Hermann Goring- was He Really Up To The Job?

[Malthus]

@ralph124c

I agree with the comments (about the ineffectiveness of the bombing). Which is why I always wondered-why didn’t the RAF and USAAF concentrate on bombing the Ruhr valley exclusively? It was the source of most of Germany’s coal and steel, and it was closer to England. It is true, Germany had a few other coalfields (mostly Silesia); but destroying the Ruhr would have really shut German armaments down, and fast.

Concentrating on one area would have effectively concentrated air defences as well, greatly increasing the cost to the attacker.

[Captain_Amazing]

There was a five month bombing campaign of the Ruhr, from March through July of 1943, that stopped after most of the big targets were hit, and increased air defenses made the RAF and USAAF shift their attention.

[Rocket_100]

@Dissonance

Stalingrad was encircled in November 1942. Third Kharkov was fought in February and March 1943. That’s four months later, not ‘almost right after’. If you take another look at the map of the Eastern Front linked, you’ll notice the Red Army continued to advance west from Kursk despite being stopped at Third Kharkov from further advances in that direction.

Stalingrad end 2.2.1943. Third Kharkov end 15.3.1943. Almost right after.

The Germans deliberately abandoned the Rzhev Salient after fighting to hold it for 14 months specifically to shorten the length of the front and to free up divisions for use elsewhere. That elsewhere turned out to be squandering them at Kursk. See here:And here:

That was mistake. It take way too long to start Kursk attack.

If that is what you meant, you didn’t convey it by stating that there was only one front in Europe in 1943.

There was second front in Europe only in july.

Again, German armament production in all categories increased every month from 1941-44 despite the strategic bombing, and the final collapse in production levels in 1945 was as much due to the physical loss of land where the factories and resources were located to the advancing Allied ground forces. This also does nothing to address the fact that the Panther had a horrible operational rate due to mechanical unreliability even in late models after the bugs of the engine setting itself on fire were addressed. The day prior to launching the largest offensive in the West since the Allies had returned to the continent the Panther only had a 71% operational rate. One month later the survivors had a 34% operational rate. The slow production rate of the Panther also ensured that the Pz-IV remained the mainstay of German panzer divisions, as it was much easier to produce and remained in production until the end of the war. It also wasn’t uncommon for there to be more running StuG-III assault guns in panzer divisions than running Panthers despite the fact that on paper the 1944 TO&E(warning, pdf file) authorized more Panthers in the second panzer battalion than the number of StuGs in the (self propelled) Panzerjäger Battalion.

For example, after bombing in april 1944 there was five months shut down in production. The bombing also effect heavily what comes to spare parts.

Yet again, this is simply not true. The US Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the war found that it had nowhere near the effect it was hoped to have in all categories of production, including fuel. Germany’s fuel problem was that they simply did not have control over the production of enough of it. One of the primary effects of the strategic bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe as any kind of effective force through attrition combating the bombers, and more particularly their fighter escorts. The P-38, P-47 and P-51 could all ultimately escort the B-17s and B-24s deep into German airspace and perform equal to or better than the Me-109 and FW-190. The FW-190 and particularly the Me-109 had very short legs, as amply demonstrated during the Battle of Britain when the Me-109 was pushing its fuel reserve dog fighting over London from bases on the French and Belgian coast.

For example Adolf Galland, Hermann Göring, Albert Speer and Erhard Milch all said that it was definitely one the most important and crucial thing. And the US strategic bombing survey identified “catastrophic” damage.

And? Again, pay attention to the numbers, they are the year they were introduced to service. More than 6 million PPSh-41s being produced from 1941 had a much greater impact than less than a half million StG44s being produced starting three years later. And again, any objections he may have had aside it was developed behind Hitler’s back, and one he was made aware of it he gave it his blessing.

StG was ready for mass production in early 1943.

1. Have you looked up the loss rates of Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th USAAF in early operations? To reiterate, Bomber Command was losing more flight crews KIA than the number of German civilians it was killing. In the disastrous Schwienfurt-Regensburg mission the 8th USAAF lost almost three times as many flight crews as the number of German civilians it killed. 2) Horseshit. The strategic bombing campaign was in no way vital to defeating Germany. They were going to be steamrollered by the Red Army in the end regardless. For the nth time, production of war materials by Germany increased every year despite the strategic bombing.

1. Loss rates were big but only temporarily.

2. When there is no fuel and no air forces it’s pretty much impossible to win the war or even do successful defence. There were actually no Luftwaffe when Red Army destroyed Germany Army Group Centre in the summer 1944 and in the west there were no Luftwaffe when there was Operation Overlord.

[Dissonance]

@Rocket_100

Stalingrad end 2.2.1943. Third Kharkov end 15.3.1943. Almost right after.

You have really got to get your facts straight. Stalingrad was fully encircled by the Soviets on November 23, 1942, bypassed and left to rot by the Soviets as they pushed on westward. The final starving remnants of 6th Army surrendered on February 2, 1943. It was four months after Stalingrad was surrounded and bypassed deep in the Soviet rear before Third Kharkov was fought, not almost right after. It was six weeks after the capitulation of the last starving 91,000 troops under Paulus’ command at Stalingrad surrendered before Third Kharkov ended, not almost right after.

@Rocket 100

That was mistake. It take way too long to start Kursk attack.

You can say this all that you want, but it doesn’t make it true. It’s not a mistake, the Rzhev Salient was abandoned without a fight by the Germans after 14 months of often very heavy fighting to retain control of it in order to free up some sort of reserve releasing 22 divisions to stabilize the front and to be able to carry out some form of limited offensive action in the coming spring and summer. That limited offensive was at Kursk, the launching of which was repeatedly delayed. The initial plan was presented to Hitler by Manstein on March 10, 1943, and

On 10 March, von Manstein presented Hitler with an alternative plan whereby the German forces pinched off the Kursk salient with an offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.[55][56] On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which outlined the intended launch of several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient.

The start date for the offensive at Kursk was then pushed back again and again until it was finally launched on 5 July 1943. That it took so long to actually launch Operation Citadel does not change the fact that the Rzhev Salient was abandoned to release forces for it.

@Rocket 100

There was second front in Europe only in july.

Which again, you didn’t convey in your initial erroneous statement that

@Rocket_100

And what is important to notice: in 1943 there was only one front in Europe.

@Rocket 100

For example, after bombing in april 1944 there was five months shut down in production. The bombing also effect heavily what comes to spare parts.

Um, horseshit. There was no five month shutdown in production of anything by Germany in April 1944. Production of armaments by Germany in all categories continued to increase from April until the end of the year in 1944. Reduction in output only began in the very last months of 1944 and in 1945 when Germany was losing physical control of the factories and raw material sources. Attempting to blame the poor mechanical reliability of the Panther and Tiger on the lack of spare parts due to strategic bombing is patently absurd. The Panther had an atrocious operational rate and broke down so frequently because it was in its very design mechanically unreliable and a maintenance nightmare. You’ll note the Pz-IV and StuG-III didn’t suffer from the mechanical problems and lack of operational rates the Panther and Tiger did.

@Rocket 100

For example Adolf Galland, Hermann Göring, Albert Speer and Erhard Milch all said that it was definitely one the most important and crucial thing. And the US strategic bombing survey identified “catastrophic” damage.

Again, nonsense. Of course fuel was an important and crucial thing for Germany and was throughout the war because they didn’t have access to enough of it, not because production of it suffered “catastrophic” damage from strategic bombing. See for example Operation Tidal Wave, the bombing of Germany’s main source of oil at the Ploesti oil fields in Romania:

The mission resulted in “no curtailment of overall product output”, and so was deemed unsuccessful.[8]

This mission was one of the costliest for the USAAF in the European Theater, with 53 aircraft [out of 177] and 660 aircrewmen lost. It was the worst loss ever suffered by the USAAF on a single mission, and its date was later referred to as “Black Sunday”.

@Rocket 100

1. Loss rates were big but only temporarily.

You’ve got a strange idea of “temporary”. In any event there is no reason to believe that strategic bombing would have been curtailed or halted had wunderwaffe miraculously caused loss rates to return to higher rates that the Western Allies were perfectly willing to accept earlier in the war when the Luftwaffe was still able to bleed the bombers before it was worn down to ineffectiveness even trying to defend the airspace over Germany as a result of attrition to Allied fighters that had the range to escort the bombers into the heart of Germany and the performance to be the equal or better of German fighters which never possessed anything close to that kind of range.

@Rocket 100

2. When there is no fuel and no air forces it’s pretty much impossible to win the war or even do successful defence. There were actually no Luftwaffe when Red Army destroyed Germany Army Group Centre in the summer 1944 and in the west there were no Luftwaffe when there was Operation Overlord.

Yeah, there was no effective Luftwaffe because it had been ground into dust resisting the strategic bombing campaign, and pilot quality fell through the floor when Germany had to reduce training time for new pilots to replace losses fast enough. The lack of training made them take losses at an even higher rate, which put them in an uncontrollable downward spiral as training time was cut further in order to make up for the losses, which resulted in even higher losses requiring an even further reduction in training time to try to produce enough pilots. You can even trace this back to Stalingrad, when the Luftwaffe stripped its training schools of pilot instructors and planes in a vain attempt to try to come up with enough Ju-52s and qualified pilots:

Losses in men and materiel were replaced by crews and aircraft from the training commands, so that virtually all training of bomber crews came to a standstill during the winter of 1942-43. By the following spring the Stalingrad airlift accounted for the loss of 240 training crews and 365 training aircraft. The training program did not recover from the effects of these losses until 1944.

[ralph124c]

Regarding oil: Germany had a large program to produce synthetic petroleum…was it ever able to make a significant amount of it? My understanding that Romania remained the main source of oil…and that supply was precarious.

[Cicero]

@ralph124c

Regarding oil: Germany had a large program to produce synthetic petroleum…was it ever able to make a significant amount of it? My understanding that Romania remained the main source of oil…and that supply was precarious.

This is a zombie thread so I hope the Mods aren’t too harsh.

Germany had a synthetic oil programme but it could never produce enough oil or kerosene after Romania fell.

As for my original question, further research has indicated Goering was a manipulative and deceitful political operator. However he was also extremely lazy, conceited and paid little attention to detail (he also looted on a vast scale).

However the main thrust- was he up to the job? Possibly. Did he do it? No. He left the running to lackeys like Udet and Milch and priorities were dreadful. As an example the same amount of aluminium would be given to a factory producing a small fighter as to a factory producing a Heinkel bomber. Many factory workers had great aluminium ladders.

In a lot of ways he was like Hitler- issue vague directives and leave it to someone else. That Germany never produced in quantities a decent heavy bomber says a lot.

(I could also add that he had an obsession with his first wife- something his second wife was not really pleased about. And other members of the heirarchy didn’t like his second wife either).

[bubba001]

As far as tank production. The Germans never established a hard tooled line for tank production like the US and Russia did. The US had 2 factories building Sherman tanks, Warren Michigan, and Lima Ohio. They were setup just like a automotive factory, building a standardized design. I read that the Sherman required 10K man hours to build, and. Tiger 300K man hours. Pictures of a German tank factory look like a job shop - a shop that builds one off stuff. And by the way, tank engines are not stamped out. They start as large castings.