a self-consistent way. Yet it can be imagined (subjectively). One can even describe it in a manner analogous to the cheese-moon example:
There exists this ‘thing’ called ‘red’ inside of most humans’ brains. But if you open up a brain it is never there.
Is the perception of the color “red” objective just because I described it as being inside physical human brains? Of course not. Similarly, is the cheese-moon objective simply because it has been described as being a ‘thing’ in ‘physical’ outer space? Both “red” and “cheese-moon” can be described as things. That does not make them objective. Though I do see how one might be lead in that direction by a very superficial reading…
I did not “flatly declare” anything. The exchange is quoted in the post you are responding to. I said:
It conveys an intelligible idea, but it is not meaningful. It has not function, use, or purpose.
To translate: “While it conveys an intelligible idea, it is not meaningful in the sense of having function, use, or purpose.”
I did not “flatly declare”, nor did I even imply, that “meaning” requires an extra element beyond intelligibly conveying intent.
Your account of this exchange is false.
As far as I am aware, this is false, though I can imagine it may be true for some dictionaries (cite?).
Actually, your statement here doesn’t make any sense. Consider this definition:
2. A crafty, sly, or clever person.
You are saying that the definition could not possibly read:
2. A clever, sly, or crafty person.
?