The rehab was being done to the exterior of the building because it was ugly. and was detracting from the view of rich people living in nearby expensive housing. (This public housing building was in a very expensive district of central London.) The money was being put into a rehab of the exterior because that benefited the rich neighbors who had to look at the building from their balconies, not for the benefit of the residents. – they had been complaining for years about safety problems within the building. They had even filed a lawsuit about it. But British Courts move ponderously slowly when it’s poor people as litigants.
I don’t know if you thought you were disagreeing with me, but you’re not.
Sorry, but if the British really do place their faith in passive measures, rather than active measures, then they are in fact a great deal less smart than other people.
You don’t even need real-life examples to prove it, either–all you need to do is watch “The Towering Inferno” to realize how stupid passive measures are. As a matter of fact, this disaster is like that movie escaped the screen and came to real life.
The sad thing is when I watch that movie all I could say bull it is so make believe. Turns out it could happen in London, and that is a shame.
Yes, this really is about the general intelligence of a whole nation. :rolleyes:
I heard this on the radio this AM driving into work. Will be most interesting to see which version of the cladding was specified for the job and which was actually used.
If the mineral fiber core was specified and then the polyethylene core version substituted then whoever made that decision best be finding legal counsel fast.
I’ve read in several place that a faulty fridge is suspected as the fire’s start. One of the articles said there have been several fires started by fridges with a bad capacitor and the manufacturers are not fixing the problem.
I have been told and the little I have researched is that almost all capacitors are made in China now and they are not very high quality. In many cases they quit after a couple of years. The suspected faulty cladding was also manufactured in China.
A contractor friend of mine commented yesterday that in the past year he’s received a notice about similar cladding, that it be tested by taking a punch core for analysis, as apparently polyethylene being substituted for mineral fiber is, unfortunately, more common than anyone would like. As it happens, he hasn’t used such cladding in the recent past, but when he heard about the cladding on Grenfell having a polyethylene core his face had a genuine look of horror on it.
So… there are several questions here: did the person making the decision have a clue about the different materials, or was the decision purely on price? Was the proper materials requested but a substitution made by someone else? And was the proper material purchased but the wrong one substituted by a manufacturer seeking to maximize profits?
Somewhere (possibly more than one place) in the chain, someone either made an inexcusable decision, or an inexcusable mistake.
Even if they accidentally supplied the wrong material, the difference between ‘rated fireproof’ and ‘rather flammable’ is sufficiently critical that it shouldn’t have been allowed to happen.
If you look at the floorplans (BBC has them), you can see that there really isn’t any place to put an additional set of stairs, without scabbing them onto the oustide of the building, which presents major issues on its own. Certainly, in the case of a cladding fire, the exterior starcases would be worse than useless.
How would that happen? It’s self-certified - By the very same government unit that would assess the fines? Not only did they not have to inspect it, they also would essentially be fining themselves. What - Move the money from one pocket to another, and issue a press release?
As would a sprinkler system.
Criminal negligence is a potential change for failing to observe such regulations - it doesn’t just have to be internal-market fines.
Sorry, just read this again. Self-certified doesn’t mean self-enforced. Safety standards are enforced at national level - the failure here was local - so a fine here might be a local government body having to shell out to a national government, which sounds like a wash, but really isn’t (and ought to represent a big deterrent to the local body)
As I understand it, the Councils are the inspecting organization; there doesn’t appear to be much in the way of a national inspection scheme.
bob++: I challenge your assertion that sprinklers would’ve been useless.
As I posted over in the MPSIMS thread:
(http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=20282595&postcount=150)
[ul]
[li]Sprinkler presence is associated with a 29% reduction in injuries per 100 reported home fires[/li][li]Sprinkler presence is associated with a 53% reduction in medical cost of injuries per 100 reported home fires; and[/li][li]Sprinkler presence is associated with a 41% reduction in total cost of injuries per 100 reported home fires.[/li][/ul]
(NFPA)
A sprinkler system would’ve mostly likely have surpressed the orignal fire in the first place. Even if it hadn’t, it would’ve restricted the ability of the fire to penetrate the building at higher levels. There may have been additional benefits, but those are more speculative.
Can you explain the issues that adding sprinklers would cause that could not be over come. Yes I know they would look tacky but that is not a restrictive issue.
Sprinkler systems add weight to a building. They may require extensive penetration of walls and internal structures in order for the required plumbing to be installed, which may compromise internal fire barriers. Then there’s the problem of getting the water where it needs to go - no way does municipal water pressure have the oomph needed to get water up to the 24th floor all on its own, that requires installing pumps of some sort. It’s not a trivial installation problem.
No it is not trivial, we agree on that. The additional weight may be a problem and may require owners to compensate in some manner. There is no need to leave internal fire barriers compromised, there are thousands of buildings where the compromise has been compensated for. Most common is properly installing fire caulk. And yes it is going to require adding a fire pump on the ground or sub ground floor, or even outside the building. All these problems can be taken care of. Cost yes there will be a cost. But leave them out and some day the cost will be replacing the building.
In terms of self-cert, yes - Councils are monitoring their own diligence (or supposed to be). And if they fuck up (for example cladding a building with napalm and killing 100 people in a fire), the council does not fine itself. - the Crown Court extracts the (potentially unlimited) fine and imposes other penalties, which may include compensation of injured parties, and imprisonment of responsible people.
This threat is supposed to keep them honest. I’m not sure if that’s a realistic expectation.
So who will the families sue for compensation, since complaints were filed, ignored, sat on? The council/owners are protected from liability it seems.
So again, who IS going to pay out to these families?
(Self certification coupled with immunity from liability seems like a recipe for tragedy, to me. I’m still gobsmacked that a gas line through the only escape route isn’t a criminal act!)
Am I wrong in thinking the London fire code is only passive systems, like firebreaks in materials, and fire escapes, rope lengths, smoke detectors, etc, are somewhat optional?
See my post #15 - did the gas line rupture?