# Hermann Goring- was He Really Up To The Job? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [December 19, 2010, 1:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709 "2010-12-19T13:01:59Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![Human\_Action](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/ac91a4/32.png) [@Human\_Action](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Human_Action)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2013, 4:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/81 "2013-11-25T16:35:43Z")
> [@Kobal2](#): > > Interesting thing is, of all the Nazi whizbang that would be copied by the Allies post-war and pushed even further throughout the Cold War, the Panzerfaust concept is one of the few that never was emulated, to my knowledge. I wonder why, since you’d think a cheap, lightweight handheld tank buster might come in handy, particularly in urban warfare. Maybe modern grenade launchers are just better panzerfausts ? I’m not sure how blow-stuff-uppy that thing really was. The [M72 LAW](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M72_LAW), adopted in 1963, is similar to the Panzerfaust in many respects: single-use, lightweight, unguided, light anti-tank weapon. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2013, 5:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/82 "2013-11-25T17:57:00Z")
> [@Kobal2](#): > > The clusterfuck that ensured Germany never dropped another paratrooper over the entire course of the war ? For the record, that’s not a good line to have on one’s résumé. Meh, hard to blame him when the problem is with paratroops as a military concept. For what it’s worth, John Keegan has identified four really large-scale uses of paratroopers during the war…going from memory, Crete, D-Day, Market-Garden and Operation Varsity, I believe. Although three of the four were technically successes, they were Pyrrhic victories at best. All four operations entailed heavy losses to superbly trained troops. It turns out parachuting is too risky and too subject to the vagaries of wind and ground conditions to be useful in large-scale military operations. As soon as helicopters offered a viable alternative, dropping by parachute was relegated to small special-forces operations in every army. > [@Kobal2](#): > > Yeah, they had jet fighters, and they were REALLY cool when they didn’t blow themselves up ! And then they used them to try and hunt other nimble fighters, which they were shit at hitting because they were going so fast ; instead of wreaking havoc on heavy bomber formations. I’d always read the Germans used their ME-262s almost exclusively against the bomber streams; do you have a cite for that? > [@Dissonance](#): > > You’re not getting how much of mechanical nightmares the Tiger and Panther were to maintain compared to the T-34 or the Sherman. Mechanical issues weren’t limited to early production models. It’s a common misconception that since the major issues were more or less fixed in later production models of the Panther that it therefore didn’t have problems. It did, the Panther was never really ‘fixed’ in the sense of becoming mechanically reliable and not liable to breakdown with much, much greater frequency than the Sherman or T-34. Again, the major issues in early production models of the Panther were _serious_ major issues, up to and including the Panther destroying itself when the engine decided it wanted to set itself on fire. In addition to mechanical unreliability, German tanks tended to have another problem: the parts that worked were _too_ well-made, if you can believe it. I saw a documentary where they showed a Panther engine block. Other nations would have stamped out the frame parts for such an engine block, but the Germans machined the entire thing lovingly like luxury watchmakers. The process took a long time, but the engine block still fit together perfectly some 70 years later. The expected lifetime of a Panther at the front in 1944 was a few days to a few weeks at most. That kind of lavish attention to the wrong detail plagued the German war effort. Great expense and labor to produce a magnificent work of art that would then be immediately destroyed (like as not, while still enroute to the front, without ever firing a shot in anger). ---
**Author:** ![bump](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/7c8e57/32.png) [@bump](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bump)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2013, 7:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/83 "2013-11-25T19:19:20Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > As soon as helicopters offered a viable alternative, dropping by parachute was relegated to small special-forces operations in every army. You could say the same thing about amphibious landings as well, but how else were the Marines going to capture an island? Large scale paratroop drops are another thing that seems foolish in hindsight, but at the time was the best option, even if kind of flawed. > [@Sailboat](#): > > In addition to mechanical unreliability, German tanks tended to have another problem: the parts that worked were _too_ well-made, if you can believe it. I saw a documentary where they showed a Panther engine block. Other nations would have stamped out the frame parts for such an engine block, but the Germans machined the entire thing lovingly like luxury watchmakers. The process took a long time, but the engine block still fit together perfectly some 70 years later. It wasn’t so much that they were individually machined, it was that the engines were hand-fitted. In other words, they’d machine the cylinder bores, and then either find the best fitting pistons out of all the ones they had on hand, or machine pistons specifically for the cylinders AS bored. Basically they spent the time and effort to make sure all the parts fit just-so, while US manufacturers tended to build the parts so that you could grab any piston and have it fit any bore reasonably well. Maybe not as well as a hand-fitted one, but it probably took a fraction of the time and expense to put that piston in versus a hand-fitted one. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2013, 8:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/84 "2013-11-25T20:43:18Z")
> [@RickJay](#): > > You are working against sixty years of movies and ahistorical conversations. Best of luck changing that here. 🙂 The idea that the Germans were more technologically advanced is now so ingrained it’s nearly impossible to uproot. We can but try.🙂 > [@Malthus](#): > > The Germans did have sone technically advanced stuff; however, they suffered from what might be termed ‘fanboy syndrome’ - the focus was on developing stuff that, individually, looked really cool, at the expense of developng warmaking systems that worked. So, constantly tinker to get a small number of really awesome looking tanks, rather than tooling up to make a large number of tanks that consistently worked. Looking for the best rather than the good-enough, right now. You are quite right, and I mean no offense by this, but fanboy syndrome is so insidious that you are falling prey to some of it right here. Hollywood hardly helps where every German tank has to be a Tiger, or wargames going back to Squad Leader and PanzerBlitz where the German side is usually drowning in Panthers, Tigers, Jagdpanthers, Wespes, Hummels and Wirbelwinds and all of the infantry are tooling around in Sd.Kfz. 251 halftracks.\* German armor was inferior tank for tank to French and British armor during the fall of France in 1940. German armor was inferior to Soviet armor from the beginning of Barbarossa up until at least 1943. They were successful because they were better able to use what they had. The Germans made extensive use of captured Soviet 76.2mm guns as the PaK 36(r), both as a towed piece and mounted on the Marder because it was far superior to the anti-tank guns Germany had available; the German 75mm PaK 40 was only just entering production as 1941 drew to a close. Even when these smaller numbers of ‘best’ equipment became available, they never came close to being the majority of the equipment Germany was using; Germany kept producing the good-enough right now in larger numbers than the more difficult to produce best equipment. Up until the last days of the war, German armor was much more likely to be a Pz-IV or StuG-III than a Panther or a Tiger, a self-propelled AT gun a Hetzer than a Jagdpanther, infantry rifles to be Kar98(k)s than StG44s, fighters to be Me-109s or FW-190s than Me-262s, and U-boats a Type-VIIc than a Type XXI. \*Only one of the four panzergrenadier battalions per panzer division was even on paper supposed to be mounted on half-tracks, for comparison all three armored infantry battalions in a US armored division were mountd on half-tracks both on paper and in practice. > [@](#): > > It may be somewhat unfair to castigate the Germans for relying so much on horsepower - they suffered throughout the war from gas shortages - but to an extent, this is a result of this phenominon: heavy trucks are simply not as sexy, fanboy-style, as heavy tanks. The fuel situation for Germany was certainly a part of the problem, but the inability of German industry to produce enough trucks was as well. Prior to the launching of Barbarossa the Germans scoured occupied Europe for trucks to try to make up for the shortfall, but this had its own logistical problems. Rather than having to provide spare parts for only a few models of wheeled vehicles, it was a nightmare of its own trying to provide spare parts for scores of different models of wheeled vehicles manufactured by every country Germany occupied. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2013, 9:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/85 "2013-11-25T21:27:42Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > We can but try.🙂 > > You are quite right, and I mean no offense by this, but fanboy syndrome is so insidious that you are falling prey to some of it right here. Hollywood hardly helps where every German tank has to be a Tiger, or wargames going back to Squad Leader and PanzerBlitz where the German side is usually drowning in Panthers, Tigers, Jagdpanthers, Wespes, Hummels and Wirbelwinds and all of the infantry are tooling around in Sd.Kfz. 251 halftracks.\* German armor was inferior tank for tank to French and British armor during the fall of France in 1940. German armor was inferior to Soviet armor from the beginning of Barbarossa up until at least 1943. They were successful because they were better able to use what they had. The Germans made extensive use of captured Soviet 76.2mm guns as the PaK 36(r), both as a towed piece and mounted on the Marder because it was far superior to the anti-tank guns Germany had available; the German 75mm PaK 40 was only just entering production as 1941 drew to a close. > > Even when these smaller numbers of ‘best’ equipment became available, they never came close to being the majority of the equipment Germany was using; Germany kept producing the good-enough right now in larger numbers than the more difficult to produce best equipment. Up until the last days of the war, German armor was much more likely to be a Pz-IV or StuG-III than a Panther or a Tiger, a self-propelled AT gun a Hetzer than a Jagdpanther, infantry rifles to be Kar98(k)s than StG44s, fighters to be Me-109s or FW-190s than Me-262s, and U-boats a Type-VIIc than a Type XXI. > > \*Only one of the four panzergrenadier battalions per panzer division was even on paper supposed to be mounted on half-tracks, for comparison all three armored infantry battalions in a US armored division were mountd on half-tracks both on paper and in practice. Fair enough - I really ought to have prefaced my remarks by stating this was the situation when the Germans were losing, not when they were winning (and yes, I know, even when they were losing, not every German tank was a Tiger, or even a large number of them - it is just that they put a disproportionate effort into the glamourous stuff). The Nazi domination of the army was progressive throughout the war. Emphasis of the glamour stuff had a distorting effect far outside the actual numbers involved - for example: the Germans delayed launching Kursk so that Panthers would be avaliable - even though only a tiny number of Panthers actually made it to that battle and they had, allegedly, very little impact. It isn’t that the Germans insisted on only having the “best” - that wasn’t my meaning at all, and no doubt it is my fault that you read it that way; rather, as the war progressed and the Nazis became more dominant over the course of the war, they put effort they could ill afford into getting “the best”, effort they could more profitably have put elsewhere. The military returns from, for example, the tiny number of super-duper tanks they actually made were simply not worth the cost. > [@](#): > > The fuel situation for Germany was certainly a part of the problem, but the inability of German industry to produce enough trucks was as well. Prior to the launching of Barbarossa the Germans scoured occupied Europe for trucks to try to make up for the shortfall, but this had its own logistical problems. Rather than having to provide spare parts for only a few models of wheeled vehicles, it was a nightmare of its own trying to provide spare parts for scores of different models of wheeled vehicles manufactured by every country Germany occupied. True, and as I noted, the US was absolutely dominant in this area. The Red Army moved on Berlin in US-made trucks. ---
**Author:** ![ralph124c](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@ralph124c](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ralph124c)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2013, 9:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/86 "2013-11-25T21:33:33Z")
> [@bump](#): > > You could say the same thing about amphibious landings as well, but how else were the Marines going to capture an island? > > Large scale paratroop drops are another thing that seems foolish in hindsight, but at the time was the best option, even if kind of flawed. > > It wasn’t so much that they were individually machined, it was that the engines were hand-fitted. In other words, they’d machine the cylinder bores, and then either find the best fitting pistons out of all the ones they had on hand, or machine pistons specifically for the cylinders AS bored. Basically they spent the time and effort to make sure all the parts fit just-so, while US manufacturers tended to build the parts so that you could grab any piston and have it fit any bore reasonably well. Maybe not as well as a hand-fitted one, but it probably took a fraction of the time and expense to put that piston in versus a hand-fitted one. I find this difficult to believe…by the early 1930’s American automobile engine factories all had automatically bored and honed blocks , by a fixed multi-head boring mill. So the Germans were using 1920’s technology? Unbelievable. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [November 25, 2013, 11:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/87 "2013-11-25T23:46:55Z")
> [@bump](#): > > You could say the same thing about amphibious landings as well, but how else were the Marines going to capture an island? > > Large scale paratroop drops are another thing that seems foolish in hindsight, but at the time was the best option, even if kind of flawed. I didn’t say it, so much as quote a respected military analyst, John Keegan. His point was very specifically that paradrops seemed like a good idea, but proved so wasteful of elite formations in all – all – major operations ever attempted that armies stopped using them entirely (like the Germans after Crete) or used them only for small-sale special forces ops while trying to transition to something else. The idea of vertical envelopment – dropping a large formation behind enemy lines – as a method of winning battles was, it turns out, fatally flawed. This happens occasionally in warfare, like the idea of using hydrogen-filled zeppelins, some things simply do not work out, even if they were neat ideas. ---
**Author:** ![the\_diego](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/7bcc69/32.png) [@the\_diego](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/the_diego)\ **Post date:** [November 26, 2013, 12:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/88 "2013-11-26T00:09:40Z")
There is no such thing as a tank that’s “too well-made.” Properly casted, welded and fitted, both the tiger and panther performed as well as the allied tanks. The trouble was by late 1944, a lot of the heavy industries was already dominated by slave labor, workers who had no love for the German cause. Though shoddy work or deliberate sabotage were punishable by immediate execution, workers still managed to break a few gear teeth, or mis-align rotating parts. ---
**Author:** ![bubba001](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/f17d59/32.png) [@bubba001](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bubba001)\ **Post date:** [November 26, 2013, 2:44am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/89 "2013-11-26T02:44:29Z")
> [@ralph124c](#): > > I find this difficult to believe…by the early 1930’s American automobile engine factories all had automatically bored and honed blocks , by a fixed multi-head boring mill. So the Germans were using 1920’s technology? Unbelievable. Boring and honing are seperate operations. Both operations are staggered, cylinders 1 & 5, then 3 and 7, and then the other side would be worked on. Pistons were done in 5 different sizes, A thru E, to match the bore size. ---
**Author:** ![bump](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/7c8e57/32.png) [@bump](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bump)\ **Post date:** [November 26, 2013, 4:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/90 "2013-11-26T16:04:01Z")
> [@ralph124c](#): > > I find this difficult to believe…by the early 1930’s American automobile engine factories all had automatically bored and honed blocks , by a fixed multi-head boring mill. So the Germans were using 1920’s technology? Unbelievable. Look up the Rolls-Royce Merlin; apparently the British ones ran like tops, but were designed for hand-fitting and meticulous craftsmanship. It took Packard getting hold of the design and reworking it for modern manufacturing techniques before it took off (so to speak) as a mass-produced aircraft engine. The thing was, US auto makers made a huge proportion of the pre-war cars and trucks and were very experienced in mass-producing engines and other components, while the European manufacturers had primarily concentrated on luxury models made in considerably smaller numbers. ---
**Author:** ![Rocket\_100](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e99b99/32.png) [@Rocket\_100](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rocket_100)\ **Post date:** [November 28, 2013, 1:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/91 "2013-11-28T01:15:20Z")
> [@Kobal2](#): > > That would be swell, if not for the fact that quantity has a quality all its own. If you get one (completely unbalanced in the ruleset ! :)) Tiger to the front, and I have 15 crummy Shermans, or worse for you 15 balls to the wall awesome T-34s, I’ll tend to win \*most \*of the time. > > Besides, for all its touted (and way overstated in popular media, BTW) tech advantage, Germany pissed much of it away in most stupid fashion. Yeah, they had jet fighters, and they were REALLY cool when they didn’t blow themselves up ! And then they used them to try and hunt other nimble fighters, which they were shit at hitting because they were going so fast ; instead of wreaking havoc on heavy bomber formations. > Yeah, they had StG 44s, which they had to trick Hitler into allowing. > Yeah, they had a nuclear program, which Hitler quashed or at the very least deliberately neglected because it was “Jew science”. > Yeah, they had missiles, which they farted away at London, pretty much at random, never achieving anything with them. Germany’s successful War Machine almost always based on quality over quantity no mather what was the situation and when it’s like that the nr. 1 question is that there have to be succesful air defence and air force to protect materials, production and factories. And of course: in the front too. And: Jet Fighters. well, in the start there is always more problems. StG 44: yes, like I said earlier. Nuclear Program: every country had a lot of problems in their nuclear programs. For example: what was Soviet Union nuclear program before they find Germany program? Missiles: situation in end-1944 and 1945 was pretty desperate. Have you ever heard Wasserfall missiles and Dr. Walter Thiel? > [@](#): > > Um, yes… and ? Is it their fault that they won the Battle of England, or that Hitler declared war on the entire world, including relatively large and prosperous bits of it he didn’t have a hint of a glint of the dream of a chance of harming directly ? What I said earlier is a fact not an opinion. I was comparing allied workers and their working conditions to german workers and their conditions. ---
**Author:** ![Rocket\_100](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e99b99/32.png) [@Rocket\_100](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rocket_100)\ **Post date:** [November 28, 2013, 3:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/92 "2013-11-28T03:56:41Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Third Kharkov only brought the Soviet offensive which had been advancing since winter 1942 to a halt in spring 1943. It didn’t happen ‘almost right after’ Stalingrad. See map [here](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Eastern_Front_1942-11_to_1943-03.png) for territorial changes on the Eastern Front between the encirclement of Stalingrad and the Soviet winter offensive finally coming to a halt (18 November 1942-March 1943). If you’ll notice the green area west of Moscow, that is the [Rzhev salient](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Rzhev) which Germany abandoned in March 1943 in order to come up with some sort of reserve to squander in the failed offensive at Kursk that summer. What I meant was that the Third Kharkov battle and success came almost right after Stalingrad. (February and March). It take way too long before Kursk started after that. > [@](#): > > Only if you consider the front in Italy not to be in Europe. You’re not getting how much of mechanical nightmares the Tiger and Panther were to maintain compared to the T-34 or the Sherman. Mechanical issues weren’t limited to early production models. It’s a common misconception that since the major issues were more or less fixed in later production models of the Panther that it therefore didn’t have problems. It did, the Panther was never really ‘fixed’ in the sense of becoming mechanically reliable and not liable to breakdown with much, much greater frequency than the Sherman or T-34. Again, the major issues in early production models of the Panther were _serious_ major issues, up to and including the Panther destroying itself when the engine decided it wanted to set itself on fire. You’ve also ignored the [limited numbers](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank#Western_Front_-_France)that were ever available. Peak strength in Normandy reached a grand total of 432 on July 30, 1944. Peak strength on the Western Front happened the day before the launching of the Ardennes Offensive - “A status report on December 15, 1944 listed an all-time high of 471 Panthers assigned to the Western Front, with 336 operational (71 percent).” Note the operational rate of only 71 percent the day before a surprise offensive with late model Panthers. After the offensive “A status report on January 15, 1945 showed only 97 operational Panthers left in the units involved in the operation, out of 282 still in their possession.” - a 34 percent operational rate. Again what I meant It was only July when there was two front in Europe and compared to Normandy the Sicilian Campaign was different thing. There was problems in Germany tank production and definitely not the least was allied bombing raids against Maybach engine plant and other tank factories. > [@](#): > > What German bombers? The He-177? Even if Germany had concentrated on production of more He-177s, and the resources diverted would have to mean less of something else, Germany had lost control of the skies over its own territory by that point. It was in no position to contest control of the skies of Britain again, and could do nothing to touch the US or Soviet tank factories in the Urals. Yes, when there is not heavy bombers to destroy enemy factories and industry the only real choise is to concentrate everything to protect own factories and industry. > [@](#): > > The Me-262 wasn’t going to make Germany’s fuel problems go away. The StG44 was developed behind Hitler’s back, but he gave it his blessing when he found out about it. Even with his blessing only 425,977 were ever manufactured. For comparison the USSR produced more than 6 million PPSh-41 submachine guns during the war. Well, allied bombings had very heavy effect what comes to Germany fuel problems/fuel shortage. That was self-feeding situation. StG44 mass production lasted very, very little time comparing to PPSh-41. > [@](#): > > As I’ve said; 1) losses were already very high early on for both the Commonwealth at night and the USAAF during the day and 2) the strategic bombing campaign was not vital to defeating Germany. It was certainly useful, but Germany was going to lose the war whether there was a strategic bombing campaign or not. 1. Yes, but not enough. Not even near as big they would’ ve be. 2. The strategic bombing campaign was vital to defeating Germany because it effect everything and in the end there was no Luftwaffe to fight. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [November 28, 2013, 11:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/93 "2013-11-28T11:53:23Z")
> [@Rocket\_100](#): > > What I meant was that the Third Kharkov battle and success came almost right after Stalingrad. (February and March). Stalingrad was encircled in November 1942. Third Kharkov was fought in February and March 1943. That’s four months later, not ‘almost right after’. If you take another look at the map of the Eastern Front linked, you’ll notice the Red Army continued to advance west from Kursk despite being stopped at Third Kharkov from further advances in that direction. > [@Rocket 100](#): > > It take way too long before Kursk started after that. The Germans deliberately abandoned the Rzhev Salient after fighting to hold it for 14 months specifically to shorten the length of the front and to free up divisions for use elsewhere. That elsewhere turned out to be squandering them at Kursk. See [here](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Rzhev#Politico-military_result): > [@](#): > > Abandoning it effectively meant the Germans would abandon any future offensive against Moscow. > > Defending the salient required 29 divisions. Its abandonment freed up 22 of those divisions. It created a strategic reserve which allowed the Germans to stabilize the front and somewhat recover from massive losses at Stalingrad. > > It is easy to understand the doubts of general Heinz Guderian about the strategic aims of the later Battle of Kursk, since the Germans had to abandon the strategically important Rzhev-Vyazma for gathering troops to take a much less valuable one at Kursk.[5] In other words, the retreat of the Germans in operation Buffel was tactically and militarily successful, but the abandonment of “the Rzhev-Vyazma pistol” was a strategic loss for Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front. > > The reserves gained by the Germans through the withdrawal were soon after used up in the offensive against Kursk later in 1943. And [here](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_B%C3%BCffel): > [@](#): > > the name Büffel Bewegung (Buffalo Movement in German) was given to a series of local retreats conducted by the German Army on the Russian Front during the period 1–22 March 1943. This movement eliminated the Rzhev Salient and shortened the front by 230 kilometers, releasing twenty-one divisions for use elsewhere. This allowed the Germans to create a reserve for operations elsewhere on the Eastern Front. > [@Rocket 100](#): > > Again what I meant It was only July when there was two front in Europe and compared to Normandy the Sicilian Campaign was different thing. If that is what you meant, you didn’t convey it by stating that there was only one front in Europe in 1943. > [@Rocket 100](#): > > There was problems in Germany tank production and definitely not the least was allied bombing raids against Maybach engine plant and other tank factories. Again, German armament production in all categories **increased** every month from 1941-44 despite the strategic bombing, and the final collapse in production levels in 1945 was as much due to the physical loss of land where the factories and resources were located to the advancing Allied ground forces. This also does nothing to address the fact that the Panther had a horrible operational rate due to mechanical unreliability even in late models after the bugs of the engine setting itself on fire were addressed. The day prior to launching the largest offensive in the West since the Allies had returned to the continent the Panther only had a 71% operational rate. One month later the survivors had a 34% operational rate. The slow production rate of the Panther also ensured that the Pz-IV remained the mainstay of German panzer divisions, as it was much easier to produce and remained in production until the end of the war. It also wasn’t uncommon for there to be more running StuG-III assault guns in panzer divisions than running Panthers despite the fact that on paper the 1944 [TO&E](http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/944GXAG.pdf)(warning, pdf file) authorized more Panthers in the second panzer battalion than the number of StuGs in the (self propelled) Panzerjäger Battalion. > [@Rocket 100](#): > > Yes, when there is not heavy bombers to destroy enemy factories and industry the only real choise is to concentrate everything to protect own factories and industry. Germany didn’t get to make this choice. It was being buried in aircraft production by its enemies just like it was in all other categories of armaments. Germany concentrated on single engine fighters because there was no other choice for them. Among the other factors, they only needed one engine, not four. Either way, the He-177 was a disaster as a strategic bomber. The engines were extremely unreliable, hence the nickname “flaming coffin”. Believe it or not, early models of the He-177 had dive brakes. That’s right, one of the design requirements of the closet thing Germany came to a proper strategic bomber was that it be able to dive-bomb. > [@Rocket 100](#): > > Well, allied bombings had very heavy effect what comes to Germany fuel problems/fuel shortage. That was self-feeding situation. Yet again, this is simply not true. The US Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the war found that it had nowhere near the effect it was hoped to have in all categories of production, including fuel. Germany’s fuel problem was that they simply did not have control over the production of enough of it. One of the primary effects of the strategic bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe as any kind of effective force through attrition combating the bombers, and more particularly their fighter escorts. The P-38, P-47 and P-51 could all ultimately escort the B-17s and B-24s deep into German airspace and perform equal to or better than the Me-109 and FW-190. The FW-190 and particularly the Me-109 had very short legs, as amply demonstrated during the Battle of Britain when the Me-109 was pushing its fuel reserve dog fighting over London from bases on the French and Belgian coast. > [@Rocket 100](#): > > StG44 mass production lasted very, very little time comparing to PPSh-41. And? Again, pay attention to the numbers, they are the year they were introduced to service. More than 6 million PPSh-41s being produced from 1941 had a much greater impact than less than a half million StG44s being produced starting three years later. And again, any objections he may have had aside it was developed behind Hitler’s back, and one he was made aware of it he gave it his blessing. > [@Rocket 100](#): > > 1. Yes, but not enough. Not even near as big they would’ ve be. > > 2. The strategic bombing campaign was vital to defeating Germany because it effect everything and in the end there was no Luftwaffe to fight. 1. Have you looked up the loss rates of Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th USAAF in early operations? To reiterate, Bomber Command was losing more flight crews KIA than the number of German civilians it was killing. In the disastrous [Schwienfurt-Regensburg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schweinfurt%E2%80%93Regensburg_mission) mission the 8th USAAF lost almost three times as many flight crews as the number of German civilians it killed. 2) Horseshit. The strategic bombing campaign was in no way vital to defeating Germany. They were going to be steamrollered by the Red Army in the end regardless. For the _nth_ time, production of war materials by Germany increased every year despite the strategic bombing. ---
**Author:** ![the\_diego](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/7bcc69/32.png) [@the\_diego](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/the_diego)\ **Post date:** [November 29, 2013, 12:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/94 "2013-11-29T00:20:52Z")
Strategic bombing is not supposed to make the enemy raise their hands and surrender in the face of raining bombs. It helps to weaken your enemy, in terms of lower production and morale. Dissonance is correct in saying it was not vital in defeating Germany by 1945. That time frame is important. If Germany was strong enough to resist the allied offensives on both sides from 1944 to maybe 1947, then strategic bombing starting in 1944 would definitely be vital in ensuring her (eventual) defeat. ---
**Author:** ![RickJay](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/bb73d2/32.png) [@RickJay](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RickJay)\ **Post date:** [November 29, 2013, 2:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/95 "2013-11-29T02:51:40Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > SThe strategic bombing campaign was in no way vital to defeating Germany. They were going to be steamrollered by the Red Army in the end regardless. For the _nth_ time, production of war materials by Germany increased every year despite the strategic bombing. This is a meaningless statement without refernece to 1. An idea of what Germany COULD have produced without bombing, and 2. What the military cost to Germany was of resisting strategic bombing. It is fact that a substantial portion of that production was dedicated to trying to stop Allied bombing; according to Keegan, a quarter of German shell production was being used trying to shoot down bombers, and by later in the war pretty much the entire Luftwaffe was involved in the same endeavour, as opposed to supporting German troops. As the German army joke went, “If you see black planes they’re British, if you see white planes they’re American, if you see no planes it’s the Luftwaffe.” It is perhaps interesting to ask why, if bombing was so useless, the Germans invested so much in trying to stop it. And what could they have done with that investment elsewhere? ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [November 29, 2013, 5:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/96 "2013-11-29T05:25:10Z")
> [@RickJay](#): > > This is a meaningless statement without refernece to > > 1. An idea of what Germany COULD have produced without bombing, and > 2. What the military cost to Germany was of resisting strategic bombing. You’re misreading me, the statement was in response to **Rocket 100** ’s comment that > [@Rocket 100](#): > > There was problems in Germany tank production and definitely not the least was allied bombing raids against Maybach engine plant and other tank factories. Whatever the problems the strategic bombing campaign caused the Germans, reducing tank production certainly wasn’t one of them; the idea that the strategic bombing campaign caused a net reduction in German armaments output is belied by the fact that production of armaments in all categories continued to increase each month throughout the entire war until the final closing months. Could they have netted more had there been no strategic bombing campaign? Sure. Did the strategic bombing campaign cause a net reduction in German production? Certainly not. > [@](#): > > It is fact that a substantial portion of that production was dedicated to trying to stop Allied bombing; according to Keegan, a quarter of German shell production was being used trying to shoot down bombers, and by later in the war pretty much the entire Luftwaffe was involved in the same endeavour, as opposed to supporting German troops. As the German army joke went, “If you see black planes they’re British, if you see white planes they’re American, if you see no planes it’s the Luftwaffe.” Indeed, that is why I said > [@me](#): > > One of the primary effects of the strategic bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe as any kind of effective force through attrition combating the bombers, and more particularly their fighter escorts. > [@](#): > > It is perhaps interesting to ask why, if bombing was so useless, the Germans invested so much in trying to stop it. And what could they have done with that investment elsewhere? I’ve not said it was useless, only that it was not _vital_ to defeating Germany as **Rocket 100** seems to think. The strategic bombing campaign was not necessary for the defeat of Germany, they were going to lose the war with or without it, particularly with the situation **Rocket 100** posits of German _wunderwaffe_ such as the Me-262 and Wasserfall causing heavy losses to Allied bombers in the last year and a half or so of the war. The strategic bombing campaign was carried out in spite of heavy losses in early operations, and would almost certainly continue to be carried out even if losses became heavy again late in the war. Even had the Western Allies decided to abandon the strategic bombing campaign, Germany’s defeat was assured by 1944. Average pilot quality in the Luftwaffe had already been devastated by attrition, Germany had no prospects of improving thier fuel situation, and the Western Allies and to a slightly lesser degree the Soviets enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in tactical airpower. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [November 29, 2013, 2:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/97 "2013-11-29T14:21:53Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > …the idea that the strategic bombing campaign caused a net reduction in German armaments output is belied by the fact that production of armaments in all categories continued to increase each month throughout the entire war until the final closing months. Could they have netted more had there been no strategic bombing campaign? Sure. Did the strategic bombing campaign cause a net reduction in German production? Certainly not. I agree with the rest of your points, but I don’t see how this invalidates RickJay’s essential point. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [November 29, 2013, 5:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/98 "2013-11-29T17:55:14Z")
> [@Sailboat](#): > > I agree with the rest of your points, but I don’t see how this invalidates RickJay’s essential point. It doesn’t; I don’t think **RickJay** ’s essential point is invalid. I agree with what he said and hold more or less the same opinion on the strategic bombing campaign as he does; I think he might have just been reading more into my statement that the strategic bombing was not vital to defeating Germany and that production continued to increase in spite of the strategic bombing than was there. I certainly don’t consider it to have been useless and mean vital in the strict dictionary sense: _absolutely necessary or important; essential_. While useful, the strategic bombing campaign was not absolutely necessary or essential to the defeat of Germany, and disrupting, or even more fantastically forcing a halt to the bombing campaign with _wunderwaffe_ wasn’t going to save Germany from defeat. ---
**Author:** ![ralph124c](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@ralph124c](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ralph124c)\ **Post date:** [November 29, 2013, 7:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/99 "2013-11-29T19:49:47Z")
I agree with the comments (about the ineffectiveness of the bombing). Which is why I always wondered-why didn’t the RAF and USAAF concentrate on bombing the Ruhr valley exclusively? It was the source of most of Germany’s coal and steel, and it was closer to England. It is true, Germany had a few other coalfields (mostly Silesia); but destroying the Ruhr would have really shut German armaments down, and fast. ---
**Author:** ![Malthus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/85f322/32.png) [@Malthus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Malthus)\ **Post date:** [November 29, 2013, 8:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709/100 "2013-11-29T20:04:28Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > It doesn’t; I don’t think **RickJay** ’s essential point is invalid. I agree with what he said and hold more or less the same opinion on the strategic bombing campaign as he does; I think he might have just been reading more into my statement that the strategic bombing was not vital to defeating Germany and that production continued to increase in spite of the strategic bombing than was there. I certainly don’t consider it to have been useless and mean vital in the strict dictionary sense: _absolutely necessary or important; essential_. While useful, the strategic bombing campaign was not absolutely necessary or essential to the defeat of Germany, and disrupting, or even more fantastically forcing a halt to the bombing campaign with _wunderwaffe_ wasn’t going to save Germany from defeat. My position is that the only thing that could have saved Germany from defeat would have been if the Soviet Union had collapsed internally following the intital shock of the invasion, as Hitler thought it would. When the Soviets did not collapse, Germany’s defeat was pretty well sealed, absent some truly improbable circumstances. The war could have lasted longer though. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/hermann-goring-was-he-really-up-to-the-job/564709.md?page=6)