Help me untangle this logical paradox involving mental conception

[Frylock]

@iamnotbatman

Here is a way I hope to pick apart precisely where our views diverge. Let’s just go ahead and choose a specific thing (not a collection of things, but one single thing), that you think you can think about, and I think you cannot think about. The only trick is that, in me specifying the thing, I transfer information to you that would allow you to think about it, whereas previously my contention would be that you could not have been able to think about it. So we have to play a game here in which you, in good faith I am confident, agree on the thing and then pretend from then on that I did not tell you about the thing. Here is a proposed candidate: please think about the thing I am holding in my hand right now. (The answer is: a yellow piece of paper with ten consecutive digits of the number sqrt(3) written on it.)

Now, you believe that there is no thing that you cannot think about

That’s right–I think I could have thought about the thing in your hand even before you told me about it, simply by, for example, for some strange reason wondering “I wonder what iamnotbatman is holding in his left hand?”

. I contend that you couldn’t have thought about the thing in my hand, because you did not know what thing to think about.

Whereas in my view it is sufficient for “thinking about” something that you have a “handle” on it, in the sense that you have on hand a description which is satisfied uniquely by that thing. (Sufficient, not necessary.)

Yes, in some vague sense, you can think about the set of possible things I might hold in my hand. You can think about pens, paper clips, or the collection possibilities as a whole. But where do you draw the line? Does thinking about a blue piece of paper with 5 consecutive digits of sqrt(2) count?

Not unless there’s only one such piece of paper in all of that segment of reality which my thinking of the paper takes to be relevant to describing the paper.

Does briefly noting that the set of possibilities includes colored pieces of paper and numbers written on them count? There is some serious definitional ambiguity if you wish to maintain that you can think about my proposed thing, having only the information that it is something in my hand.

I don’t see what definitional ambiguity you’re talking about here. You seem to be saying it’s hard to see where to draw a certain line if thinking about a set of possibilities including the thing is sufficient for thinking about the thing itself. But that is a view I’ve never offered. So if there’s some definitional ambiguity here it doesn’t have to do with my own view.

To be clear: I don’t think that thinking of a set of possibilities which happens to include the thing itself is, in itself, sufficient for thinking about the thing itself.

If we use the unambiguous definition, that is, that thinking about a thing implies thinking about the thing itself rather than a collection of possible things of which the thing may be a member, then you can not think about the claimed thing without guessing and getting very lucky.

A. That’s not a definition. What definition are you using? I do not think definitions are really the right starting point here but you do keep bringing up the idea of defining “think about” so I am curious to know, now, what your definition is.

B. What you’ve said above seems to mean (unless I’m misunderstanding you) that you can’t think about fictional objects or unreal objects. Since I seem to my self to think about fictional and unreal objects quite a bit, I’d ask why I should believe you when you say I can’t do that. (Or in what way I’ve misunderstood you.)

This implies that your theorem “I can think about the thing in your hand” conveys no information. This can be tested and confirmed experimentally through repeated trials by asking you what thing you are thinking about, and showing that it is statistically uncorrelated what thing I am holding in my hand.

It conveys the information that I can think about the thing in your hand. I’m not sure what other information you are hoping for it to convey, or why.

Do you think “I can think about the thing in your hand” ought to convey information about what’s in your hand? I don’t know why you would think that. I mean, in normal discourse I’ve got a responsibility not to say “I can tihnk of the thing in your hand” unless I’ve got some idea about what’s actually in your hand. But this is far from normal discourse. And that implication is part of the pragmatics of speech, not part of the meaning of what I said.

[The_Hamster_King]

@iamnotbatman

If we use the unambiguous definition, that is, that thinking about a thing implies thinking about the thing itself rather than a collection of possible things of which the thing may be a member … .

Actually, I believe this is where the problem lies.

I would argue that “thinking about the thing itself” is impossible. Whenever we think about a thing we’re ALWAYS thinking about “a collection of things of which the thing may be a member”. Our thoughts about things are ALWAYS incomplete simulations/lossy compressions that describe the bounds upon a collection of potential things rather than a particular individual thing. This is true whether the thing is “the thing hidden in my hand” or “the bowling ball in the corner”. The bounds on the latter are tighter than the bounds on the former, but the nature of the thought is the same.

[iamnotbatman]

@Frylock

That’s right–I think I could have thought about the thing in your hand even before you told me about it, simply by, for example, for some strange reason wondering “I wonder what iamnotbatman is holding in his left hand?”

But without any more information, your “wondering” could just as well be about any other persons hand. Therefore your use of the noun iamnotbatman is vacuous. Similarly the “what” is left unconstrained. What exactly are you really thinking when you “wonder what iamnotbatman is holding in his left hand”? Does the phrase really have any meaning beyond a mere repetition of the information I transfered to you: that I am holding something in my left hand.

@Frylock

Whereas in my view it is sufficient for “thinking about” something that you have a “handle” on it, in the sense that you have on hand a description which is satisfied uniquely by that thing. (Sufficient, not necessary.)

I don’t follow you here.

@Frylock

Not unless there’s only one such piece of paper in all of that segment of reality which my thinking of the paper takes to be relevant to describing the paper.

I don’t follow you here either.

@Frylock

I don’t see what definitional ambiguity you’re talking about here. You seem to be saying it’s hard to see where to draw a certain line if thinking about a set of possibilities including the thing is sufficient for thinking about the thing itself. But that is a view I’ve never offered. So if there’s some definitional ambiguity here it doesn’t have to do with my own view.

Then what is your view? Please describe exactly what you are thinking when you are thinking about the thing I am holding in my hand.

@Frylock

To be clear: I don’t think that thinking of a set of possibilities which happens to include the thing itself is, in itself, sufficient for thinking about the thing itself.

OK, then I am lost about what you think. What precisely is sufficient to constitute thinking about the thing I am holding in my hand?

[iamnotbatman]

@The_Hamster_King

Actually, I believe this is where the problem lies.

I would argue that “thinking about the thing itself” is impossible. Whenever we think about a thing we’re ALWAYS thinking about “a collection of things of which the thing may be a member”. Our thoughts about things are ALWAYS incomplete simulations/lossy compressions that describe the bounds upon a collection of potential things rather than a particular individual thing. This is true whether the thing is “the thing hidden in my hand” or “the bowling ball in the corner”. The bounds on the latter are tighter than the bounds on the former, but the nature of the thought is the same.

This is actually irrelevant to my own point, but a complication I’m hoping to avoid by simply “sweeping it under the rug.” In my example, Frylock thinking “a yellow piece of paper with 10 consecutive digits of sqrt(3)” would be sufficient, because unless we have photographic memory, our sensory organs and our brains are not capable of discerning many details of an object beyond what I listed, and so thinking about the object is necessarily limited to a lossyness more or less corresponding to my description.

[iamnotbatman]

@Frylock

A. That’s not a definition. What definition are you using? I do not think definitions are really the right starting point here but you do keep bringing up the idea of defining “think about” so I am curious to know, now, what your definition is.

I’d like yours too. My definition of “think about X” would be “form an internal representation of X, or of various aspects of X.” If X is a yellow piece of paper, then “thinking about a yellow piece of paper” means forming an internal representation of a yellow piece of paper. Incidentally, this definition implies that in order to think about X, you must be able to describe X to someone else in a way that unambiguously identifies it.

@Frylock

B. What you’ve said above seems to mean (unless I’m misunderstanding you) that you can’t think about fictional objects or unreal objects. Since I seem to my self to think about fictional and unreal objects quite a bit, I’d ask why I should believe you when you say I can’t do that. (Or in what way I’ve misunderstood you.)

You’ve misunderstood me. You can think of fictional objects. But how does thinking of a fictional object imply that you have thought about the real object I am holding in my hand?

@Frylock

It conveys the information that I can think about the thing in your hand. I’m not sure what other information you are hoping for it to convey, or why.

Arrg, a tautological response! “Me saying I can think about the thing in your hand conveys that I can think about the thing in your hand.” What information should it convey? Any information at all. What is the point of telling someone you are thinking of the thing in their hand, when in fact you are simply imagining random possibilities that have no actual correlation to what is really in their hand? You have conveyed no information, or at worst, lied to the other person, because what you are thinking has no correlation with the thing in their hand, which you claim to be thinking about. The situation would be different if you claim was accurate: that you are thinking of the possibilities of what could be in your hand. In this case information is conveyed: you are thinking of the set of things that might conceivably be in someone’s hand.

@Frylock

Do you think “I can think about the thing in your hand” ought to convey information about what’s in your hand?

No, the statement should convey information about your own thoughts. If you say “I am thinking about an apple” but you are really thinking about just a random object, then your statement has not conveyed any (true) information about what you are thinking. Practically this means that, if asked, you should be able to identify the object you are claiming to think about.

[iamnotbatman]

@Frylock

I’ve said nothing to imply that.

Well, I’ve offered my argument that he is, and your objection is that my view implies something I don’t agree that it implies. I guess the onus is on you to explain why you think the implication holds. If you were right–if some element of my argument really does imply that running a simple program constitutes thinking about things represented by its output–then I would need to revise either my view or my argument. But you’ve not yet offered me a reason to think the implication holds.

If it’s a random string of letters, meaningless even to them, then they haven’t communicated anything, so there’s no reason for me to think they’re thinking about anything but, roughly, themselves, thinking, and random strings.

Well, if you are able to “think about the fifth prime” without knowing even what a prime is (this is an example, I’m know you personally know what a prime is), then what exactly are you thinking about? How could your thinking process have anything to do with primes at all, or even numbers, if you don’t know what a prime is? In what sense are you “thinking about it?” The only thing you can do is guess; form a totally random thought. I think this means that the statement is informationally equivalent to a computer designed to print out statements like “I think about the fifth prime”, without of course understanding anything it is saying. The only difference is that the computer doesn’t necessarily internally represent the random thought choice in the same way a human does (a computer doesn’t “think” at all, perhaps), but I don’t think that’s relevant to the point. If you don’t grok the analogy, don’t worry we can prune this argument leaf.

[Frylock]

@iamnotbatman

But without any more information, your “wondering” could just as well be about any other persons hand.

Honest question: What are you talking about?!

I’m not wondering about just anyone’s hand. I’m wondering about you’re hand.

I actually genuinely cannot make heads or tails of what you’ve said above or immediately below.

Therefore your use of the noun iamnotbatman is vacuous. Similarly the “what” is left unconstrained. What exactly are you really thinking when you “wonder what iamnotbatman is holding in his left hand”?

I’m thinking “I wonder what iamnotbatman is holding in his left hand.” That’s exactly what I’d be thinking.

Does the phrase really have any meaning beyond a mere repetition of the information I transfered to you: that I am holding something in my left hand.

It means, to rephrase in one way, “There is a person named iamnotbatman, and he’s holding something in his hand, and I don’t know what it is, and I would like to know what it is.”

I don’t follow you here.

I don’t follow you here either.

Why not? Where do you start to lose me?

Then what is your view? Please describe exactly what you are thinking when you are thinking about the thing I am holding in my hand.

See above. How can I get more exact than by laying out the content of the thought? What I am thinking is “I wonder what he has in my hand.” That’s as exact as it gets.

OK, then I am lost about what you think. What precisely is sufficient to constitute thinking about the thing I am holding in my hand?

For any concept there are usually several disparate sufficient conditions, so I can’t be precise about this. But here’s one sufficient condition: I am in an occurent mental state in which there figures a description that either is uniquely satisfied by the object you’re holding in your hand, or could be uniquely satisfied only by an object you were holding in your hand."

[Frylock]

@iamnotbatman

I’d like yours too.

I don’t have one. Like I said, I don’t think definitions are a good place to start when it comes to this topic. I don’t have a definition, I have intuitions about what counts as instances. From these, plus discussion, I hope to develop a definition.

My definition of “think about X” would be “form an internal representation of X, or of various aspects of X.” If X is a yellow piece of paper, then “thinking about a yellow piece of paper” means forming an internal representation of a yellow piece of paper. Incidentally, this definition implies that in order to think about X, you must be able to describe X to someone else in a way that unambiguously identifies it.

Then you do not think that any non-linguistic creature can think about anything?

Arrg, a tautological response!

No, the anwer was contained in your question already.

“Me saying I can think about the thing in your hand conveys that I can think about the thing in your hand.”
[/quote]

That’s exactly the information conveyed. That’s only as “tautological” as Tarski’s truth schema. Do you think the truth schema is tautological? (“X” is true iff X.)

No, the statement should convey information about your own thoughts. If you say “I am thinking about an apple” but you are really thinking about just a random object, then your statement has not conveyed any (true) information about what you are thinking. Practically this means that, if asked, you should be able to identify the object you are claiming to think about.

Wait, are you asking what information is conveyed, or what “(true) information” is conveyed? I took you to be asking for the former. Do you mean to be asking the latter instead, though?

[Frylock]

@iamnotbatman

Well, if you are able to “think about the fifth prime” without knowing even what a prime

Of course you can think about the fifth prime without knowing what a prime is. My son has no idea what a prime number is, but he has certainly thought about the fifth prime on numerous occasions. Just the other day, for example, he was wondering in what year he will turn eleven years old.

[iamnotbatman]

@Frylock

Of course you can think about the fifth prime without knowing what a prime is. My son has no idea what a prime number is, but he has certainly thought about the fifth prime on numerous occasions. Just the other day, for example, he was wondering in what year he will turn eleven years old.

My patience is wearing thin. The fact that your son can think about the number 11 has nothing to do with the information content of the phrase “I am thinking of the fifth prime.” If your son says “I am thinking of the fifth prime”, and he has no idea what he is saying, then his statement is vacuous, he is just saying words without understanding them, and what he is thinking about has no correlation with his claim.

[iamnotbatman]

@Frylock

@iamnotbatman

Then what is your view? Please describe exactly what you are thinking when you are thinking about the thing I am holding in my hand.

See above. How can I get more exact than by laying out the content of the thought? What I am thinking is “I wonder what he has in my hand.” That’s as exact as it gets.

You can get more exact by describing what cognitively you are doing when “you wonder.” I contend that if you think about this carefully you will see that what you are doing either is not thinking anything coherent at all, or falls into one of the categories I previously described, such as cataloging the possible things I might have in my hand.

[Frylock]

@iamnotbatman

My patience is wearing thin.

Go take a breather.

[iamnotbatman]

@Frylock

I don’t have one. Like I said, I don’t think definitions are a good place to start when it comes to this topic. I don’t have a definition, I have intuitions about what counts as instances. From these, plus discussion, I hope to develop a definition.

This is what I meant when I said I thought you were using sloppy semantics (which you took as offensive). I’m sorry, but it is very difficult to have a coherent discussion with someone who cannot define the words they are using when making a bold declaration they are trying to defend. The truth value the statement we are debating is crucially dependent on definitions.

This doesn’t mean you are wrong, btw, within your own internal set of definitions, but it does mean it is impossible for someone else to prove you wrong, and so makes this debate kind of pointless.

@Frylock

Then you do not think that any non-linguistic creature can think about anything?

Non-linguistic creatures can think. I used the word “incidentally” for a reason. My definition does not imply that language is necessary. But for language-speaking creatures there is a convenient corollary of my definition.

@Frylock

No, the anwer was contained in your question already.

“Me saying I can think about the thing in your hand conveys that I can think about the thing in your hand.”

That’s exactly the information conveyed. That’s only as “tautological” as Tarski’s truth schema. Do you think the truth schema is tautological? (“X” is true iff X.)

I should have written: “Me saying I can think about the thing in your hand conveys that I can say that I think about the thing in your hand.”

Saying X does not imply X.

@Frylock

Wait, are you asking what information is conveyed, or what “(true) information” is conveyed? I took you to be asking for the former. Do you mean to be asking the latter instead, though?

In the statement “I think about the object in your hand”, I am saying that no information is conveyed because there is no correlation between your thoughts and the actual object in my hand. If you say “I am thinking about an apple” but you are really thinking about just a random object, then I am again saying no information is conveyed (I am not just referring to true information), beyond perhaps the true statement (if it was so interpreted and intended), which would be “I think about the possibility of an object in your hand.” Thus far, I can only guess that what you mean by “there is nothing I can’t think about” is really:

There is no thing about which I cannot speculate as to what it may be.

[Frylock]

@iamnotbatman

This is what I meant when I said I thought you were using sloppy semantics

Look, you know what? The truth is, I am not convinced from this conversation that you know what “semantics” means.

You said elsewhere in the post that the conversation is pointless. Fair enough. Like I said: Go take a breather.

[UltraVires]

@iamnotbatman

This is actually irrelevant to my own point, but a complication I’m hoping to avoid by simply “sweeping it under the rug.” In my example, Frylock thinking “a yellow piece of paper with 10 consecutive digits of sqrt(3)” would be sufficient, because unless we have photographic memory, our sensory organs and our brains are not capable of discerning many details of an object beyond what I listed, and so thinking about the object is necessarily limited to a lossyness more or less corresponding to my description.

I think that it is a semantic difference where you two are talking past each other:

What is in my left hand—to you means the exact object that you are holding. And you are correct. Nobody on this board can possibly think about that exact object because it is unknowable.

To Frylock it means the possibilities of what MAY be in your left hand, and he can certainly think or wonder about those.

And that is exactly where the OP got confused and thought he had a paradox. It was just a homonym problem.

[iamnotbatman]

@jtgain

I think that it is a semantic difference where you two are talking past each other:

What is in my left hand—to you means the exact object that you are holding. And you are correct. Nobody on this board can possibly think about that exact object because it is unknowable.

To Frylock it means the possibilities of what MAY be in your left hand, and he can certainly think or wonder about those.

And that is exactly where the OP got confused and thought he had a paradox. It was just a homonym problem.

And I’ve pointed this out over and over again. The question of what MAY be in my left hand is distinct from what IS in my left hand. Search for the terms “possibilities” and “possibility” in this thread and see how many times I have tried to point this out. The fact that this appears to be ambiguous implies a lack of semantic precision, one that Frylock seems intent on not removing. And yes, Frylock, I know what semantics means. Do you?

[Frylock]

@jtgain

I think that it is a semantic difference where you two are talking past each other:

What is in my left hand—to you means the exact object that you are holding. And you are correct. Nobody on this board can possibly think about that exact object because it is unknowable.

To Frylock it means the possibilities of what MAY be in your left hand, and he can certainly think or wonder about those.

I appreciate the attempted diplomacy but I actually do think that I can think about the exact object iamnotbatman is holding in the described scenario.

Putting aside “I wonder what he has”, I’ll discuss a different thought I could have. I could think to myself, as a result of what I take (incorrectly) to be a psychic intuition, “I know he is holding a pen in his hand.” In that case, I am thinking of the object in his hand, the object is a piece of paper, and I am thinking something false about it.

I’m thinking about the piece of paper, and I’m thinking something about it that is incorrect.

Why do I say I’m thinking about the piece of paper? Because the thought is about the object in his hand (it says, after all, “the object in his hand is such-and-such”) and the object in his hand is a piece of paper. A = B and B = C.

(I should acknowledge here an awareness of the possibility that there’s stuff under the surface here about the validity of substitution of identicals in opaque contexts etc etc but I don’t think that would actually affect the point in this conversation.)

[Frylock]

@iamnotbatman

And I’ve pointed this out over and over again. The question of what MAY be in my left hand is distinct from what IS in my left hand. Search for the terms “possibilities” and “possibility” in this thread and see how many times I have tried to point this out. The fact that this appears to be ambiguous implies a lack of semantic precision, one that Frylock seems intent on not removing. And yes, Frylock, I know what semantics means. Do you?

There’s no semantic ambiguity here. You keep bringing up possibilities, and I keep telling you I’m not talking about possibilities. If there was an ambiguity, I cleared it up long ago.

[Frylock]

You appear to be committed to the view that if I see you grab something from a tub of apples and oranges, and what you actually grabbed was an apple, but simply due to the exigencies of the situation, I mistakenly believe what I see you grab is an orange (I have line of sight to it, and have my attention fixed on it, I simply misidentify it), then when I form the belief “the object in his hand is an orange,” I’m not thinking about the object in your hand.

Is that your view?

If it is not your view, then what (true?) information is conveyed by my thought? And in what way am I thinking about the thing in your hand and not a mere possibility concerning what it might have been?

[iamnotbatman]

@Frylock

You appear to be committed to the view that if I see you grab something from a tub of apples and oranges, and what you actually grabbed was an apple, but simply due to the exigencies of the situation, I mistakenly believe what I see you grab is an orange (I have line of sight to it, and have my attention fixed on it, I simply misidentify it), then when I form the belief “the object in his hand is an orange,” I’m not thinking about the object in your hand.

Is that your view?

That is not my view.

You are thinking about the object in my hand, because if I were to ask you about the object that you are thinking about, the properties you would describe would be highly correlated with the actual object in my hand. I would be able to experimentally verify, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you were in fact thinking about the object in my hand, despite making a mistake in visual recognition (note that as I said earlier regarding your bringing up those without linguistics, that verifiability is a sufficient but not necessary condition). You would be able to tell me that the object is about the same size and shape of an apple, and that I picked it from a tub of apples and oranges. In simple terms, when you say “I am thinking about the object in your hand” (and you actually are in the above sense) you are conveying useful information to me. I can now rely on the fact that you are thinking of an object in my hand that is apple-like, knowing myself full-well that given the situation, it is conceivable that the apple and the orange may have been visually taken for one another. If, for instance, we are in a situation in which our lives depend on you knowing that I have an apple-like object in my hand, the information that has been transmitted can be made of use: you can distract an attacker while I throw the apple/orange at them! Information has been conveyed!

This is in contrast to a situation in which I grab an apple, you say you think about the object in my hand, and yet randomly pick out of an infinite set something to think about.